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ABSTRACT 
 
Worldwide energy policies are built on three pillars: ‘cost competitiveness’, ‘security 
of energy supply’, and ‘environmental responsibility.’ This has brought about the 
integration of renewable energy sources into national systems with the deployment of 
policy instruments to make renewable energy sources electricity (RES-E) capable of 
nearly competing on a commercial basis with traditional forms of electricity 
generation. At the national level within the EU, there has been much experimentation 
with different policy instruments with varying levels of success. Nevertheless the EU 
as a whole will not meet its stipulated renewable energy target. This study challenges 
the theoretical and abstract evaluation presented in the literature about EU wind 
power delivery systems and has developed an integrative evaluation framework. This 
evaluation framework is used in this study to present the views of key stakeholders on 
their experiences with the performance of key policy instruments (feed-in tariff, and 
renewables obligation) implemented in three EU Member States namely: Germany, 
The Netherlands, and United Kingdom. It also challenges the EU-wide harmonised 
renewable energy policy agenda as proposed in Directive 2001/77/EC. The concept of 
path dependency of the historical institutional approach was adopted in order to 
explore the diversity of the wind power industry across the three country cases. An in-
depth semi-structured interview with fifty-five senior wind power policy makers and 
experts was conducted to explore the historical emergence, the architect, and the 
outcome of the support and implementation of the policy instruments. Findings 
showed that the approach to wind power deployment in the three country cases differs 
significantly and this has affected the pattern of each country’s wind power policy 
instrument. Also, the role and contribution of the stakeholder groups to the success of 
the wind power policy instruments differ significantly in each of the country cases. 
This helps to explain the performance of the different policy instruments adopted. 
Concerning the harmonisation of EU renewable energy policy instruments which have 
received much attention in recent times, this study found that harmonisation based on 
a single policy instrument is not feasible and may ultimately inhibit the growth of the 
European wind power market. A harmonised system may cause uncertainties amongst 
willing investors, thereby causing a withdrawal of further investment in the wind 
power market. If this happens, Europe may also lose its position as the world leader in 
the wind power market. Furthermore, national histories demonstrates that Member 
States have different culture, stakeholder groups, political, and business practices that 
will influence policy instruments and the likelihood of any policy succeeding.  Thus, 
rather than promoting harmonisation and political market for wind power, it is 
important that Member States adopt and implement, stable, flexible, and transparent 
policy instruments that enable wind power and other renewable energy sources to 
emerge, develop, and go through the R&D stage to a point of maturity where they can 
compete with other energy sources with limited financial support. 
 
Key words: Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Feed-in Tariff, MEP, Renewables 
Obligation, Performance, Path Dependency, Harmonisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this Chapter is to set in context the scope and boundaries of this study. In 
order to understand and justify the need for renewable energy sources and hence 
policy instruments, it is essential to provide an overview of energy and its relevance 
to human activities. The Chapter will also define key themes and concepts that will 
recur throughout this study before providing an overview of the country cases and 
why they are selected. The Chapter will go on to discuss the theoretical lense, aim 
and objectives before discussing the structure of the Chapters of the study.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
Energy is an important element for growth and development. It is vital in the 
production of goods and services, and virtually all economic activities depend on it 
for survival. Kolev and Riess (2007:11), while emphasizing the importance of energy 
argued that: “for modern societies energy is vastly more valuable than what its share 
in gross domestic product suggests [energy sector in the European Union (EU) 
accounts for 3% of GDP], and although a secure supply of energy is the more vital 
the more ‘modern’ a society is, its [energy] importance does not rise and fall over 
time”. 
 
Energy is needed, for example, to generate electricity, run cars, charge batteries, and 
even cook. A short term unavailability of energy is likely to cause significant chaos, 
as all economic activities and human movement could be halted without it. Energy is 
available in two different forms renewable and non-renewable. Non-renewable 
 2 
energies are defined as natural resources that cannot be regenerated or reused, for 
example fossil fuels such as crude oil, coal, and natural gas. Records show that 
approximately 90% of world energy supplies are provided by fossil fuel (Elliot 
2007). Eight countries1 in the world have 81% of the world crude oil reserves; six2 
have 70% of all the natural gas reserves; and eight countries3
 
 have 89% of all coal 
reserves (Sayigh 1999). 
From the above description, it is clear that crude oil reserves are concentrated in a few 
locations and countries around the world. This and other reasons explain why the 
interest in renewable energy sources have emerged and received much attention in 
recent years, some of which are mentioned below. 
 
First, is the growing import dependence on fossil fuel by the EU on other locations or 
regions of the world. According to the European Commission Communication (EC 
2008), it is expected that the EU import dependence may reach 70% by 2030. Kolev 
and Riess (2007) state that energy rich countries and neighbours of the EU are no 
longer reliable, because of political instability and politically motivated supply 
disruptions, as witnessed between Russia and Ukraine during the last week of 2005 
and the beginning of 2006 (Spanjer 2007: 2889), and more recently during the peak 
of winter 2008 and January 2009 (BCC 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c).  
 
In addition, due to growing global demand, energy (fossil fuel) prices have been on 
the increase. It has been forecast that oil prices could hit $200 per barrel within the 
                                                 
1 Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, Canada, Nigeria, Russia, and Libya  
2 Russia, Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate (U.A.E), and United 
States of America (U.S.A) 
3 People Republic of China, U.S.A., India, Australia, South Africa, Russia, 
Indonesia, and Poland 
 3 
next ten years (BBC 2008b). Kolev and Riess (2007) also noted that there has been a 
growing demand for energy, both from developed economies (the U.S.A, the United 
Kingdom, and Germany) and emerging ones (China and India), however the efforts 
of international companies and governments are not enough to secure production, 
hence a constant supply of energy at affordable prices can not be guaranteed. 
 
Furthermore, the earth’s climate is changing and as such, global warming is having an 
effect. The main source of global warming is from the production and consumption of 
energy, principally the burning of fossil fuel, which releases CO2 and other dangerous 
chemicals (nitrogen oxide, sulphur oxide etc) into the atmosphere. According to the 
IPCC (2007) report, the average concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has risen 
from 280 parts per million (ppm) in 1750, to 370 ppm in recent times, while the 
average temperature has also risen by 0.6oc during the 20th century (Rowlands 2005). 
The consequence of these changes to the environment has resulted in rising sea 
levels, national disasters like flooding, heavy rainfall and other environmental effects. 
 
For these reasons, the share of renewable energy sources, in terms of electricity 
generation in the world, has doubled4
   
 over the past decade as the use of renewable 
energy sources (e.g. wind power) is increasingly becoming an essential part of 
sustainable electricity generation worldwide (Neilson and Jeppensen 2003; Midttun 
and Koeford 2003; Helm 2002b; Martinot 2001; Jacobsson and Johnson 2000). 
Renewable energy sources are becoming an integral part of electricity generation in 
the European Union (EU). The drive for promoting renewable energy came top on 
                                                 
4 The Word Wind Energy Association (2008) reports that wind turbines now 
generate over 1% of the world electricity. Eurostat (2008) claimed that 
renewables meet 3.3% of global electricity demand 
 4 
Europe’s political agenda after the oil crisis of the 1970’s (de Alegria Mancisidor et 
al 2009; Blok 2006; Johansson and Turkenburg 2004; Jansen and Uyterlinde 2004; 
IEA Wind 2001, 2000). Since then, there have been significant concerns in Europe 
over a range of issues including: cost competitiveness, security of energy supply and 
environmental protection (Strachan et al 2006; Nilson 2006; O’Gallachoir et al 
2002)5
 
.  These and related issues demand that renewable energy sources make an 
ever increasing contribution to the energy mix (EWEA 2006a; Ferguson 2006; 
Madlener and Stagl 2005; Rowlands 2005a; Neilson 2003; Meyer 2003; EU 2002; 
EU 2000a). 
Following Directive 2001/77/EC renewable energy sources are defined in this thesis 
as “renewable non-fossil energy sources, i.e. wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, 
hydro-power, biomass, landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases.” Wind 
power, in particular, has come to the forefront of global renewable energy debates. It 
is abundant in most regions of the world, most promising and is nearly capable of 
competing on a commercial basis with traditional forms of electricity generation 
(EWEA 2006c; Strachan et al 2006; Reeves and Beck 2003; Ackermann and Soder 
2000; Andersen and Jensen 2000; Moore and Ihle 1999; Hemmelskamp 1998). 
Breukers (2006:15) said that: 
“Wind power generation has some advantages over the use of 
fossil and nuclear energy sources. It does not depend on 
exhaustible resources, it contributes very little to climate 
change, it involves no oil spills, radioactive waste, nuclear 
risks, its environmental impacts are not of the kind associated 
with lignite mining or large hydro power, and the 
decommissioning of a wind turbine is relatively unproblematic 
compared to the decommissioning of a large power plant.” 
 
                                                 
5 See further discussion in Chapter 2 titled: The European Union and 
International Policy Context: Literature Review 
 5 
As a result, many EU Member States have focused on the deployment of wind power 
as the favoured renewables option. Szarka (2004) outlines three main reasons why the 
EU policy tends to favour renewables. These include: the growing awareness of the 
threat of climate change as a result of the use and burning of fossil fuels; pollution 
and risks caused by fossil fuel and nuclear energy; and concerns over security of 
supply.  It is perhaps not surprising then, that Europe is now the leading player in the 
international wind power market, accounting for 54% of total global installed 
capacity, and employing some 108,600 people (EWEA 2009a). Germany and Spain 
are still among the top few countries in the world that have a high wind installed 
capacity, alongside the U.S.A and India. Table 1.1 highlights the global ranking and 
breakdown of total wind installed capacity for years 2007 and 2008. Europe recorded 
an 18% growth rate over 2007 records (EWEA 2009b). According to EWEA (2009c) 
the EU now generates approximately 142 Twh of electricity from wind. This 
represents 4.2% of the total EU electricity consumption.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Table 1.1: Ranking and breakdown of global wind installed capacity (2007-2008) 
 Ranking 
Total 2008 
Country Additional 
capacity 
2008 [MW] 
Growth 
rate 2008 
(%) 
Total 
capacity 
end 
2008 
[MW] 
Total 
capacity 
end 2007 
[MW] 
 Ranking 
Total 2007 
2 Germany 1655.4 7.4 23,902.0 22,247.4 1 
3 Spain 1595.2 10.5 16,740.3 15,145.1 3 
1 USA 8351.2 49.7 25,170.0 16,818.8 2 
5 India 1737 22.1 9587.0 7,850.0 4 
9 Denmark 35.0 1.1  3,125.0 6 
4 China 6298.0 106.5 12,210.0 5,912.0 5 
6 Italy 1009.9 37.0 3,736 2,726.0 7 
8 United 
Kingdom 
898.9 37.6 3,287.0 2,389.0 9 
10 Portugal 732.0 34.4 2,862.0 2,130.0 10 
7 France 949 38.7 3,404.0 2,455.0 8 
12 Netherlands 478.0 27.4 2,225.0 1,747.0 12 
11 Canada 523.0 28.3 2,369 1,846.0 11 
13 Japan 352.0 23.0 1,880.0 1,538.0 13 
17 Austria 13.4 1.4 994.9 981.5 14 
14 Australia 676.7 82.8 1,494.0 817.3 16 
18 Greece 116.5 13.3 989.7 873.3 15 
15 Ireland 439.7 54.6 1,244.7 805.0 17 
16 Sweden 235.9 28.4 1,066.9 788.7 18 
20 Norway 95.1 28.5 428.0 333.0 19 
19 Poland 196 71.0 472.0 276.0 24 
 Rest 963.1 3.53 7,125.5 3,044.9 - 
TOTAL  27261.0 100 121,188 93,849.1 - 
Source: World Wind Energy Association [Online] 16th July 2009 
With the expansion of wind power and other renewable sources, there has been an 
increasing interest in the performance of the numerous policy instruments that EU 
Member States have adopted (Rathmann 2007; Toke 2006; Perrels 2003; 
Enzensberger et al 2002). Harmelink et al (2006:344) defined policy instruments 
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broadly, “as any concrete activity initiated by the government in order to enlarge the 
market implementation of renewable energy sources”. Hewlett (1991:2) states that: 
“policy instrument is the generic term provided to encompass the myriad techniques 
at the disposal of governments to implement their public policy objectives”.  
 
The aim of deploying renewable energy policy instruments is to further encourage 
investment and penetration of renewable generated electricity into the market. 
However, different types of policy instruments implemented in Europe in recent 
times have received attention from various authors of renewable energy literature. 
See for example: Szarka (2007, 2006), Strachan et al (2006), Breukers (2006), 
Connelly and Smith (2003), Morthorst (2003a), (2003b), Enzensberger et al (2002), 
Cassidy (2002) and Loiter and Noberg-bohm (1999).  
 
Broadly speaking, policy instruments include: voluntary or technology-push 
instruments; regulatory instruments; and economic instruments. Connolly and Smith 
(2003) indicate that voluntary instruments are put in place by government authorities 
to change the attitudes and behaviours of market players. While Strachan et al (2006) 
view technology-push instruments as initiatives directed towards research and 
development. These include: the provision of information and education, certification 
of standards and schemes, etc (Connolly and Smith 2003). Breukers (2006:25) adds 
that voluntary instruments involve the provision of grants, loans, and other financial 
incentives that enable investment into renewable energy. 
 
Regulatory policy instruments tend to mandate market players to conform to certain 
patterns of law set by the state authority (Connolly and Smith 2003). Economic 
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instruments can be further divided into two, namely supply-pull and demand-pull 
instruments. Strachan et al (2006) state that demand-pull policies are made up of 
market and government regulations that are meant to stimulate a renewable energy 
market, e.g. renewable portfolio systems, certificate trading, tax reductions etc. 
Whereas, supply-pull instruments are government regulations that set prices for 
renewable energy generated capacity brought to the market e.g. direct subsidies, tax 
deductions, fixed tariffs, tender etc (Enzensberger et al 2002).   
 
Two main policy instruments, in particular, tend to dominate the EU wind power 
market. One guarantees prices, while the other ensures market share, through 
mandated targets/quota (Sawin 2004). These are commonly referred to as: (i) the 
feed-in tariff; and (ii) the renewables obligation or the quota system.   
 
The feed-in-tariff can be described as a policy instrument that obliges regional or 
national transmission system operators to feed the full production of green electricity 
into the grid at a politically fixed price (Ringel 2006; Toke 2006; Sawin 2004; Sijm 
2002; Wiser et al 2002). The feed-in tariff has been used in Germany to support the 
renewable energy market and by the end of 2005, 4.3% of electricity generation was 
from wind power (IEA Wind 2006). Germany is the world’s leader in terms of 
installed capacity for wind power. The Electricity Generation Environmental Quality 
(MEP) is also a form of feed-in tariff that gives additional premium to renewable 
generated electricity. The quota system is a relatively new policy instrument for 
renewable energy sources. It is quantity driven and also referred to as the Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS). The quota system is aimed at increasing demand for 
renewable electricity and has recently been implemented in the UK (Ringel 2006; 
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Toke 2006; van der Linden et al 2005; Wiser et al 2002).  It is a procedure, whereby 
supplier companies are obliged to purchase and sell a certain percentage of electricity 
from renewable energy sources. To ensure proper implementation, a penalty is 
charged for non-compliance by the obligated parties (Ringel 2006; van der Linden et 
al 2005; van Dijk et al 2003). A detailed analysis of both schemes is presented in 
Chapter Nine “A Cross National Comparison: Discussion and Comparison of the 
Feed-in tariffs, the MEP, and the Renewables Obligation”. 
 
This research is concerned with evaluating the performance of wind power policy 
instruments, especially in the context of Directive 2001/77/EC (Szarka 2007; Elliot 
2007, 2005; Harmelink et al 2006; Ringel 2006; Rowlands 2005a, 2005b; Lauber 
2005, 2004; van Dijk et al 2003).  The directive called for a harmonised policy 
instrument for the EU. Harmonisation will lead the convergence of all EU Member 
States policy wind power policy instrument into a single form. According to 
Holzinger and Knill (2005:781-782) harmonisation “refers to a specific outcome of 
international co-operation, namely to constellations in which national governments 
are legally required to adopt similar policies and programmes as part of their 
obligations as members of international organisations”. Hence, harmonisation of the 
EU wind power policy instruments implies that the Member States would have to 
sacrifice their renewable power systems for that of the European Union. 
 
However, based on the report from the European Commission in December 2005, it 
was decided to suspend the plans to harmonise wind power policy instrument until 
later in the future. The European Commission, in a communication on “The support 
for electricity from renewable energy sources,” concluded that: 
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• “It is impossible to isolate the discussions of support schemes from 
the issue of administrative barriers; 
• While gaining significant experience in the EU with renewable 
support schemes competing national schemes could be seen as 
healthy at least over a transitional period. Competition among 
schemes should lead to a greater variety of solutions and also 
benefits; 
• It is too early to compare the advantages and disadvantages of 
well-established support mechanisms with systems with a rather 
short history. Therefore, and considering all the analyses in this 
communication, the commission does not regard it appropriate to 
present at this stage a harmonised European system; 
• The Commission will closely monitor the state of play in the EU 
renewable energy policy and, not later than December 2007, make 
a report of the level of Member States systems for promoting 
renewable electricity in the context of the on-going assessment 
related to 2020 targets and a policy framework for renewable 
energy beyond 2010.” 
  
Before the release of this communication, an EU-wide harmonised policy instrument 
was proposed by the Commission. Albeit, from the Communication it was clear that 
there is a still no evidence of one best policy instrument able to fit into all the 
different Member States political6 and market structures7
“...the Commission’s intention to have another review of the 
policy framework in 2007 is pointless: it contradicts its own 
stated objectives to ensure short and medium term regulatory 
stability in the Member States and allow countries time to fine 
tune the frameworks they have developed in the last few 
years.......effective competition in the conventional power 
market is a precondition for creating an undistorted European 
market for renewable electricity....” (EWEA 2005:4) 
. Responding to the report 
the EWEA Policy Director said that:  
 
At present, harmonisation is difficult to achieve; Member States have very different 
policy instruments in place (Reiche 2002c). Furthermore, when evaluating such 
policy instruments, it is initially very difficult to determine how one policy option 
                                                 
6 Political structure refers to government and wind power institutions and their 
relationship with each other. 
7 Market structure refers to the nature of the Member States’ energy and 
renewables market with regards to competition, especially the free interplay of 
supply and demand in determining energy prices. 
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can be preferred to another (del Rio 2005, 2004). The feed-in tariff, for example, is 
often heralded as being an effective instrument at delivering political fixed targets, 
but is often criticised as not being the most cost-efficient instrument (Toke 2006; 
Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006; Elliot 2005b; Farinelli et al 
2005; Hvelplund 2005; Lauber 2005, 2004; Rowlands 2005a, 2005b). Further 
discussion on policy instruments is provided in Chapter Three: “European Union 
Policy Instruments and Evaluation Typologies.”  
 
In comparing and contrasting different policy instruments, three EU Member States 
have been chosen for detailed investigation: Germany, The Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom.  The rationale for the country selection is that they have adopted 
different approaches and policy instruments to the deployment of renewable energy, 
with varying levels of success (do Valle Costa et al 2008; Toke 2007a, 2007b; 
Agnolucci 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; del Rio and Hernandez 2007; Ringel 2006; Mitchell 
et al 2006; Jacobsson and Lauber 2006; Fusaro 2005; Sawin 2004; Grotz 2002; 
Reiche 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Dinica 2002).  As outlined, the UK has employed a 
market based procurement mechanism, i.e. a quota system (Foxon et al 2007; Connor 
and Mitchell 2004; Stenzel et al 2003), the German Government a feed-in-tariff 
mechanism, while The Netherlands has not adopted a stable policy instrument (Toke 
et al 2008; Breukers and Wolsink 2007; Agterbosch et al 2009, 2007; van Schenk et 
al 2007; Klevas et al 2007; Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006; Rooijen and van Wees, 
2006; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006; Sawin 2004). 
 
It is against this backdrop that this thesis aims to critically appraise the performance 
of wind power policy instruments outlined in each of the selected countries, using an 
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integrative framework developed from an in-depth review of the literature.  
However, this research also recognises that the choice of policy instrument alone 
does not bring success, factors such as political and regulatory environments, 
industry structures and nature of stakeholder groups are also important in shaping the 
business environment of the Member States under investigation (Szarka 2007). 
 
This thesis defines political and regulatory environments as the willingness of the 
government and politicians to bring forward renewables, the rate of public 
acceptance and the legal systems which allow the policy instrument to work in the 
wind or renewables market of each Member State.  Industry structure is defined as 
the style of ownership and control in the Member States investigated. The German 
and the Dutch wind power industry are commonly based on community and local 
ownerships; it is the opposite case for the UK. In the UK, wind power ownership 
favours big company (e.g. utilities) ownership, rather than community ownership 
(Elliot 2007; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006; Toke 2005). A stakeholder in this study is 
defined as actors who have positive and negative perceptions of the wind power 
industry. Szarka (2007, 2004) grouped stakeholder groups into three clusters: (i) the 
pro-wind coalition; (ii) the conservationists’ organisation; and (iii) the anti-wind 
movements. The author described the last group as an organised association at local 
and national levels, with the aim of breaking wind power development (2007: 323). 
They have a very strong influence in the UK but less of an impact in Germany and 
The Netherlands (Elliot 2007; Toke 2005). However, the analysis and findings of this 
research are based on the views of the first group; the pro-wind coalition/actors. This 
is made up of industry actors and associations (VDEW8, Energiened, AEP9, BWE10
                                                 
8 German Association of Electricity Producers  
, 
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NWEA11, BWEA12, EWEA13, EREC14, Eurelectric, REA15
 
, Ecofys etc.), 
international NGOs (International Energy Agency, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth 
etc) and Government institutional actors (Ministry of Environment Germany (BMU), 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Netherlands, the Department of Business, Enterprises, 
and Regulatory Reform (BERR), Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM), 
SenterNovem, Germany Energy Agency (DENA) etc) (Szarka 2007). These actors 
are actively involved in the design and implementation of policy instruments adopted 
by each of the Member States investigated.  
Secondly, the harmonisation plans of the EU wind power policy instruments have 
received much attention in recent times (Soderholm 2008a; Elliot 2007; Lise et al 
2007; Held and Ragwitz 2006; Toke 2006; del Rio 2005; de Vos 2005; del Rio and 
Gual 2004; Lauber 2004; Eurelectric 2004). The European Commission, in its 
directive in March 2009, left the issue open for the foreseeable future. However, it is 
unlikely that the harmonisation plans will take place in the EU. Germany, The 
Netherlands, and the UK represent different perspectives of the wind power industry 
(Toke et al 2008; Fouquet et al 2005; Lauber 2005), local and corporate ownership 
(Breukers and Wolsink 2007a, 2007b; Toke 2006; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006), 
different market, socio-political structures and conditions. Harmonisation at this 
stage may be at the expense of the performance of existing policy instruments and 
the end may jeopardise/inhibit further progress in European wind power market 
growth, as different Member States may be caught between harmonisation and the 
                                                                                                                                          
9 UK Association of Electricity Producers 
10 German Wind Energy Association 
11 Netherlands Wind Energy Association 
12 British Wind Energy Association 
13 European Wind Energy Association 
14 European Renewable Energy Council 
15 Renewable Energy Association 
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promotion of wind power. Chapter Nine, “A Cross National Comparison: Discussion 
and Critical Analysis of the Feed-in Tariff, the MEP, and the Renewables 
Obligation” provides a comprehensive analysis of the comparison of policy 
instruments and also examines the impact an EU-wide harmonised instrument has on 
the national and European wind power market. 
 
Furthermore, when reviewing the renewable energy policy literature, there seems to 
be rather disorganised cross-national comparisons made about wind power delivery 
systems. There have been limited attempts to provide a detailed integrative 
framework that can be used to present the interaction of the stakeholder groups, or 
actors mentioned earlier, in the EU wind power industry. Most of the criteria and 
analysis presented in the literature are based on theory and lack empirical evidence 
(del Rio and Gual 2007; van der Linden et al 2005). This is an important gap that this 
thesis seeks to address. Thus, the framework developed in this thesis is utilised to 
gather evidence from various stakeholder groups and at the same time is used as an 
analytical tool for evaluating the performance of wind power policy instruments 
implemented in Germany, The Netherlands, and UK. This will add further value to 
the current cross national comparisons that are made about wind power delivery, 
differentiating this thesis from other research in this area. Chapter Four “Evaluation 
Framework” presents a detailed framework utilised by this study to analyse the 
policy instruments implemented in the three EU Member States investigated. Having 
outlined and discussed the importance of renewable energy sources viz-a-viz wind 
power to the current energy debate, the Chapter now goes on to introduce the country 
cases before discussing the theoretical lense of the study. 
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1.3 OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES 
1.3.1 European Union 
During the last two decades, wind power technology has advanced to become a near 
market energy source. In recent years it has become Europe’s fastest growing 
renewable energy source (GWEC 2006; EWEA 2009b; EWEA 2009d). About 8,877 
MW of installed wind capacity was added in 2008, thus Europe’s total installed 
capacity at the end of the same year reached 65,935 MW, representing over 50% of 
the global installed capacity (121,188 MW). Hence, Europe has now exceeded its 
projected target of 40,000 MW by more than 20%, three years earlier than the 2010 
due date (EWEA 2009c, 2007a; GWEC 2007; WWEA 2007).  It is also estimated 
that investment in the industry exceeded €25 billion in 2008 (EWEA 2009b, 2008a). 
Furthermore, the world wind power sector employed 350,000 people worldwide in 
2007 (GWEC 2008; and WWEA 2008). At the end of 2008, records show that over 
400,000 jobs were created by the sector (WWEA 2009). 
 
1.3.2 Germany 
Germany is recognised internationally as being one of the pioneering countries in the 
development and application of renewable energy sources (Bechberger and Reiche 
2004; IEA Wind 2002). Although deficient in wind, Germany is the world leader in 
terms of market and installed capacity of wind power (EWEA 2006b; WWEA 2006; 
IEA Wind 2006). The major instruments used to encourage market growth are: the 
feed-in tariff, tax incentives and low interest loans (Ackermann et al 2001). At the 
end of 2007, the country’s total installed capacity was 22,247MW, or about 24% of 
world installed capacity, while records at the end of 2008 show that Germany’s wind 
installed capacity increased and reached 23,903MW (EWEA 2009b; WWEA 2009). 
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To date, the German feed-in tariff is described as one of the most effective policy 
instruments in Europe and worldwide (Toke 2006; Mitchell et al 2006; EU 2005a; 
Ranci 2005; Lauber 2004; Sawin 2004; Bechberger and Reiche 2004; Johansson and 
Turkenburg 2004).  
 
1.3.3 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands, once a pioneer of wind power in Europe, is now lagging somewhat 
behind Germany and Spain because of the lack of public acceptance, institutional 
constraints and general instability of government policy for wind power. Despite 
having a very good tax structure for wind power, investors are not willing to finance 
wind projects, due to a high risk of uncertainty and insecurity as government policies 
are complex and unstable (Agterbosch et al  2009, 2007, 2004; van Rooijen and van 
Wees 2006; IEA Wind 2004; Kwant 2003). Meanwhile the total installed capacity at 
the end of 2007 was 1,746MW and at the end of 2008, installed capacity reached 
2,389MW. The Netherlands ranks among the fifteen top world leaders, in terms of 
installed capacity, with an annual market growth rate of 27.4% (WWEA 2009).  
 
1.3.4 United Kingdom 
In the UK, the Electricity Act of 1989 marked the beginning of support for wind 
power and the introduction of the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). The NFFO 
was abandoned in 2002 in favour of the renewables obligation (RO), which still 
operates today as the main policy instrument used to promote the development of 
wind power in the UK. This is very different to the mechanism being employed in 
Germany and The Netherlands. However, the RO is described as not being as 
effective as the German feed-in tariff due to its complexities and volatility. 
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Nevertheless, the UK’s total installed capacity at the end of 2007 was 2,389MW, 
representing a 38% growth rate compared to that in 2006.  In 2008, installed capacity 
reached 3,241MW (EWEA 2009b). 
 
1.4 THE THEORETICAL LENS: NEW INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
New Institutional theory has been used by many researchers (for example: Toke et al 
2008; Heiskala 2007; Breukers and Wolsink 2007a; Ma 2007; Breukers 2006; March 
and Oslen 2005, 1996, 1989, 1984; Paulsson and Malmborg 2004; Diermeir and 
Krihbiel 2003; Ingram and Silverman 2002; Thelen 2002, 1999; Lowndes 2002; 
1996; Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000; Bulmer 1998, 1994; Hirsch and Lounsbury 
1997; Peterson 1995; Dowding 1994; DiMaggio 1988) to explain the relationship 
between organisations, government institutions, and industries. Paulsson and 
Malmborg (2004) used new institutional theory approach to explain the interactions 
which exist between organisations and institutions in Sweden in relation to CO2 
emissions trading. Furthermore, Toke et al (2008), Breukers and Wolsink (2007a), 
and Breukers (2006) adopted the historical (path dependence) approach of new 
institutional theory to explain wind power policy planning and outcomes in six EU 
countries - Denmark, Spain, Germany, Netherlands, Scotland, and England/Wales. 
 
Bulmer (1998) therefore contends that new institutional theory is one of the principal 
methodological approaches to have emerged in recent comparative social science 
literature. This is also consistent with Diermeir and Krehbiel (2003), who stated that 
new institutional theory is particularly well suited to comparative research, whether 
the institutional comparisons are cross-sectional or inter-temporal, or whether they 
are between committees or constitutions. Notwithstanding, new institutionalism 
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differs from other approaches as it does not constitute a unified body of thought (see 
for example: March and Oslen 2005, 1989, 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996; Jeppesson 
1991; Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Hall and Taylor (1996) identified three schools 
of thought or strands of new institutional theory: the historical approach, the rational 
approach, and the sociological approach. 
 
1.4.1  Historical Institutional Approach 
The historical institutional approach defines institutions as formal and informal 
procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the organisational 
structure of polity or political economy (Alexander 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
They view institutions as being associated with organisations. Hall and Taylor 
(1996) also observed that historical institutional approach has built a strong tradition 
in political institutions, which they argue matter in any organisation. Thus, they tend 
to provide a detailed explanation of how institutions affect decision making from a 
group theory perspective. Alexander (2005) also observed that historical 
institutionalism approach focuses on path dependency and a heightened awareness of 
unintended consequences. 
 
1.4.2  Rational Choice Institutional Approach 
Rational choice institutionalism approach is based on analysis of the economics of 
organisations and from the influential work of North and Williamson (Alexander 
2005). According to Breukers (2006: 51) rational choice institutionalism defines 
institution as “rules and game’; structures of incentives that make up the 
opportunities and constraints for rational actors”. Thus, rational choice institutional 
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theory places great importance on property rights, rents, transaction costs and 
institutional development (Immergut 1998; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
 
Hall and Taylor (1996) also identified four features of rational choice institutional 
approach: first, as observed by Alexander (2005), is that rational actors have sets of 
fixed preferences, tastes and values which tend to drive their behaviour to satisfy 
these tastes and values. Secondly, rational actors also view politics as being 
collective action dilemmas and rational actors would always operate in a way that 
satisfies their preferences in a Pareto optima16
 
 manner. They also viewed rational 
actors as being driven strategically, following the behaviour of other actors. Thus, 
institutions exist because of the need to solve problems and are designed to suit the 
functions they perform (Breukers 2006; Alexander 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
1.4.3 Sociological Institutional Approach 
The sociological institutionalism approach began as a subfield of an organisation 
theory (Alexander 2005). Hall and Taylor (1996:946-947) also observed that  
sociological institutionalism argues that: “many of the institutional forms and 
procedures used by modern organisations were not adopted simply because they 
were most efficient for the tasks at hand, in line with some transcendent ‘rationality’, 
instead, they argued that many of these forms and procedures should be seen as 
culturally-specific practices, akin to the myths and ceremonies devised by many 
societies, and assimilated into organisations, not necessarily to enhance their formal 
means-ends efficiency, but as a result of the kind of processes associated with the 
transmission of cultural practices more generally.” 
                                                 
16 Making their own self better off, without making others worse off 
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However, they define institution more broadly than other schools of thought. They 
view an institution as a frame of meaning, guiding human actions and culture 
(Breukers 2006; Thelen 2002; Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, they associate an 
institution with roles attached to norms of behaviour and belief. Institutions 
influence behaviours by specifying what an individual should do, and what one can 
imagine oneself doing in a given context.  
 
In managing the complexities of the three institutional theories, Table 1.2 
summarises the focus of each school of thought. 
Table 1.2: Institution Definition and Focus 
School of Thought Definition of Institution Focus and Interest 
Historical institutional 
approach 
Formal and informal 
procedures, routine, 
norms, and conventions 
embedded in the  
organisational structure of 
polity or political 
economy 
The role and impact of 
political institutions in 
decision making 
Rational choice 
institutional approach 
Rules and games, 
structures of incentive that 
make up the opportunity 
and constraints for 
rational actors 
Property rights, rents, 
transaction costs and 
institutional development 
Sociological institutional 
approach 
A frame of meaning 
guiding human actions 
and culture 
Norms and behaviour 
Source: Author Generated 
 
1.4.4 New Institutional Theory and Country Cases 
According to Breukers and Wolsink (2007: 2738) the “New Institutionalism 
captures a cross-disciplinary tendency towards a renewed interest in how the role 
of institutions can contribute to the understanding of social and political 
outcomes”. Thus, new institutional theory helps explore the three country cases 
considered in this study. As mentioned earlier, the three countries have achieved 
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varying successes in wind power deployment over the past decades, especially in 
the experimentation of different types of policy instruments. 
 
Historical institutional approach has been adopted for this study. Historical 
institutional approach was employed because it enables this study to trace the 
historical emergence of different kinds of institutional and industry arrangements 
that have either helped to promote, or distort, wind power industry development in 
the Member States examined. Historical institutionalism defines institution as the 
rules governing organisation or behaviour, which are generally accepted by 
members of a social group. These can be formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms, and conventions embedded in the organisational structure of polity or 
political economy (Laird and Stefes 2009; Alexander 2005; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Breukers and Wolsink (2007: 2738) further argued that institutions in some cases 
are biased, in that they “partly reflect and maintain the status quo since they 
empower some actors and enhance some perspectives at the expense of others”. 
 
Thus, a key component of an institution is the presence of actors or stakeholder 
groups that interact with each other to bring about intended and unintended 
outcomes. As such, policy instruments implemented by the Member States are the 
results of the outcome of interactions between wind power industry stakeholders.  
Steinmo (2001:1) states that: “historical institutionalists are primarily interested in 
understanding and explaining specific real world political outcomes”. Historical 
institutionalists start with institutions and ask how they affect the individual’s 
behaviour and focus more on historical views of institution (Pierson 1991). The 
notion of path dependency helps to explain how the set of decisions one faces for 
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any given circumstance is limited by the decision one has made in the past, even 
though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. Thelen (1999: 387) also 
states that the path dependency approach “suggests that institutions continue to 
evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing political 
manoeuvring but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories”.  
 
This study has adopted the concept of path dependency in order to explore the 
diversity of the wind power industry across the EU, especially within the three 
country cases under study. This will be done within three boundaries or parameters. 
Firstly, is the exploration of the historical emergence of policy instruments and 
goals they are set to achieve. This is in line with the Directive 2001/77/EC, which 
mandates Member States to deploy policy instruments in support of wind power and 
other renewables. The Directive contains and sets targets which each Member State 
is expected to achieve over a given period of time. Secondly, is the examination of 
the policy making process that is the architect of each policy instrument. Breukers 
and Wolsink (2007:2739) state that: “the process of policy making involves the 
interaction, cooperation and conflicts among actors and stakeholder groups”. 
Thus, this study utilises new institutional theory (historical institutional approach) 
to explain the relationships and interactions that exist between the actors in the wind 
power industry. This helps to unveil the role of the national government in 
establishing rules, regulations, and policy instruments, in relation to environmental 
non-governmental organisations and the wind power industry. 
 
Thirdly, this thesis investigates the outcome of the support and implementation of 
the policy instrument deployed to promote wind power in the three country cases, in 
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terms of their performances over time. This is achieved by utilising the integrative 
framework, presented in Chapter Four of this thesis, to critically analyse the policy 
instruments implemented in each Member State and also to make comparisons, in 
order to put the argument for the EU-wide harmonisation plans into context, which 
has recently been very controversial.  
 
Performance is a theme that will recur in this thesis. This thesis will analyse the 
performance of the feed-in tariff, the MEP, and the renewables obligation as 
implemented in Germany, The Netherlands, and United Kingdom. Performance in 
this thesis is defined as how well a policy instrument has contributed to the growth 
and development of wind power over time. In order to understand the performance 
of policy instruments, an evaluation framework has been developed and broken 
down into eight components as presented in Chapter Four of this thesis. 
  
1.5 THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to contribute in addressing the challenges of the 
expansion of the wind power market by offering a practical and impartial critique of 
the current policy instruments (i.e. the feed-in tariff, MEP, and renewables 
obligation) adopted in the three EU Member States investigated. It aims to develop 
an integrative framework for evaluating the performance of wind power policy 
instruments, especially in light of the EU proposed harmonisation plans. More 
specific objectives include: (i) to critically examine the international and EU 
renewable energy policy drivers, and the role of wind power especially in the EU 
energy and climate change debate; (ii) to critically appraise the wind power industry 
structures and the role of stakeholder groups (e.g. NGOs and renewable energy 
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consortiums) in the business environment in each Member State under investigation; 
and (iii) to utilise the framework developed to critically compare and contrast the 
performance of the feed-in tariff and quota system.  
 
The development and application of this framework to this research stems from the 
call to harmonise the EU wind power policy instruments by the Directive 
2001/77/EC and most importantly from the question emerging from the academic 
literature, whether the feed-in tariff system is the most effective instrument in 
promoting the deployment of wind power in Europe and encouraging a market take-
off of wind power at national level. This thesis does not seek to credit nor discredit 
policy instruments rather it considers the performance of policy instruments in order 
to set in context the EU harmonisation agenda which has been a subject of much 
conjecture. It draws from historical institutional theory approach, especially the 
notion of path dependency to explore the diversity of the wind power industry across 
the Member States investigated. The concept of path dependency assumes that 
technological choices made in the past influences subsequent choices. Scheinstock 
(2007:93) argued that: “nation-states tend to retain patterns of institutional 
continuity and national distinctiveness, even under conditions of external shocks to 
their political and economic environment”. Thus, the idea and notion of path 
dependency help inform the core objective of this thesis which is to compare and 
contrast the performance of the feed-in tariff, the MEP, and renewables obligation. 
Furthermore, Scheinstock (2007:93) contends that: “path dependency is a 
characteristic of institutional development, because actors involved in technological 
development processes also exploit institutional resources”. Therefore the outcome 
of the comparison of the policy instruments implemented in the three country cases 
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would be useful to comment on the current EU-wide harmonisation plans which in 
recent times have been a subject of much conjecture. 
 
1.6 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This study consists of Ten Chapters covering the introduction to the research, the 
literature review, methodology and analysis. Chapter Two sets out the international 
and European Union policy context. It begins by outlining the three pillars on which 
energy policies are built worldwide before reviewing key EU renewable energy 
policy landmarks. The Chapter also highlights the importance of Directive 
2001/77/EC and Directive 2009/28/EC to the EU renewable energy policy 
instruments design and implementation. The directives provide that Member States 
implement the choice of policy instruments that suits their political and market 
conditions. Recently, the EU agreed to reach a renewable energy target of 20% by 
2020. Wind power is expected to play an important role in reaching this target by 
2020; hence the Chapter also considers the relevance of wind power to the current 
debate. The Chapter concludes by pointing out that wind power will continue to grow 
and make significant strides towards the EU energy objectives. This is because it is a 
near market technology and available in most locations of Europe; it is clean and has 
limited climate change impact. 
 
Chapter Three reviews the existing literature on renewable energy policy instrument 
evaluation typologies. The aim of the Chapter is to attempt to highlight some of the 
key weaknesses of the typologies found in the literature. First the Chapter provides 
an overview of policy instruments typologies and will highlight three common policy 
instruments widely implemented by EU Member States. Furthermore, in reviewing 
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the literature, it will be demonstrated that most of the evaluation criteria presented 
are limited to effectiveness and efficiency criteria. This approach alone does not 
provide a complete understanding of the performance of policy instruments. It is 
therefore important to develop an evaluation framework which goes beyond 
effectiveness and efficiency.    
 
The Chapter will also point out that most of the evaluation criteria presented in the 
literature are limited to policy makers’ views on policy instruments; it does not 
include other stakeholder groups (e.g. renewable energy associations; NGOs and 
consortiums, industrialists etc). For a holistic and impartial analysis, the views of key 
wind power and renewable energy stakeholders on the performance of policy 
instruments are important in reaching a laudable conclusion. Analyses presented on 
the performance of policy instruments are based on theoretical and abstract views. 
This Chapter three therefore concludes that there is a need for a holistic analysis 
based on empirical evidence from wind power industry stakeholders.  This forms an 
important part of thesis, and to achieve this aim the thesis will attempt to develop an 
integrative framework for evaluating the performance of policy instruments. This 
will allow this study to make a significant contribution to the current literature on the 
experiences of implementing policy instruments in the Member States investigated. 
 
Arising from the conclusion above and from the first hand knowledge gained in the 
literature, Chapter Four sets out and defines the policy instrument evaluation 
framework through which this research will evaluate the performance of the feed-in 
tariff, the MEP, and renewables obligations. The Chapter highlights policy design 
conditions drawn from Directive 2001/77/EC. This is very useful in understanding 
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the basis of the choice of policy instrument implemented by Member States 
investigated. Furthermore, the Chapter then discusses the evaluation framework by 
first justifying the reason for the selection before introducing each component part of 
the framework. The evaluation framework is made up of eight different components 
and these are grouped into four clusters, thus differentiating this thesis from others. A 
key contribution of this thesis to the renewable energy policy literature is the attempt 
to use the evaluation criteria to present the views of policy makers, practitioners, and 
other stakeholders regarding the performance of policy instruments mentioned 
above. Thus, Chapter Five outlines the method used. 
 
In order to allow this thesis to provide impartial and holistic analyses of the 
performance of policy instruments implemented in the three country cases 
investigated, a qualitative research approach was adopted. Semi-structured interviews 
were used to collect the views of senior government policy makers, practitioners, and 
academics in each country case, hence very detailed and rich data was gathered and 
without doubt helped to strengthen the findings and analyses presented in subsequent 
Chapters of this thesis.  Secondary data sources (e.g. EU and Member States policy 
documents) were used to complement and strengthen data gathered through 
interviews. 
 
Chapters Six to Eight “Country Analyses”, present the findings and analyses of the 
three EU Member States (Germany, Netherlands, and the UK) investigated by this 
study. Chapters Five to Seven critically outline the principal market drivers shaping 
the wind power industry in each country. An overview of wind power policies since 
the 1970s to present (2008) of each Member States is also reviewed. Furthermore, 
 28 
detailed empirical analyses of the performance of the policy instruments (German 
feed-in tariff, the MEP, and the UK renewables obligation) based on the framework 
presented in Chapter Five “Evaluation Framework”, were presented. The findings 
and analyses of each Member State do differ significantly, and this helps to explain 
the outcome of the analyses of the performance of the different policy instruments 
adopted.  
 
Chapter Nine “A Cross National Comparison: Discussion and Critical Analysis of 
the Feed-in tariff, the MEP, and the Renewables Obligation”, presents a qualitative 
analysis and comparison of the policy instruments adopted by the three Member 
States investigated. Arising from the critical analysis of the three Member States in 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven, the aim of this Chapter is to attempt to add value to 
the current cross-national comparisons made about wind power delivery and to 
present a more rigorous comparative framework, which teases out different 
dimensions of policy instrument evaluation. The discussion proceeds to a detailed 
examination of the impacts of the current policy instrument harmonisation debate on 
the EU wind power industry. The harmonisation agenda has been a subject of much 
ongoing debate and conjecture throughout Europe. Considering the different 
environment, culture and market structure of each Member State, there is no one best 
policy option for the EU harmonisation agenda. 
 
Chapter Ten “The Research Conclusion and Recommendation” concludes the study 
by presenting the research findings and the contribution of this study to wind power 
policy and management literature. This Chapter identifies areas for future research 
and provides contributions to the current cross national debate and comparisons 
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made to the EU wind power delivery systems. The research also offers a number of 
policy recommendations for the EU wind power policy instruments harmonisation 
agenda. These recommendations focus how to move the Member States wind power 
market forward, rather than concentrating on the current harmonisation debates. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN UNION RENEWABLE ENERGY 
POLICY CONTEXT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
One of the key objectives of this thesis is to outline international energy policy 
drivers of change, and to critically appraise the principal market drivers which are 
shaping the EU energy industry. This Chapter sets out key international and EU 
policies relating to renewable energy sources, and it begins by introducing the 
international policy drivers on which energy policies - worldwide - are built. It is the 
desire to address key energy policy drivers that bring about the deployment and 
integration of renewable energy sources into national systems, thus the deployment of 
policy instruments, to make renewable energy electricity competitive with other 
forms of energy, comes into play. 
 
On this note, the Chapter will move to further discuss the international and EU 
renewable energy policies before setting out the relevance of wind power to the 
current renewable energy debate. As mentioned in Chapter One, wind power has 
come to the forefront of global renewable energy debates, whereby it is seen to be 
abundant in most regions of the world, most promising and has competitive 
advantage,  and additionally, it is capable of nearly competing on a commercial basis 
with traditional forms of electricity generation.  
 
2.2 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POLICY PILLARS 
Energy policies worldwide appear to be built on three pillars;  
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1. Cost competitiveness - the need to make energy relatively cheap and 
affordable for households and industry;  
2. Environmental responsibility - rising to the challenge of the global climate 
change, as a result of the effect of using fossil fuels as a major source of 
energy to humanity; and  
3. Security of supply - owing to the threat of over dependence on a single 
resource, such as fossil fuel.  
 
Oil reserves are concentrated in relatively few locations, but coal reserves are 
extensive and found in most parts of the world (O’Gallachoir et al 2002; Kellet 
2002). Kellet (2002) provided a diagrammatical framework (Figure 2.1) that shows 
the relationship between these three key world energy policy drivers and argued that 
policy instruments, such as the feed-in tariff and the quota system, are designed on 
the drivers of energy policy. However, for sustainable energy development to be 
achieved, these key energy policy drivers must be balanced (O’Gallachoir et al 2002).  
Figure 2.1: Energy Policy 
 
Source: Kellet 2002 
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These three key pillars will now be discussed to determine their relevance to the 
current renewable energy policy debate. 
 
2.2.1 Security of Energy Supply 
Over the past four decades, security of energy supply has been one of the main 
energy policy goals, starting with the two global oil crises of the 1970s (Hedenus et al 
2010; Bielecki 2002). However, the concept has recently been revived (Kruyt et al 
2009; Costantini et al 2007; IEA 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Mulder et al 2007; Correlje 
and van der Linde 2006; EU 2006a), due to: 
• the recent increase in the dependence of developed and industrialised 
economies on energy imports; 
• the increased shortages in most cases caused as a results of disruptions in 
supply; and  
• the current high oil prices in the period 2007 and beyond.  
 
Indeed, the concept has been defined and approached differently by many authors, 
e.g. Hedenus et al (2010) found that the concept is vague and hard to define; whereas 
Alhajji (2007) argued that the exact definition of the concept makes different 
meanings to different people at different moments in time (Kruyt et al 2009). 
Nevertheless, the most cited definition is that which is set out by IEA (2001:76), 
where it defines security of energy supply as: “Reliable and adequate supply of 
energy at reasonable prices”. 
 
The IEA (2001) definition tends to imply that the uninterrupted supply of energy that 
meets the need of the global economy - at a cost based price – which is determined by 
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the market, and is based on demand and supply balances (Bielecki 2002).  Therefore, 
central to the concept of security of energy supply is that: “energy is inevitable for 
human life and a secure and accessible supply of energy is crucial for sustainability 
of modern societies” (Muneer 2007:1388).  
 
Furthermore, the second point to highlight is that, any attempt which disrupts the 
availability of energy supplies may cause economic and social consequences 
(Constantini et al 2007).  However, the EU is not left out of the discussion, 
Constantini et al (2007:211) contends that: “The current European domestic energy 
system is not sufficiently reliable or affordable to support sustained economic 
growth. OECD European countries are consuming more and more energy and 
importing more and more energy products. As a result, external energy dependence 
for all sectors of the economy is constantly increasing, especially, for oil and gas.”  
 
This view is consistent with Jansen and Uyterlinde’s (2004) observation. On this 
note, the authors pointed out that the blue print for the EU policy on security of 
energy supply is given in the Green Paper “Towards a European strategy for the 
security of energy supply” (EU 2000b). Here, the three main points emphasised in the 
Green Paper, as outlined by Jansen and Uyterlinde (2004:95) were:  
(i) “The EU will become increasingly dependent on external energy sources. 
Enlargement will not change the situation;  
(ii)  The EU has very limited scope to influence energy supply conditions but the 
EU can intervene on the demand side: mainly by promoting energy saving 
in buildings and the transport sector;  
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(iii) At present, the European Union is not in a position to respond to the 
challenge of climate change and to meet its Kyoto Protocol 
commitments”. 
 
In continuing, the Green Paper (EU 2000b), revealed that EU dependence is 
increasing and stressed that the EU meets 50% of its energy needs through imports, 
although this may rise to 70% by around 2030 if no action is taken by the EU. 
Furthermore, EU (2007) also reports that the reliance on gas importation is expected 
to soar from 57% to 84%, and in addition to this, and from 82% to 93% for oil by 
2030. Such increases cannot go unnoticed and national and regional governmental 
policies require significant rethinks, in order to address these shortfalls. Hence, two of 
the key factors influencing the EU energy import dependence, are: 
(i) the EU energy crunch; and 
(ii) the forecasted depletion of the finite North Sea oil resources (Eur 2007).  
 
Notably, Spanjer (2007) divided security of supply into two broad parts: (i) System 
security - the extent to which consumers can be guaranteed gas supplies, within 
foreseeable circumstance; (ii) Quantity of supply - guaranteeing an adequate supply 
of gas now, as well as in the future (p2890). Spanjer’s analyses dwells more on the 
quantity of supply aspect and this is linked to the EU’s dependency on the Russian 
gas supply. Spanjer (2007) and Weisser (2007) further claimed that the EU import 
dependence creates the three important risks of:  
 Source dependence;  
 Transit dependence; and  
 Facility dependence. 
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Source dependence is described as the increase in Europe’s energy demand in recent 
times - which is expected to rise from 36% in 2002 towards 69% by 2030. The bulk 
of the energy supply according to Weisser 2007, is expected to come from Russia 
(33%), North Africa (27%), and the Middle East (17%).  
 
Describing transit dependence, Weisser (2007) indicates that most of the gas supplies 
across Europe are pipeline bound and they are concentrated in a few trunk lines17
 
 
(p2). Here, Europe is seen to be dependent on a relatively small number of pipelines 
and can affected by disruption, whether political or otherwise, and Europe is therefore 
vulnerable to shortages, which may affect economic activities.  
Similarly, any breakdown of the existing pipelines will put a strain on the other transit 
systems, and this may also cause facility dependence (Weisser 2007; Spanjer 2007). 
Overall, in terms of the consequences of  security of energy supplies, there would 
appear to be a likelihood of the EU becoming more exposed and vulnerable to price 
fluctuations, which may have a negative impact on economic development (Spanjer 
2007; Weisser 2007; Corredje and van der Linden 2005; Jager-Waldau et al 2004). 
 
Being aware of the problems of security in energy supply, Jager-Waldau et al (2004) 
suggested that measures need to be taken to reduce the EU’s dependency on energy 
and gas demand from other regions of the world. Such measures should be designed 
to look after the citizens’ welfare, environmental protection and sustainable 
development18
                                                 
17 Few Gas pipelines from main source of supply to European Union Member 
States 
. As a preferred solution, the Green Paper (2000b) states that: 
18 This argument is linked to Article 2 and 6 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997. 
For further details see Jager-waldau et al (2004: 12) 
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“Renewable sources of energy have a considerable potential for increasing security 
of supply in Europe. Developing their use, however, will depend on extremely 
substantial political and economic efforts. In the medium term, renewables are the 
only source of energy in which the European Union has a certain amount of room for 
manoeuvre aimed at increasing supply in the current circumstances. We cannot 
afford to ignore this form of energy” (Jager-waldau et al 2004:13). 
 
Against this backdrop, this suggestion identified serious concerns over conventional 
methods of energy production and additionally, points towards the need for a greater 
focus on renewable energy for Europe as a whole. 
  
2.2.2 Environmental Responsibility/ Protection 
This thesis defines environmental responsibility as: “the need to rise to the challenge 
of the global climate change, as a result of the effect of using fossil fuel as a major 
source of energy to humanity (O’Gallachoir et al 2002:2). 
 
In recent times, the concept of climate change and its impact on the environment has 
received significant attention internationally (Hirschl 2009; Nordhaus 2007; Stern 
2006a, 2006b; UNEP and IEA 2002). Indeed, Stern (2006b:1) summarises that: 
“There is now an overwhelming body of scientific evidence that human activity is 
causing global warming, with the main sources of green house gases....the fastest 
growing sources are transport and electricity”. 
 
Whist, the damages being caused by climate change are vast, there is a suggestion that 
demands that international and national governments should respond promptly (Stern 
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2006a). As such, in understanding the nature of the evolution of climate change, it is 
noted that the beginning of international climate policy can be traced to the 
development of international environmental policy through international conferences, 
aimed at protecting the climate (Sahin 2004). The first of such conferences which is 
recognised as having initiated the international environmental policy, was the 
Stockholm Conference in 1972, which led to the emergence of the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP). The Brundtland Commission 1987 also initiated the 
publication of the international environmental framework ‘Our Common Future’, 
which called for the protection of the atmosphere and the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. Later, the Toronto Conference 1998 was also agreeable to this and set a 
target for reducing CO2 emission by 20% of the 1988 levels, by 2005. Meanwhile, the 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held in 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro, expanded these international policy goals even further by 
including sustainable environmental development policies and the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Furthermore, in December 1997, the most 
prominent and effective international policy was developed in Kyoto, with policies 
relating to quantified emissions limitations and associated reductions being 
recommended and subsequently adopted by a number of developed countries. The 
second approach is primarily based on the international technological policy towards 
protecting the climate. Internationally, renewable sources are considered an important 
measure in protecting the environment and mitigating the threat of global climate 
change, but Hirschl (2009) contends that renewable energy was scarcely mentioned in 
the main documents of international climate policy convention and the Kyoto Protocol. 
A key reason for this is pointed out by Hirschl (2009: 4410) in that: “The international 
climate policy begins solely on the output side i.e. with the emission of greenhouse 
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gases that are to be reduced and/or regulated, and leaves out the question of how 
these are to be produced or should be produced”. 
  
However, Lund (2009); Sahin (2004); and Sims (2004) contend that renewable energy 
and other energy efficient technologies19
 
 are the best means to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Consequently, Sahin (2004) stressed that wind power has the greatest 
capacity to promote the use of renewable resources technology internationally and can 
help save nearly 50 million tonnes of CO2 per year.  
2.2.2.1  Kyoto protocol and the EU 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement on the abatement of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG), with the overall aim, to attain a 5% reduction of the GHG 
emission, below the 1990 levels during the period 2008 to 2012. Signatories to the 
protocol are to achieve this objective by introducing national policies to reduce 
emission. The Kyoto protocol primarily allows three flexible mechanisms: 
International Emission Trading System (ETS), Joint Implementation (JI), and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) (Anger 2008; van Asselt and Biermann 2007; 
Streimikiene and Mikalauskiene 2007; Egenhofer 2007; Jager-waldau et al 2004). 
With this in mind, according to Pan and Regemorter (2004), these three flexible 
mechanisms were recommended by the Kyoto Protocol to alleviate emission 
reduction loads of the committed countries that may have difficulty in meeting their 
respective obligations. 
 
                                                 
19 Low energy using light bulbs, fuel efficient cars, and improved carbon capture 
facilities 
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The EU is a strong proponent of the Kyoto Protocol and has committed itself to 
achieving an 8% reduction of the 1990’s level of the greenhouse gases emission 
between the period 2008 to 2012. Jager-waldau et al (2004) described the Gothenburg 
meeting of the European Council in June 2001 as a good starting point, where heads 
of government met to discuss ways to combat climate change. The outcome was the 
stimulation of negotiations of burden sharing of the greenhouse gases emission 
reduction by each Member State20
 
. This was accompanied by the European Climate 
Change Programme (ECCP) which provided for the integration of the European 
policy, science and technology efforts, with respect to environmental protection. The 
ECCP also witnessed the development of a series of implementation processes and 
awareness campaigns, aimed at exposing the EU authorities to the formulation of 
relevant energy policies. However, the second report of the ECCP (2003) stated that 
the EU would not meet the set Kyoto target with the current policy measures in place 
(Jager-waldau et al 2004. Nevertheless, the 8% target affects all the Member States 
starting with the EU-15 and subsequent enlargement. Table 2.3 outlines the set 
targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The outcome was in response to the achievement of the overall EU 8% 
commitment to GHG emissions reduction by 2008 to 2012, compared to the 
1990 levels. 
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Table 2.3: Increase in the share of renewable energy sources in electricity 
market from 1997 to 2010; and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels by the 2008-2012 compliance period. 
Country EU directive Kyoto target 
Austria  +8.1% -13.0% 
Belgium +4.9% -7.5% 
Denmark +20.3% -21.0% 
Finland +6.8% 0.0% 
France +6.0% 0.0% 
Germany +8.0% -21.0% 
Greece +11.5% +25.0% 
Ireland +9.6% +13.0% 
Italy +9.0% -6.5% 
Luxembourg +3.6% -28.0% 
Netherlands +5.5% -6.0% 
Portugal +0.5% +27.0% 
Spain +9.5% +15.0% 
Sweden +10.9% +4.0% 
United Kingdom +8.3% -12.5% 
EU Total +8.1% -8.0% 
Source: European Energy Agency (2001) 
 
Based on the above figures, it is noted that according to the Report on the 
Demonstrable Progress under the Kyoto Protocol (EU 2005c), the EU has made 
significant progress in achieving the 2012 target and even has plans and strategies21
 
 
in place to meet the post 2012 target (EEA 2008; EU 2008a; EUR 2008b). 
2.2.2.2  EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS came into force in January 2005, based on the Directive 2003/87/EC 
(Egenhofer 2007). The ETS is the biggest international environmental trading scheme 
and a key pillar of the fast growing global carbon trading market (EC 2007). The ETS 
was put in place by the EU Commission in order to create a market for emission 
                                                 
21 Extending the EU ETS to other greenhouse gases and other industrial 
emitters; a harmonised ETS suitable for EU internal market with common rules 
to ensure a level playing field; and a proposed EU framework to cover other 
areas where the EU ETS does not apply e.g. building, transport, agriculture, and 
waste (EU 2008a)  
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reductions, and to allow Member States to reach their respective Kyoto targets. 
According to the European Communication (EC 2005:6) the: “EU ETS is based on 
the recognition that creating a price for carbon through the establishment of a liquid 
market for emission reductions offers the EU the most cost-effective way for the 
Member States to meet their Kyoto obligation and move towards the low carbon 
economy of the future…..the ETS should allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto target at a 
cost between EUR 2.9 Billion and EUR 3.7 Billion annually…..”  
 
As a consequence, the Communication further outlines six principles upon which the 
EU ETS is based, and these include:  
• ‘Cap’ and ‘Trade’ system 
• A focus initially on big CO2 emitters 
• Phase implementation with periodic reviews  
• Allocation plans for emission allowance decided periodically 
• Strong compliance framework  
• Tapping emissions reduction opportunities from the rest of the world, through 
the use of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
(JI), and providing links with compatible schemes in the third world countries.  
 
The first phase of the EU ETS, or the mandatory warm-up phase (2005-2007), covers 
CO2 emissions from large industrial and energy installations and provides a number 
of limits, as the allowance, companies can emit (Asselt and Bietmann 2007; EC 2005; 
van Egenhofer et al 2002). Most of the allowances are allocated to installations free 
of charge, at 95% for the first phase and at least 90% for the second phase 2008-2012 
(EC 2005). 
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To ensure compliance, a market based instrument, which makes it possible to put a 
price on carbon emissions, is incorporated into the ETS. EC (2005) also states that 
installations must surrender a number of allowances, equivalent to verified CO2 
emissions each year. The allowances are then cancelled to avoid them being 
recounted or resold, and any allowance left can be used the following year. A fine of 
40 Euro per tonne is levied on those that go over their emission limits, and this 
penalty was risen to 100 Euros from 2008-2012. 
 
With respect to the performance of the EU ETS during the first phase (2005-2007), 
the European Communication (EC 2008) claimed that the EU ETS successfully 
established free trade of emission allowance across the EU. The first phase also saw 
the introduction of monitoring and verification infrastructures, including a 
comprehensive register of verified emissions. The EU ETS has also successfully 
concluded two compliance cycles. Furthermore, it has developed into the world’s 
largest single carbon market, accounting for 67% in volume and 81% in terms of 
value in the global carbon market. Moreover, it has worked as a driver of the global 
credit market and has triggered worldwide investments in emission reduction 
projects, as well as linking 147 countries through the CDM22 and JI23
                                                 
22 Clean Development Mechanism 
 projects (EU 
2008b:2). During the same period, EU (2008a) reports that the EU absolute emissions 
were reduced by 6.5% compared to 2005 verified emissions. However, some of the 
shortfalls experienced were due to an excessive allocation of allowance in some 
Member States and a lack of complete verified data. Hence, the European 
Communication (EC 2008) proposed an amendment to the EU ETS directive 
2003/87/EC and further affirmed the EU’s commitment to a 20% reduction in 
23 Joint Implementation 
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greenhouse gases by 2020. The EU ETS directive 2003/87/EC amendment is aimed at 
achieving three objectives of:  
• Fully exploiting the potential of the EU ETS to contribute to the EU’s overall 
greenhouse gases reduction commitments, in an economically efficient 
manner;  
• Refining and improving the EU ETS in the light of experience gathered;  
• Contributing to transforming Europe into a low greenhouse gases emitting 
economy and creating the right incentive for forward looking low carbon 
investment decisions, by reinforcing a clear, undistorted and long-term carbon 
price signal (EU 2008b). 
 
With these objectives, the scope of the current EU ETS would expand to include new 
sector and gases24
 
 not currently covered by the EU ETS. Furthermore, going beyond 
the ETS, the European Commission in EC (2008) indicated that renewable energy 
deployment in the EU would also help reduce greenhouse gases emissions and 
improve energy security. Currently, renewables account for 8.5% of the EU energy 
consumption, which falls far short of the 20% target which is to be achieved by 2020, 
(EU 2008a). To encourage Member States, EU (2008a:7) claimed that the EU council 
agreed to: “a fair target that takes account of the different national starting points 
and potentials, including the existing level of renewable energies and the energy mix, 
notably low carbon technologies”. 
With these plans and strategies in place, the EU ETS’s second phase is in operation 
(2008-2012) and it is rather early to analyse the final success of the EU ETS from the 
                                                 
24 CO2 emissions from petrochemical, ammonia, aluminium, N2O etc 
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period 2005-2012. A further point to note is that, the EU ETS has been criticised for 
not applying to all emissions generated in the EU, rather it is limited to only CO2 
emissions in four sectors (Oberbdorfer and Rennings 2007). The EU ETS is also 
unfair and inadequate as it favours firms that qualify for free emissions permits, over 
others that do not have this advantage. Thus, Oberbdorfer and Rennings (2007) 
claimed that the EU ETS lacks environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. 
 
2.2.2.3  The EU and energy efficiency 
The Action Plan for energy efficiency (2000-2006) defined energy efficiency as 
reducing energy consumption without reducing the use of energy-consuming plant 
and equipment. In this case, there is a focus towards promoting behaviour, working 
methods and manufacturing techniques which are less energy-intensive. The EU 
energy efficiency is aimed at reducing energy consumption and wastage. This is very 
important in order for the EU to attain the three energy objectives of security of 
energy supply, competitiveness, and environmental protection. To demonstrate the 
EU’s commitment in promoting energy efficiency, the strategy towards the rational 
use of energy (RUE) was adopted in 1998 by the European Commission (EU 1998) 
and it proposed an 18% reduction of energy use by 2010. While in 2000, an EU 
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency (2000-2006) was released as a follow-up to the 
Commission Communication 1998. The Action Plan outlined the barriers to EU 
energy efficiency25
                                                 
25 Inefficient use of energy in the industry sector; practice of selling energy by 
kWh rather than a service (http:www.europa.eu)  
. The objective of the Action Plan was to attain a 1% decrease, per 
annum until 2010, over and above the 18% envisaged in the 1998 European 
Commission Communication. It proposed action plans which are divided into three 
categories:  
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• Measures to integrate energy efficiency into other community policies - this is 
to be carried out in the six main areas: transport; enterprise policy; regional 
carbon policy; R&D; taxation and tariff policy; international cooperation and 
pre-accession activities.  
• Initiatives to strengthen and extend existing policies in household appliances; 
commercial and other equipment; buildings etc.  
• New policies and measures - through the promotion of energy efficiencies in 
public procurement; cooperative technology procurement; energy audits in 
industry and the tertiary sector; and best practice. 
 
In order to strengthen the action plan 2000-2006, the Green Paper ‘Energy Efficiency 
or Doing more with less’ EU (2005c), states that the EU must intensify its efforts in 
the transport, energy production, and building sectors to be able to achieve the energy 
efficiency targets. The Green Paper (EU 2005c; Eur 2008a) further stressed that the 
EU dependence on energy imports may rise to 70% by 2030 and outlined four key 
areas where the EU could strengthen its energy efficiency plans. These include:  
• Intensive effort is needed by the EU Commission to reverse the trend of 
increasing energy consumption, by combating energy waste.  
• Reducing the dependency on petrol usage in the transport sector.  
• Improved technology in energy production process, as 40-60% of energy 
necessary for electricity production is lost in the production process.  
• Increase energy efficiency in buildings. Heating and lighting in buildings 
accounts for 40% of all energy used in the EU. 
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Following the Green Paper (2005c), saw the evolution of the EU Action Plan for 
energy efficiency (2007-2012), released in 2006 by the European Commission. The 
action plan highlighted measures to improve the energy performance of products, 
buildings and services, improving energy transformation, limiting the costs linked to 
transport, changing behaviour, adapting and developing international partnerships 
(EU 2006c). Putting these actions and legislation to work in the EU will translate into 
a 20% reduction in energy consumption by 2020 through energy efficiency (EU 
2008b). 
 
2.2.3 Cost Competitiveness 
Cost competitiveness is defined in this thesis as the need to make energy cheap and 
affordable for households and industries. Jansen and Uyterlinde (2004) refer to the 
cost competitiveness objective of relaxing the EU’s internal electricity market, and 
they argued that competitiveness is promoted through liberalisation of the EU 
electricity and gas market, separation of energy production, transport and distribution 
activities. This is also consistent with the findings of Newberry (2006, 2005, 2004, 
2003, 2002a, 2002b), Neuhoff and Newberry (2005), Brunekreeft et al (2005). On 
this, Newberry (2002b) indicated that EU electricity and gas directives 96/92/EC and 
98/30/EC were adopted in 1996 and 1998 to further strengthen the liberalisation 
programme of the EU and required all Member States to open up their markets for 
competition by 2000, with the aim of replacing the monopolistic structures of the 
electricity market and energy sector with a competitive market. While Meyer (2003) 
argued that the European Schemes, deployed in recent times to promote renewable 
energy sources for electricity, they are related to the liberalisation of the energy 
market. Meyer (2003) also indicated that the relaxing of the electricity market in 
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Europe was first pursued by the UK in 1989 and Norway in 1991. This was before the 
European Council of Ministers adopted the Directive 96/92/EC in 1996. However, 
Ringel (2003) indicated that after accepting the directives, the EU energy sector 
witnessed an irregular change. This is primarily due to the directive 96/92/EC seeking 
to achieve low energy prices with high efficiency through competition, while 
pursuing security of energy supply, energy quality, price, and environmental 
protection (Meyer 2003).  
 
Ringel (2003) and O’Gallachoir et al (2002) indicated that the liberalisation of the 
electricity market was aimed at delivering low consumer prices and competitive 
energy costs and prices. It tends to give the end users the opportunity to choose their 
supplier freely - as well as – to be able to negotiate contracts, while generators can 
sell their electricity mix to any other market players26
 
. This is to allow the free 
interplay of supply and demand, with high hopes of increasing economic efficiency.  
Ringel (2003) also argued that market liberalisation does not pose any threat to the 
European Union objective of maintaining a balanced security of energy supply, 
neither does it affect the drive of meeting the EU’s environmental responsibilities 
rather, they complement one another. This is also true with Newbery’s (2002b) 
findings. Here, Ringel (2003) and Newbery (2002b) used the British experience as a 
case study to analyse the relationship and conflicts between energy policy and the 
desire for liberalised electricity markets. Ringel (2003) concluded that Britain has an 
advantage, since the inception of market liberalisation in 1990, and that Britain was 
also well placed in terms of security of supply. However, Newbery (2002b) indicated 
                                                 
26 The consumers represents the demand side while the generators represents 
the supply side respectively 
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that the main problem of liberalising the energy market is the tension between the 
desire of efficient, competitive and unregulated wholesale and retail markets against 
long-term investment and security of supply. 
 
In summary, in collating these drivers of change, it is noted that these energy policy 
pillars are integrated to form the basis for building a sustainable economy for the EU, 
in terms of job creation, an increase in productivity, consumer protection and the 
overall protection of the environment through the reduction of climate change impact. 
Renewable energies such as wind power are expected to play a major role in 
strengthening the EU’s effort in achieving these objectives. The next section outlines 
key EU renewable energy policy milestones before providing an overview of the 
relevance of wind power to the current debate.  
 
2.3 THE EU RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY LANDMARKS 
The White Paper (EU 1995) on energy policy for the EU is a good landmark and 
starting point for promoting the development of renewable energy sources and energy 
policy design. The White Paper (EU 1995) sets the general principle that governs the 
energy policy design of the EU. According to the White Paper, EU energy policy is 
based on the integration of the market, public interest and welfare, with sustainable 
economic and social development. Indeed, Jager-waldau et al (2004:15) pointed out 
that the establishment of a stable and common policy framework for renewable 
energy deployment in the EU is driven by four main factors: “the growing EU energy 
import dependence; security of supply; man-made climate change and Kyoto Accord 
Obligation; and the threat of missing the future of a new global renewable energy 
technology market”. 
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Two of the key documents published to promote renewable energy sources and also 
to address factors outlined above, include the Green Paper ‘Energy for the future: 
renewable sources of energy’ (EU 1996) and the White Paper ‘A community strategy 
and action plan’ (EU 1997). 
 
The Green Paper (EU 1996:3) outlined the advantages and barriers of the increased 
use of renewables, vis-à-vis community objectives and sets out the basic elements of 
a policy strategy to be implemented at both Community and Member State levels. 
The Green Paper (EU 1996) reinforces the strategic aim of promoting renewable 
energy sources as an integral part of energy policy and a number of other policies, 
and sets the objective of doubling the contribution made by renewable energy sources 
to the European Union’s balance by 2010. Similarly, the White Paper EU (1997) 
presents the goals and drive for the development and promotion of renewable energy 
sources. The document revealed that renewable energy can help reduce EU 
dependence on imports of fossil fuel, reduce the emission of CO2 and open up the 
entire economy with job opportunities for citizens. Furthermore, the strategy and 
action plan are directed towards the goal of achieving 12% penetration of renewable 
energy sources by 2010 (p10). Thus, the White Paper (EU 1997) is an important 
document that allowed Member States to shape and formulate indicative targets of 
renewable energy sources consumption. 
 
In evaluating the initial progress of the White Paper (EU 1997), the Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on the implementation of the 
community strategy and action plan on renewable energy sources (1998-2000) (EU 
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2001) reports that the share of renewable energy sources in the community increased 
from 5.8% in 1997 to 5.9% in 1998. The report reveals that Member States had little 
experience in collecting renewable energy statistics in the early 1990s. Albeit, 
evidence from EU (2001) shows that the total renewable primary energy production 
rose by 32%, while renewable energy electricity generation increased by 29%. Wind 
power in particular soared from 4541MW in 1997 to 7660MW in 1999, signifying a 
70% rate of growth. 
 
In addition to the evaluation of the implementation of the community’s strategy and 
action plan of renewable energy sources, Jager-waldau et al (2004) noted that some 
legislative instruments had been used at EU level recently to promote the deployment 
of renewable energy sources and to increase the energy efficiency of the EU. The 
most important of these legislative instruments, as far as this thesis is concerned, is 
the “Directive on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in the internal electricity market” (Directive 2001/77/EC) and the “Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources” (COM (2008) 19 final. Here, these directives set indicative 
targets for the share of renewable energy electricity for Member States, with each 
being given the freedom to choose the kind of policy instrument that would enable it 
to reach the set target. Values for Member States’ indicative targets for the 
contribution of electricity produced from renewable energy sources to gross 
electricity consumption by 2020 and the choice of policy instruments implemented by 
EU Member States are shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
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Table 2.1: National Renewables Target 
Country Share of energy from 
renewable sources in final 
consumption of energy 
2005 (%) 
Target for share of energy 
from renewable sources in 
final consumption of 
energy 2020 (%) 
Belgium 2.2 13 
Bulgaria 9.4 16 
The Czech Republic 6.1 13 
Denmark 17 30 
Germany 5.8 18 
Estonia 18 25 
Ireland 3.1 16 
Greece 6.9 18 
Spain 8.7 20 
France 10.3 23 
Italy 5.2 17 
Cyprus 2.9 13 
Latvia 34.9 42 
Lithuania 15 23 
Luxembourg 0.9 11 
Hungary 4.3 13 
Malta 0.0 10 
The Netherlands 2.4 14 
Austria 23.3 34 
Poland 7.2 15 
Portugal 20.5 31 
Romania 17.8 24 
Slovenia 16 25 
The Slovak Republic 6.7 14 
Finland 28.5 38 
Sweden 39.8 49 
United Kingdom 1.3 15 
Source: EU (2008) 19 Final; Directive 2009/28/EC 
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Table 2.2: Choice of Policy Instruments for Member States (•Present 
promoting system * Policy instrument in one region °Introduction is 
planned) 
Country Feed-
in 
tariff 
Quota 
obligation 
Tender Exemption 
from energy 
taxes 
Parts of 
the 
revenue 
of energy 
taxes 
finance 
RES 
Austria •  •  • *  •  
Belgium •  •     
Denmark •  o     
Finland •     
France •   •   
Germany •    •  
Greece •     
Ireland   •    
Italy  •     
Luxembourg •     
Netherlands    •  •  
Portugal •     
Spain •     
Sweden •  o   •   
United 
Kingdom 
 •    •  
Source: Reiche 2002 
 
The directive 2001 also proposes a harmonised framework for the promotion of 
electricity produced from renewable energy sources for the EU, and regulations for 
grid access in Member States in order to remove the possibility of discrimination 
against electricity generated from renewable energy sources. However, the directive 
is not without its weaknesses. Although it recognises the importance of a harmonised 
policy instrument for the development of renewable energy sources of electricity for 
the EU, it fails to present a model of such an instrument, rather it allows individual 
Member States the choice to implement the policy instrument that suits their market 
system.  
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In January 2007, the European Commission endorsed and published a Renewable 
Energy Roadmap which called for a mandatory target of 20% share of renewable 
energy sources of the EU Member States energy mix by 2020. To enable Member 
States to meet the set target, a new renewable energy directive (Directive 
2009/28/EC) was finally adopted in April 2009. The directive set individual targets 
for each Member State and as a consequence, it requires each to increase its 
respective share of renewable energy from the current level to an overall share of 
20% by 2020. To this end, the European Commission issued a template for National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAPs) in June 2009. Member States are 
mandated to present in June 2010, plans that sets out targets for share of energy from 
renewable sources consumed in transport, electricity, heating and cooling by 2020 
(EU 2009).  
 
In homologating the aforementioned issues, it is now important to focus on the role of 
wind power as a major source of renewable energy, particularly as wind power is 
expected to play a major role in the delivery of the Member States National Action 
Plan. Hence, this Chapter will now provide an overview of the relevance of wind 
power to the current EU renewable energy debate. 
 
2.4 RELEVANCE OF WIND POWER TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 
Over the past two decades, wind power capacity for electricity generation has grown 
significantly, such that wind power is expected to play a key role in the delivery of 
the EU renewable targets by 2020. Kjaer (2008) claims that more wind capacity was 
installed in the EU than any other power generating technology apart from natural 
gas, between 2000 and 2008. Similarly at the global level, wind capacity installed 
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reached 121,188 MW at the end of 200827
 
. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage increase 
of wind capacity installed globally between 2000 and 2008. 
Figure 2.2: Percentage Increase in World Wind Capacity (2000-2008) 
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Source: World Wind Energy Association [Online] 16th July 2009 
 
From the above graph, global wind capacity installed annually has increased every 
year. Records in 2008 also show an increase of 29% compared to 2007 figures 
(WWEA 2009), and Europe retained its place as the global wind power market 
leader. At the end of 2008, installed wind capacity reached 65,933MW, with 
Germany and Spain retaining their leading places among the world national wind 
power markets alongside the U.S.A, China and India (WWEA 2009; EWEA 2009b). 
Table 2.4 shows the percentage share of the five world leaders in installed wind 
capacity in 2008. 
 
                                                 
27 See Appendix 4 for further explanation 
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Table 2.4: Percentage share of global wind capacity installed 
Country Total capacity installed Global percentage share 
U.S.A 25,170 MW 20.77% 
Germany 23902.8 MW 19.72% 
Spain 16740 MW 13.81% 
China 12210 MW 10.08% 
India 9587 MW 7.9% 
Others 33577.9 MW 27.71% 
TOTAL 121,188 MW 100% 
Source: World Wind Energy Association [Online] 16th July 2009 
 
The subsequent sections of this Chapter examine the relevance of wind power to the 
current debate on the relevance of wind power as an alternative to conventional 
electricity generation and in terms of renewable energy provision.  
 
2.4.1 Wind Power and Electricity Generation 
According to the WWEA (2009), the world wind capacity installed by the end of 
2008 is generating 200 terawatt hours per annum. This represents over 1.5% of the 
global electricity consumption. At the EU level, EWEA (2009b:7) states that wind 
power in 2007 “produced 119 terawatt hours in an average wind year, equal to 3.7% 
EU power demand, up from 0.9% of EU electricity demand in 2000”. These figures 
increased further in 2008, and records show that installed wind power capacity 
produced 142 terawatt hours, equal to 4.2% of total EU electricity demand (EWEA 
2009b).  At Member States level, Denmark generates 21% of its total electricity 
demand from wind power, while Germany and Spain generates 7 and 12% of 
electricity respectively, from wind power (EWEA 2009a). It has also been predicted 
that the EU will reach 80,000MW wind capacity installed by 2010, which suggests 
that the EU will generate 5% of its overall electricity consumption from wind power. 
Further, with the release of the draft of the EU directive for renewables target by 
2020, it has been predicted that by 2020, between 12-14% of the EU electricity 
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consumption will be generated from wind power (EWEA 2009b). These figures 
imply that Europe’s dependence on the import of fossil fuels to meet electricity 
consumption and demand for its populace can be reduced with the deployment of 
more wind power. Against this backdrop, Kjaer (2008:2) importantly points out that: 
“renewable energies are indigenous and Europe is a world leader in wind power. By 
developing this source further it can turn the energy tables around, [with the EU] 
becoming an exporter and remaining in control of its energy costs with an unlimited 
supply of power on its door step”. 
 
2.4.2 Wind Power and Climate Change 
Wind power, when compared with conventional energy sources, has less 
environmental impact, and rather than adding to the quantity of carbon dioxide 
emission to the atmosphere, it reduces it (Kjaer 2008). Wind power does not require 
fuel to operate, thus the price fluctuations of crude oil, coal, and gas does not affect 
its operation and generation in any way. EWEA (2009c) states that the total cost of 
producing wind power throughout the 20 -25 years life span of the wind turbine can 
be predicted with great certainty. With the current installed wind power capacity, the 
EU will have exceeded its 72 million tonnes of CO2 reduction plans by 2010.  In 2007 
Kjaer (2008) pointed out that with 56,535 MW capacities installed, about 91 million 
tonnes of CO2 was avoided. The 180 GW of installed wind capacity, predicted by 
2020, would help avoid over 300 million tonnes of CO2 being emitted into the 
atmosphere and would save €8.2 billion in CO2 abatement (EWEA 2009b; Kjaer 
2008). However it is important to note that, the impact of wind power on the 
reduction of GHG emissions has been contested in recent times (Pryor and 
Barthelmie 2010; Milborrow 2009; Szarka 2007; Yang 2007; Holhinen and Tuhkanen 
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2004; Jean-Baptiste and Ducroux 2003). Furthermore, Milborrow (2009) argues that 
wind power could potentially replace other high GHG emitting energy sources, such 
as coal fired plants, while Szarka (2007) accepted the fact that wind power 
technology produces no emission, but argued that it only reduces emissions 
indirectly. In the author’s opinion this is primarily due to there being a lack of 
established standard measurement on how this can be both calculated and justified28
 
.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has highlighted the three energy pillars (security of energy supply, 
environmental protection, and cost competitiveness) on which energy policies 
worldwide are built. The desire to address these key issues bring about the 
deployment and integration of renewable energy sources into national systems, thus 
the deployment of policy instruments to make renewable energy electricity effective 
and competitive with other forms of energy, all come into play.  
 
Whist the Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Kyoto Protocol has 
failed to explicitly or strongly mention renewable energy as a possible option to be 
put into practice Hirschl (2009), this Chapter highlights the importance of renewable 
energy sources such as wind power as a viable and sustainable option to address 
environmental pollution caused by conventional electricity generation. This is 
consistent with Hirschl’s (2009: 4407) observation that: “the reason behind national 
renewable energies –whose relevance continue to increase [is that] renewable energy 
reduces our dependence on the import of ever scarcer and more expensive fossil fuels 
and at the same time provides an effective contribution to climate 
                                                 
28 For Further reading please see Szarka (2007: 128-137) 
 58 
protection…..[renewables] also creates lead markets through early development of 
green industries and sustainable jobs that also brings high export potentials in 
growing international markets.” 
   
The growth of renewable energies in the EU is closely linked to the endorsement and 
adoption of legislative instruments which enable Member States implement policy 
instruments for renewable energies. However, these legislative instruments have not 
been without limitations, and in the past, EU directives tend to lack enough evidence 
as to how Member States are mandated to meet set targets. However, with the recent 
move of the EU, through the introduction of mandatory targets (EU 2007), and the 
National Action Plans (EU 2009) it is too early to conclude on the EU’s performance 
towards the 2020 targets.  
 
Nevertheless, wind power is expected to continue to grow and make a significant 
impact towards EU energy objectives and this is primarily due to it’s availability in 
most locations of Europe; it’s clean and has limited climate change impact. Albeit, 
the use of policy instruments in Member States being necessary and would further 
help the resource to grow. Against this backdrop, this thesis therefore examines the 
performance of policy instruments implemented in Germany, The Netherlands, and 
the UK, in order to promote wind power. The next Chapter defines the nature of the 
feed-in tariff and the quota system and includes a detailed discussion of the 
typologies of evaluation criteria which permeates renewable energy literature. The 
Chapter is important because it helps put the evaluation framework presented in 
Chapter Four into context, and this will be used in order to better understand the 
 59 
nature of complexities surrounding the introduction and expansion of wind power 
within the renewable energy debate. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EUROPEAN UNION POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND EVALUATION 
CRITERIA: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter will provide an overview of typologies of policy instruments evaluation 
criteria that permeate renewable energy policy literature. Performance of policy 
instruments is defined in Chapter One as how well policy instruments have been 
successful in the delivery of wind power over time. The Chapter will suggest that 
most of the criteria presented in the literature are theoretical, and in most cases biased 
(Enzensberger et al 2002). This is considered a weakness since findings and analyses 
presented are not based on empirical evidence but on theory (Held et al 2006). 
 
The Chapter will begin by outlining key EU renewable energy policy instruments 
implemented in recent times and provide a summary definition of the feed-in tariff, 
quota, and tender systems as adopted in Germany, The Netherlands, and United 
Kingdom. However, this thesis will not attempt to examine the structure of these 
policy instruments rather it will evaluate their performance in relation to the 
evaluation framework that will be presented in Chapter Four. This is to enable this 
thesis to set in context the EU harmonisation agenda which has been subject to much 
debate in recent times. 
 
Next, the Chapter will go on to present some common policy instruments evaluation 
typologies found in the literature.  Some of these criteria have been limited to 
effectiveness and efficiency (del Rio and Gual 2007; Blok 2006). Therefore this 
Chapter aim to conclude with the limitations of current typologies and point towards 
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an integrative evaluation framework that can be used to present the views of 
stakeholders on the performance of policy instruments implemented in three country 
cases under study.  
 
3.2 TYPOLOGY OF EUROPEAN POLICY INSTRUMENTS  
In an attempt to understand the effectiveness of renewable energy supporting policies 
Harmelink et al (2006: 344) defined policy instruments as: “as any concrete activity 
initiated by the government in order to enlarge the market implementation of 
renewable energy sources”. Policy instruments are essential and implemented due to 
the need to accelerate the development of renewable energy sources. Renewables are 
still expensive and cannot compete on commercial basis with other non-renewables 
without government support (Ciocirlan 2009; Johansson and Turkenburgh 2004). 
Finon (2007) in analysing the pros and cons of alternative policies aimed at 
promoting renewables adds that policy instruments are needed to support renewables 
because of the market failures in the creation and innovation of products especially in 
the case of renewable energy replacing fossil fuels. Finon (2007) contends that 
without support, renewable energies will face entry barriers. First, is that renewables 
are expensive now because they are still in their developmental stages however, their 
costs will fall as they gain commercial maturity. Secondly, “an entry barrier stems 
from constraints and costs on integrating decentralised, renewable technologies into 
existing centralised infrastructure. The cost of integrating renewable electricity into 
the network (comprising network investment cost, balancing for intermittent 
production, the cost of regulating voltage and frequency, and so on) are indeed 
among the most important obstacles for developers and producers of renewable 
electricity” (Finon 2009:112). 
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Whist, policy instruments are needed to help limit potential risks as a result of the 
barriers pointed out by Finon (2007), they are adopted by national governments in 
order to make renewable energy electricity effective and competitive with other forms 
of energy. Hence, EU Member States implement a wide range of policy instruments 
to promote the development and application of renewable energy sources (Vehmas 
and Luukkanen 2003; Reiche 2002a). 
 
Vehmas and Luukkanen (2003) identified green certificates, investment aid, tax 
exemptions or reductions, tax refunds and direct price support as key policy 
instruments contained in the Directive 2001/77/ EC. Reiche (2002a, 2002b) also 
included the feed-in tariff, quota obligation, tender, exemption from energy tax and 
earmarking in the list. The author claimed that these policy instruments are the most 
widely implemented by EU Member States.  
 
Lauber (2002a, 2002b) has also identified some other forms of policy instruments 
implemented within the EU. Lauber (2002b) classified them into three, namely: 
financial support for R&D and financial aid invested in renewable energies; 
Directive 2001/77/EC; and the EU framework on environmental state aid. In his 
analysis, Lauber (2002b) noted that the Directive 2001/77/EC is rather a simple 
principle that enables the EU to assess the cost effectiveness and overall performance 
of various policy instruments within the community, with the aim of providing a 
framework for promoting renewable energy sources later in the future. 
 
Enzensberger et al (2002), in presenting their evaluation criteria, divided the policy 
instruments into two broad areas: the ‘legislative’ and ‘non legislative’ instruments 
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respectively. Enzensberger et al (2002) defined the former as those implemented by 
the government authorities. The authors further classified the legislative instruments 
into demand and control (regulatory) instruments and the market based (economic) 
instruments. The regulatory instruments make the market players conform to 
acceptable state laws, while the economic instrument ensures a favourable interplay 
of the market players. This is made possible by the free interaction of the supply-
push and demand-pull approach, where the market price and quantity for sale in the 
market come into play, in the form of the feed-in tariff and the quota/certificate 
systems. Enzensberger et al (2002) advocated further that the non legislative 
instruments are basically implemented by stakeholders interested in promoting 
renewable energy technology. These instruments are initiated through pricing, 
informative (educative) and administrative measures. 
 
Moreover, based on analysis, the authors identified the feed-in tariff, tender system 
and the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) as the most important policy instruments 
commonly employed by Member States. Held et al (2006:3) further divided the 
European policy instruments into direct and indirect policy instruments. Direct policy 
instruments “aim at the immediate stimulation of RES-E, whereas indirect 
instruments focus on improving long-term framework conditions.” See Appendix 6 
for Held et al (2006) classification of policy instruments. 
 
However, Ackerman et al (2001) argued that these policy instruments do not 
necessarily bring about cost reductions, while some of the instruments, like the 
combination of the green certificate and the quota system may attempt to provide the 
desired cost reduction, but its implementation to date has not been successful in this 
 64 
regard. Figure 3.1 shows the typology of the common policy instruments utilised by 
the EU Member States. 
 
Figure 3.1: Key policy instrument implemented by EU Member States 
  
Source: Author Generated 
 
 
3.2.1 The Feed-in Tariff System 
This refers to the price per KWh payable by the local distribution company for local 
renewable energy generation fed into the local distribution grid. The concept feed-in 
tariff also applies to the total amount per KWh received by an independent producer 
of renewable electricity, including production subsidies and tax refunds (Haas et al 
2004; Sijm 2002; Ackerman et al 2001). The feed-in tariff system is the most 
implemented and successful policy instrument used in promoting renewable energy 
sources in the EU. The system is used mostly by the European wind power market 
leaders e.g. Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Denmark in the past. The Government 
usually fixes the price of electricity produced from renewable sources and mandates 
Policy Instrument 
Feed-in Tariff Quota System Tender System 
EU Member States 
e.g. Germany, 
Netherlands, and the 
UK,  
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utilities to buy the electricity at the set price. The feed-in tariff is provided for a 
specified period of time and differs from one renewable energy source technology to 
another because of the difference in generation cost. It is price driven, as it tends to 
favour the producers, especially when the fixed price is high, at the expense of 
electricity consumers (Menanteau et al 2003; Jansen 2003).  
 
3.2.2 The Quota System 
The quota system is a relatively new policy instrument for promoting renewable 
energy sources. It is quantity driven and also referred to as the Renewable Portfolio 
Standard (RPS). The quota system is also aimed at increasing demand for renewable 
electricity and was recently implemented in Sweden and the UK. It is a system, 
whereby utilities or producers are obliged to provide and sell a certain amount/ 
percentage of energy mix from renewable energy sources. To ensure proper 
implementation, a penalty is charged for non-compliance by the obligated parties 
(van der Linden et al 2005). 
 
3.2.3 The Tender System 
The tender system is a system that brings together investors and developers to 
compete through a competitive bidding system. The investors in this case compete for 
an electricity premium purchase agreement and government administered fund. The 
electricity producers are obliged, by the government, to buy a considerable volume of 
electricity generated from renewable sources, at a premium price. The difference 
between the market price and the premium price is paid back to the utilities/electricity 
provider through a non-discriminating levy on all domestic electricity consumption. 
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The tender system has been used in the UK (under NFFO) and France (Menanteau et 
al 2003; van Dijk et al 2003). 
 
3.3 TYPOLOGY OF EVALUATION CRITERIA  
Renewable energy policy instruments have been evaluated using various criteria and 
approach. Majority of the criteria found in the literature relating to policy instruments 
evaluation are centred on effectiveness and Efficiency. Held et al (2006:2) pointed 
out that: “the literature reviewing the effectiveness and efficiency of various 
promotion strategies for RES-E has attracted increasing attention in recent years.” 
This connote that effectiveness and efficiency are main criteria of evaluation of 
policy instruments, other criteria are secondary (Verbruggen 2009). This brings the 
question; what is effectiveness and efficiency and how has it been defined in the 
literature? 
 
van Dijk et al (2003) defined effectiveness of policy instrument from a quantitative 
view as the amount of capacity added through policy instruments. While Held et al 
(2006) contends that the definition offered by van Dijk et al (2003) does not 
represent appropriate indicator of effectiveness and therefore defined it in terms 
available potential for individual renewable energy technology in a specific country. 
van der Linden et al (2005) viewed the effectiveness criterion as the ability of policy 
instrument to deliver a large capacity over a period of time. Verbruggen (2009) adds 
further that effectiveness of a policy instrument should ask clarification on three 
aspects of (i) goal and target setting; (ii) quantification of RES-E sources and 
technologies; (iii) robustness of obtained levels of effectiveness. On the other hand, 
Verbruggen (2009), Held et al (2006), del Rio and Gual (2007), van der Linden et al 
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(2005), and van Dijk et al (2003) defined efficiency of policy instrument in relation 
to costs and benefits of renewable energy sources to the society. 
 
Whist, the definition of the two main criteria is subject to much debate, Lewis and 
Wiser (2007), Mitchell et al (2006), Harmelink et al (2006), Sawin (2004), Meyer 
(2003), van Dijk et al (2003), and Enzensberger et al (2002) are the most cited 
academic commentators who recently presented policy instruments evaluation 
criteria and in some cases analysed the performance of key policy instruments 
implemented by the EU Member States. Evidence from the criteria described by 
these authors shows that policy instruments has been analysed in different ways and 
are mostly based on theoretical experience rather than empirical evidence (del Rio 
and Gual 2007; Enzensberger et al 2002). In some cases analyses are done in favour 
of policy makers and government actors involved in renewable energy policy making 
process (van der Linden et al 2005; Enzensberger et al 2002). In some cases these 
analyses have also been biased. For example Enzensberger et al (2002: 786) provide 
an evaluation criterion for measuring the effectiveness of policy instruments (e.g. 
feed-in tariffs, quota system, etc) implemented by EU Member States. The author 
argued that “while these criteria are helpful and commonly used to assess and to 
compare policy instruments from the point of view of a policy maker, they neglect in 
many cases the interest of other important stakeholder groups”.  Enzensberger et al 
(2002) evaluation criteria are summarised in Figure 3.2:  
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Figure 3.2: Typology of Evaluation Criteria (i) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Enzensberger et al (2002) 
 
The authors identified different stakeholder groups as: non governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and politically active ecologists, national policy makers, 
international policy makers, investors, project developers and plant suppliers, and 
utility companies. Each of these stakeholders has an interest in the design and 
formulation of present and future policy instruments.  
 
van Dijk et al (2003) also provides an interesting contribution to the literature on 
evaluation criteria. However, the criteria presented by these authors are theoretical in 
nature (del Rio and Gual 2007; van der Linden et al 2005). According to van Dijk et 
al (2003), the criteria used in measuring the performance of any policy instrument 
are defined by the contribution of such instrument to the sustainable growth of the 
renewable energy market. This definition is further broken down to a set of criteria 
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which conforms to that presented by Enzensberger et al (2002). However, this thesis 
argues that the evaluation method presented by van Dijk et al (2003) is an 
advancement of the evaluation criteria discussed in Enzensberger et al (2002). van 
Dijk et al (2003) set of evaluation criteria included: the measure of effectiveness, 
cost effectiveness, certainty of industry, market efficiency (static and dynamic) 
transaction costs and administrative capacity, equity (fair distribution benefits) and 
market conformity of policy instruments. The policy instruments used for analysis 
also include: the feed-in tariff; quota; competitive bidding system; subsidies and 
fiscal measures; investment support; and labelling and green tariffs. Figure 3.3 
depicts van Dijk et al (2003) evaluation criteria. 
Figure 3.3: Typology of Evaluation Criteria (ii) 
  
Source: van Dijk et al (2003) 
 
The analysis provided by van der Linden et al (2005) also follows the same approach 
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instrument, indicated that the renewables obligation systems in the USA, UK, and 
Sweden are assessed based on the criteria presented in van Dijk et al (2003). 
However, the authors selected some features of the criteria (effectiveness, market 
efficiency, certainty of renewable energy system electricity industry, cost 
effectiveness, and equity), and introduced the stakeholders support for the system as 
being last in the list of their criteria. van der Linden et al (2005) modified the criteria 
presented by van Dijk et al (2003) in order to explain in detail the efficiency and to 
ensure the effectiveness and benefits of adopting the quota system. Furthermore, they 
clearly explained the direct effect the quota system had on the EU and international 
renewable energy market. According to the authors, the report was commissioned by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs to review the experiences gained by using the quota 
system and to enable the Dutch government to make the decision whether or not to 
implement a similar system in the near future. Figure 3.4 summarises the criteria 
presented by van der Linden et al (2005). 
Figure 3.4: Typology of Evaluation Criteria (iii) 
 
 
Source: van der Linden et al 2005 
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One main criticism directed towards van der Linden et al (2005) criteria is that it is 
theoretical and not based on empirical evidence (del Rio and Gual 2007).  Therefore, 
in this study, the criteria is further modified in order to move the debate forward and 
to explain the empirical involvement of various stakeholder groups and their 
perception of the policy instruments implemented in the EU Member States. This is 
very important, as this thesis argues that the success of any policy instrument 
depends on its design and implementation. This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Four of this thesis.  
 
Sawin (2004) also argued that the effectiveness of any policy instrument will depend 
on how it has been designed and enforced. Sawin (2004), however, claimed that 
using a particular policy instrument does not bring about success, what creates 
success is the recognition and understanding by the Government, of the type of 
technologies to be promoted. Based on these findings, Sawin (2004) argued that a 
good evaluation framework, that measures the performance of policy instruments 
should be predictable, long-term and consistent with clear government intent29, it 
must be appropriate30, flexible31, credible and enforceable32, simple and clear33, and 
transparent34
 
. 
Harmelink et al (2006) also advocate that additional policy instruments/incentives 
are needed to reach the national and indicative targets at EU level. To this effect, 
                                                 
29 Ability to provide certainty that can draw investors into the renewable energy 
industry market  
30 The ability of policy to match with renewable energy source government 
objectives  
31 Easily adjusted 
32 Convincing and effective 
33 Ability of policy to be easily implemented, understandable and easy to comply 
with 
34 Ability to be open and fair in all respects 
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Harmelink et al (2006), unlike Enzensberger et al (2002), presented a checklist to 
assess the performance of policy instruments and further describe the success and the 
risk factors of these instruments respectively. Harmelink et al (2006) split the policy 
instruments that were implemented and effective, before and after September 2001, 
into two: Active (policies passed by parliament in different EU Member States before 
September 2001, these include: budgets and tax exemptions). The continued policies 
(incentives continued)35. Based on this description, Harmelink et al (2006) drew up 
two checklists to demonstrate how the effectiveness of policy instruments can be 
determined36. They distinguished between the characteristics of the instruments by 
determining the ‘theoretical37’ and ‘actual38
                                                 
35 These include: compensation schemes directed towards one technology and 
stated in government documents; the generic instruments; and policies in 
advanced phase of development (Harmelink et al; 2006). 
’ effectiveness of each policy instrument. 
Harmelink et al (2006), however, claimed that the methods presented above, allow a 
great variety of characterisations and help explain the factors influencing the 
implementation of renewable sources, inclusive of technical and market factors. 
Harmelink et al (2006) also demonstrated a practical approach in the development of 
the use of renewable energy. This was undertaken by using four criteria to make a 
country by country analysis of the development of renewable energy sources at EU 
level. The first step involves the collection and analysis of information on the 
development and use of renewable energy sources over the period 1990-1999; the 
national targets for renewable energy sources; the implementation potential; and 
policy instruments put in place to support the use of renewable sources. The second 
step is based on the active policies used for the development of renewable energy 
36 The effectiveness of different types of policy instruments, success and risk 
factors of supporting individual renewable energy sources.  
37 The basic elements for each instrument required to allow it have an effect on 
implementation of renewable energy sources. 
38  Factors that need to be put in place to achieve the theoretical effectiveness. 
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sources between 2003 and 2010. The third step examines the impact of continued 
policies for the period of 2003 to 2010. The fourth step examines the shortfall in 
national targets and finally, the deficit in the EU target. 
 
In an attempt to evaluate the success of policy strategies for the promotion of 
electricity from renewable energy sources in the EU, Held et al (2006:2) present the 
following criteria;  
• “Effectiveness: there should be a substantial increase in RES-E capacity; 
• Economic efficiency: electricity from RES-E capacities should be generated 
at competitive costs which should decrease over time (due to learning 
effects); 
Strategy targets derived from these criteria are: 
• ensure sustainable growth of the RES-E industry; 
• enhance social acceptance and increase public awareness with respect to 
renewable energy; 
• improve technical reliability, technical performance and standardisation; 
• remove obstacles with respect to grid-connection; and 
• strive for low administration costs, low transaction costs and minimise public 
financial support to reach a certain level of installed RES-E capacity.”  
 
Held et al (2006) contends that the main objective of implementing policy 
instruments is to increase the capacity installed for generating renewable electricity. 
Therefore, the criteria presented by Held et al (2006) are limited to effectiveness and 
efficiency. This is a significant weakness. Verbruggen (2009) applied similar 
evaluation criteria for the Flanders’ tradable certificates system.  The Verbruggen 
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(2009: 1385) contends that: “evaluation of RES-E support policies starts at 
clarifying the objectives adopted by policy makers, when designing support schemes 
and instrument”.  Justifying his argument, Verbruggen (2009) focuses on three 
criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Equity criterion is measured “first, [by] 
the realisation of the widely accepted “polluters pay” principle; second, [by] the 
avoidance of excess (monopoly and swindle) profits by free-riders” (Verbruggen 
2009:1388).  
 
Again, Verbruggen (2009) criteria and analysis is abstract as it is not based on 
empirical evidence. More broad description of renewable energy policy instrument 
evaluation criteria is provided by del Rio and Gual (2007).  
 
del Rio and Gual (2007) contends that although the FIT is often regarded as most 
effective policy instrument, care must be taken on how the FIT is set. del Rio and 
Gual (2007) therefore provides the following criteria for evaluating the FIT. 
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Figure 3.5: Typology of Evaluation Criteria (iv) 
 
Source: del Rio and Gual (2007) 
Author Generated. 
Although, del Rio and Gual (2007) criteria goes beyond ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘efficiency’ criteria, it was designed and intended to analyse the FIT system. it is 
limited to Member States with FIT experience e.g. Spain, Germany, and Denmark39
 
. 
This is a significant weakness.  
Having outlined and discussed policy instruments evaluation criteria found in the 
literature, the Chapter now goes on to review renewable energy policy literature that 
applied various approaches to analyse and compare policy instruments.  
 
3.4 EVALUATION AND COMPARISON LITERATURE 
Finon (2007), Lipp (2007), Szarka (2007), Mitchell et al (2006), Toke (2006), 
Hvelplund (2005, 2001), Lauber (2004), Sawin (2004), and Menanteau et al (2003) 
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provide an important contribution to the comparison of common policy instruments 
implemented in most EU Member States. Mitchell et al (2006), for example, 
analysed and compared the effectiveness of the renewables obligation of England 
and Wales and the German feed-in tariff, with respect to risk reduction in terms of 
price, volume, and balancing risk. The authors argue that the success of the feed-in 
system is due to the lower risk and higher security the system tends to offer 
investors. Mitchell et al (2006) split the security provided by the feed-in system into 
‘price risk’, ‘volume risk,’ and ‘balancing risk’. The authors advocate that the 
guaranteed feed-in tariff provides renewable energy generators with prices higher 
than the normal market price and, as such, provides the hedge against price volatility, 
saving the generator costs. Mitchell et al (2006) indicated that the feed-in system 
does not present volume risk, like other mechanisms. The feed-in system guarantees 
all renewable energy generated and bought from generators. The feed-in tariff also 
eliminates the risk of balancing, it allows generators to feed all generated output 
directly into the grid and does not penalise unreliable generation, thus, boosting 
investors’ confidence. 
 
In contrast, and using the same principle, Mitchell et al (2006) argued that the 
renewables obligation of England and Wales does not reduce price risk, as the value 
of the ROC and others largely relies on supply and demand. It is also difficult to 
predict what will become of the ROC once the UK’s 10.4% target is met. Similarly, 
there is volume of risk, as analysed by Mitchell et al (2006,) as generators are not 
guaranteed security of output purchase after 2027. Generators, as well are mandated 
to make electricity market decisions; this affects smaller independent producers as it 
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is not cost effective for them and they are fined for any discrepancies occurring, 
creating a balancing risk. 
 
With these evaluations and comparisons, Mitchell et al (2006) concluded that the 
German feed-in system is more effective than the renewables obligation of England 
and Wales, because of its ability to reduce price, volume, and balancing risk more 
effectively than the renewables obligation. This is also true with the findings of 
Hvelplund (2005, 2001). 
 
Moreover, Hvelplund (2005, 2001) put emphasis on two renewable energy policy 
instruments: the quota system and the renewable feed-in tariff system. He classified 
these systems into two broad models (a) political price/amount market40 (PPAM) and 
(b) the political quota/certificate price market41
 
 (PQPM). In comparison, Hvelplund 
(2001) argued that the political quota/certificate price market does not foster 
competition. Hvelplund (2001) argued that the PQPM discourages competition 
between investors as it allows for a higher profit margin for wind turbine owners in 
regions with high wind capacity and a lower margin for turbine owners in regions 
with poor wind capacity. Hvelplund (2001), therefore, concluded that the PQPM is 
not a suitable model for the promotion of the renewable energy market, because it is 
politically influenced, while the PPAM is not, making the latter preferable to the 
former.  
The comparison outlined by Menanteau et al (2003) follows a similar approach to 
that of Hvelplund (2001) and he presented the incentives used in most of the EU 
                                                 
40 political prices for electricity from renewable sources are fixed with quality to 
be produced determined by the market forces 
41 the quantity is fixed as quota with prices determined by the market 
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Member States to support the development of wind power in two forms: the feed-in 
tariff, and the competitive bidding system. Menanteau et al (2003) analysed the 
performance of these policy incentives using four criteria. These are: ‘capacity to 
stimulate renewable electricity generation’, ‘net overall cost for the community’, 
‘incentives to reduce costs and prices’, and ‘incentives to innovate’. 
 
In terms of capacity to stimulate renewable electricity generation and incentives to 
enter the market, Menanteau et al (2003) analysed the two incentives in respect to 
future profitability, risks and transaction costs. Future profitability is guaranteed, as a 
result of the prospects of return on investment offered, by the high prices of the feed-
in tariff. Menanteau et al (2003) found that this is the case for German, Danish, and 
Spanish led sustained wind power development, in relation to installed capacity and 
industrial development. The feed-in tariff also guarantees low transaction costs and 
low risk because continued subsidies are granted to new developers, allowing 
investors to control costs. In comparison, Menanteau et al (2003) advocated that the 
lower purchase price of bidding systems is open to risks and results in a small 
amount of installed capacity. The bidding system is also surrounded by uncertainty in 
the profitability of projects, which is accompanied by huge costs for procurement and 
preparation. The authors advocated that the granting of subsidies to successful 
bidders is uncertain, while the unsuccessful bidders are left to bear the costs incurred 
in the preparing and bidding processes, bringing about lower profits in comparison to 
the feed-in tariff system. The bidding system also places less importance on factors 
that tend to make projects materialise. Environmental impact studies, education, 
information, public interest and awareness etc, are not fully considered, as in the case 
of the feed-in tariff. The effect of this is translated in the wider spread of projects in 
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Member States implementing the feed-in tariff by high profits and an even 
distribution of projects, leading to a geographically balanced development, as is the 
case with Germany as opposed to England and Wales, where there is great public 
resistance. 
 
Menanteau et al (2003), in relation to the net overall cost of supporting renewable 
energy sources, found that the feed-in tariff, although very simple to administer, is 
very costly in terms of subsidies compared to the bidding system, which allows for a 
controlled subsidy. The feed-in system does not have a controlled subsidy system 
because of its institutional rigidity. However, Menanteau et al (2003) argued that the 
two policy instruments in question are similar in certain respects because of the 
favourably large share of differential rent which the feed-in tariff tends to provide for 
producers, while the competitive bidding system allows indirect control of public 
expenses through successive quotas. 
 
Menanteau et al (2003) also found that the bidding systems provide greater 
incentives at lower prices and costs when compared to the feed-in system, which is 
less flexible and reversible than the bidding system. The authors maintain that this is 
due to the use of the best available sites which the competitive bidding system tends 
to provide, and a combination of other factors. Menanteau et al (2003) also noted 
that the feed-in tariff brings about technical change and surpluses shared among 
investors and manufacturers, while in the competitive bidding system producers are 
mandated to pass on the surplus at lower costs to tax payers. This makes the 
technical and learning effects of the feed-in tariff implemented by Member States 
greater for manufacturers because it helps build and promote producers generating 
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capacity. Similarly, the lower profit margin of the competitive bidding system brings 
with it a reduced R&D investment capacity for manufacturers and suppliers. The 
authors, therefore, concluded that the feed-in tariff system is more efficient than the 
competitive bidding system. 
 
Moreover, Sawin (2004) provided a very good contribution to the comparison of the 
feed-in tariff system and the quota system discussions. Sawin’s (2004) approach is 
presented in Figure 3.6: 
 
Figure 3.6: Summary of Sawin (2004) approach for comparison of Policy 
Instrument 
 
Author Generated 
 
Sawin (2004), however, concluded that for renewable energy to reach its full 
potential policies and framework conditions need to be established to allow for the 
development of sustained renewable energy technology markets and industries that 
are able to help deliver and promote a reduction in cost and increased renewable 
energy capacity. Sawin (2004) also pointed out that the feed-in tariff system has, so 
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far, been the most successful policy instrument implemented in the EU. It has led to 
cost reductions and economies of scale and an increased installed capacity of 
renewable energy sources. However, Sawin (2004) recommends a combination of 
policies to deliver the required cost reductions and lower risks expected from 
renewable energy sources. 
 
Toke (2006) provides an excellent comparison of the renewables obligation (UK) to 
other policy instruments (German feed-in tariff). Toke (2006) argued that the feed-in 
tariff is more expensive than the renewables obligation for three reasons (i) the 
German feed-in tariff declines over 20 years of fixed payments (ii) base load of 
electricity prices is higher (iii) lower wind speed.  Equally, in terms of capacity 
factor, Toke (2006) found the German feed-in tariff produced lower subsidy per 
quantity of installed capacity, than was the case for the renewables obligation. The 
explanation put forward by Toke (2006) revolved around the fact that private 
investment in capital investment is tax deductible, with marginal tax rates for the 
highest income group, up to 50%, making investment in Germany more attractive 
than in the UK for instance. 
 
Toke (2006) also argued that the renewables obligation is not as flexible as the feed-
in tariff because the former tends to set a single level of payment for all renewable 
energy generators, both onshore and offshore. Similarly, while analysing the 
renewables obligation and the feed-in tariff, in terms of cooperative/local ownership, 
Toke (2006) argued that the feed-in tariffs are not necessarily better than the 
renewable energy obligation in supporting projects owned by cooperatives. The 
author concluded that cultural factors are responsible for the pattern of ownership of 
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wind power schemes in the UK. In summary, it can be deduced that the financial 
returns per MW of installed capacity of the renewables obligation is much higher 
compared to the feed-in tariff system.  
 
Lauber (2004) also put forward an important argument in comparing the two policy 
instruments analysed by other authors. Lauber (2004) in comparison, recognises that 
the REFIT system favours early and rapid growth of renewable sources while the 
RPS/TGC accommodates stable and predictable growth. Lauber (2004), like 
Menanteau et al (2003), argued that the REFIT favours the producers of renewable 
energy source equipment because of the support it provides to various technologies, 
from the early stage of development until market competitiveness. Whereas the 
RPS/TGC favours the time period when the technology is near market, because of 
the low prices it tends to provide at an early stage of development. In a concluding 
remark, Lauber (2004) suggested that the two incentives could be used to develop a 
harmonised framework for more efficient and effective policies implemented in 
favour of renewable energy sources, vis-à-vis wind power. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has presented the evaluative criteria found in the literature to appraise 
the performance of various policy instruments that have been employed so far to 
promote the development of renewable energy electricity in Europe. However, policy 
instruments in this thesis has been defined as being the economic tools, put in place 
by the EU and national government/authorities, to help push renewable energy 
electricity to the energy market, thereby making them competitive alongside the non 
renewable energy sources.  No doubt, literature that presents criteria for evaluating 
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policy instruments are numerous but the problem with the literature as highlighted in 
this Chapter is that they are abstract, and provide a theoretical analyses of the 
performance of EU policy instruments. Majority of the analysis and comparison 
presented in the literature are biased as they do not represent the views of stakeholder 
in the wind power industry, they only represent the views of policy makers 
(Enzensberger et al 2002; del Rio and Gual 2007). Although, majority of the 
renewable energy policy evaluation literature aims to understand the justification for 
the choice of policy instruments by Member States, and in most cases attempt to 
evaluate the relevance of such to the growth of wind power and other renewable 
energy sources, the consequences of presenting ‘one sided’ and ‘theoretical’ views 
about policy instruments limits the understanding of the how well policy instruments 
has performed in moving the EU wind power industry forward and also limit the 
understanding of the experiences with the design, and operations of policy 
instruments. This thesis is therefore intended to develop policy evaluation framework 
from the first hand knowledge gained in the literature and then apply that as a tool or 
framework for evaluating the performance of policy the feed-in tariff, the MEP, and 
the renewables obligation. Thus, evidence gathered and analysis will be based on the 
views of policy makers, and other stakeholders that these policy instruments directly 
impact upon in the wind power industry.  
 
Chapter Four presents the evaluation criteria used for analysis in Chapters Six to 
Eight of this thesis. Results obtained in these Chapters will be used in Chapter Nine 
to compare and contrast wind power policy instruments and set in context the 
harmonisation plans of the EU, which have been a subject of debate and conjecture 
in recent times. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to develop an integrative framework for evaluating the 
performance of wind power policy instruments in three EU Member States. More 
specifically, the study aims to critically compare and contrast the performance of the 
feed-in tariff and quota system in order to set in context the discussion on EU 
harmonisation agenda which is subject to current debate. 
 
Chapter Three provided an overview of the literature on policy instrument evaluation 
criteria in the EU. Nevertheless, the Chapter concludes that, most evaluation criteria 
provided in the literature are limited in that they are based on abstract, and not on 
empirical evidence. They are biased as such limits the understanding of the 
performance of the EU policy instruments.  
 
Based on the literature reviewed in Chapter Three, a new evaluation framework has 
been developed in this Chapter. This framework will allow the researcher to evaluate 
the performance of policy instruments used in the three country cases under 
investigation. Historical institutional theory provides a theoretical lens through which 
to explain the outcomes of the implementation of choice policy instruments by 
country cases under investigation. As pointed out in Chapter One, the notion of path 
dependency helps this thesis to explore the diversity of wind power industry across 
the EU. Thus, this Chapter will provide an overview of policy design conditions as 
required in Directive 2001/77/EC before discussing the framework conditions and a 
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brief justification for the selection of evaluation criteria. Finally, the evaluation 
criteria are grouped further into four clusters. 
  
4.2 POLICY INSTRUMENTS DESIGN CONDITIONS 
As pointed out in previous Chapters, renewable energy sources are near marker 
technologies, and requires adequate support to enable them compete on commercial 
basis with non-renewable energy sources. However, when policy instruments are not 
designed properly, the aim of promoting renewables may not be achieved in the 
long-run. de Jager and Rathmann (2008:4) contends that: “a good policy instrument 
design that reduce the cost of renewable electricity by 10 to 30%”. Grotz and 
Fouquet (2005) also argue that; success in achieving politically fixed targets will not 
be feasible without a good and reliable policy instrument which secures investor 
confidence. Therefore, EU Directive 2001/77/EC states that any proposal for a policy 
instrument should address the following issues: 
• Contribute to achievement of the national indicative targets. 
• Be compatible with the principle of internal electricity market. 
• Take into account the characteristics of different sources of renewable energy, 
together with the different technologies, and geographical differences. 
• Promote the use of renewable energy sources in an effective way, and be 
simple and at the same time, as efficient as possible; particularly in terms of 
costs. 
• Include sufficient transitional periods for national policy instruments of at 
least seven years and maintain investor confidence. 
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Morthorst et al (2005:8) also noted that policy instruments are not, by themselves, 
sufficient for an extensive deployment of renewable sources. Other issues need to be 
put in place to make a successful policy instrument. Instruments must be well 
designed with the electricity generators having good access to the grid. This implies 
that administrative barriers are removed and application processes are streamlined, 
while public participation and acceptance of renewables is widely encouraged. This 
research upholds this fact and argues that the success of any policy instrument 
depends on how it is designed and implemented.  Therefore the criteria, applied for 
the evaluation of the policy instruments implemented in the EU Member States 
investigated, is based on the following conditions: (i) The implementation of policy 
instrument is important in delivering the huge potential of wind power in the EU; 
and, (ii) Policy instruments should therefore be capable of reaching a politically fixed 
target within the time frame stipulated, at minimum or least cost possible, with little 
or no risk of uncertainties.  
 
The evaluation criteria discussed in this study focuses on how this is achieved over 
time. It is also assumed that policy instruments should receive wide support from 
stakeholders and interest groups with a vested interest in wind power. Policy 
instruments should provide incentives for both small and large investors, such that a 
level playing field of competition is created without discrimination in the market. 
Policy instruments also need to be designed to conform to the legal and market 
regulations, especially the internal electricity market or the electricity market 
liberalisation pursued by the EU and its Member States. 
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4.2.1 Evaluation Criteria 
Various frameworks and approaches have been developed to evaluate the 
performance of policy instruments (see Chapter Three).  Drawing on the 
international wind power literature, including, for example, de Jager and Rathmann 
(2008), del Rio and Gual (2007), Dinica (2006), Harmelink et al (2006), Mitchell et 
al (2006), Toke (2006), Connor (2005), Elliot (2005), van der Linden (2005), Lauber 
(2004), Sawin (2004), Haas et al (2004), van Dijk et al (2003), Menanteau et al 
(2003), Sijm (2002), Wiser et al (2002), Enzensberger et al (2002), and Hvelplund 
(2001). This study has identified the following criteria that seem to permeate existing 
debates. However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the main criticism of these 
standards is that they are theoretical in nature. They are not based on empirical 
evidence. In most cases analyses based on these conditions are limited to a few 
stakeholder groups (Ezensberger et al 2002; del Rio and Gual 2007). This is the 
reason why this study has modified the criteria from the literature, to account for 
wide coverage of different stakeholder groups. Furthermore, rather than offering a 
theoretical analysis of the performance of the policy instruments deployed by 
Member States to promote wind power, this study applied the evaluation framework 
as a guide to the design of interview schedule and used it for gathering empirical 
data.   These measures will subsequently be applied to assess the performance of the 
German feed-in tariff, the Dutch MEP, and the UK renewables obligation. 
  
4.2.1.1 Administration 
The policy instrument needs to reduce regulatory and non-regulatory barriers, 
streamline and expedite administrative procedures, ensure that guiding principles and 
rules are objective, transparent and non discriminatory, and fully take into account 
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the peculiarities of the various renewable energy technologies. Policy instruments 
should also be cost effective and simple to implement. Transparency is defined here 
as the ease of access to information on investment and financial related data from 
governmental regulatory bodies. Under this criterion, the questions explored include: 
• To what extent is the policy instrument transparent and easy to understand? 
• Is the policy instrument flexible and practicable? 
• Is the administrative and transactional cost low compared to other policy 
instrument? 
 
4.2.1.2   Stakeholders support/ involvement 
Stakeholders in this context are defined broadly to include parties or groups that are 
affected by policy choices and facilitate policy instruments. Stakeholders can react 
differently – they can facilitate or indeed inhibit the deployment of wind power.  The 
extent to which the policy instrument encourages stakeholder groups to participate 
and be involved in wind power deployment is crucial to successful implementation.  
Under this criterion the questions explored include: 
• Does the policy instrument involve stakeholder groups in its design and 
implementation? 
• Do stakeholders largely favour the policy instrument? 
• Ultimately, to what extent does the policy instrument encourage corporate 
ownership and/or community ownership of wind power? 
 
4.2.1.3 Certainty for industry 
The willingness of investors to enter the wind power market is crucial to the 
expansion of wind power capacity.  A policy instrument must be capable of attracting 
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a wide range of new investors to the market and it must be stable over the longer 
term, so that investor confidence can be guaranteed.  Policy instruments are highly 
risky when they are not stable and are unpredictable, with investors usually being put 
off when this happens.  Under this criterion, the questions explored include: 
• Does the policy instrument possess characteristics that ensure investor 
confidence? 
• To what extent is the policy instrument perceived by investors and 
stakeholders as stable or unstable, both in the short-to-medium term and in the 
long-term? 
• To what extent does the policy instrument mitigate investment risks? 
 
Next are the effectiveness and efficiency criteria. Most of the comparative analysis in 
the literature that focussed on these criteria has defined them in different ways, (for 
example see del Rio and Gual 2007; Szarka 2007; Elliot 2007, 2005; Toke 2007, 
2006; EU 2005; van der Linden et al 2005; van Dijk et al 2003) however, Szarka 
(2007:94) noted that of all the contentions between the definition and 
conceptualization of both criteria, “outcomes have turned out to be more complex”. 
For this study, subheadings 4 and 5’s definition of both criteria offered by Szarka 
(2007) has been selected for it appropriateness, as it appears to capture the definition 
offered by a number of authors. 
 
4.2.1.4   Effectiveness 
Szarka (2007:93) states that: “the criterion of effectiveness concerns the quantity of 
the new capacity coming on line and the timeliness of build in relation to targets”. 
Therefore, effectiveness can be simply measured by the extent to which the policy 
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instrument has performed, in terms of how fast and in what quantity wind power has 
added to new installed capacity, in meeting politically fixed targets.  Under this 
criterion questions explored include: 
• To what extent has the policy instrument performed in achieving politically 
fixed targets? 
• How much and in what quantity has the policy instrument delivered over 
time? 
• How does this compare with other policy instruments? 
 
4.2.1.5   Efficiency  
According to Szarka (2007:93) “the criterion of efficiency relates primarily to the 
price competitiveness of generation...it also concerns other dimensions of 
competition, notably equipment costs”. Therefore, one of the main means used to 
assess the performance of policy instruments has been to focus on the cost of their 
operation. Efficiency can be measured in terms of the costs of operating the policy 
instrument, to ensure a reasonable market and competitive price for investors when 
compared with other forms of energy.  Efficiency also needs to take into 
consideration the risk factors over time.  For investors, assessing risk is essential in 
terms of price, volume, and for system balancing. Under this criterion questions 
which are explored include: 
• Is the policy instrument capable of delivering wind power at a low cost to 
consumers? 
• Is the policy instrument efficient in reducing production risks, and investment 
costs? 
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• Does the policy instrument provide a reasonable market and competitive price 
for wind power? 
 
4.2.1.6  Market Conformity 
Policy instruments need to be designed in a way that they fit into the existing market 
and legal systems. Directive 2001/77/EC Article Four sub section 2(b), also states 
that policy instruments implemented by Member States should be compatible with the 
principles of the internal electricity market. Some Member States already have fully 
liberalised power markets including power exchanges, while others are still in 
transition. Thus it becomes increasingly important how well a policy instrument fits 
into a liberalised power market and eventually the development of competition in 
European power market. Market conformity aims to examine the extent of which 
policy instruments are compatible with the legal and market system of the internal 
electricity market, hence liberalisation of the electricity market, international and 
cross boundary trade (Wiser et al 2002; Sijm 2002). Under this criterion the questions 
which are explored include: 
• Is the policy instrument compatible with the legal and market conditions of 
internal electricity market? 
• Does the policy instrument encourage competition among suppliers and 
generators of electricity? 
 
4.2.1.7   Finance 
Financial security examines the extent to which a policy instrument is able to 
guarantee security and return on investment, with low or no risk, over a long period 
of time.  Sawin (2004) argued that long term certainty results from guaranteed prices 
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that facilitate the willingness of investors to invest in wind power projects.  A further 
dimension is to assess the ease at which wind power projects are able to secure 
finance from banks and other lending institutions. Questions explored include: 
• Does the policy instrument guarantee return on investment? 
• Is it easy to obtain finance for investment in wind power with the policy 
instrument? 
• Does the policy instrument possess a high or low risk of encouraging or 
discouraging support from financial institutions? 
 
4.2.1.8   Impact on economic development  
This aims to assess the impact of policy instrument in contributing to economic 
development (e.g. employment), and environmental responsibility (e.g. reductions of 
greenhouse gases).  Morthorst et al (2005) have also identified that positive local 
effects need to be considered, including enhanced public support for renewable 
energies. Questions explored include: 
• Does the policy instrument encourage local and economic development? 
• Does the policy instrument contribute to environmental objectives including 
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions? 
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Table 4.4: Evaluation Criteria and Questions Guiding the Research 
 
Evaluation 
Criteria 
Questions Guiding The Research 
Administration • To what extent is the policy instrument transparent and easy to 
understand? 
• Is the policy instrument flexible and practicable? 
• Is the administrative and transactional cost low compared to 
other policy instruments? 
Stakeholder 
Support/ 
involvement 
• Does the policy instrument involve stakeholder groups in its 
design and implementation? 
• Do stakeholders largely favour the policy instrument? 
• Ultimately, to what extent does the policy instrument encourage 
corporate ownership and/or community ownership of wind 
power? 
Certainty for 
Industry 
• Does the policy instrument possess characteristics that ensure 
investor confidence? 
• To what extent is the policy instrument perceived by investors 
and stakeholders as stable or unstable both in the short-to-
medium term and in the long-term? 
• To what extent does the policy instrument mitigate investment 
risks? 
Effectiveness • To what extent has the policy instrument performed in 
achieving politically fixed targets? 
• How much and in what quantity has the policy instrument 
delivered over time? 
• How does this compare with other policy instruments? 
Efficiency • Is the policy instrument capable of delivering wind power at a 
low cost to consumers? 
• Is the policy instrument efficient in reducing production risks, 
and investment costs? 
• Does the policy instrument provide a reasonable market and 
competitive price for wind power? 
Market 
Conformity 
• Is the policy instrument compatible with the legal and market 
conditions of internal electricity market? 
• Does the policy instrument encourage competition among 
suppliers and generators of electricity? 
Finance • Does the policy instrument guarantee return on investment? 
• Is it easy to obtain finance for investment in wind power with 
the policy instrument? 
• Does the policy instrument possess a high or low risk to 
encourage or discourage support from financial institutions? 
Impact on 
Economic 
Development 
• Does the policy instrument encourage local and economic 
development? 
• Does the policy instrument contribute to environmental 
objectives, including the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions? 
Source: Author Generated 
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4.2.2 Integrating the Evaluation Criteria 
To enable this study to compare and contrast the performance of the feed-in tariff, the 
MEP, and the renewables obligation, the above criteria were integrated to produce a 
theoretical but pragmatic framework.  Figure 4.1 outlines the framework and 
identifies four possible dimensions of policy instrument performance evaluation using 
the notion of path dependency of the historical institutional theory. Mayer (2008) 
contends that the concept of path dependence originates from the general premise that 
early events have a substantial effect on later ones. Therefore the performance of 
policy instruments may be affected by the way they are designed and implemented. 
Thus, the first dimension of the framework describes the process conditions where the 
administration of the policy instrument is examined. It is assumed that policy 
instruments need to be transparent and flexible enough to understand, and bring about 
a positive investment environment for investors. The exploration of the historical 
emergence of the policy instrument in the country cases will be very useful in 
providing an understanding the processes of policy instrument design.   
 
Dimension Two describes the stakeholder interests and the certainty for industry. 
Renewable energy policy making process involves various actors and institutions 
thus, support from stakeholder groups and the perception of the policy instrument 
varies from one stakeholder to another. If conditions are favourable enough, 
stakeholders’ support is likely to be higher than when conditions are not favourable or 
when the risk is great. This implies that a favourable policy instrument and conditions 
encourage investment in the wind power industry; as such risks and uncertainties are 
reduced and may be averted completely. The transparency and flexibility of the 
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policy instrument will have a strong impact on the commitment of the stakeholders 
and their support. Hence a strong wind power industry should emerge. 
 
Dimension Three describes the possible outcomes of the interaction that exist 
between actors in the wind power industry. Breukers (2006:65) contends that: “policy 
making is a political process and the outcomes depend on how interests and values 
are represented in the political configuration of actors involved.” Held et al (2006) 
pointed out that renewable energy policy instruments are formulated and 
implemented in order to achieve national renewables target hence, it is important to 
understand how well targets has been achieved through the implementation of policy 
instruments.   Four key parameters are utilised in this stage to access the policy 
instruments namely: effectiveness; efficiency; market conformity; and finance. 
 
Dimension Four describes the down stream outcome of the implementation of the 
policy instrument. The impact of the policy instrument and its contribution to 
economic and environmental development is important. This might include the 
contribution of policy instrument to the economy, in terms of employment 
opportunities created, and the contribution to the overall reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
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Figure 4.1: An Integrative Framework for Evaluating Wind Power Policy 
Instruments 
 
Author Generated 
 
Feed-in Tariff/ Quota 
System/ MEP 
Process Quality 
Stakeholders Support/ 
Involvement: Defined as the 
level of support of policy 
instrument by the government, 
NGOs, investors, and the wind 
power industry. 
 
Administration: Measures the 
ease of implementing policy 
instrument, the flexibility, and 
transparency of policy instrument. 
 
Certainty of Industry: Measures 
the stability of policy instrument; 
the willingness of investors to 
invest both in the short to medium 
term, and long-term. 
 
Outcome 
Efficiency: 
Measured by 
the amount 
spent on the 
targets 
achieved, 
risks, pricing, 
and resource 
allocation. 
 
Effectiveness
: 
Measured and 
defined as 
politically 
achieved 
targets within 
a set time. 
 
Market 
conformity: 
The 
compatibility 
of policy 
instrument 
with 
liberalisation, 
competition, 
cross border 
and 
international 
trade. 
 
Finance: 
Measures the 
extent to 
which policy 
instrument 
guarantees 
security in 
terms of 
loans, fund, 
investment 
guarantee and 
payback, and 
liquidity. 
 
Impact on Development: Defined as the 
extent to which policy instrument contributes to 
economic growth, environmental and social 
benefits. 
 
Downstream Outcome 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
The literature reviewed in Chapter Three presented an overview of the renewable 
energy policy instruments evaluation typologies. However, they are flawed because 
they are limited in most cases to effectiveness and efficiency criteria, and are biased 
towards stakeholders considered. This is a major weakness. The aim of this Chapter 
has been to develop an integrative framework for evaluating the performance of wind 
power policy instruments, with the objective being to utilise the framework to 
critically compare and contrast the performance of the feed-in tariff, the MEP, and 
the renewables obligation. Drawing on the international wind power literature, 
evaluation criteria were developed. Eight different perspectives of analysing the 
performance of policy instruments were identified and then grouped further into four 
clusters. These criteria will be applied in Chapters Six to Eight of this study to assess 
the performance of the German feed-in tariff, the Dutch MEP, and the UK 
renewables obligation. Results from the comparison of the policy instruments in 
Chapter Nine will be used to put into context the EU harmonisation debate which is 
currently subject much debates.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having discussed the evaluation framework that will be used in this study to 
critically examine the performance of policy instruments of the country cases 
investigated, this Chapter will now provide an overview of the methodological 
approach adopted. The Chapter will first examine the positivist and the interpretive 
stance of research before reviewing both research methodologies. Next, an overview 
of selected method for data collection is presented before outlining the procedure for 
coding and data analysis. 
 
5.2 METHODOLOGY 
Over the past decades there have been issues and discussions over research 
methodology and approaches (see for example: Carter and Little 2007; Duranti 2006; 
Gunzenhanser 2006; Gysen et al 2006; Hamilton et al 2006; Mason 2006; Yanchar et 
al 2005; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Robson 2002, 1993; Nigel 2001; Hollway and 
Jefferson 2000; Boswell and Brown 1999; Maffie 1999; Fischer 1998; Lin 1998; 
Hughes and Sharrock 1997). Therefore, this study is not unaware of the gap which 
exists in the literature between various philosophical research schools of thought (see 
for example: Saunders et al 2007; Neuman 2006; Silverman 2006a, Silverman 2006b; 
Denzin and Lincoln 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Remenyi et al 1998; Denzin 1989). One of 
the most common is between the ‘Positivist’ and the ‘Interpretive’ philosophical 
stance. 
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Marsh and Furlong (2002:20) argued that the positivist adheres to a fundamentalist 
ontology and is concerned with establishing causal relationships between social 
phenomena, thus, developing explanatory and indeed, predictive models. The 
positivist approach is usually linked to natural science and stems from the influential 
work of Auguste Comte (1798-1857). 
 
From a philosophical and epistemological point of view, positivists place more 
importance on objectivity and evidence in the search of truth (Saunders et al 2007; 
Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Easterby-Smith et al 2002). The key idea of the positivists is 
that the social world exists externally and that its properties should be measured 
through objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, 
reflection or intuition (Easterby-Smith et al 2002: 28). The claims are based on two 
assumptions that: (i) reality is external and objective; and (ii) knowledge is only 
significant if it is based on observations of external reality (Easterby-Smith et al 
2002). Thus, from the positivist point of view, knowledge is acquired through direct 
observation or by induction, and experiences derived through our senses (Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003), while, the interpretive school of thought arose from the criticism levied 
against the positivist approach to research. 
 
The interpretivists, through direct observation and induction viewed the world 
differently (Ritchie and Lewis 2003). They believe that the world, people, and 
institutions are fundamentally different from actual science (Bryman and Bell 2004). 
The interpretive approach is built on two premises, which include: (i) people act on 
their beliefs and preferences; and (ii) we cannot presume objective facts, such as 
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social class, race and institutional position by looking at people’s beliefs and 
preferences (Bevir and Rhodes 2002: 133). 
 
The interpretivists’ school of thought can be traced back to the influential work of 
Wilhem Dilthey (1835-1911) and Max Weber (1864-1920). Wilhem Dilthey, in his 
contribution, concluded that social research should explore life experiences in order 
to reveal the connections between the social, cultural, and historical aspects of 
people’s lives and to see the context in which particular actions take place. Weber, on 
the other hand, argued that researchers must understand the meaning of social actions 
within the context of material conditions in which people live (Ritchie and Lewis 
2003: 7). Thus, Weber’s argument tends to bridge the gap between the interpretivist 
and positivist approaches to research. Interpretivist approaches advocate the need for 
interpretation and observation in the social world (Saunders et al 2007; Ritchie and 
Lewis 2003). 
 
Following the suggestion of Read and Marsh (2002) a researcher should decide upon 
and adopt the most appropriate methods that interest them in a particular research. 
This study followed the interpretivist school of thought. Due to the nature of the 
research inquiry, qualitative methodology was adopted for the study. The rationale 
behind this is because qualitative methodology approach availed the researcher the 
opportunity to deal extensively with all aspects of the research questions arising from 
the performance of the key policy instruments deployed to promote wind power in the 
Member States investigated. 
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Devine (2002: 197) viewed qualitative method as a “generic term that refers to a 
range of techniques including…individual interviews and focus groups interviews 
which seek to understand the experiences and practice of key informants and to 
locate them firmly in context”. Spencer et al (2003) also argued that qualitative 
research aims to provide an in-depth understanding of people’s experiences, 
perspectives, and histories in the context of their personal circumstances or settings. 
It tends to explore phenomenon by using unstructured methods sensitive to the social 
context of the study. Data gathered in this sense is detailed, rich and complex.  
 
Quantitative research emphasizes the measurement and analysis of casual 
relationships between variables and not processes (Denzin and Lincoln 2003). The 
purpose of quantitative research is to “discover how many and what kind of people in 
the general or parent population have a particular characteristic which has been 
found to exist in the sample population” Brannen (1992:5). Quantitative research is 
centred more on design issues, measurement, and sampling. Neuman (2006) noted 
that quantitative research is a deductive approach that requires detailed planning prior 
to data collection and analysis. It also seeks to utilise methods that include structured 
questionnaires.  
 
A key difference between qualitative and quantitative methodology is flexibility 
(Berg 2007). Due to the nature of quantitative methodology, it is fairly not flexible as 
qualitative methodology. Mack et al (2010:4) contends that: “qualitative methods are 
typically more flexible- that is, they allow greater spontaneity and adaptation of the 
interaction between the researcher and the study participant.....the relationship 
between researchers and the participant is often less formal than in quantitative 
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research. Participants have the opportunity to respond more elaborately and in 
greater detail than is typically the case with quantitative methods”. Hence, 
qualitative methodology encourages open ended questions and probing which gives 
opportunity to participants to express themselves and in turn allow the researcher the 
flexibility of asking how and why questions during the process of engaging 
participants (Mack et al 2010).  
 
Due to the many different languages spoken in the Member States investigated, the 
utilisation of quantitative techniques would have demanded the translation of the 
questionnaire into German and Dutch before embarking on data collection, and back 
into English after the field work. This would have taken considerable time and effort, 
and the translation process may have even introduced bias and distortions to the 
information. Therefore, in order to avoid this strenuous and complex process, and to 
maintain high quality data that is reliable and valid, this researcher felt that 
administering a questionnaire was not appropriate in addressing key research 
questions arising from the literature. 
 
5.2.1 Methods of Data Collection 
Arising from an in-depth review of the renewable energy policy literature, three main 
research tools for gathering data were identified: secondary sources, interviews, and 
questionnaires (see for example: Butler and Neuhoff 2008; Lipp 2007, 2001a, 2001b, 
2001c; Lise et al 2007; Lund 2007; Midttun and Gautesen 2007; Mitchell et al 2006; 
Strachan et al 2006; Toke 2006, 2005; Vachon and Menz 2006; Hvelplund 2005, 
2001; Sawin 2004; Strachan and Lal 2004; Scharpf 2000). However, for the purpose 
of this research, two (i.e. secondary sources and interviews) of these research 
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instruments or tools identified above have been utilised. Some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of using these research instruments are summarised in Table 5.1 
 
Table 5.1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Research Tools 
 
 Interviews Questionnaires Secondary Sources 
Advantages Most appropriate 
approach for 
studying complex 
and sensitive 
areas; a possible 
means of 
obtaining in-depth 
information; and 
can be used for 
any type of 
population. 
Proves to be a 
relatively simple and 
straight forward 
approach to the 
study; it is helpful in 
the collection of 
generalisable 
information; it gives 
room for high 
amount of data 
standardisation. 
Data is easily generated; 
to an extent reliable and 
concise. 
Disadvantages It is time 
consuming and 
sometimes 
expensive when 
potential 
respondents are 
scattered over a 
wide geographical 
location; quality 
of data obtained is 
affected by 
experience, skills 
and commitment 
of interviewer; 
researcher’s bias 
in the framing of 
questions and the 
interpretation of 
responses is 
always possible. 
It usually has a low 
response rate; 
ambiguities in and 
misunderstanding of 
the survey question 
may be detected; data 
are affected by the 
characteristics of the 
respondents; 
respondents may not 
treat the exercise 
seriously and the 
researcher may not 
be able to detect this. 
Sometimes it is difficult 
to ascertain the validity 
and reliability of data. 
Source: Robson (2003). 
 
In order to enable the researcher explore the set of evaluation criteria presented in 
Chapter Four, semi-structured interviews were conducted in the country cases under 
investigation. 
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An interview, as defined by Parahoo (2006:307), is “the verbal interaction between 
one or more researchers and one or more respondents for the purpose of collecting 
valid and reliable data to answer particular research questions.” First the interview 
schedule was designed and drawn from the research framework discussed in Chapter 
Four, since each criterion is crucial to the outcome of this research. To allow the 
respondents leeway and flexibility, a semi-structured form of interview was designed. 
This is also consistent with Bryman and Bell’s (2004:355) argument that: “flexibility 
is important in varying the order of questions and also in clearing inconsistencies in 
answers”.  
 
Similarly, a semi-structured interview schedule allowed this researcher the 
opportunity to ask questions, which were not originally in the schedule, but are 
relevant (Neuman 2006).  Furthermore, it guides the respondents and brings them 
back on track whenever they seem to be distracted. This is also consistent with 
Parahoo (2006), and Bariball and While’s (1994) argument that semi-structured 
interviews allow a researcher the opportunity to change words but not the meaning of 
the questions contained in the interview schedule. This is because certain words 
might evoke a different meaning to different respondents so, the semi-structured 
interview helps break down questions for respondents, without introducing any form 
of bias. Parahoo (2006:329) further noted that: “validity is enhanced because 
respondents can be helped to understand the questions and interviewers can ask for 
clarification and probe for further responses if necessary.” 
 
Furthermore, due to the nature of this research and the audience (i.e. senior policy 
makers) considered for the data collection process, two sets of interview schedules 
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were designed for each Member State (see Appendix 1 for full details). This was done 
to enable the researcher to balance the information from the respondents representing 
government and industry. It was also to ensure reliable and valid data. Key areas 
covered in the interview schedule included:  
 The principal wind power market drivers. A key focus of this aspect of the 
interview was to capture issues surrounding the introduction of the study and 
the justification for promoting wind power, with the implementation of the 
choice policy instrument. It was also to enable the interviewee to respond to 
questions in a relaxed manner.   
 
 The process of policy instrument design and implementation. The key focus 
of this aspect of the interview schedule was to understand why the particular 
policy instrument was chosen by the Member State and to explore the 
institutional roles and process of the design and implementation of the policy 
instrument.  
 
 The performance of policy instruments and the impact of harmonisation of 
wind power. The key focus is to critically examine the performance of the 
choice of policy instrument. The questions explored here relate to the 
evaluation criteria developed from the literature and adopted in this study. 
These questions also seek to understand why there was much experimentation 
in each Member State with the deployment of the choice policy instrument.  
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 Significant issues impeding the development of wind power. The aim here is 
to understand the institutional barriers to the advancement of wind power in 
each Member State.  
 
Linking the four sections together, is to set the argument in context for the 
harmonisation of the EU renewable energy policy instrument, which has been a 
subject of much debate in recent times. For geographical and financial reasons, the 
data collected through interview took place in two phases, first face-to-face 
interviews and then telephone interviews. 
 
5.2.1.1 Face-to-face interview 
The first stage of the data collected consists of key government bodies directly 
associated with either the design or the implementation of policy instruments. Major 
wind power associations and environmental NGOs were selected at this stage for a 
personal interview. This step involved significant travelling costs and planning but 
the data gathered was extremely rich. The researcher was also able to coordinate the 
interviews and of the fifty-five interviews twenty-nine were face-to-face. 
 
5.2.1.2 Telephone interview 
The second stage of the data collection process was mainly through telephone. To 
recap, this research focuses mainly on three EU Member States that are widely 
dispersed in different locations of Europe. With this in mind, it was not possible for 
the researcher to travel round the Member States for a second time due to the time 
and costs involved. Therefore a telephone interview was utilised for respondents who 
were not available for face-to-face interviews during the first stage of the research. 
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The interview schedule used was the same as that of the face-to-face interviews. The 
data collected at this stage was also very rich. The principal reason for this was that 
the researcher was already known to the respondents. Having attended seminars and 
conferences in the subject area afforded the researcher the privilege to network and 
familiarize himself with the target respondents. In fact, most of the contacts made 
were through attendance of major conferences and other large gatherings of senior 
policy makers. This is consistent with Berg (2007: 109) finding that initial contacts 
“allow the subjects [respondents] to ask questions and raise any concerns they might 
have about the study or their participation. It will also provide an opportunity for the 
investigator to gain some sense of the individual and to begin developing a kind of 
relationship and rapport as well as an opportunity to convince the individual to 
participate in the study if the individual is resistant.” 
 
Furthermore, contrary to often cited criticisms against telephone interviews (see for 
example: Holt 2010; Stephens 2007; Sturges and Hanrahan 2004; Carr and Worth 
2001) the process of data collection at this stage proved extremely productive and the 
data collected was very valuable. As with the face-to-face interview, the interview 
schedule used was also semi-structured, each lasting between forty-five minutes to 
one hour. Twenty telephone interviews were conducted during the research. 
 
The secondary data utilised in this thesis is to complement data from the interview. 
The secondary data gathered were mainly from published documents from the EU 
and the national governments (Directives, Energy Papers, IEA Wind Report 2000-
2008, etc) ministries and departments, international organisations and renewable 
energy associations’ websites. The review of the secondary sources were particular 
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helpful in understanding of renewable energy policy instruments of the country cases 
investigated. It also offered me the opportunity to understand how each policy 
instruments are viewed by various stakeholder groups operating in the wind power 
industry. 
 
5.2.2 Sample Selection Method and Size 
Before making decisions about sample selection, a considerable amount of time and 
effort was spent on understanding the political and regulatory environment, industry 
structures and the stakeholder groups in the business environment of the Member 
States under investigation. This enabled the researcher to identify the key 
stakeholders directly involved in renewable energy policy making.  
 
Again, due to the nature of the research, a gradual strategy of sampling was adopted. 
According to Flick (2006), this is patterned after the theoretical sampling developed 
by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The selection of participants for the interview process 
was focused directly on personnel and employees involved in the wind power policy 
for their organisations. This, to an extent, helped the researcher to identify those 
knowledgeable in the subject area for interview. For various reasons (differences in 
the geographical locations of each Member State studied42
                                                 
42 Member States investigated in this study are far apart and as such are located 
in different regions of Europe. 
, cost, time, and the 
bureaucratic processes of interview appointments) the researcher opted to identify the 
personnel directly charged with the responsibility of handling renewable energy 
policies for their organisation thus, the questions were selected with experts, 
practitioners, and academics in mind. This was to avoid gathering unwanted data and 
wasting valuable resources and time. Table 5.2 shows a sample of respondents 
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interviewed in each of the three Member States (see Appendix 2 for the details of 
organisations selected). 
Table 5.2: Numbers of Interviews held 
Country Number of contacts 
made 
Number of Face-to-
Face Interviews 
Number of Telephone 
Interviews 
Number of 
Interviews 
EU 4 - 4 4 
Germany 17 7 10 17 
Netherlands 18 13 3 16 
United 
Kingdom 
20 9 9 18 
Total 59 29 26 55 
Author Generated 
 
In total, a high response rate was achieved with most of the organisations willing and 
happy to participate. However, organisations which refused to participate gave 
reasons which anchored on availability and time. Some just did not wish to divulge 
information and hence totally refused to participate.  
 
5.2.3 Pilot study 
Polit and Beck (2009:563) described a pilot study as a “small-scale version, or trial 
run, done in preparation for a major study”. The importance of the pilot study in a 
social qualitative research cannot be overemphasized. A pilot study is necessary so as 
to avoid wasting time and money. Aitman et al (2006) observed that pilot studies can 
reveal deficiencies in the design of a proposed experiment or procedure and these can 
be addressed before time and resources are expensed on large scale studies.  
Following the generation of the interview schedule, a pilot interview was carried out 
with two academic experts in the field of study and later with some wind farm 
operators (Airtricity Ltd, Fred Olsen Ltd, and Natural Power). The primary reason for 
piloting was to seize the opportunity to test the questions on industry practitioners and 
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academic experts. Data and responses received at this stage were very useful and 
instrumental to the development of the final interview schedule. It provided the 
researcher with ideas and clues that were not originally thought of when designing the 
initial interview schedule.  Secondly, the pilot study also afforded the researcher the 
opportunity to understand and identify key stakeholders groups involved in wind 
power policy making processes, as such the selection of respondents for interview 
became easier and less stressful. 
 
5.2.4 Reliability and Validity 
Reliability and validity has been viewed differently by many qualitative researchers 
(Koro-Ljungberg 2008; Neuman 2006; Ritchie and Lewis 2003; Golafshani 2003; 
Cohen et al 2000; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Although, its 
relevance in qualitative research has been highly contested (Stanbacka 2001), its 
importance cannot be overemphasized (Patton 2002). According to Golafshani 
(2003:601), “validity and reliability are two factors which any qualitative researcher 
should be concerned about while designing a study, analysing results and judging the 
quality of the study”. Kirk and Miller (1989:19) contend that: “reliability is the extent 
to which measurement procedure yields the same answer however and whenever it is 
carried out; validity is the extent to which it gives the correct answer. These concepts 
apply equally well to qualitative observations.” 
 
Newman (2006:196) and, Lincoln and Guber (1985:300) used the word 
“dependability” to refer to reliability in qualitative research. Clont (1992), and Seale 
(2002, 1999) referred reliability to consistency, truthfulness, and dependability. 
However, Collingridge and Gantt (2008:390) contend that: “reliability in qualitative 
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research typically refers to adopting research methods that are accepted by the 
research community as legitimate ways of collecting and analysing data. Specifically, 
reliable qualitative methods consistently produce rich and meaning descriptions of 
phenomena”.   
 
Applying this to the study, the process of interview schedule design was carefully 
thought through and standardised as much as possible thus, minimising any form of 
bias. This is evident in the richness and extensiveness of the data gathered and 
presented in this study. The findings of the study are also presented as objectively as 
possible. The data obtained represents not only the views of policy makers, but also 
that of practitioners and academic experts. This provides the study with a complete 
data that is very rich, extensive and reliable. 
 
According to Neuman (2006:196), validity means “truthful’ based on ‘authenticity’ of 
giving a fair, honest, and balanced account of social life from the view point of 
someone who lives it every day”. Although the relevance of the concept of validity to 
qualitative research is contested by many social science researchers (see for example: 
Golafshani 2003; Stenbacka 2001; Cresswell and Miller 2000), there is need to put in 
place checks and balances in qualitative research. Validity in quantitative research 
means accurate measurement. In qualitative research, “measuring what one purports 
to measure means selecting an appropriate method for a given question and applying 
that method in a coherent, justifiable, and rigorous manner” (Collingridge and Gantt 
2008:391).    
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However, for this study, the description of validity offered by Ritchie and Lewis 
(2003) seems appropriate. The authors referred to validity as ‘correctness’ or 
‘precision’ of a research reading. The sample coverage for this study is a wide 
representation of actors involved in renewable energy policy design and 
implementation. Respondents were selected purposefully to avoid gathering 
unnecessary data or data outside the scope of this study. The data was collected and 
the findings were validated using academic practitioners in the field of study. To this 
end, three academic experts were interviewed, each representing the three Member 
States covered in the study. The interview process was also carried out systematically 
such that the quality of questions asked enabled respondents to fully express their 
views of policy instruments implemented by Member States. Thus, the findings of 
this study are categorized to reflect the meaning assigned by the respondents to the 
criteria for evaluating the performance of policy instruments.  Therefore, in order to 
ensure reliability and validity of the data collected, the researcher maintained 
consistency throughout the organisations and institutions selected. Therefore, to a 
large extent, the authenticity of the data collected is guaranteed, valid, and reliable. 
 
5.2.5 Handling of Data  
According to Richards (2005:33) “making qualitative data is ridiculously easy. The 
challenge is not so much making data but rather making useful, valuable data, 
relevant to the question being asked, and reflecting on the process of research”. The 
data handling stage is one of the most important processes of this study. Prior to 
carrying out the data analysis, a very careful and flexible process of handling data 
from the field was thought through and clearly defined. This is broken down further 
into the following stages. 
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5.2.5.1  Recording and transcribing of data 
Recording in qualitative research is undertaken because it is impossible to remember 
all the answers to the questions asked during the interview. Bryman (2008: 451) 
states that: “the recording of conversations and interviews is to all intents and 
purposes mandatory”. The process of recording helped the researcher to concentrate 
and limit note taking during the interviews. It also afforded the researcher the 
opportunity to prompt and probe the respondents when it was necessary to do so. The 
recorded data was transcribed verbatim to retain the richness and content of the data. 
However, Green and Thorogood (2009:117) pointed out that: “transcribing 
conversation is, of course, a translation process in itself. The choices of punctuation, 
spelling and detail of the transcript all affect how it is read by those analysing it”. 
Whilst it is difficult during transcription to capture body language, and other forms of 
expression by the interviewee, the researcher made a great deal of effort to capture as 
much gesture as possible. Although it’s assumed by many authors (for example: 
Barbour 2008; Bryman 2008; Punch 2005; Richards 2005; Ritchie and Lewis 2003) 
that the process of transcribing is time consuming and rigorous, the researcher did all 
the transcribing. This was personally exiting and beneficial. The process brought the 
researcher closer to the data and helped in identifying categories and themes which 
were subsequently used for coding purposes.  
 
5.2.5.2  Coding and method of data analysis 
The interview schedule for this study was generated from the evaluation criteria 
developed from the first hand knowledge gained in the literature. The generation of 
the criteria made it clear that objectives needed to be develop to test the framework 
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through the generation of a number of subjective questions. Therefore, qualitative 
statements in the nature of data were collected to address each of the questions.  
 
In order to identify the key themes emerging from the data set, the information was 
first sorted out and grouped into individual Member States. Barbour (2008:196) 
described this stage as ‘the early stages of coding’. It enabled the researcher to 
develop a list of code names which was later applied to the data. Green and 
Thorogood (2009:201) described this stage as a ‘coding scheme’ developed by 
looking through the early data to identify the key themes and how they will be 
labelled. The aim of this process is to “assemble, or reconstruct the data in a 
meaningful or comprehensive fashion” (Jurgenson 1989:107). A total of fifty-five 
interviews were analysed. Codes were attached to each criterion that emerged from 
the literature. 
 
Seale (1999:154) defined coding as “an attempt to fix meaning, constructing a 
particular vision of the world that excludes other possible viewpoints”. As such 
Richards (2005) notes that coding is not merely the act of labelling all the parts of a 
document, but rather the process of bringing them together so they can be reviewed 
and allowing thoughts on the topic to be developed.  
 
Once the set of categories and codes had been attached, the responses from the 
transcript were rearranged sequentially to follow the order of categories created. 
Green and Thorogood (2009:201) notes that: “these kinds of cut and paste techniques 
are ‘low technology’, but they work. They allow the researchers to compare, contrast, 
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and start to build up categories and typologies and to discuss the meaning of their 
data”.  
 
A total of forty-five themes were identified and grouped into eight categories based 
on the evaluation criteria discussed later in this Chapter. Table 5.3 shows the list of 
codes and categories. A full list of the themes is shown in Appendix 5. 
Table 5.3: Categories for Analysis 
Code Categories 
01 Administration 
02 Stakeholder support and involvement 
03 Certainty for industry 
04 Effectiveness 
05 Efficiency 
06 Market conformity 
07 Finance 
08 Impact on development 
Source: Author Generated 
The method adopted for analysing the data for this study is content analysis. Kaplan 
(1943:230) defined content analysis as “a technique which attempts to characterise 
the meaning in a given body of discourse in a systematic and quantitative fashion”. 
Whilst this definition relates to quantitative analysis, Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 
1278) define qualitative content analysis as a “research method for the subjective 
interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process 
of coding and identifying themes or pattern”. The most common way of using 
content analysis is where coding is based on categories designed to capture the 
dominant themes present in a text (Franzosi 2004). Content analysis allowed the 
researcher to test and utilise the evaluation framework developed in Chapter Four to 
evaluate the performance of policy instruments implemented by Member States 
investigated. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this Chapter is to discuss the methods used to collect data analysed and 
presented in Chapters Six to Nine of this study. Qualitative research methodology 
was chosen because of it flexibility and appropriateness. It allowed the researcher the 
leeway of exploring the performance of policy instruments implemented in the 
country cases, it flexibility allowed participants (interviewees) to provide their views 
about policy instruments while the researcher in turn had the opportunity to probe and 
ask questions which were not in the interview schedule but are important. The 
following three Chapters will present the findings and analyses from the three country 
cases. Arising from the findings, Chapter Nine will compare and contrast the 
performance of policy instruments and put in context the EU harmonisation debate 
which has been a subject of much conjecture. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS: GERMANY 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Following the discussion of the methods used for data collection in Chapter Five, this 
Chapter will now present the findings and analysis of the first country case 
(Germany) of this research. The development of wind power in Germany has been a 
great success (Busgen and Durrschmidt 2009; Lipp 2007; Toke and Lauber 2007; 
Agnolucci 2006; Bechberger and Reiche 2004). Germany is often heralded as one of 
the EU Member States with limited wind resource (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006; 
Ranci 2005) yet, the development of wind power has surpassed countries with great 
potentials43
 
 of wind resource in terms of capacity installed (EWEA 2010; Mints 
2007; Michaelowa 2003).   
Unlike The Netherlands and UK, Germany has adopted the feed-in tariff. The feed-in 
tariff began operation in 1991 and obliges regional or national transmission system 
operators to feed the full production of green electricity into the grid at a politically 
fixed price (Toke 2006; Agnolucci 2006). Germany has now passed its 12.5% target 
and is on course to meet its 2020 target (EU 2009; Busgen and Durrschmidt 2009). 
However, the bulk of this capacity comes from wind power. Thus, Germany is a first 
division member of deployed wind power capacity, along side Spain, China, and 
U.S.A.   
The principal objective of this Chapter is twofold. First, is to critically examine the 
performance of the feed-in tariff (FIT) i.e. the German policy instrument for 
                                                 
43 For example; UK, Denmark, and France 
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promoting wind power. Secondly, to examine the lessons learnt from the 
implementation and performance of the feed-in tariff. The aim is to set this argument 
in the context of the European Union harmonisation agenda and to compare and 
contrast the German policy instrument with the other two EU Member States 
investigated in this study. In doing this, historical institutional theory is utilised to 
explore wind power implementation in Germany using three parameters as outlined in 
Chapter One: emergence of policy instrument; policy architecture; and the outcome 
of the support and implementation of policy instrument. This Chapter presents the 
findings arising from the series of interviews undertaken with sixteen organisations 
widely involved in renewable activities in Germany. The next section provides an 
overview of Germany’s wind power policies from 1970-2008. 
6.2 GERMANY WIND POWER POLICY: 1970 - 2008   
Germany is recognised internationally as a pioneering country in the development 
and application of wind power (Reiche and Bechberger 2004; Coenraads and de Vos 
2004; Grotz 2002). This stems from the aspiration of the German government to 
promote the development of indigenous energy sources in a bid to solve the 
country’s dependence on fossil fuel and other conventional forms of energy 
(Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006; Ranci 2005;  Shui-Fai 2005).  
 
Like the UK, plans to promote renewable energy in Germany started after the 1970s 
with the introduction of the Federal Government framework programme for energy 
research (Gan et al 2007). The idea was conceived by the government to promote 
nuclear energy. However, in 1974, German citizens objected to this plan, hence the 
birth of the anti-nuclear power movement (Jacobsson and Lauber 2006).  
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The beginning of a strong anti-nuclear power movement brought about the 
emergence of the promotion of renewable energy projects. Following the lead, 
renewable energy technology was based on federal government R&D support for 
wind power turbines (Ranci 2005). Worthy of mention among this drive was the 
GROWIAN44
 
 Project, launched in 1978 primarily to support large scale 
manufacturing of wind turbines. However, due to the limitations and shortfalls in 
manufacturing and systems integration, the project was short lived and was regarded 
as an economic failure. Still, it led to the concentration of support for smaller wind 
turbine of 250kw from 1986 to 1988 (Ranci 2005; Bechberger and Reiche 2004). 
Furthermore, in 1989 the programme was expanded to 100MW and gave an 
incentive of 3 cents per kWh to wind power generators thus, changing the spectrum 
from an R&D funding to production incentive (Reiche and Bechberger 2004:1684). 
Moreover, the success of the programme also led to another upgrade of the wind 
generation capacity from 100MW to 250MW in 1991. This time, obligation was 
placed on wind generators to participate in a scientific measurement evaluation 
programme (WMEP), helping to create a database on the operational behaviour of 
wind turbines in Germany (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006; Ranci 2005; Bechberger 
and Reiche 2004).  
 
Lauber and Metz (2006), Lauber (2002a) noted that the German farmers in the 1990s 
began to face heavy competition, due to market liberalisation pursued by the EU, 
through its common agricultural policy (CAP). Thus, German farmers began to 
source for alternative means of earning income. With the government programmes   
                                                 
44 Big wind power system 
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established, investing into wind power became a great opportunity, especially in 
northern Germany. The availability of good wind speed in this region served as 
motivation for farmers, who seized the opportunity to earn more income. Agnollucci 
(2008) noted that farmers did not opt for the production of biomass because wind 
power investment complements commercial crop production and the same land is 
used for both wind farms and farming, while investment into biomass acted as a 
substitute for commercial crop production, as the land used for its generation cannot 
be used for farming. Lauber (2004, 2002a) also pointed out that the law to promote 
wind power at this time was pushed forward by two MPs from the Northern Lander 
as a private members bill. At the same time, some politicians in this region also 
became involved and helped generate further support at parliamentary level. To this 
end, Lauber (2002b, 2001) noted that two Conservative (CDU) Party members of the 
Bundestag from the Northern Germany district submitted a private members bill for 
a feed-in tariff for electricity from renewable energy sources in 1990. This received 
much interest and support from other political parties. Thus, what today is known as 
the feed-in tariff was born and named Stromeinspeisegestz (StrEG 1990).  
 
The StrEG 1990 was the first significant move to promote wind power in Germany. 
It was finally adopted in 1991, having the distinctive feature of obligating public 
utilities to purchase renewable generated power from solar, hydro, biomass and other 
renewables on a yearly fixed base rate (Bechberger and Reiche 2004; Ranci 2005). 
The compensation amounted to 90% of the total value of wind power in Germany. 
Ranci (2005) also noted that the StrEG 1991 subsidized the operation of the 
commercial wind installations at the price of 4.1 euro cents/kWh. Moreover, to 
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enable projects to run well, a form of soft loan was granted to local farmers and 
investors by the state owned Deutsche Ausgleichs Bank (DtA). 
 
Although the idea of the StrEG 1991 was brought forward by the coalition from all 
spectrums of political parties, except the Liberal Party (FDP), great opposition came 
from the electricity utility industry, e.g. E.ON, RWE, and the German Electricity 
Producers Association (VDEW). The reason behind the hostility, as pointed out by 
Agnollucci (2008), is that the FIT law obliges suppliers to take and pay for the 
electricity generated and fed into the grid, while the plants owned by same were 
exempt from the FIT scheme. The VDEW also claimed that it is too expensive to 
promote small hydro plants, and that the ‘hardship clause’, which places purchase 
obligation on utilities could result in an undue economic and technical burden, 
therefore the utility companies called for an amendment which eventually led to the 
redefinition of the hardship clause in 1998 (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006; BMU 
2005). Suffice to say that the StrEG 1991 was a great success in the history of 
Germany’s wind power market. From 1991 to 1999, wind power installed capacity 
increased from 98MW to 4444MW (BMU 2006b, 2006c) representing more than 
100% growth rate.  
 
With the liberalisation and deregulation of the German electricity market in 1998, the 
Social Democrats and the Red Green Party saw the need to improve the FIT. 
Therefore, the StrEG was amended and the EEG came into force in April 2000. The 
purpose of the EEG 2000 was:  
“To facilitate a sustainable development of energy supply in 
the interest of managing global warming and protecting the 
environment and to achieve a substantial increase in the 
percentage contribution made by renewable energy sources to 
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power supply in order at least to double the share of renewable 
energy sources in total energy consumption by the year 2010, 
in keeping with the objectives defined by the EU and by the 
Federal Republic of Germany.” (Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES) Act 2000)  
  
One key aspect, which the Act dealt with, was the purchase of and compensation 
paid for electricity generated by wind power (RES Act 2000). Grid operators were 
obliged to connect to their grid electricity generation installations from renewable 
energy sources. For wind, the compensation paid for electricity generated was at 
least 9.10 cents per kWh for a period of 5 years, starting from the date of 
commissioning. One advantage of the system was that the EEG’s remuneration 
system was based on fixed regressive tariffs, whereby low cost renewable producers 
are compensated less than the high cost generation producers (Ranci 2005). For wind 
power, gusty sites are compensated less than not so windy sites. Apart from the 
obligation placed on grid operators, provision was made in the Act for a national 
equalisation scheme to help reduce and record the cost differences in the amount of 
energy purchased and paid by the grid operators in different locations in Germany.  
 
Bechberger and Reiche (2004) also identified further provision in the Act which 
made it comply with the European law on state aid. Firstly, on 30th June every other 
year, a report shall be submitted by the Ministry of Economics and Technology on 
the progress achieved, in terms of market introduction and the cost development of 
power generation installations. This is to allow the government and the Ministry of 
Environment to identify areas of the Act that require adjustment, and be able to act 
upon it without delay. Secondly, the Act also created a kind of incentive by 
providing justifiable means to avoid payments of compensation rates higher than the 
costs of having an effective operation. As such, windy sites receive lower tariffs than 
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less gusty sites. This also helps check and balance the level of compensation received 
by both sides. 
 
The Act was a great success, as the installed capacity rose from 4444 MW in 1999 to 
16,629 MW in 2004. Again, over 70% increase in total installed capacity was 
recorded during the same period. Due to the huge success noted during this period, 
the national electricity associations began to hold divergent views on the RES Act 
and as a result, support and opposition were divided between different parties. 
Nevertheless, the VDEW and the BDI which comprise the utilities and other 
industries opposed the Act strenuously. However, support from various political 
parties and coalition grew and there was a unanimous call for the amendment of the 
Act by 2004 (Wustenhagen and Bilharz 2006).  
 
The RES Act amendment came into force in July 2004 and its aim was not too 
different from the RES Act 2000. The purpose of the RES Act was- (i) To facilitate a 
sustainable development of energy supply, particularly for the sake of protecting 
climate change, nature and the environment, to reduce the costs of energy supply to 
national economy, to incorporate long-term external effects, to protect nature and the 
environment, to contribute to avoiding conflicts over fossil fuels and to promote the 
further development of technologies for the generation of electricity from renewable 
energy sources; (ii) To contribute to the increase in the percentage of renewable 
energy sources in the supply of power by at least 12.5% by 2010 and by at least 20% 
by 2020 (BMU 2004). 
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Added to the structure of the Act was the clear definition of renewable energy 
sources including wind power in any capacity. Secondly, the issue of transparency on 
the part of the utilities and grid operators was also clearly defined. They are obliged 
to give notice of the different fees paid in renewable energy sources installations to 
any third party. Grid operators are also mandated to publish the data necessary to 
determine the energy quantities and fees for all RES installations. Thirdly, the 
introduction of the Guarantee of Origin enables the required organisations to 
guarantee the electricity produced from renewables (BMU 2004a, 2004b). 
 
In order to comply with the EU law on state aid, the 2004 Act demands that 
remuneration for wind power should be at least 5.5 eurocents per kWh for a period of 
five years, starting from the date of commissioning. This is expected to increase by 
3.2 eurocents per kWh for electricity generated from plants which achieve 150 
percent during a five year period. For other installations that cannot meet this 
requirement, the period is extended by 2 months for each .75 cents per kWh of the 
reference yield (BMU 2004b; Bechberger and Reiche 2004). 
 
The aim of this is to maintain the cost effectiveness of the operations of wind power 
installed capacity, especially with the re-powering process currently ongoing in 
Germany. Overall, the RES Act 2004 has proved successful, installed capacity is 
now over 20,000 MW. After a series of consultations, workshops, and seminars on 
the revision and amendment of the RES Act 2004, the new RES Act was signed to 
law in June 2008 by the German Parliament (WWEA 2008) and came into force in 
January 2009. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the key components of German wind 
power policy. 
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Table 6.1: An Overview of the German Wind Power Policies 1970-2008 
Year Law or measure Focus 
1970 Federal Government Framework 
Programme 
All energy research 
1974 Federal Government R&D Support for wind power turbines  
1978 GROWIAN Project Support for big wind power 
systems 
1987 NRW REN-Programme Comprehensive support for 
renewables 
1989 Federal 100 MW/ 250MW Wind 
Programme 
Investment incentive payment 
per kWh for renewable 
electricity 
1991 Federal Electricity Law  (StrEG) Feed-in tariff for renewable 
electricity   
Requirement for utilities to 
purchase renewable electricity 
Tariff wind power: 90% of 
consumer price electricity  
1994 NRW change Nature 
Protection law 
Facilitating projects of 1 or 2 
turbines 
1996 NRW Wind ordinance (renewed 
in 2000, 2002 
Planning and permitting 
procedures and nature protection 
laws 
1997 Federal Change  
Federal Construction Law 
Privileging wind power in 
outlying areas. Municipal 
designation of wind priority 
zones  
1998 Federal Energy Reform Act, 
amending the StrEG 
Geographical equalisation of 
reimbursement obligation 
utilities 
2000 NRW Wind Ordinance 
Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 
Renewal of 1996 ordinance 
Feed-in tariff for 20 years 
Tariff decoupled from electricity 
price 
Differentiation for location and 
over  time. 
Requirement for electricity 
suppliers to purchase renewable 
electricity 
2002 NRW Wind Ordinance 
 
Renewal of 2000 Ordinance 
2004 Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 
2004 
Renewal of 2000 EEG 
Stronger degression in tariffs for 
wind power 
2008 Renewable Energy Act (EEG) 
2009 
Renewal of 2004 EEG 
 
Source: Breukers (2006) 
6.3 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
The evaluation framework utilised for analysis in this study was discussed in detail in 
Chapter Four. Sample selection focused mainly on the organisations that have stakes 
in renewable energy, vis-à-vis wind power policy in Germany. Sixteen organisations 
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were contacted through telephone and e-mail, of which none of them refused the 
request to participate in the data collection process.  
Interestingly, there was no condition attached to the agreement by the respondents to 
participate in the data gathering process. The respondents interviewed were personnel 
directly charged with the responsibility related to wind power policy management for 
their organisation. This was very helpful during the data collection process. The 
researcher found that all the respondents were very knowledgeable in the area of wind 
power policy and as such the assurance of the reliability and validity of data obtained 
was guaranteed. The mode of data collection was through in-depth semi-structured 
face-to-face, and telephone interviews. Eleven of the seventeen interviews were 
conducted by telephone with each interview lasting between forty to sixty minutes 
(see Appendix Two for breakdown). Considerable time was also spent arranging the 
face-to-face interviews. The rationale for opting for telephone interviews is discussed 
fully in Chapter Five.  
 
The issues covered during the interviews include: (i) principal wind power market 
drivers facing Germany; (ii) the process of policy instrument design, implementation, 
stakeholders’ support and involvement; (iii) the performance of the policy instrument 
and the impact of harmonisation of wind power policy instrument; and (iv) significant 
issues impeding the deployment of wind power in Germany. More generally, the 
series of interviews conducted, focused on the second and third issues, as these form 
the central theme of the research. This also offered the researcher the opportunity to 
obtain rich data on the operations and performance of the FIT of Germany. 
Furthermore, the richness of the data facilitated the data analysis process and helped 
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in providing a critical analysis of the FIT. The next section provides the findings and 
analysis of the data obtained through the interviews conducted with the seventeen 
personnel.  
6.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
6.4.1 Principal Market Drivers 
According to Gan et al (2007:147) wind power policies in Germany are driven by a 
broad coalition and a strongly involved parliament. Evidence from the interviews 
reveals that a willing parliament in support of wind power seems to be an important 
driver, not just for political reasons, but also in the promotion of economic 
opportunities and progress to the deployment of wind power in Germany. The 
German policy instrument developed earlier was basically the idea of the 
Conservatives (CDU). The Red-Green coalition helped reform part of the Renewable 
Energy Source Act to make it conform to the current day demands.  
 
Strongly evident in the past was the awareness of environmental problems (e.g. the 
Chernobyl accident of 1986), and the demand for a sustainable means of energy 
supply. The climate change threat, in particular, helped bring to the government’s and 
public’s attention, the urgent need to substitute the conventional sources with a viable 
alternative, such as wind power. During the interviews, evidence revealed that the 
deployment of renewable energy sources in Germany came top on the governmental 
agenda to demonstrate efforts aimed at protecting the environment. Illustrating this, a 
senior executive officer of a popular renewable energy association state that: “In the 
beginning the main reason was to protect the environment and also to protect other 
environmental aspects and the climate change, also to avoid using materials which 
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are not too healthy that’s why the use of RES is important.” (Interview undertaken: 
26th September 2006). 
Thus, wind power became very important in order to ensure the German Government 
pursued a carbon free economy and most especially to ensure security of energy 
supply. Wind power deployment could also help cut down on excessive fossil fuel 
import bills and help promote domestic production of renewable energies thus 
creating employments. Germany is an industrialised nation and the deployment of 
wind power was an opportunity to develop wind turbine and component parts for a 
market beyond Germany. To further strengthen this course, the feed-in tariff was also 
adopted in 1991 and amended by parliament in 2000, 2004, and 2008.  
This is evident in the capacity that has been delivered by the feed-in tariff (over 
20,000 MW). During an interview one renewable energy policy expert confirmed this 
and claimed that wind power has been the German renewable specialty. Interestingly, 
the feed-in tariff was also designed in a way that wind power development could be 
achieved, not only in the best sites, but also in the less windy areas. The remuneration 
for every wind park is calculated, based on the output of individual wind parks. The 
FIT also offered investment or planning security for potential investors and created a 
stable enabling environment for the development of a strong wind power market. 
Illustrating further, a senior manager of one of the big utilities said: 
You get a feed-in tariff depending on what technology you use 
and where your wind farm or your generator is located. You 
also get a fixed price for bringing the electricity into the grid 
and the grid operators must take the electricity and pay the 
owner of the wind farm, and that is the main market driver in 
Germany because it guarantees for over 20 years that you will 
be paid and get the money back for your investment.” 
(Interview undertaken: 30th November 2006). 
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Another important factor in driving wind power in Germany was the change in 
building law. Wind power projects are classified as privileged projects at local 
authority level and do not require planning permission for the building and 
construction of turbines. Local authorities are obliged to accept windfarm sites, except 
when the proposed windfarm has military issues. Notwithstanding, environmental 
impact assessments (EIA) are carried out to ensure the suitability all the sites.  
 
In addition, you need businesses and farmers to invest in the technology and as was the 
case in Germany in the early years wind power deployment. There was a great level of 
public acceptance for wind power and in the early1990s, farmers and small local 
communities in the north of Germany often joined together to share ownership in wind 
farms. People were interested in being independent energy producers and with the 
generous FIT in place they were offered the opportunity to make their energy available 
to the market.   
 
One other strong incentive available to the farmers and corporate investors was a 
guaranteed tax exemption over a certain period of time. Other incentives outlined by 
Toke and Lauber (2007), Jacobsson and Lauber (2006), Ranci (2005), Bechberger and 
Reiche (2004), and Ibenholt (2002) include: support through R&D and technology 
demonstrations, soft loans, and the general willingness of banks and investment 
companies to offer finance to farmers and capable investors. Table 6.2 provides a 
summary of the drivers discussed above. 
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Table 6.2: Summary of the German Wind Power Market Drivers 
• Strong Parliamentary Support 
 
• Climate Change and Environmental Protection 
 
• Security of Energy Supply and Electricity/Energy Cost  
Reductions 
 
• The Feed-in Law 
 
• Change in the Building Law 
 
• Strong R&D Programmes 
 
• Renewable Energy Technology Demonstration 
 
• Availability of Soft Loans and willingness to Invest 
Source: Author Generated 
 
6.4.2 Evaluation of the Performance of the Feed-in tariff (FIT) 
6.4.2.1  Administration 
According to Sijm (2002:14) the administrative demand for the FIT is simple, and it is 
one of the shortest laws implemented in Germany. There is one law which fixes the 
price and a single mechanism which calculates the cost and converts it, so it is payable. 
Two remarkable features of the FIT are its transparency and flexibility. The FIT sets 
the price for each renewable energy technology and allows each to develop. Evidence 
from the interviews also reveals that once the price for each renewable technology is 
fixed, the government make regular adjustments when necessary thus, making the 
transaction costs of the FIT much lower than the market based systems. Another 
important factor regarding the transparency of the FIT is that the price for each 
renewable energy technology is decided with the help and input from research 
institutes and industries (Sawin 2004). It is not surprising then that investors are aware 
of the wind potential of any particular site and are conscious of what a single turbine 
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can or could produce each year. Thus, they can make calculations and decide if further 
investments are economically viable or not.  
 
Evidence from the interviews also demonstrates that the FIT is flexible. This is 
contrary to the views of Wiser et al (2002) who believe that the FIT is inflexible. As 
way of explanation, the FIT allows adjustment of the fixed price and can be designed 
to account for changes in technology and the market place. The law itself requires that 
a bi-annual evaluation be carried out. When this happens, changes can be made to the 
FIT without damaging investors’ confidence and investment security (Szarka 2007). 
 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that there is conflict between conventional energy 
supplies (the utility companies) and wind power generators or producers. The utilities 
represented by the German Association of Electricity Producers (VDEW) challenged 
the transparency of the FIT, especially with the bureaucratic technicalities involved in 
the handling of the law, the larger the number of plants involved in the system the 
higher the technical complexity involved and vice versa. Similarly, the FIT law 
mandates utilities to pay and feed into the grid all energy generated from wind without 
making provision for system balancing thus, creating addition burden and costs for the 
utilities which they, in turn, pass on to the final consumers. To deal with this conflict 
there is need to amend the feed-in law in such a way that will retain its current features 
and in addition allow for system balancing of all energy generated and fed into the 
grid.   
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6.4.2.2  Stakeholders support /involvement 
One of the principal arguments in support of the FIT is the wide involvement of 
stakeholders in the process of design and implementation. Renewable energy actors, 
utilities companies, research institutes, and environmental NGOs play a key role in 
the development of wind power policy in Germany. This is also consistent with Valle 
Costa et al (2008: 78) who claim that: 
“Politics in Germany are decentralised. Together with the 
Federal Government, and local government, the state 
administrators have an important role in governance and the 
three levels have priority.” 
 
In similar way to The Netherlands and the UK, the Ministry of Environment and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU) has the sole responsibility of the Feed-in Tariff (FIT) and its 
administration on behalf of the German Parliament. The Ministry of Environment, 
acting for the German Parliament engages all the stakeholders in discussion on the 
operations of the FIT and ensures that all the stakeholders are heard throughout the 
legal process and adoption of the FIT.  During the bi-annual review the draft and the 
proposal of amendments of the law also comes from the Ministry of Environment 
who arrange different rounds of discussion with various stakeholder groups before 
passing the report, in a document, to the parliament for ratification. Although not all 
the opinions of the stakeholders are taken on board since the Parliament is the final 
decision maker, evidence from the respondents interviewed reveal that to date, many 
of opinions and suggestions from the public hearings, workshops, and seminars are 
adopted in the final law.  A very important contributing element to the outcome of a 
strong institutional relationship between the government and the wind power 
industry is the existence of good wind power research institutes and associations e.g. 
DEWI, DENA, and BWE. Breukers (2006) noted that these institutions bring 
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together the wind power industry actors and the government, thus helping to 
minimise institutional conflicts that otherwise could hamper the investment security 
provided by the FIT. It also affords the Ministry of Environment the opportunity of 
obtaining a wider view and representation of public perception of the FIT law. 
  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the feed-in tariff is supported and accepted by 
almost all the parties affected, except for the utilities who feel that the feed-in tariff 
should be replaced with a market based system. Illustrating and confirming this, one 
policy advisor of a wind research institute stated that:  
“Yes, the government does involve other stakeholders. There 
are some consulting works and some issues like the cost 
situation, and the development experience and other aspects 
that are carried out by the stakeholders; we are also involved 
with these …” (Interview undertaken: 9th November 2006)  
 
Therefore, stakeholders are involved in different capacities, ranging from advisory, 
consultation, the decision making process, and in the implementation of the FIT. The 
German wind energy association, for instance, is responsible for making proposals 
and represents the views of all the trade associations from the wind power 
perspective and speaks in one voice for all the trade associations they represent. 
 
6.4.2.2.1  Wind power implementation and scale 
As mentioned earlier, stakes in the German wind power industry is predominantly 
farmer and local cooperative based. Breukers (2006) traced this back to pre 1974 
when the anti-nuclear and environmental movement began the search for alternative 
energy. Agnollucci (2008) also adds that with introduction of the EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), farmers became more interested in seeking an alternative 
means of income generation. Evidence from the interviews reveals that the first set of 
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wind farms in Germany were owned and managed by farmers and landowners 
especially in the northern costal Lander (also see Szarka and Blühdorn 2006). With 
the availability of bigger turbines and an increase in maintenance costs, wind power 
ownership gradually shifted to cooperatives where group of farmers, local 
individuals, and developers teamed up together to own wind farm sites. However, the 
FIT was instrumental to this movement as it tends to support this form of wind power 
ownership and implementation. The reasons offered by respondents to explain this, 
were that the risk is not so high thanks to the FIT law and does not divide capacities 
of scale, neither does it discriminate between large and small producers, but rather it 
encourages any investor. As soon as a farmer installs his wind turbine he is certain to 
receive a specified tariff for a couple of years and with that he can obtain finance for 
his investment. Interestingly, the banks and other building societies have learnt over 
time how to calculate wind power investment returns and are prepared to weigh up 
the risks. Evidence from the data gathered also revealed that this is not the case with 
other systems (Soderholm 2008a). The banks are more hesitant to finance wind 
power projects thus, stronger players who can afford to take market risks are required 
in order to sustain the market. It is not surprising then, that the countries with quota 
systems have bigger utility companies as they are the main investors in renewables 
since they have the financial resources to contend with uncertainties and conditions 
in such markets.  
 
Respondents to this also claimed that the FIT is a very good system that encourages 
an early take-off of wind power investment. As such, it removes all entry barriers to 
the market, because with the FIT, all the risks associated with the market are well 
controlled and every investor has the guaranteed right to feed any generated amount 
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of energy into the grid. Investors are fully informed about the market and know how 
high or low the tariffs are at any time. Since the tariffs are paid for a twenty year 
period, there is a high level certainty guarantee of investment security for small 
players who cannot afford much risk.  
 
To date, wind power ownership in Germany is still dominated by local ownerships. 
This is consistent with the findings of Toke (2007a, 2007b, 2006), and Szarka and 
Blühdorn (2006). Toke (2006) in particular argued that the German wind power 
ownership consists of the small and local ownership system. The key factor 
responsible for this is that farmers are the land owners and they have a very limited 
institutional barrier to the siting of wind farms and as such they are the backbone of 
the German wind industry. Farmers usually converge and site windfarms in areas 
very close to the grid. 
 
To summarize, the success story of the German wind industry can be linked to the 
small and local ownership implementation structure. Clearly, the deployment of wind 
power in Germany follows the bottom-up approach. This was further strengthened by 
the strong positive relationship between political and institutional actors. The 
strength of the relationship created an economic and political enabling environment 
in which the FIT could operate. Hence Breukers (2006:219) pointed out that: “the 
strength of the policy community around wind power [in Germany] lies in the 
diversity of interests and political affiliations, represented by actors at various 
levels.” It is not surprising, therefore, the German wind sector attracted a high level 
of acceptance and support from the public. 
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6.4.2.3  Certainty for industry 
The stability of any policy instrument is essential in promoting a healthy renewable 
energy market and in developing domestic turbine manufacturing industry. This is 
typical of the German renewable industry. The German FIT has been regarded as a 
very stable and certain instrument for promoting wind power (Toke and Lauber 
2007) because it offers a very high level of investment certainty. It has been in 
existence for over fifteen years and guarantees a return on investment, due to the 15-
20 year period support it offers. del Rio and Gual (2007: 997) noted that:  
“The FIT provides a high level of security for (risk-averse) 
investors, by guaranteeing revenue stability to high initial 
capital investments especially in short to medium term”.  
 
Before embarking on a project, investors would usually assess the feasibility of the 
project and investment risks. To date, investment risks of renewable energy sources 
are still high compared to the non renewables/conventional energy sources, thus a 
renewable energy project cannot be left without adequate support to promote 
investment growth. Hence, the FIT is guaranteed for fifteen years or more and avoids 
unnecessary price fluctuations that destroy investors’ confidence. 
 
Furthermore, the FIT is also a political tool, used as a means of achieving 
technological and industrial development. Evidence from the interviews reveals that 
the result of the political stability of the FIT is evident in the robust manufacturing 
industry that has emerged in recent years.  With a stable market condition, the 
turbine manufacturing industry is able to invest in turbine development through R&D 
finance, thus improving the efficiency of existing wind turbine capacity. It is not 
surprising then that German made wind turbines and component parts are sold all 
over the world and rank among the world market leaders in this regard. This is not 
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the case with Belgium, Italy, and UK that implement the market based system (Lund 
2009; Verbruggen 2009; Wang 2006; Farinelli 2004). Similarly, with the controlled 
risk level, small or local private investors are assured of investment certainty, 
especially when two or more people combine resources to own a share in wind 
power projects. This also provides an explanation as to why there are many small-
medium and large scale players in the German wind power market. The investors are 
clear of the insecurity of the level of financial support they receive from the FIT and 
investors can calculate exactly how much the power station will pay them for kWh 
supplied. Investors know precisely what they will receive over a period of fifteen to 
twenty years and can base their estimate on the tariff to calculate what the return on 
investment would be for the future. Another interesting fact is that the FIT offers 
different levels of payments for windy and less windy sites. However, this is not to 
say there are no investment risks associated with the FIT, however, the risks are 
much lower and negligible.  
 
The RES Act (BMU 2004b) has now been amended and changes made as regards 
some key elements relating to wind power tariffs, but that notwithstanding, there is 
no evidence yet if these changes will affect investors’ confidence, as the fundamental 
principle of the FIT is still preserved. The Renewable Energy Act which established 
the FIT was reviewed and signed into law in June 2008 (WWEA 2008).  
 
6.4.2.4  Effectiveness 
Simj (2002) observed that the FIT is very effective in promoting the renewable 
energy generated electricity system in countries like Germany, Spain, and formerly 
in Denmark. The renewable energy industry in these countries relies largely on tariffs 
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set by the authority as well as production cost, administrative procedures and natural 
conditions. More specifically, the German FIT has been generally considered as 
being very effective in the delivery of a record level of wind installed capacity. This 
is further confirmed in the EU Commission Report (EU 2005a). When asked about 
the effectiveness of the FIT in delivering a politically fixed target, the respondents 
interviewed argued in the favour of the FIT and claimed that the FIT will 
undoubtedly meet the 12.5% politically fixed target. From the interviews, evidence 
reveals that there is a strong positive correlation between wind power installed 
capacity and the German national renewable energy target. One of the respondents 
claimed that in 2006, the share of renewable energy generated electricity to the 
national consumption or demand was 10.2%. Therefore, it was expected that at the 
end of 2007 Germany would have reached its 12.5% target. Evidence also reveals 
that out of this 10%, 4-5% account for the contribution from wind power. Thus, 
when the national target is finally reached, it is expected that half of the generated 
capacity will come from wind power. This is also consistent with the findings of 
Bechberger and Reiche (2004) and BMU (2007a, 2006a, 2003) that wind power 
plays a principal role in reaching the German national target. As pointed out earlier, 
the FIT has been very instrumental in the German wind power record achievements. 
It is therefore not misleading to say that Germany is committed to reaching its 12.5% 
target and exceeding it by 2010 and interestingly wind power will play a significant 
role in making this a reality. According to the EU (2005a) assessment, Germany is 
one of the few countries likely to achieve their target. Thus, in terms of effectiveness, 
the FIT has been a great success especially where wind power is concerned.  
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All the respondents interviewed pointed out that renewable energy [wind power] 
installed capacity growth has exceeded expectations.  No doubt, if the FIT continues 
to reward investments, the growth rate in Germany will continue and reaching targets 
will not be problem. Evidence from the Ministry of Environment confirmed this. 
According to the Ministry, 11% of the 12.5% target has already been reached and the 
remaining 1.5% target will be achieved by the end of 2008, well ahead of time. The 
excess would be used to build a foundation for the 2020 target. A renewable energy 
policy officer who was interviewed confirmed: 
 “We had about 4-5% in the end of the 1990s…and at the end of 
2006 have reached close to 11%, so compared to records from 
previous years it is a success and as long as we have the RES 
Act running, we will have 12.5% in 2008, so we will actually 
reach the target. Looking further to 2020, if the installations 
each year will stay as it is right now we may have little less in 
the wind industry for some year... we will come to 20-25% in 
2020 and the official goal of the German government is at least 
20% in 2020...” (Interview undertaken: 30th October 2006) 
 
According to EWEA (2007b), and GWEC (2007) reports, Germany ranked number 
one in Europe in terms of wind power installed capacity and for the past five years 
the country has remained the world leader in terms of wind technology development 
and market. By the end of 2006, Germany wind power installed capacity stood at 
20,622MW. A total of 2,231.1MW was installed in 2006, thus representing an 11.9% 
increase on 2005 records. Reasons provided to explain why the FIT is successful can 
be divided into three; first, the FIT is a stable piece of legislation and the 
Government has been very committed and dedicated to its operations and 
implementation. A senior policy officer with a research institute noted that 
renewables [wind power] would always need a good law and favourable framework 
 140 
to enable them to grow and compete with other forms of energy. This is what exactly 
what the FIT does for people who use the law in Germany to generate wind power 
electricity capacity.  
 
Secondly, not only does it provide a stable law but also the FIT comes with clear 
guidelines which enhance a proper delivery system. Hence, there is always a 
guarantee that all energy generated will be fed into the grid. During the interviews, 
evidence also revealed that planning laws are not complicated, but recently regional 
planning laws have become very important because the potential for onshore 
installed capacity is slowing down. All the major good locations have already been 
used. The re-powering system ongoing at the moment is slower than expected. 
Illustrating this further, a senior policy officer with one of the government 
institutions said that: “re-powering systems may sometimes be very difficult 
especially if the regional state level planning laws do not allow the plant to grow 
bigger….this may be a potential barrier to further growth.” (Interview undertaken: 
30th October 2006). Notwithstanding, respondents claimed that the financing 
structure of the FIT is very good. The FIT has a low risk exposure which paves the 
way for a dynamic and strong wind turbine and component parts manufacturing. 
 
Thirdly, the German wind power market and framework is characterised as that 
which creates an enabling investment environment for all willing investors. A great 
deal of money is being invested into R&D, which to-date helps promote wind turbine 
technology development, making re-powering possible and furthermore, easing wind 
power generation problems.  
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Experience from the above analysis has shown that the relationship between 
institutional actors has been very useful as well as the generous FIT. Having a very 
favourable policy instrument in place for promoting wind power in Germany has 
helped achieved both the economic and technological development of wind power. 
As shown through the interviews, the record level wind installed capacity delivered 
in Germany has been brought about by: (i) industrialised companies that can produce 
wind power turbines with available infrastructure (ii) people with an open mind who 
are willing to put their little resources together to start investment into wind power 
and; (iii) a good finance structure built on low investment market risk. Thus, 
Germany has been earmarked as one of the few EU member states that will reach and 
possibly exceed the 2010 target. Notwithstanding the current situation of re-powering 
onshore wind projects in Germany, the German FIT system has delivered the fastest 
development of wind power installed capacity in Europe so far. 
 
6.4.2.5  Efficiency 
It is usually argued that the FIT is less efficient because it is not a market based 
system. This has largely been contested in recent studies (Butler and Neuhoff 2008, 
2004; Elliot  2007, 2005; Toke 2007a, 2007b; BMU 2006a; Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006; Fouquet et al 2005; Grotz and Bischof 2005; 
Hvelplund 2005; Lauber 2005; Sawin 2004; Menanteau et al 2003). According to the 
EU report (2005a), the FIT currently offers less support than any other system 
operating in other EU countries. 
 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that wind power tariffs in Germany are not as 
high as heralded by its critics, but just above the level to stimulate the market.  Over 
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time, the FIT leads to lower prices over a fixed period of 20 years. As pointed out by 
Sawin (2004) this is long enough to bring renewables through the learning 
curve/developmental stage. Thus, with national investments and a growing wind 
turbine manufacturing industry, cost can be reduced over time. The BWE report 
(2005:2) claimed that the payments for new turbines in 2005, for example in 
Germany, amounted to 8.53 euro cents/kwh (Grotz and Bischof 2005). The price 
offered by the FIT for wind power generated capacity is lower than in other systems. 
Hence, in terms of static efficiency, the regular adjustment to the FIT, in relation to 
how renewable technology matures, makes the law efficient. In terms of dynamic 
efficiency, the FIT law cuts down cost through the economic of scale brought to the 
turbine and component parts manufacturing industry. Project developers also benefit 
from this and as such can compete in the market by offering lower prices.  
Evidence from the interviews also reveals that due to the degression of the tariffs, the 
payment would usually decrease, and over the years, depending on the site quality 
the base rate offered would usually decrease as well. Szarka and Blühdorn (2006) 
found that the payments to new wind farms reduced to 8.7eurocents/kwh for an 
initial period, and fell to a base rate of 5.5eurocents/kwh. During the interviews, 
evidence suggested that the respondents were more in support of the EU (2005a) 
findings.  The EU Commission at the end of 2005 assessed the renewable policy 
instruments within the Member States. In the field of wind power one of the 
conclusions made was that the FIT is the most effective system, due to the way they 
initiated the developed wind power installations in the EU. On the other hand, it is 
the most cost effective way to promote wind power compared to other generation 
costs and schemes promoted for example, in the UK. In comparison with some 
specific technologies, i.e. onshore wind power, the respondents also argued that the 
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FIT is cost effective, cheaper and more efficient than the British or Italian system, 
which they regarded as being more expensive. This is also consistent with the 
findings of Toke (2006), Szarka and Blühdorn (2006), and Fouquet et al (2005). In 
addition there is also degression from the FIT. The FIT decreases by 2% (BMU 
2007b) every year, thus one of the policy directors with a wind power association 
claimed that the degression allows onshore wind developers to use more developed 
and advanced technologies, hence promoting R&D and innovation. 
 
Furthermore, the FIT is stable, it does not fluctuate and it also comes with low 
potential risk. Prices fixed for renewables are not determined by taking marginal 
costs from the most expensive technology. They are just above the level that 
promotes the market. The FIT also offers different prices for different technologies, 
thus helping each renewable technology to pass through the learning curve faster 
rather than slowly. Illustrating further, a senior policy officer with a government 
institution said that:  
“The FIT is efficient because it promotes RES vis-à-vis wind 
power, it is not only a question of been cheap, and the costs 
that are proved with the FIT are good for a take off of 
projects.’ (Interview undertaken: 10th November 2006) 
 
To date, the share of wind power of the total electricity generation in Germany is 
4.34% (IEA Wind 2007). This shows that the FIT is very cost efficient in terms of 
bringing wind power into the market, and to a large extent provides a market price 
that is much cheaper than any other system. Mitchell et al (2006) also claimed that 
the FIT is better in balancing prices, risks, and volumes generated. This is also 
consistent with EREF (2005) report that the FIT shows that an established minimum 
price system does not guarantee higher prices than other systems. The price for 
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German wind installed capacity is about €89/Mwh for the first five years and €61 
from year six to twenty. 
 
Contrary to the views of this research and others (Toke 2007a, 2007b, 2006; Elliot 
2007, 2005a; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006; Mitchell et al 2006; Fouquet et al 2005; del 
Rio 2004; Menanteau et al 2003), the FIT has been criticised for charging different 
prices for different renewable energy technologies, but critics fail to understand that 
renewable energy are near market technologies that need different levels of support. 
For example, solar PV, wave and tidal energies are still emerging and need to be 
supported for them to achieve the onshore wind record. Wind power is advanced and 
able to compete on a commercial basis with other non renewables. The cost of 
generating wind electricity in Germany is much lower than many other Member 
States.  
 
In summary, the FIT has proved to be a good system in the delivery of wind power 
generated capacity at a low cost to consumers and it is very efficient in reducing 
production costs, risks and investment costs over time, through its ‘degression 
principle’. For wind power, upon which this study is centred, it also provides a 
competitive price compared to other systems. 
 
6.4.2.6  Market conformity 
One major criticism about the FIT is that it could cause distortions in a free and 
competitive market; hence it is regarded as not being compatible with a liberalised 
electricity market (del Rio and Gual 2007; Sijm 2002). Bower et al (2001) noted that 
German electricity market was liberalised in 1998 by the Federal Energy Law EnWG 
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1998. Muller et al (2007), and Bower et al (2001) report that the German 
liberalisation programme was in accordance with the EU Directive on electricity 
markets, and its aim was to bring down the consumer prices in order to increase 
efficiency and to allow consumers to have the privilege of choosing their own 
suppliers. However, there seems to be an institutional conflict between the utilities 
and proponents of the FIT in this regard. One key conflicting issue is that the FIT 
does not offer a competitive price between the wind power/renewable energy 
generators. The FIT tends to charge different prices for each renewable energy 
technology, depending on the level of their development. Secondly, the FIT is only 
available for domestic generators and does not include imports from outside 
Germany. This in itself may conflict with EU laws.  
 
Furthermore, the FIT achieved a percentage of the market by defining a niche 
(renewable energy generated electricity) outside the competitive pricing market. 
Though evidence from the interviews reveals that this is not a problem at the moment, 
but could be an issue of concern in the near future when Germany meets the 2020 
renewable energy electricity target. After this period it is expected that a significant 
amount of renewable energy capacity will be fed into the grid. When this occurs 
respondents claimed the FIT would have to be amended to make it more flexible 
before feeding generated capacities into the grid.  
 
Arising from the above, therefore, one key question that comes to mind is whether the 
FIT is compatible to the national and EU legal provision? In answering this question 
it is important to note that green electricity is still increasing to a point of maturity 
and needs incentives to be able to compete in the market. Without policy instruments, 
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renewable energy source technology will be too expensive and unaffordable. Though 
there have been one or two legal cases against the FIT in the past at EU level, the 
respondents claimed that it has not yet been proved in Germany that the FIT distorts 
market conditions. Comparing the electricity market in Germany with other EU 
Member States shows that conventional energy in Europe still has a lot of market 
distortions, e.g. in France EDF is the main supplier of electricity, consumers cannot 
freely choose an energy supplier to buy their electricity from.  In Germany there are 
four large utility companies which control German territories. It is against this 
backdrop that the FIT cannot be criticised as being incompatible with the German 
legal and regulatory provisions. However, because the utility companies are not in 
favour of the FIT, they rejected the notion that the FIT is compatible with the 
liberalised market system preferred by the EU (BMU 2003). 
 
The argument presented in support of this is that by 2020 about 20% of the electricity 
shares will be taken off the market when the renewable electricity (RES-E) target is 
reached in Germany. The electricity grid operators have no power to bargain or 
negotiate prices with the renewable electricity generators. Grid operators are 
mandated to take the electricity from the generators at a fixed price, thus forcing them 
to pay for them, whether there is need for electricity or not. Illustrating this further, a 
senior policy manager with the VDEW said that: 
“Our main criticism of the system is that we feel it is not 
suitable to the internal market. It is not logical because the 
power producer gets his money for each kWh which he feeds in, 
he does not care about when the feed-in is done or whether 
there is a customer. The idea of a liberalised market is that each 
supplier has to find a customer or otherwise each customer has 
to find a supplier so in each second and hour, the supplier in the 
whole system has to be exactly the same as the 
consumption.........we have already reached in Germany where 
the wind power feed in is higher than other consumption and 
this at the moment causes a lot of work and a lot of power to 
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equalise this and on a longer term this can’t fit together with the 
internal market.” (Interview undertaken: 2nd November 2006). 
 
Earlier on, in the 1990s, PreussenElektra and RWE (two German utilities) had 
opposed the implementation of the 1991 feed-in law. The reason for this opposition, 
as pointed out by Szarka (2007:33), was down to two reasons: first the financial 
burden of paying state-imposed minimum prices for generation from renewable 
sources, particularly for firms having high levels of wind generation in their grid. 
Secondly, existing generators were losing their market share to new entrants. In 
March 2001, the case of PreussenElektra VS Schleswag, was referred by referred by 
the German court of first instance to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). This case 
centred on whether the obligation on suppliers to buy renewable energy resulted in 
fixed prices being higher than the real economic value of that type of electricity 
constituted under State aid (Armenteros and Lefevere 2001). Ruling, the ECJ decided 
that the provision of the FIT law was compatible with the EC regulations based on 
Article 87(1) EC Treaty45
                                                 
45 Any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form 
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is, in as far as it affects 
trade between Member States, incompatible with the common market.  
. Referring to the ECJ’s decision, Szarka (2007), and 
Armenteros and Lefevere (2001) noted that the ECJ reasoned that only advantages 
granted directly, or indirectly, through State resources occurred under the scope of 
Article 87(1) thus, the court rejected the claim that the FIT law does not conform to 
EC treaty (Klinski 2005). Further, (Szarka 2007: 33) noted that the ECJ decided that 
the FIT law “was justified on environmental grounds by the virtue the EC’s 
legislation and the international treaties to reduce GHG emissions, making reference 
to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol”. 
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The renewable electricity directive 2001/77/EC also allowed and gave the Member 
States the opportunity to choose the mechanism that best suits the market system of 
each Member State. Therefore, in this context the FIT is completely compatible with 
the German and the EU legal provisions. 
 
6.4.2.7  Finance 
The nature and framework of the FIT helps to create trust and confidence amongst 
investors. The FIT is valid for at least fifteen years, thus removing insecurity and 
uncertainty in the market place.  
 
With the absence of market uncertainties, financial institutions are more willing to 
lend and finance wind power projects. The guarantee of return on investment also 
makes risk avoidable. Equally, investment risks are averted while producers are able 
to calculate total income earnings of a turbine. Hence, the FIT is considered to be 
highly dependable and very rewarding. It is also characterised as a market with a 
relatively manageable investment risks. Banks are willing to finance projects because 
of the absolute certainty of return on investment and the lower risk margin than in any 
other non FIT system. Also, as pointed out by Sawin (2004), banks in Germany even 
go a long way to lobby for the continuation of the FIT in Germany. According to the 
author, companies are also willing to invest in wind power technology and train their 
staff because of the financial security they enjoy.  This explains the reason why it is 
easy to realise and operate wind farm projects of various sizes in Germany. 
Illustrating this further a Manager with one of the German wind energy agencies said 
that: 
“If you want to finance a project, the investors will have to be 
confident over a period of time, so the FIT provides this, and 
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investors usually can calculate using the speed of the wind and 
the viability of the project, and then it lot easier to get finance 
with the guaranteed premium for 20 years period.” (Interview 
undertaken: 10th November 2006) 
 
It is not surprising then that the ownership structure of wind power projects and 
investment are completely different from that of the UK. Investment in wind power is 
highly favoured by local farmers and landowners. Thus, there seems to be little 
resistance to the deployment of wind power. Szarka (2007) noted that the actions of 
anti-wind power groups are not as pronounced in Germany as in the UK.  
 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that small wind power companies account for a 
60-70% share of the German wind power market. The FIT is generally regarded as a 
fair system that does not require the assistance of big companies to operate. It is a 
perfect system for farmers to operate and manage without any problem, since most of 
the farmers are land owners they can decide on what to do with their land. With low 
maintenance costs, farmers can maintain the wind farm throughout the life time of the 
turbines. Findings from the interviews reveal that it is a lot easier for farmers to 
obtain credit from finance houses. Banks are guaranteed of long term security and 
investments enabling them to recoup their funds.  Furthermore, the farmers or local 
investors are also guaranteed a regular income and profit at the end of the project’s 
life span. With the guaranteed cash flow, it is very easy to obtain a loan for 
investment into wind power, hence farmers do not need much collateral unlike the 
UK scheme.  
 
To summarise this discussion, the FIT favours small and large scale actors, hence it is 
not risky to invest with the FIT. However, from the large players’ point of view, the 
 150 
offshore wind investments demand finance, which may ultimately eliminate small 
investors. Of course in Germany this is still relatively very slow at the moment 
because of the huge uncertainties surrounding offshore investment. During the 
interviews, evidence revealed that the FIT is not the only factor that determines how 
successful a project would be, however, investors need to be careful when selecting a 
site for wind parks. Finance institutions are still very careful in this regard, the fact 
that the FIT is guaranteed for long term investments is not the final guarantee of 
securing funds from the banks, projects also need to be carefully selected and 
properly designed. It is not surprising then that most of the wind farms are located in 
the north Lander of Germany where local conditions are most favourable. Finally, 
following the historical path of the deployment of wind power in Germany, it can be 
concluded that FIT creates the opportunity for institutional and economic 
development through the support the wind power industry received from financial 
institutions. This support however is also very rewarding as banks tend to benefit and 
profit from investments embarked upon. 
 
6.4.2.8  Impact on development  
The FIT has been an important tool in the development of onshore wind power in 
Germany. Without the policy instrument, it would have been almost impossible for 
Germany to attain its current height and position in the world. Although the FIT has 
been criticised for being inefficient in promoting other sources of renewables, 
respondents during the interviews claimed that the FIT - as well as the public 
acceptance factor - has also helped to deliver 100% wind capacity in Germany to 
date. The FIT has undoubtedly helped to stimulate growth in the wind power market 
and without it the development would have been different. 
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To recap, by the end of 2008, the total installed capacity of wind power reached 
23,903 MW representing about a 7.4% increase compared with 2007. The total 
electricity output from wind power also stood at 30.5Twh representing 5% of national 
electricity demand and total turnover was well over €7000 Billion in year 2006 (IEA 
Wind 2007; BMU 2007). When asked about the economic contribution of wind 
power to the German national economy, mixed feelings were reported. Five of the 
respondents from the utility companies interviewed claimed that the benefits 
attributed to the wind industry sector were superficial, especially in the employment 
figures often heralded by the supporters of the wind industry. This is contrary to the 
findings of Lehr et al (2008), and Krewitt and Nitsch (2003). The jobs created to date 
by the wind power industry specifically, are significant to the achievement of the 
German wind power industry (Blanco and Rodrigues 2009; Busgen and Durrschmidt 
2009; Lehr et al 2008; Lipp 2007; Hillebrand et al 2006). Furthermore, the German 
wind turbine manufacturing industry is still expanding and occupies a strong position 
in the growing world wind market, and according to IEA Wind (2007:126) “some of 
the German wind turbine manufacturers doubled their production in year 2006 with 5 
MW capacity machine design in progress”. The wind sector employs 70,000 people 
and this is expected to increase as soon as the plans to move offshore are perfected 
(BMU 2007). The findings from the interviews reveal that most of the wind industries 
are located in the north of Germany. Consequently, wind power industries in this 
region of Germany have added economic value to poor regions and, in that sense, it is 
difficult to deny the positive impact of the wind sector in the country. This is 
consistent with the findings of Krewitt and Nitsch (2003).  Krewitt and Nitsch (2003) 
claimed that the economic benefit of implementing the FIT in Germany to promote 
renewables, outweighs the widely claimed cost brought to the society by the FIT.  
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Also important is the contribution wind power makes to the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions and achieving the German Kyoto targets.  IEA Wind (2006) report 
shows that with 18,685 operational turbines, Germany was able to cut down 26.1 
million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions in 2006 compared to 24.6 million tonnes 
in year 2005.  
 
To summarise this discussion, contrary to the views of the German utilities, the FIT 
has been a useful instrument in terms of (1) pushing both local and national 
development of wind power, (2) for industrial development and (3) for employment 
or job creation.  
 
The next section discusses the lessons and outcomes of the implementation of the FIT 
in Germany. Arising from the analysis above, it is evident that the strengths of the 
FIT outweigh its potential weaknesses. However, there can not be a perfect policy 
instrument. A policy instrument, such as the FIT, may work well in promoting 
renewables in one region of the EU, while failing to do so in other regions. In other 
words, the success of any policy instrument is not only determined by how it is 
designed and implemented (Sawin 2004) but also on the industry structures, and 
stakeholder groups at play in the business environment of the Member States. 
 
6.5 POLICY LESSONS AND OUTCOMES 
From the analysis above, a few policy lessons can be learnt from the implementation 
of the FIT in Germany. First, the historical path of the deployment of wind power in 
Germany created a strong institutional relationship between various actors in the 
wind power industry. This relationship has created economic and institutional 
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benefits that have expanded the installed wind capacity of Germany because of the 
bottom-up approach to the development of wind power. Wind power policy is 
characterised as effective and efficient. With a robust planning system, 
administrative and application processes are streamlined, thus paving way for a 
credible and enforceable policy instrument. Furthermore, the past two decades have 
witnessed a very stable policy instrument that guarantee access to grid and covers 
cost to a level that investment into wind power is profitable. An important lesson 
learnt is the market opportunity for renewable energy brought about with the 
implementation of the FIT. Overall, this has helped to encourage investor confidence 
thus, Germany has witnessed broad participation of stakeholders in policy design 
and implementation. Experiences with the FIT also demonstrate how renewable 
energy policy implementation can be linked with four core objectives: security of 
energy supply, environmental protection, economic and technology development. 
This is consistent with the claims of Szarka (2007) that the FIT provides a linking 
ground for energy policy, industrial policy, and environmental policy. According to 
BMU (2007), wind power installed capacity supplies over 5% of the total electricity 
demand. With this, Germany has also achieved significant reduction in CO2 
emissions. Similarly, with a favourable investment environment, wind turbine and 
component part manufacturers have seized the opportunity to develop through 
technological learning and improvement in the design of more efficient turbines and 
component parts (Mendonca 2007). Linking this to the FIT, Lipp (2007), also 
pointed out that it is the success of the FIT that carried Germany to its current lead 
position, and has allowed it to survive three changes in government. 
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Another lesson learnt from the experiences of the FIT is that a policy instrument can 
be flexible without reducing investors’ confidence. The flexibility of the FIT 
demonstrates how a policy instrument can be used to provide support which enables 
renewable energy technologies to develop. This also demonstrates that a transparent 
policy instrument brings together the suppliers and consumers of renewable energy. 
The large companies do not preside over the smaller ones, entry and exit is possible 
without restrictions. Mendonca (2007) pointed out that the FIT facilitates 
enforcement, maximises confidence in policies, and helps ensure that the 
mechanisms are open and fair. Szarka (2007) also noted that the FIT creates a 
balance of power between the utility companies, because of the low investment risks 
offered by the FIT. Hence the FIT is open to all levels of investment and creates the 
opportunity for broad participation. 
 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
Energy policies aimed at addressing the problems of the security of energy supply 
and climate change began in the 1970s, with federal government R&D programmes. 
A significant move towards the achievement of these goals was further encouraged by 
the introduction at the beginning in the 1990s, of the feed-in tariff system. Since then, 
the FIT has been in place and has undoubtedly helped in the delivery of huge installed 
wind power capacity.  
 
To date, Germany remains the world leader in terms of onshore wind capacity. From 
the analysis provided in this Chapter, the FIT has been relatively effective and 
efficient in the delivery of low cost onshore wind power. When compared to other 
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policy instruments investigated in this thesis, the FIT appears cheaper than the RO 
and almost on a par with the Dutch MEP. 
 
The FIT also gives investors confidence and is an excellent mechanism for 
guaranteeing a return on investment. Furthermore, it does not put barriers between 
renewable technologies and large or small investors. It is not surprising then, that the 
German wind power sector is made up of mainly small scale generators and local 
ownership schemes. Though a greater percentage of the success rate of the wind 
power industry is delivered by the FIT, other factors also play important roles. These 
include wide stakeholders’ involvement and support, a very good regulatory and 
market environment, stability, and the willingness of financial institutions to lend 
investors money. All these explain the reason for the success of the FIT. To this end, 
Germany has been named as one of the EU Member States that would reach and 
surpass its 12.5% renewable electricity target by 2010. 
 
However, until recently when things began to change, obtaining planning permission 
was fast and simple. This explains the reason why the FIT, in eighteen years of its 
operation, has delivered over 20,000MW wind installed capacity. A Regime for the 
re-powering of older wind turbines is currently in place, but the process is slower than 
expected, thus the rate of expansion has declined. As yet, it is not clear what the 
offshore plans of the German government would be. Overall, this Chapter concludes 
that the FIT has performed very well and has achieved a significant record level of 
wind installed capacity and other renewables for Germany. Thus, Germany now 
remains a first division member for deployed wind power capacity, alongside Spain, 
the U.S.A, India, and China. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE NETHERLANDS 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides an overview of the findings and analysis of the second country 
case (The Netherlands) of this research. The Netherlands is a pioneering country in 
wind power technology, along with Denmark and Germany; yet in recent times, has 
not adopted a stable policy instrument for the promotion of wind power generated 
electricity (Agnolucci 2007a; Agterbosch et al 2009, 2004; Gan et al 2007; van 
Rooijen and van Wees 2006). Therefore, The Netherlands remains a second division 
member of deployed wind power capacity – lagging behind Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, and alongside countries like France, Italy, Portugal and the UK (Otitoju et al 
2010).  
 
Thus, the principal objective of this Chapter is twofold. First, is to critically examine 
the performance of the Dutch policy instrument (Electricity Generation 
Environmental Quality (MEP)). Secondly, is the examination of the lessons learnt 
from the implementation and performance of the MEP. The key focus here is to set 
the critique in the context of the EU harmonisation agenda, and to compare and 
contrast The Netherlands policy instrument with the two other Member States 
investigated in this study. In doing this, historical institutional theory is utilised to 
explore wind power implementation in The Netherlands, using three parameters as 
outlined in Chapter One: emergence of policy instrument; policy architecture; and the 
outcome of the support and implementation of policy instrument.  
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Renewable energy policies in The Netherlands have been very complicated and 
volatile. The Dutch government has experimented with so many policy instruments 
which have made the renewable energy market a high risk and uncertain. To  date it 
is not yet clear what would be the next policy option for promoting renewable 
energy sources after the MEP was abandoned in August 2006 (Agnolucci 2007; 
Breukers and Wolsink 2007; Agterbosch 2006; Breukers 2006). This Chapter 
presents the findings arising from the field work undertaken with fifteen 
organisations involved in renewable energy activities in The Netherlands. 
Meanwhile, before presenting the findings, the next section provides an overview of 
The Netherlands wind power policies from 1970-2008.  
 
7.2 THE NETHERLANDS WIND POWER POLICY: 1970-2008 
Renewable energy in The Netherlands was boosted shortly after the oil crisis of the 
1970s (Gan et al 2007; van Rooijen and van Wees 2006; Junginger et al 2004; 
Wolsink 1996). Renewed interest in wind power found its origin in the energy crisis 
(Wolsink 1996). To this end the Ministry of Economic Affairs published the first 
White Energy Paper in 1974. The aim of the paper was to highlight the need to be 
energy efficient and to diversify the energy options available (Kamp et al 2004). 
Renewable energy sources were viewed as alternative energy sources (Breukers 
2006). The Government initiated the promotion of renewable energy through a 
national research programme for the development and application of wind power. 
Thus, the period between 1976 and 1987 witnessed the introduction of two R&D 
programmes (NOW I and II), where the Dutch wind turbine manufacturing industry 
received support for the development of different megawatt capacity turbines 
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(Breukers 2006). The programmes failed because of the lack of agreement between 
the government and the organisation of cooperating power producers (NV SEP). 
 
With the failure of NOW I & II, the government moved to set specific targets for 
different technologies hence, the Integrated Wind Energy programme (IPW) was 
introduced in 1986 (Junginger et al 2004).  For wind power, the government 
planned to have a cost-effective wind turbine on the market by 1991. To this end, 
the target of 100 to 150 MW installed capacity was expected to be reached by 1990 
and 1000MW by 2000 (Breukers 2006; Wolsink 1996). Breukers (2006) also noted 
that the Dutch government made €60 million and other investment subsidies 
available for each installed kW equivalent to €300/kW in 1986 and 1987. However, 
the IPW was not successful and did not meet these targets. Two or more reasons 
accounted for this. First was as a result of the failure of NOW I & II. The failure of 
both programmes paved way for the support of small scale wind turbine 
manufacturing which could not meet the requirement of achieving government set 
targets. Secondly, the manufacturers of wind turbine also faced pressures from the 
market. Breukers (2006) pointed out that instead of going through the learning 
process (see also: Kamp et al 2010, 2007); manufacturers relied on the research 
institutes knowledge. Rather than producing turbines that worked, manufacturers 
had to change their practices to follow recommendations from research institutes in 
order to make them cost-effective (Kamp et al 2004). Consequently, the Dutch wind 
turbine manufacturing industry failed and remained small and could not compete 
internationally with others, hence most of the turbine manufacturers lost the 
opportunity to grow and did not survive the 1990s. Lastly, as wind power became 
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more popular, local opposition increased. Finding sites for building wind turbine 
became very difficult (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). 
 
In place of the unsuccessful IPW, the Dutch government adopted the Wind Energy 
Application programme (TWIN I & II). TWIN I focussed on the development of 
commercial turbines through subsidies on wind turbine rotors. Wind turbine 
manufactures were awarded grants to encourage the production of large wind 
turbines. This programme also failed because the domestic wind turbines did not 
have an advantage over the imported ones. Again the Dutch turbines could not 
compete with their foreign counterparts (Wolsink 1996; Breukers 2006). As a 
corrective measure the TWIN II R&D programme was adopted. The programme 
was aimed at promoting better relationships between turbine manufacturers and 
research institutes. This aim was partly achieved, but Breukers (2006) revealed that 
it was too late to salvage the Dutch wind turbine industry at this time, and most of 
most of the manufacturers went bankrupt in subsequent years. 
 
Following on from this, the Environmental Action Plan (MAP I-III) covenants were 
adopted from 1991-2001. The aim of the MAP was: (i) to cut down the CO2 
emission (Keijzers 2002), and (ii) to help diversify the fuel supply system by 
reducing the dependency on fossil fuel through the deployment of renewable 
sources (IEA 2007, 2004; Dinica 2006; Junginger et al 2004; Koster 1998; Kwant 
2003; IEA Wind 2000). The government signed a covenant in 1990 with the energy 
industry to comply with its CO2 emission reduction targets (Agterbosch et al 2004). 
As a result, the MAP provided a series of measures for energy savings and 
conservation, and for the introduction of renewable energy sources (do Valle Costa 
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et al 2008). Thus, van Rooijen and van Wees (2006) pointed out that the 
introduction of the MAP obliged energy distributors to commit to the voluntary 
sales target of 3.2 per cent of renewable electricity, 0.7% of gas, and a 2.7 Mtons 
CO2 reduction of emissions by 2000. This was a further incentive for the Dutch 
wind power sector to grow. Consumers paid the environmental levy while, energy 
distributors and generators applied for the money to support the generation of 
renewables (Agterbosch et al 2004). The institutional and social conditions were in 
favour of the energy distributors as long as they were able to comply with the CO2 
reduction target (Agterbosch et al 2004). Before long, the opportunity to develop the 
Dutch wind power sector was lost when the distributors dominated the market and it 
later became unclear how the MAP funds were managed. Hence, the MAP was 
withdrawn and voluntary targets were not achieved (Breukers 2006; van Rooijen 
and van Wees 2006). The failure of the MAP saw the end to the subsidy era and the 
introduction of the fiscal system or the creation of green funds (Junginger et al 
2004). The first among the fiscal schemes, introduced by the Dutch government, 
was the Accelerated Depreciation Scheme on Environmental Investments (VAMIL). 
This scheme, offered companies the option of an accelerated depreciation of 
environmentally friendly equipment, like wind turbines, from 1996-2003 (Breukers 
2006). Thus, VAMIL served as an opportunity for companies to reduce production 
costs.  
 
The second fiscal scheme was the Investment Reduction Scheme (EIA) which 
offered tax credits on renewable energy technologies and made it possible for 
companies investing into renewables to reduce their taxable profit. Breukers (2006) 
pointed out that the EIA excluded the non-profit organisations, as such, the Energy 
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Investment Regulation for the non-profit and special sectors (EINP) was introduced 
to provide subsidies on investment costs for projects owned by cooperatives which 
were exempt from the EIA (Agterbosch et al 2004; Dinica and Arentsen 2003).  
 
Following the introduction of the EINP three fundamental institutional changes 
came about during the period 1998-2002 (Agterbosch et al 2004). The first of these 
three changes was the Regulatory Energy Tax (REB/ecotax) introduced in 1996. 
Households and small-medium sized enterprises were required to pay an 
environmental energy tax on electricity, generated on both conventional and 
renewables electricity. The REB/ecotax is divided into two: (i) REB 36o- a payment 
made by electricity consumers to support green energy producers; and (ii) REB 36i- 
a tax exemption for green energy purchases (Breukers and Wolsink 2007; Breukers 
2006; Agterbosch et al 2004). 
 
The second fundamental change, as pointed out by Agterbosch et al (2004), was the 
liberalisation process which began in 1998. This led to the third change in July 2001 
when green electricity market was fully liberalised.  Customers, irrespective of the 
rate or value of the electricity consumed, could choose their energy provider, hence 
making it possible to match energy policy and liberalisation of the electricity 
market. The goal of matching both markets was again to stimulate the domestic 
market and the production of green electricity and also to cut down on the costs for 
both the producers and consumers respectively (do Valle Costa et al 2008; Gan et al 
2007; Dinica and Arentsen 2003).  This led to two results; (i) independent wind 
power developers had the opportunity to deploy more wind capacity (Breukers 
2006); (ii) the disintegration of the monopoly powers of energy distributors. 
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Producers are free to sell to the highest bidder in the market, rather than being 
restricted to local distributors (Agterbosch et al 2004). However, with the 
complexity of the Dutch planning system and the increasing difficulty in finding 
suitable sites for wind power, due to the local resistance faced by developers, the 
REB did not add much value to the Dutch wind installed capacity. Rather, it profited 
from imports from outside The Netherlands. do Valle Costa et al (2008:74) noted 
that: “there was a flow of the ecotax to foreign markets which does not reflect 
additional investment in the capacity in renewable energy in the countries of origin, 
as such it was not capable of ensuring security for investors domestically who had 
to compete with low costs of imported energy”. The REB was also not stable in 
terms of the prices it offered, it changed annually and as such, its credibility was 
affected (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). Therefore, due to the inherent problems of 
the ecotax (Reijnders 2002), the Ministry of Economic Affairs in its 2002 Energy 
Report called for the amendment of the 1988 Electricity law. As a result, a new 
policy instrument was introduced by the Dutch Government in 2003 called the 
‘Environmental Quality of Electricity Production’ (MEP). This is a form of feed-in 
tariff available for domestic renewable energy generators, and it was meant to 
reduce investment risks and to improve the cost effectiveness of renewable 
electricity. This is facilitated through a feed-in tariff, combined with ecotax 
exemption (do Valle Costa et al 2008; Gan et al 2007; van Rooijen and van Wees 
2007; Junginger et al 2004; Kwant 2003). The MEP subsidy was fixed for a period 
of ten years and is available and applicable to only renewable electricity produced in 
The Netherlands. It was financed by an annual €34 levy on electricity connections 
of every household (do Valle Costa et al 2008; Gan et al 2007; Breukers 2006; van 
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Rooijen and van Wees 2006). Table 7.1, therefore, shows the breakdown of the 
Dutch policy discussed above, during the period 1975 – 2008. 
Table 7.1: Overview of the Dutch Wind Power Policies 1975-2008 
Policies and Programmes  Period Focus 
National Research 
Programme Wind Energy 
NOW 1 1976-1981 R&D&D 
 
Large scale applications 
National Research 
Programme Wind Energy 
NOW2 1982-1887 R&D&D 
 
Large scale applications 
Integrated Programme 
Wind Energy 
IPW 1986-1990 Development of 
commercial turbines, 
 
Large scale application, 
 
Subsidy on the rotor area 
Application Wind Energy 
in The Netherlands 
Programme  
Decision Subsidy Wind 
Energy (BSW): (until 
1996) 
TWIN I 1991-1994 Development of 
commercial turbines, 
 
Large scale application, 
 
Subsidy on the rotor area 
Application Wind Energy 
in The Netherlands 
Programme  
 
TWIN II 1996-2000 National R&D plan (NRW) 
Investment subsidy for 
demonstration 
Price-performance 
relationship of turbines 
Market creation 
Environmental Action 
Plans-related to first 
National Environmental 
Policy (NMP) 
MAP I-III 1991-2001 Investment and production 
subsidies- managed by 
distributors 
Green label system 
Accelerated Depreciation 
Scheme on Environmental 
Investments 
VAMIL 1996/97 Fiscal incentive for 
investments 
Green Funding  1996 Lowest interest rates for 
loans 
Green Investment 
Reduction Scheme 
EIA 1997 Fiscal incentive for 
investments 
Energy Investment 
Regulation for the Non-
Profit and Special Sectors 
EINP 1998 Fiscal incentive for 
investments 
CO2 reduction plan  1997 Investment subsidy 
Ecotax  1996 Tax on electricity and 
energy consumption 
REB360  1996 Option to provide 
production subsidy 
REB 36i-Ecotax 
exemption 
 1997 Exemption for buyers of 
renewable electricity 
Environmental Quality of 
Electricity  
MEP 2002-2006 Feed-in tariff with Utility 
companies mandated to  
feed into the grid all 
generated electricity at a 
fixed premium price.  
 
Source: (Breukers 2006) 
 
 
7.3 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
The evaluation framework applied in examining the performance of The 
Netherlands support scheme (MEP) was reviewed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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Considerable time was taken by the researcher to understand the role of the 
government, renewable energy associations, and Environmental NGOs in the 
implementation of the MEP before embarking on the careful selection of the 
respondents. Hence the Ministry of Economic Affairs plays a predominant role in 
the Dutch’s choice of policy instruments for renewable energy sources.  
 
The role of other stakeholders is minimal and in some cases they are only consulted 
years after the policy has been decided. Notwithstanding, organisations that have 
stakes and contribute in one way or another to the renewable energy market were 
identified and selected for interview. Due to the importance of the data, the 
researcher also took considerable time to contact the right officers and personnel 
involved in the renewable energy policy for each organisation, hence fifteen out of 
the sixteen respondents interviewed were well informed about the policy instrument 
(MEP) implemented in The Netherlands. For the researcher, it ensured the accuracy, 
reliability and validity of the data collected. Of the seventeen organisations selected, 
sixteen were very willing to be interviewed, while two of the organisations 
eventually backed out and refused to respond to emails and telephone calls. The 
interview schedule was constructed from the framework discussed in Chapter Four. 
This allowed the researcher a little flexibility. Thus, all the interviews were semi-
structured, each lasting an average of forty-five minutes. The in-depth semi 
structured interview afforded the researcher the opportunity of obtaining very rich 
data and a broad sense of the policy instrument. Detailed analysis of the MEP’s 
operation and performance is presented in the next section of this Chapter, while a 
detailed comparison of the MEP and other policy instruments investigated in this 
thesis is presented in Chapter Nine. 
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7.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
7.4.1 The Principal Market Drivers for Promoting Wind Power in The 
Netherlands 
According to Kwant (2003), renewable energy policies are driven by the well-
organised need for a sustained society. Over the years this has served as an 
important driver to the deployment of wind power in The Netherlands. 
Unfortunately, in recent times no policy instrument or market driver exists for the 
promotion of wind power and other renewables in The Netherlands. 
 
The MEP which served as the principal market driver in the past (2003-2006) was 
withdrawn by the Government. Evidence from the interviews revealed that the 
Government, through the Ministry of Economic Affairs, is working in collaboration 
with the stakeholders on implementing a new policy instrument. As mentioned 
earlier, the MEP was similar to Germany’s FIT and during its lifetime helped to 
bring forward the development of significant wind power installations in The 
Netherlands.  
 
Apart from the legislative instrument market driver, The Netherlands have the 
additional goal of reaching 9% of renewable energy sources electricity by 2010 and 
an overall or general renewable energy capacity of 10% in 2020. Findings from the 
interviews reveal that these goals have not been written into an act or bill. They are 
Government policy goals written in the form of a policy document and are reviewed 
annually in the energy papers published by the Government institution concerned. 
In a broader sense, there are three key issues responsible for driving renewable 
energy vis-à-vis wind power market in The Netherlands, namely: security of energy 
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supply; environmental protection and the threat of climate change; and low prices. 
This is evident in the past government policies. For example, the REB eco-tax was 
aimed at stimulating the market by encouraging investment into energy. It offered 
an equal price for both renewables and non renewables regenerated electricity, 
hence consumers demanding green electricity were willing to pay for it. 
Consequently, Agterbosch et al (2004) noted that the institutional and social 
conditions were favourable for the energy distributors who took the advantage to 
boost the total capacity installed in renewables. It is not surprising that the energy 
distributors and utilities were able to diversify their portfolio and include all forms 
of energy. It also proved to the consumers that the utility and energy distributors are 
environmentally friendly and aware of the threat of global warming, especially with 
regards to the Kyoto Protocol and the EU carbon di-oxide emission reduction. 
Hence, the need to comply with Government regulations, expand the market share 
while at the same time providing consumer satisfaction are the key drivers for 
promoting and investing renewables in The Netherlands. Table 7.2 presents a 
summary of the drivers discussed in this section. The next section gives a detailed 
analysis of the performance of the MEP. 
Table 7.2: Summary of the Dutch Wind Power Market Drivers 
• The need for a well organised sustained society 
• Climate change and environmental protection 
• Security of energy supply and electricity/energy costs reduction 
• The MEP during a three year period (2003-2006) 
• The need to comply with the government regulations 
• To satisfy consumers’ demand for renewable electricity 
• A strong consumer demand for clean electricity 
Author Generated 
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7.4.2  Evaluation of the Performance of the MEP 
7.4.2.1 Administration 
Interestingly, the MEP is a form of feed-in tariff similar to the German system, but 
in practical terms it was costly and difficult for the Government to implement and 
administer. This is because the administrative and transaction costs of the MEP are 
very high and that was the main reason why the Government, through the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs, had to withdraw it. The Government’s budget for renewables 
was always exceeded throughout the lifetime of the MEP. Like the German FIT, the 
MEP sets out prices for renewable energy technology. Thus, investors are aware of 
the wind potential of any particular site and what a single turbine can produce each 
year. However because the MEP was not properly designed, respondents claimed 
that the MEP was too successful and over stimulated the market as investors were 
rewarded too much and sometimes made windfall profits on their investment. For 
example Breukers and Wolsink (2007) noted that the remuneration period for wind 
power is equal to 18000 full load capacity hours over a maximum period of 10 
years thus, 850 kW wind turbines are likely to reach these full load hours in just 7.6 
years. 
 
Like the German system, the MEP is easy to understand and to some extent 
transparent, because farmers know what they will receive for selling each kilowatt 
hour of wind power in the market. On the other hand, the computation and 
calculations from the utility point of view is where the complexity lies. Since it is 
expensive to maintain, the MEP scheme requires modification and as such, it is 
almost impracticable and very inflexible. As a way of explanation, the MEP does 
not allow adjustment of fixed prices. It is very difficult to make changes because in 
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its original design no provision for this was made. This is also consistent with do 
Valle Costa et al (2008:73) findings about the Dutch wind power policy 
instruments:  
“The policy for promoting RES-E in The Netherlands was 
developed in a complex manner. The various phase-ins and -
outs of the support instruments and the confusing political 
context leads to uncertainties in markets, making the 
implementation of renewable energy projects difficult, 
particularly wind power.” 
 
To summarise this discussion, it can be inferred that the MEP, in its original state, is 
a simple system but complex in administration. Furthermore, because it was not 
carefully thought through at the beginning, it did not endure. Like the previous 
policy instrument it was stopped abruptly by the Government, effectively, making 
the Dutch wind industry high risk and uncertain.   
 
7.4.2.2  Stakeholder support/involvement 
One key criticism directed against the wind power policy instruments implemented 
in The Netherlands is that they lack wide stakeholder support and involvement. 
Renewable energy actors, utilities companies, research institutes, and environmental 
NGOs play limited role in the development of wind power policy in The 
Netherlands. The Ministry of Economic Affairs remains the dominant player in 
deciding the choice of policy instrument, design and implementation. Gan et al 
(2007) pointed out that the renewable energy policy making process in The 
Netherlands is very different.  Stakeholders are allowed to interfere when final 
decisions concerning a policy instrument have been reached. For example, a senior 
policy advisor interviewed in the Ministry of Economic Affairs said that: 
“Well stakeholders were not very involved at the moment we 
design the MEP because it was in a rush and hurry that we have 
 169 
to implement the system, so consulting the sector was no time 
for it, we did it rather quickly after two years we decided to 
evaluate the MEP and in that process many stakeholders were 
asked to give comments on the MEP. The result of that 
evaluation was used in the redesign of the MEP in 2005. So that 
was a change of the electricity law and the implementation of it 
will be taking place in January 2007. But from the start there 
was no much involvement of the stakeholders but in the 
meantime when we did the evaluation, there was involvement 
and in the redesign there was a short consultation period.” 
(Interview undertaken: 30th November 2006)    
 
This implies that the Ministry of Economic Affairs was the ‘Architect’ and 
‘Designer’ of the MEP because the responsibility was placed on the Ministry by the 
Dutch Government. TenneT also has sole ownership and regulation of the grid and 
transmission system. Evidence gathered during interviews reveals that the 
Government did not involve other stakeholders during the early stage of the 
development and design of the renewable policy instruments. They (stakeholders) 
were only consulted after completing the design of the MEP. A senior member with 
The Netherlands’ Wind Energy Association said that:   
“...the government do it in a very late stage when they have 
developed the support scheme, then they come back to the 
market [us] and ask if the support scheme works well or not.....” 
(Interview undertaken: 27th September 2006).  
 
Thus, the Dutch renewable energy market lacks a healthy relationship between the 
government and the investors. According to Breukers and Wolsink (2007), 
cooperation among stakeholders, within the wind power sector, has been 
troublesome. The authors pointed out that there has been lack of trust and conflicts 
of interest between the wind power industry actors. In addition, the Government’s 
action did not help matters; Dinica (2002) argued that the Government did not 
create a good investment environment for renewables.  In the past, policy 
instruments were introduced to achieve short-term goals, there was no avenue for 
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stakeholders to interact and minimise institutional conflicts that could hinder 
investment security. Although findings reveal that most stakeholders favoured the 
MEP and would have wanted such a scheme for The Netherlands, the Government 
could not sustain it.  
 
7.4.2.2.1 Wind power implementation and scale 
As mentioned earlier, 50% of the wind power stake in The Netherlands is owned by 
farmers and cooperatives (Breukers and Wolsink 2007). Evidence from the 
interviews also revealed that the MEP encourages the smaller generating companies 
in the same way it does the large scale generating companies, because it offers the 
same rate to all investors and does not discriminate amongst investors. This is 
largely responsible for the current nature of wind farm holdings in The Netherlands. 
There are many farmers who have stakes and holdings in wind power and 
sometimes wind parks are constructed by consortia of energy servicing companies. 
Illustrating the position of small companies in the share of onshore wind farms, a 
policy director, with one renewable association, claimed that most of the installed 
capacity of wind power in The Netherlands is owned by farmers, cooperatives and 
the like. As a way of explanation, farmers own the land and can decide where they 
want to install a wind turbine. They also have the ability to convince others to pool 
funds and initiate a joint investment because, with the MEP scheme, it is more 
beneficial to invest in wind than in subsistence farming. According to Breukers and 
Wolsink (2007), over 50 independent companies are now involved in the 
development of wind power in The Netherlands. The authors pointed out that 
farmers have been able to network with distributors and large energy companies and 
obtain a good price for generated capacity. Agterbosch et al (2009), and Agetrbosch 
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(2006) also add that the contribution of environmental movements and 
organisations like Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, etc. has been very important to 
the development of wind power in The Netherlands. However, the big energy 
companies have a smaller portion of the installed wind capacity. This situation may 
change as plans to move offshore mature.  
 
To summarise, whatever criticism is levied against the MEP, it was a good policy 
instrument. Comparing the MEP to previous systems Breukers and Wolsink (2007), 
van Rooijen et al (2006), and Agterbosch (2006) contested that the MEP has helped 
improve wind power and other renewable energy sources’ level playing field. Due 
to the reward it offers, local farmers were encouraged to invest in wind power and 
have been able to own more stakes than the energy supply and distributing 
companies. Compared to the past policy instruments, wind installed capacity was 
higher with the MEP than with others. Had it been well designed it could have been 
a model of success for the Dutch wind industry. 
 
7.4.2.3 Certainty for industry 
As mentioned earlier, the stability of any policy instrument is essential in promoting 
a healthy renewable energy market and in a developing domestic turbine 
manufacturing industry. This has not been the case with The Netherlands. The 
Dutch renewable energy market has always been characterised as unstable and not 
being able to attract investors and financial support (Toke et al 2008; Agnolucci 
2008). Evidence from the interviews reveals that there has been no consistent 
Government support for the wind power industry. Policy instruments developed in 
the past have not been sustained by the Government hence, the investors have lost 
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confidence and trust in government programmes aimed at supporting renewable 
energy sources. As a result, there has been a gradual loss of wind turbine 
manufacturing industry in The Netherlands (Kamp et al 2004; Agterbosch et al 
2004).  Agnolucci (2008) pointed out that the opportunities which the Dutch wind 
power domestic companies had in the 1990s were gradually eroded away due to the 
lack of policy continuity.  Furthermore, because the government does not create an 
enabling environment to encourage investments in wind power, risks and 
uncertainties have increased over the years. Due to the ‘stop’ and ‘go’ nature of The 
Netherlands’ policy instruments, the willingness of investors to enter into the wind 
power business has reduced drastically and most investors would prefer to diversify 
their investment portfolio towards a more stable and less risky venture, rather than 
investing into wind power and other renewables. Currently, Netherlands has no 
policy instrument in place that encourages new investments into renewable energy 
sources. The MEP was stopped in August 2006 thus, bringing all investment in 
wind power to a standstill. Only projects that were built or completed before the 
MEP was abandoned still benefit from the MEP support. Projects built after do not 
qualify, thus they had to be funded by investors or would have to wait for the 
proposed government policy instrument. Renewable energy sources are ‘near 
market technologies’ and cannot currently compete with other non renewables 
without adequate support. This help is lacking at the moment in The Netherlands. 
On the other hand, the turbine manufacturing industry has no financial and 
technological backing to carry out R&D programmes to improve on domestically 
manufactured turbines. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Dutch wind power 
market has lost its entire wind turbine manufacturing companies to Germany, Spain, 
and Denmark, where there are better investment environments.  Once the 
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Government abandon a policy, investors are not clear what the next option will be 
and how long the next will last, hence they are very reluctant to invest into wind 
power. As a result, respondents claimed existing investors have cut down on their 
portfolios and are looking to other markets outside The Netherlands instead. 
Currently, Netherlands is ranked among one of the riskier markets in Europe in 
terms of renewable energy.  It is not clear what the new policy instrument will be 
like and for how long it will last. It is very important that the Government involves 
all the stakeholders in the design and implementation of its renewable energy policy 
to restore the Dutch wind power credibility. 
 
7.4.2.4  Effectiveness 
Contrary to the findings of van Rooijen and van Wees (2006) that the effectiveness 
of the Dutch green electricity policy, between 1996 and 2006, has generally been 
limited, the MEP is regarded as the most effective instrument The Netherlands has 
ever used to promote wind power. It is not surprising then, that all the respondents’ 
interviewed argued in support of the effectiveness of the MEP. Netherlands is 
committed to reaching the 9% target of RES-E by 2010 and wind power plays a 
significant role in making this a reality. Evidence from the interviews reveal that the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, on behalf of the Dutch Government, stopped the 
MEP because of the predictions that Netherlands will meet and surpass its 9% 
renewable electricity target by 2010. Prior to the existence of the MEP, meeting the 
2010 target was unsure. Recent evidence (EU 2006a) placed Netherlands among 
eight other Member States that would reach the 2010 target. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs claimed that the key reason why the MEP was set at zero by the 
Government was that the 9% goal has now been reached. In 2005, renewable 
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energy capacity was 6% and an additional 3% was contracted or allocated in 2006. 
Therefore, the government decided to stop all subsidies, since the EU renewable 
energy electricity target has been reached. Thus, it is not misleading to claim that 
the MEP was one of the tools used to deliver record capacity of renewables in The 
Netherlands.  
 
According to EWEA (2007b), The Netherlands is ranked 8th in terms of wind power 
installed capacity in Europe and was placed among the first twelve in the world to 
have over 1500MW wind installed capacity. By the end of 2006, Dutch wind power 
installed capacity stood at 1560MW. A total of 341MW was installed in same year, 
thus representing a 29% increase in 2005 installed capacity. No doubt, the MEP 
would have delivered more capacity if it had not have been stopped by the Dutch 
government. Respondents noted that if a similar system was implemented in The 
Netherlands more renewables capacity could be delivered, especially wind power. 
The reason being that the MEP encourages the deployment of renewables from the 
grassroots. Wind power generators do not have to look for buyers of generated 
capacity. Like the German FIT, energy suppliers and distributors are mandated by 
law to take all generated capacities at a fixed premium price. Also the MEP is very 
attractive to investors because producers are guaranteed of profit upon investment. 
However, Agnolucci (2007) pointed out that due to the inherent problems in the 
design of the MEP, there was no provision made in the rules to curb excess profit. 
Even though targets are met, obtaining planning permission for wind sites is still a 
very complex and unclear process. Planning permission is still left in the hands of 
few actors who exert much authority and influence in favour of self or anti-wind 
organisations. Breukers and Wolsink (2007) pointed out that the action of nature and 
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other landscape protection organisations in The Netherlands are on the increase. 
These organisations have formed a strong network that opposes wind power 
deployment at various levels.   
 
It is therefore important that the Government re-introduces a similar system like the 
MEP if future targets are to be reached and exceeded. With system like the MEP, 
many landowners and farmers can invest in wind power while still using the same 
land for farming. Farmers that are not capable of doing this alone can come together 
as cooperatives to own stakes in wind power. Nevertheless, it is important that the 
Government designs and implements a policy instrument that can guarantee 
investors’ confidence. The Dutch Government should remove any uncertainty and 
adopt a simple, clear, and stable policy instrument that will boost investment 
potential in wind power. 
 
7.4.2.5  Efficiency 
The efficiency of the MEP has generated many doubts and questions. The challenge 
of any policy instrument is usually to improve economic efficiency and to deliver 
RES-E at the least possible cost. The Dutch Government, through the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs initiated the MEP and later withdrew it because of its 
‘inefficiency’. A senior policy advisor with the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
claimed that renewable generated capacities were over subsidised thus, the market 
was over stimulated. The MEP is financed through an annual levy of €34 on 
electricity connections to Dutch households (van Rooijen and van Wees 2006). 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that this annual levy alone is not sufficient to 
cover the subsidies and fixed premiums associated with the MEP, hence, the 
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Government spends huge amounts of tax payers’ money to finance the excess. 
Respondents pointed out that the budgeted excess is always surpassed by the 
Government throughout the lifetime of the MEP, thus causing budget deficits. It is 
not misleading, to argue that the MEP is weak and not efficient in static and 
dynamic terms. Two or more reasons can be given to explain this. Firstly, the MEP 
was so rigid that the Government could not adjust prices. Secondly, because the 
MEP rewards investments in renewables over and above what the market could 
offer, it was impossible to cut down cost, hence the final consumers bear the burden 
of paying higher prices for generated capacity. Supporting this claim, respondents 
revealed that the energy distributors and generators in The Netherlands are probably 
happier than their counterparts in Germany because they receive more money. 
Comparing the Dutch prices with other EU Member States, a senior policy advisor 
with a Government institution, claimed that onshore wind generators receive a 0.04 
eurocents plus 0.06 eurocents [0.10 eurocents] subsidy, while in Germany 
generators are paid an overall subsidy of 0.08 euros. Thus, investors are more 
comfortable in The Netherlands than in most other countries in Europe.  
  
7.4.2.6  Market Conformity 
The MEP, a similar system to the German FIT, has been criticised by some authors 
(van Dijk et al 2003; Sijm 2002; Wiser et al 2002) as being an instrument that 
distorts market competition and not being capable of creating a single liberalised 
electricity market. The Dutch liberalisation of green electricity began in 2001 
following the EU’s drive for electricity market liberalisation. This clearly marked 
the first move in the relaxing of the Dutch retail electricity market. The 
liberalisation of the green electricity market was aimed at providing incentives for 
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consumers to buy green electricity, thus creating a level playing field for both green 
electricity and conventionally sourced electricity (do Valle Costa et al 2008; 
Agnolucci 2007a; Gan et al 2007; van Rooijen and van Wees 2006). Respondents 
claimed that The Netherlands rank among the forerunners of liberalisation in 
Europe, alongside the UK and Germany. To demonstrate this, both conventional 
and renewable electricity markets in The Netherlands are liberalised and there is no 
price difference between them. van Rooijen and van Wees (2006) pointed out that 
electricity companies have used the green electricity liberalisation as a tool to retain 
existing customers as well as attracting new ones.  Interestingly, there was no legal 
case against the MEP throughout its lifetime. Comparing the Dutch electricity 
market to other EU Member States, respondents claimed that the MEP was just part 
of the demands to fulfil the EU obligation of promoting renewable electricity. The 
MEP was designed and implemented to serve as a mechanism enabling The 
Netherlands to deliver the RES-E target, as demanded by the EU thus, exhibiting 
the commitment of The Netherlands government to promote RES-E. Besides, an 
investor building a wind farm is doing so in order to obtain a contract for selling 
generated electricity to the grid operators who are mandated by the Government to 
buy all generated renewable electricity at a fixed price. It is against this backdrop 
that the MEP cannot be criticised as being incompatible with the Dutch legal and 
regulatory provisions.  
 
One interesting point regarding the Dutch electricity liberalisation, is that customers 
are allowed to choose their buyer and they can switch from one supplier to another. 
This is why The Netherlands is regarded as being one of the few countries having a 
high customer demand for green electricity. There is also no price difference 
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between green and conventionally sourced electricity; hence customers are not 
disadvantaged by opting for green electricity. From the moment green electricity 
prices and conventional power cost the same, Dutch consumers were motivated to 
purchase green electricity, showing their loyalty to maintaining a sustainable 
environment.  
 
To summarise therefore, the renewable electricity directive 2001/77/EC also 
allowed and gave the Member States the opportunity to choose the mechanism that 
best suits the market system of each Member State. Therefore, in this context the 
MEP is completely compatible with Dutch and EU legal provisions. 
 
7.4.2.7  Finance 
The ‘stop’ and ‘go’ nature of the Dutch renewable energy policy instruments causes 
renewables investors concern. There is currently no notable policy instrument in 
The Netherlands. The MEP was the last of the policy instruments and was 
abandoned three years after its design and implementation. New projects are not 
forthcoming, because investing into renewables, without any Governmental 
support, is practically impossible. Furthermore, financial institutions would always 
want to be sure of the returns on investment before they lend or finance any project. 
It is not surprising then that, throughout the lifetime of the MEP it was possible to 
obtain finance for projects that passed through the planning permission process 
successfully. The MEP guarantees payment for 10 years, but the problem lies in 
starting up the project before the expiry of the short lived policy instrument, like the 
MEP. It only existed for three years and projects that could not secure the subsidy 
before it was stopped do not receive any Government subsidy. Planning regulations 
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in The Netherlands make it very difficult for projects to start operating within three 
years. Besides, the majority of the best sites for onshore wind are saturated, 
therefore with a policy instrument, whose lifespan is unknown or does not usually 
exceed three years, it is difficult for developers to begin a project and see it go 
through the planning stage successfully. Furthermore, a project does not qualify for 
the MEP until it is up and running. Before then, there is no possibility of a 
guaranteed return on investment. Unfortunately, the MEP subsidy no longer exists 
in The Netherlands therefore, only projects which were able to pass through the 
planning stage and could secure the Government’s approval before the deadline 
were eligible for the MEP subsidy over the next 10 years. Thus, the renewable 
energy sources market at the moment is hugely characterised by high risks and 
uncertainties, as such investors are not certain of what the market holds, making it 
difficult to obtain finance for new projects. 
 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that the actions the Government have taken to 
correct this are negligible at the moment. van Rooijen and van Wees (2006), and 
Dinica (2002) pointed out that all the Government has been concerned about in the 
past is implementing policy support to ensure The Netherlands meet the EU’s 
renewable energy target.  Hence, support for renewable energy sources is more of a 
political issue than one of economics. One of the key reasons why the MEP was 
stopped was because the 9% RES-E target for 2010 had been achieved. Investors 
are not too clear what happens next as support in the future could also be based on 
meeting the EU 2020 targets. This is what discourages support from financial 
institutions.  Investors need to be sure before committing their resources. Right now 
in The Netherlands, there is no policy instrument in place for the RES-E project. All 
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new projects are on hold because it is expensive to operate a RES-E project without 
finance, and financial institutions are reluctant to invest in a project where there is 
no assurance of its survival. The bottom line here is that the Government needs to 
come up with a single policy instrument that will endure for 10 to 15 years, like the 
FIT in Germany, and the FIT Premium in Spain. There is also the need to move 
away from the idea of developing policies in order to meet national or EU targets, 
and to implement policy instruments that give the development of the RES-E 
market a chance. 
 
7.4.2.8  Impact on Development 
The MEP was an important policy instrument in the development of wind power in 
The Netherlands. The Netherlands, previously a pioneer of wind power along with 
other EU Member States, lost this privilege as a result of the instability of its policy 
instrument. Before 2003, when the MEP was introduced, the total installed capacity 
of wind power was less than 1000MW (IEA Wind 2002). By the end of 2008, total 
installed capacity reached 2225MW. With the current record, it is evident that the 
MEP was a very good policy instrument for stimulating the growth of wind power, 
and technological advancement of wind turbine capacity was very beneficial to the 
capacity added during the life time of the MEP (Breukers and Wolsink 2007; 
Breukers 2006). The MEP gave rise to record levels of installed wind capacity 
generated by fewer large capacity turbines than the older windmills, producing less 
capacity. 
 
In terms of the contribution of the wind industry to the Dutch economy, respondents 
pointed out that wind installations are built mostly in rural areas and as such bring 
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some social benefits to these areas. Findings from the interviews also reveal that 
many of the wind turbines are owned by ‘MARSHALS’ or cooperatives, made up 
of groups of farmers and land owners. Therefore, for the farmers who have wind 
farms it is a means of external or additional income. 
 
However, The Netherlands has lost its entire turbine manufacturing companies to 
countries like Denmark, Germany and Spain. Thus, it is difficult to measure the 
impact the wind industry’s has on improving employment and social benefits. 
Findings from the interviews also reveal that, due the collapse of wind turbine 
manufacturing, the wind power sector no longer has a positive effect on the 
employment sector as it used to do in times past. Farmers, nowadays, import 
turbines from abroad and only the management and servicing of the turbines are 
carried out by Dutch companies. Hence, it can be concluded that the Dutch wind 
power sector’s contribution to the employment sector is minimal. In terms of its 
contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and The Netherlands 
Kyoto targets, IEA Wind (2006) reported that The Netherlands was able to cut 
down 3.1 million tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2006. This is insignificant, compared 
to the figures and rates achieved in Germany. 
 
To summarise, therefore, the MEP proved to be an important tool for the 
development of wind power in The Netherlands and without such a good policy 
there would not have been as many installations as there are today in The 
Netherlands. Be that as it may, the MEP only existed for a short period of three 
years and as such, it is difficult to measure the effect it had on employment figures 
and other benefits associated with the Dutch wind power sector.  Doubtlessly, it 
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would have done better if the Government had allowed it to remain in place. 
 
7.5 POLICY LESSONS AND OUTCOMES 
From the above analysis, some policy lessons can be learnt from the Dutch 
renewable energy policies. Over the years, Dutch renewable energy policies have 
been characterised as being inconsistent and uncertain. Historically, The 
Netherlands has experimented with more policy instruments than any other EU 
Member States, yet The Netherlands lags behind Germany, Spain, and Denmark in 
terms of installed wind capacity. One key reason explaining the need for this 
experimentation is the lack of clarity on the part of the Government on which is  the 
best method to increase the deployment of renewable energy sources without 
affecting investment certainty. No doubt changes to policy instruments are 
necessary, especially in the case of wind power which is more advanced than other 
renewables as a near market technology. However, these changes should be 
reasonable and should not erode the economic benefits of the renewables market. In 
the late 1980s and 1990s, Agnolucci (2007) noted that the Dutch renewables/wind 
power industry was given the opportunity to develop domestically and as such 
could compete with other EU Member States in turbine manufacturing. However, as 
a result of policy failure, the Dutch wind industry lost this promising market to 
Germany and Denmark. Breukers and Wolsink (2007) add that this failure created 
economic and institutional conditions that narrowed future options. Following the 
historical path of the deployment of wind power in The Netherlands, there is a very 
weak institutional relationship between various actors in the wind industry. A few 
actors in the industry tend to dominate others and exert much power and influence. 
For example, renewable energy policies have, in the past, been designed and 
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implemented solely by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Planning permission, on 
the other hand, has been strongly influenced by the Spatial Planning Ministry. One 
key error in the Dutch spatial planning law is the exclusion of wind power in 
planning laws. The deployment of wind power has instead been complicated and 
limited to very controversial sites. There is no opportunity to appeal against any 
planning application rejected by the authorities. However, Breukers and Wolsink 
(2007) argue that permitting procedures do not constitute a bottleneck for the 
realisation of wind power. What constitutes a major bottleneck is the institutional 
failure and lack of direction and political will of the Government. Unlike Germany, 
the Dutch Government has not been able to integrate other actors into wind power 
programmes. The role of Government research institutes and industry actors has 
been very limited. As such the role of other actors has been divergent, rather than 
converging, with each pursuing a separate agenda and selfish interest. This is 
evident through the withdrawal of the MEP. A key reason for this was because the 
Government assumed that the political target set by the EU had been reached, as 
such the Dutch renewable energy market did not need any other incentive to 
stimulate the market. Focus has gradually shifted from building a viable renewable 
energy market to merely achieving targets. Not surprising, the domestic wind 
turbine manufacturing industry gradually fizzled out. 
 
With regards to the MEP, the performance of the MEP over the three years of its 
existence, demonstrates that renewables can do better with long-term guaranteed 
support. It could also influence the change in the supposedly acclaimed Dutch top-
down approach to the deployment of wind power to a bottom-up approach. The 
reason being- farmers and landowners are willing to engage and become involved in 
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investing in wind power. Thus, deployment can originate from the grassroots. This 
encourages wider participation of stakeholders and actors as is the case in Germany. 
The Dutch renewable electricity market liberalisation programme could also be very 
helpful in this regard. Prices of conventional and non conventional energy are the 
same. Dutch households have the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment 
towards the global climate change abatement and challenge them. Hence, a policy 
that can bring together other strands of wind power is necessary at this point. This 
will enable actors with various level of experience to contribute in the improvement 
in the design and performance of future policy instruments (Breukers and Wolsink 
2007). 
  
7.6 CONCLUSION 
Like Germany and the UK, renewable energy policies in The Netherlands began in 
the 1970s, with the aim of tackling climate change and cutting down on the 
dependency on fossil fuel available in only few regions of the world. Evidence from 
the analysis reveals that The Netherlands has not adopted a stable policy instrument 
for promoting wind power. At present, there is no policy instrument to support new 
investments into wind power. The last policy instrument was the MEP and it was 
stopped abruptly by the Dutch Government in August 2006. However, the 
Government is working together with other stakeholders to introduce a new scheme. 
This is expected to happen in 2009. 
 
Prior to the introduction of the MEP in 2003, the rate of wind power deployment in 
The Netherlands was slow and ineffective. However, with the MEP, the Dutch wind 
power sector changed, hence the country was able to achieve a record level of 
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onshore wind installed capacity. From the analysis presented in this Chapter, the 
MEP was very effective in bringing the market over 800MW installed capacity. The 
reason to explain this revolved around the fact that the MEP is a form of FIT and 
encourages the development of wind power market. Also, the Dutch wind power 
sector is made up of farmers and corporate ownerships. However, the MEP could 
not be sustained because of its inefficiencies. The Government claimed that the 
MEP had caused too many budget deficits and that extra costs could no longer be 
borne by the Government. 
 
When compared with other policy instruments, the MEP seems to offer good tariffs, 
but it was short-lived because of the complexities surrounding its design, hence 
making the Dutch renewable market vulnerable and risky. Unlike the German 
system, planning permission is rather difficult and not easy to come by. There is 
little space available to build more onshore capacities. Notwithstanding, the Dutch 
government claimed that with the current level of wind installed capacity and other 
renewables, it will reach its 9% target by 2010. 
 
Overall, this Chapter concludes that the Dutch Government needs to adopt a long 
lasting solution to the ‘stop’ and ‘go’ nature of the wind power policy instrument if 
The Netherlands is to meet renewable targets beyond 2010.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS: UNITED KINGDOM 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter provides an overview of the findings and analysis of the third country 
case (United Kingdom) of this research. To date, wind power is the most advanced 
and nearly competitive form of renewable energy in the UK (Strachan and Lal 2004). 
The UK is often heralded as one of the windiest countries in Europe and has great 
potential both onshore and offshore (Strachan et al 2006; BWEA 2004). 
Interestingly, the development of wind power in the UK has been slow, compared to 
countries like Germany and Spain which have less wind resource (Brennand 2004; 
Ibenholt 2002).  
 
Unlike Germany and The Netherlands, the UK has adopted a different policy 
instrument. The renewables obligation began operation in 2002 and places an 
obligation on utility companies to supply 10% of their electricity mix from 
renewables, by 2010. This target is expected to reach 15% by 2015 and 20% by 2020 
(Toke 2005; Connor 2003). The bulk of the renewable capacity is expected to come 
from wind power because onshore wind at the moment is presented as being the most 
advanced among other renewables.  Scotland has been a significant player in helping 
the UK achieve this target. Currently, Scotland is on its way to reach the 18% target 
of renewable electricity by 2010 and 50% by 2020 (Otitoju et al 2010; Scottish 
Government 2009).  
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However, unlike Germany and The Netherlands, the UK is not on course to meet its 
10% target by 2010 (Prag 2007; Helm 2002a). Reasons outlined to explain this 
revolve around the strict UK planning and permission laws for onshore and offshore 
wind power projects. Other reasons include a strong landscape protection movement, 
a weak transmission system in Scotland, and the presence of a well organised anti-
wind lobby groups (Cowell 2007; Cowell and Strachan 2007; Parkhill 2007; Szarka 
2007; Strachan and Lal 2004). Thus, like The Netherlands, the UK remains a second 
division member of deployed wind power capacity, behind Denmark, Spain, and 
alongside countries like France, Italy, and Portugal.  
 
The principal objective of this Chapter is twofold. Firstly, is to critically examine the 
performance of the RO, i.e. the UK policy instrument for the promotion of wind 
power. Secondly, it aims to explore key policy lessons that can be learnt from the 
implementation and performance of the RO. The key focus is to set this argument in 
the context of the European Union harmonisation agenda and to compare and 
contrast the UK policy instrument with the other two EU Member States investigated 
in this study. In doing this, historical institutional theory is utilised to explore wind 
power implementation in the UK using three parameters as outlined in Chapter One: 
emergence of policy instrument; policy architecture; and the outcome of the support 
and implementation of policy instrument.   
 
This Chapter presents the findings arising from in-depth semi-structured interview, 
undertaken with eighteen stakeholder organisations widely involved in renewables 
activities in the UK. Meanwhile, before presenting the findings, the next section 
provides an overview of UK’s wind power policies from 1970-2008. 
 188 
8.2 UK WIND POWER POLICY: 1970-2008 
Plans to promote renewable energy in the UK can be traced back to the 1970s.  At 
this time, renewable energy was based on research and development, with only very 
limited electricity being produced from renewable energies. During the 1970s and 
1980s, renewable energy was both marginalised and shackled by the technocratic 
corporatism of the then nationalised energy industry.  
  
During the 1980s, the UK government began to pursue a wholesale liberalisation and 
privatisation of the electricity market.  Becoming the first EU Member State to open 
up its market for competition through the adoption of Electricity Act in 1989 (Meyer 
2003), the regulatory framework was geared towards promoting competition, and 
lower consumer prices and avoiding market distortions. 
 
While the Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) introduced in 1990, did kick-start the 
wind power sector in the UK, its failings have been well studied.  Though the NFFO 
served as an initial financial policy instrument to promote the take-off of most 
commercially viable renewable energy technologies, Mitchell and Connor 
(2004:136) reveal, however that the NFFO was set up as a means to subsidise nuclear 
generation, which had proved too difficult to privatise.  At that time, as Szarka and 
Blühdorn (2006) outline, only limited support was provided to renewable energies.  
 
The NFFO was arranged in rounds, as a form of tender system, which allowed 
companies to compete for financial support for investing in renewables. In simple 
terms, the cheapest bid submitted won the contract and the company then received a 
subsidy.  By 2000, a total of 1500MW installed capacity of renewable energy sources 
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was proposed, but after all of the NFFO rounds, it failed to deliver the required 
target. Hence, Brennand (2004:89) noted that:  
“The failure of the NFFO to achieve its 1500 MW target of new 
renewable generating capacity in the UK by the year 2000 led 
the government in the same year to declare a new target of 
10%, therefore the NFFO was put on a hold.” 
 
Much was said about the planning problems faced by wind power schemes (Connor 
and Mitchell 2004), but perhaps a bigger factor contributing to the disappointing rate 
of windfarm installation was due to the competitive bidding system itself. It 
encouraged low-cost schemes. Unfortunately, many seemed to be proposed on the 
basis of optimism and a desire to win a contract, rather than the development of real 
schemes, which in reality often proved to be rather more costly than the original bids 
suggested. 
 
The change in Government in 1997 and its commitment to the ecological 
modernisation of the UK economy brought about significant changes to energy 
policy. do Valle Costa et al (2008) indicated that the Utility Act which was 
introduced in 2000 was intended to strengthen these changes further and to establish 
a new regulatory framework for gas and electricity markets, thus the New Electricity 
Trading Agreement (NETA) came into operation in 2001.  However, the uncertainty 
created by the formation of NETA effectively put a halt to renewable energy 
developments at that time. 
 
NETA was designed, more or less, like a community market and it was meant to 
drive down the price of bulk electricity. To further encourage a low carbon economy 
and to reduce CO2 emissions, the Carbon Trust was created in 2001.  In the same 
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year, the UK climate change programme was published by the Government.  
Strachan and Lal (2004) reported that the climate change programme has pushed 
forward governmental policies that gave way for renewable energy to further 
strengthen the government’s intention of reaching the 10.4% target by 2010. 
 
In 2002, the RO was introduced to replace the NFFO in England, Wales, and 
Scotland. While in the Northern Ireland, the RO came into force in April 2005 
(Ofgem 2009). This once again stimulated investor confidence in wind power, the 
best-developed technology, amongst in particular, large and integrated utility 
companies. To recap, the RO order is a form of Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
that places an obligation on licensed electricity suppliers in England, Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland to source an increasing proportion of renewable 
electricity (Ofgem 2008). The RO set a target of 10.4% and 15.4% for 2010 and 
2015 respectively. This was intended to increase annually, beginning with 3% in 
2002-2003, 7.9% in 2007-2008, and 9.1% in 2008-2009 (Ofgem 2008).  The quotas 
are intended to be achievable through the issue of a green certificate for each unit of 
generation. The RO is guaranteed for twenty-five years and as such will be in force 
up to 31 March, 2027 (Szarka 2007). Like the FIT and the MEP, the RO is financed 
by electricity consumers. Szarka (2007:83) noted that: “RES-E sell their electricity 
by the usual means, but they also receive a subsidy through the RO”. Renewable 
energy generators receive renewables obligation certificates (ROCs) for each MWh 
of renewable energy electricity generated. The ROCs can either be obtained by 
buying from generators or from the ROCs market. According to Ofgem (2009) 
report, a total of 16,466,751 ROCs was submitted during the 2007-2008 period, 
equating the value of £871,914,465.  Failure of suppliers or utilities to meet the 
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required ROCs, leads to the payment of a “buy-out price”. The buy-out price allows 
electricity suppliers to make up any shortfall between the amount of their obligation 
and the number of renewables obligation certificates presented. The funds from the 
buy-out price are recycled amongst the generators that meet their quotas. Table 8.1 
below indicates the buy-out price from 2002-2010. 
Table 8.1: Buy-out Price (2002-2010) 
Period Buy-out Price 
2002-2003 £30/ MWh 
2003-2004 £30.51/ MWh 
2004-2005 £31.39/ MWh 
2005-2006 £32.33/ MWh 
2006-2007 £33.24/ MWh 
2007-2008 £34.30/ MWh 
2008-2009 £35.36/ MWh 
2009-2010 £37.19/ MWh 
Source: OFGEM 2008; 2009 
Author Generated 
 
About 70% of the buy-out price recycled to suppliers went to six main suppliers 
(British Gas 15.83%; EDF 16.74%; E.ON Energy Limited 14.18%; Npower Ltd 
10.76%; Scottish Power 8.53%; SSE 16.98%) (Ofgem 2008). The fluctuations in the 
prices of the ROC and the buy-out price has created further uncertainties and risks for 
the market however, to date the RO has helped to deliver the surge in onshore wind 
power investment and installed capacity.  
 
The Energy White Paper, published in 2003 (DTI 2003), arose from the need to 
address a series of emerging energy challenges i.e. meeting the UK energy demand, 
dealing with the threat of climate change, and reducing dependency on fossil fuels 
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especially from other parts of the world. The 2003 Energy White Paper set out four 
principal goals which have continued to date: (i) putting the UK on course to reduce 
its CO2 emissions by 60% by 2050; (ii) maintaining reliability of energy supplies; 
(iii) promoting competitive markets in the UK and abroad; and (iv) ensuring that 
every home is adequately and affordably heated.  Renewable energy – particularly 
wind power – is expected to play an important role in making this become a reality 
(Foxon and Pearson 2007; Odenberger and Johnsson 2007; Foxon et al 2005; DTI 
2003).  
 
The ‘New’ Labour Government has also sought to improve the planning environment 
for windfarms. This has featured in the adoption of the Planning Policy Statement 22 
(PPS22) guidelines for local authorities in England. These guidelines introduced 
‘criteria based’ assessment of windfarms and undermined efforts by local authorities 
to declare ‘no-go’ areas for windfarms. However the Westminster Government no 
longer has control over wind power planning in Wales (except for schemes over 50 
MWe) and Scotland (not at all). The Welsh and Scottish Executives have both 
maintained pro-wind power planning policies, albeit in the case of Wales, under 
TAN-8 though limiting wind power development, mostly to a few small wind power 
development zones.  
 
Scotland is more important than England in reaching the renewables target in 
onshore planning terms (Kelly 2006; Scottish Executive 2000). However, the 
previously high proportion of wind power planning approvals has been falling in 
Scotland. The most recent Scottish planning policy statement (SPP6) allows local 
authorities to earmark some areas for ‘significant protection’ (against windfarms). 
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The emergence of a Scottish National Party (SNP) Scottish Executive in May 2007 
has further dampened the possibility of a high approval rate. Nevertheless, the 
Executive’s attitude to onshore windfarms, while more cautious than Labour’s, is 
still moderately supportive. It is thus still likely that half or more of the windfarms 
will be approved, in addition to many that have already received planning consent 
and the goal of achieving 50 per cent of Scottish electricity from renewable energy 
by 2020 is still realistic. There is no shortage of schemes in the planning pipeline. A 
large backlog already exists for windfarms awaiting planning approval, but they need 
transmission upgrades before they can be constructed. The ‘Beauly-Denny line’ 
(North-South Scotland) transmission line has been subject to a lengthy planning 
enquiry and while it seems likely to be approved, this will not be operational before 
2010. 
 
Various other delays have afflicted the offshore programme, although some of these 
can indeed be attributed to the operation of the RO. Since the RO favoured the 
cheapest projects, offshore schemes have sometimes been put on the ‘back-burner’. 
This problem has been exacerbated by the increase in wind turbine prices since 2005, 
a consequence of the burgeoning global demand for wind turbines and increases in 
the cost of energy, steel and concrete. In addition, the British Government and its 
regulator, OFGEM, have been relatively slow to organise an agreement to allow the 
bulk of the charges for grid connection of offshore windfarms to be passed on to 
electricity consumers through the transmission change element of bills.  Even so, it 
has to be said that Britain is now (end of 2007) roughly equal with Denmark in 
having around 400 MWe of offshore wind capacity, and is, therefore, the joint world 
leader in this particular sub-technology. 
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According to the first annual report after the implementation of the Energy White 
Paper (DTI 2004:5), out of the one hundred and twelve key milestones set as a first 
step towards achieving the White Paper’s long term commitments, fifty-six had been 
completed by the end of March 2004. In the context of renewable energy sources, 
1.6GW was consented with 2 GW capacities under way. While 2004 mainly set in 
place long-term strategies for achieving the targets outlined in the 2003 White Paper 
(DTI 2005). One important development was the change made to the RO order 2004.  
This increased the level of the obligation to 15.4% by 2015/16 which was meant to 
“provide investors with additional confidence” (DTI 2005: 5). During 2005, the UK 
became one of only eight countries to reach over 1000MW installed wind capacity 
(DTI 2006).   
 
Following the Energy Review, the 2007 Energy White Paper (2007) was published 
and a “banding” system was introduced to the RO46
                                                 
46 The breakdown of the proposed banding regime is further found in page 151 
of the Energy White Paper 2007. 
. This reform was introduced in 
response to criticism that the RO was allowing development of only the cheapest 
technologies (including onshore wind), rather than more expensive renewables such 
as offshore wind and wave power. The aim of the banding system is to allocate more 
or less one ROC for each MW of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources, depending on the stage of technological development and associated costs 
(DTI 2007:150). Thus, enabling the increase of the deployment of emerging marine 
(wave, tidal, etc.) renewable technologies, and improving the overall cost 
effectiveness of the RO (DTI 2007). Interestingly, this involved a reversal of policy 
established earlier by the DTI.  This is an issue which is picked up later in the thesis 
when discussing the research findings. The new Energy White Paper came into 
 195 
operation in May 2007; therefore it is too early to comment further on its progress 
and success. Table 8.2 summarises the development of UK renewable energy 
policies discussed in this section. 
Table 8.2: An Overview of UK Renewable Energy Policies 1970-2008 
Policies and 
Programmes 
 Period Focus 
Development Initiatives  R & D 1970 - 1988 R & D & D Limited 
Renewables  
Liberalisation and 
Privatisation of 
Electricity Market 
 1989 Opening up market for 
competition 
NFFO Nuclear and 
Renewables 
NFFO 1990- 2002 Nuclear Subsidy 
Utility Act  2000 Gas & Electricity market 
Regulating Framework 
(NETA) 
NETA 2001 Reducing prices for bulk 
electricity 
Carbon Trust  2001 CO2 emissions reduction 
12.5% Kyoto targets 
achievement 
United Kingdom Climate 
Change Programme 
UKCCP 2001 Kyoto target and 
renewable energy sources 
targets 
Renewables Obligation RO 2002 Renewable Energy 
Sources 
Energy White Paper  2003 Meeting energy demand 
and climate change, and 
reducing dependency on 
fossil fuels from other 
parts of the world. 
Energy White Paper  2007 Meeting energy demand 
and climate change, and 
Creating an enabling 
environment for all 
renewable energy sources 
to grow through the 
introduction of ‘banding’  
Source: Author Generated. 
 
 
 196 
8.3 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
 The evaluation framework utilised in analysing the performance of the RO was 
discussed in detail in Chapter Four of this study. As with Germany and The 
Netherlands, considerable time was spent by the researcher to understand the role of 
the Government, renewable energy associations and environmental NGOs in the 
implementation of the RO in the UK hence, the DTI (now the BERR) plays a 
predominant role on behalf of the Government in the design of the RO. Other 
stakeholders mentioned also have a strong impact on the RO through consultations, 
seminars, workshops etc. Therefore, a sample of eighteen 18 organisations was 
drawn in the UK and like other countries, interviews were conducted. Only one of 
the organisations interviewed refused to participate fully, but after much persistence 
and persuasion, a twenty minute telephone interview was granted. A semi-structured 
interview schedule was drawn from the framework utilised as discussed in Chapter 
Five and it is also used in analysing the bulk of the data gathered from the eighteen 
respondents interviewed in the UK. On average, the semi-structured interview lasted 
between forty-five minutes and one hour. As with Germany and Netherlands, the in-
depth semi-structured interview afforded the researcher the opportunity of obtaining 
very rich data and a broad sense of the policy instrument. This was useful during the 
data analysis process. 
 
8.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
8. 4.1 Principal Market Drivers for Promoting Wind Power in the UK  
According to McKay (2006) energy policies in the UK as a whole, are based on four 
considerations: environment, energy reliability and security, affordability for the 
poorest in society and competitive pricing for businesses, industries and households. 
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When asked about the principal market drivers for promoting renewable energy vis-à-
vis wind power in the UK, all the interviewees claimed legislative instruments, 
principally the renewables obligation that have been in place since 2002 has been the 
major market driver. It came into force to replace the NFFO of the 1990s. Findings 
from the interviews reveal that the UK has the best renewable energy sources in 
Europe, particularly wind power.   Now that onshore wind power is matured to a 
point where it is viable, probably the primary driver for making renewable energy 
sources especially wind power, is that there is a market for them through the 
renewables obligation to sell the electricity generated.  
 
Furthermore, there are political and environmental drivers. According to McKay 
(2006) both environmental and energy security drivers have created political 
pressure which has resulted in a combination of regulation, fiscal incentives and 
support schemes to encourage renewables. From the evidence gathered, it can be 
deduced that the RO was put in place to stimulate the renewable energy market and 
to bring forward generated capacity to the market, hence enabling the UK to reduce 
its CO2 emissions and reach its Kyoto targets. The UK also has the goal of reaching 
10.4% of RES-E in 2010 and double that in 2020. Furthermore, according to the 
Kyoto agreement, the UK is expected to meet its target of a 12.5% reduction of CO2 
emissions by 2010-2012 respectively. The 2003 Energy White Paper outlined a set 
of visions of how the energy market should evolve over the next fifty years i.e. 2050. 
A senior officer with a government institution claimed that this was the first time the 
Government had officially adopted measures to reduce CO2 emissions. Part of that 
vision was also to attain a low carbon economy through the deployment of 
renewable energy at a high level that would achieve a 30-40% target by 2050. 
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Evidence from the interviews reveal that without adopting a well designed energy 
efficiency strategy and other viable methods, reduction in carbon emissions can not 
be achieved in the UK. Therefore, for the UK to move to a fundamental low carbon 
economy, a high percentage of renewable energy sources need to be integrated into 
the country’s energy mix. In addition, to the climate change driver is the increasing 
security of energy supply. Wind power has an advantage in this regard over other 
forms of fuel as it is local and do not need to be transported or imported. Hence, 
another key driver for promoting wind power in the UK is the need to have a diverse 
energy portfolio, which would allow UK businesses to become part of the global 
economy. Illustrating this further, a senior officer with a government institution said 
that: 
“The driver for promoting renewables from our own 
perspective is the need to have a very diverse energy portfolio; 
therefore it is an opportunity for the UK business to be part of 
the global economy, so we can capture part of the global 
market in renewables which will be beneficial to the UK Plc 
ultimately. And the second driver is around being a global 
leader in climate change agenda, and our government have 
chosen and proven to be a global leader in climate change and 
to influence the world and part of that influence is based on our 
success of clear-cut support of renewable energy and climate 
change in the UK. It is very hard to preach to people who are 
not doing what they are supposed to be doing at home to stop if 
you don’t practice some at home........” (Interview undertaken: 
14th June 2006) 
 
 
From the utility company’s perspective, the need to catch up with the current increase 
in crude oil and gas prices may be an additional driver to the deployment of wind 
power in the UK. Findings from the interviews reveal that in recent times there have 
been many uncertainties with the way gas prices are increasing.  This may become 
unbearable in the future and therefore, wind power, whose generation costs are more 
or less fixed at the onset, can supplement demands to an extent. A senior manager 
 199 
with one of the big utility companies claimed that because of growing general 
concern the government decided to use energy supplies as a vehicle to promote 
renewables and place an obligation on the suppliers to produce a certain percentage of 
their electricity mix from other forms of energy, primarily the non conventional ones 
(Renewables).  
 
To summarise, the renewables obligation is the most important legislative driver in 
the UK to date and it has been helpful in delivering a record level capacity of 
onshore wind in the last five years. Table 8.3 below provides a summary of the 
drivers discussed in this section. The next section provides the discussion on the 
performance of the renewables obligation, based on the evidence gathered from 
various interviews with eighteen organisations in the UK.  
 
Table 8.3: Summary of UK Wind Power Market Drivers 
• Availability of market for renewables through the RO 
• The Environment 
• Energy reliability and security- the need to catch up with the current 
increase in crude oil and gas prices 
• Competitive pricing for businesses, industries, and households 
• The need for a diversified portfolio 
Source: Author Generated 
8.4.2 Evaluation of the Performance of the Renewables Obligation (RO) 
8.4.2.1  Administration 
The administrative demand for the RO is far more complex to deal with than the 
other policy instruments investigated in this study (Sawin 2004; Sijm 2002). The RO 
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does not fix the price for the choice of renewable energy technology that is near 
market rather, it sets targets, which suppliers should achieve in a fixed time period.  
However, because it is a market system, investors know the market position and, 
how the market operates. Stakeholders are also made aware of any changes to the 
RO through different rounds of statutory consultations. Draft orders are published 
first so the stakeholders can be kept well informed before they are finally signed into 
law. 
 
The reason outlined to explain the complexity of the RO revolves around the fact 
that the RO is relatively new and has only been in operation for seven years, thus, 
more time is necessary to allow errors to surface and remedies to be put in place. 
This is consistent with van Dijk et al (2003:21) observations that:  
“The targets of the RO themselves may be very transparent, the 
administrative rules of the TGC trading system are often a bit 
more complicated”  
While Sawin (2004), observed that many of the requirements of the quota systems 
are far more challenging especially in fixing targets. When targets are high, prices go 
up and vice-versa.  Findings from the interviews also reveal that the RO is not 
flexible. It rewards some technologies (onshore wind) more than others who are still 
far from getting into the market, for example offshore wind, wave and tidal energy 
etc. Szarka (2007:86) noted that “the consequence of the inflexibility design of the 
RO is that government cannot ‘steer’ policy towards targets precisely as with 
REFITs”. It is difficult with the RO to a change target once it is fixed. This is also 
consistent with Sawin (2004:16) findings that the quota system is inflexible, “Once 
targets and timetables are established, they are difficult to adjust. Even as markets 
change and technologies advance, experiencing major breakthroughs in efficiency 
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and or in cost is difficult. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that targets or timetables 
can be altered….” 
 
This inflexibility however is not seen to be disadvantage from the perspective of 
most of the respondents.  The certainty of the RO makes it desirable to investors. 
Investors know exactly what is going to happen to the market and how that is set out 
in the law, therefore, the RO cannot be altered carelessly and ad hoc by the 
Government. Financial decisions can be made, as the RO can not be changed. 
However, a vague and flexible change would dilute market confidence and make it 
difficult for stakeholders to base financial decisions on it. One identified problem is 
that RO personnel at the DTI (BERR) have changed on a regular basis, with some 
respondents saying that this had been detrimental to the scheme.  Illustrating this, a 
senior manager with one utility company said that:  
“The personnel that manage it (the RO) have changed every 16-
18 months, so there is inconsistency on the government side 
which is an issue.” (Interview undertaken: 28th November 2006) 
 
From the perspective of this respondent this had affected the performance and 
credibility of the scheme. 
 
To summarise this discussion, the RO seems to be a transparent scheme but one 
which is complex and not flexible in its operation.  Once targets are fixed, it is 
usually not easy to reverse, though this was actually seen as a strength of the scheme 
by those interviewed in this study. 
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8.4.2.2  Stakeholder support/involvement 
Unlike the MEP, one key argument in support of the RO is the wide support of 
stakeholders in the process of consultations47
“The UK has a centralised system of government which 
provides the government with a great deal of capacity to control 
policy reforms. As a result there is little participation at local 
and regional levels of government, which in their turn have little 
political and financial capacity. The renewable energy industry 
does not have much political representation and traditional 
environmental organisations in England exert their role to 
promote renewable energies.”  
 and design. Almost all the renewable 
energy actors and utility companies play key roles in the development of wind power 
policy in the UK. This is contrary to the report of do Valle Costa et al (2008: 68) 
that:  
 
The DTI, now BERR, is the dominant player in the design of the RO, while OFGEM 
is charged with the administration responsibility. The BERR, on behalf of the UK 
Government engages all the stakeholders in the amendments of the RO through an 
annual consultation. Although not all the opinions of the stakeholders are taken on 
board it is evident that stakeholders are heard in the design and implementation of 
the RO. Illustrating and confirming this, a senior manager of a major utility company 
stated that: 
“I think the stakeholders are involved; there are consultation 
processes. And personally I think the RO is working at the 
moment, and it is giving what it is set out to do, so I think at the 
moment, it operating effectively.” (Interview undertaken: 13th 
December 2006) 
 
From the perspective of the respondents there are plenty of opportunities to get 
involved in the consultation forum and contribute to the modus operandi of the RO 
                                                 
47 BWEA, REA, Energy Institute, Friends of the Earth, AUPUK, Greenpeace UK, 
SRF, Country Guardian etc 
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thus, the finance community backs the RO because it is an attractive mechanism. 
However, the activities of organisations in support of wind power have not been able 
to break the hold of the strong anti-wind lobby groups in the UK, so that a strong 
network can be established between wind power institutions, the farmers and 
landowners. This may be a result of the absence of local ownerships or cooperatives 
in the UK (Toke et al 2008). 
 
8.4.2.2.1 Wind power implementation and scale 
Stakes in the UK wind power industry are predominantly owned by large 
corporations. Szarka and Blühdorn (2006:30) pointed out that: “In the UK.... cases of 
local ownerships are rare exception, with wind farms mostly owned by large 
operators (including utilities) which are national or international firms”. Evidence 
from the interviews reveals that the RO does not provide opportunities for small scale 
generating companies. The nature of the scheme makes it difficult for small scale 
investors to obtain financial backing.  One renewable energy expert from a popular 
renewable energy association said that:  
“The system is designed to attract a larger scale build and 
therefore it attracts large scale developers”. (Interview 
undertaken: 8th September 2006) 
   
 
This is perhaps one of the key reasons that help to explain why so little community 
ownership has developed in the UK. The process of getting projects through the 
planning permission stage is very complicated and cumbersome. Illustrating the wind 
power ownership structure in the UK, a director with one renewable energy 
association claimed that it is very difficult for the small scale generating companies.  
This demonstrates that the small scale generating companies are not effective at all; 
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the ones already existing represent a small proportion of the market (Toke 2007b). 
The market risk is so high that small scale ownership investors are not able to bear 
the burden, thus the RO may not be suitable for the early take-off of wind power 
investment. On the contrary, the Government and the utility companies present a 
different argument.  They both claim that the RO creates a level playing field for 
both small and big players and that rather than pursuing market players, the RO is a 
mechanism that was put in place to deliver renewable capacity in its own right and 
was not designed or structured to favour any party. It was intended to create mass 
deployment of renewable energy in the UK electricity sector, enabling the 
government to meet its obligation and to cut down on CO2 emissions.  
  
From the utility companies’ perspective, evidence from the interviews demonstrates 
that small scale generators and community owned windfarms are not necessary and, 
in actual fact, they complicate things too much. A senior project manager with one of 
the utility companies said that: 
“These things happen but they are not a means to an end.....why 
should a community have a part in a turbine, they don’t have a 
part in the local TESCO, local car manufacturing plant, and 
other big manufacturing plants, so why should they have a part 
in turbines? There is no reason........” (Interview undertaken: 
12th December 2006) 
 
From the Manager’s perspective what is affecting the penetration of wind in the UK 
is the extremely effective campaign by the anti wind farm groups.  They have done 
an incredibly effective job with very poor tools. The information they use is very 
misleading, but it is believable, and they convey their message very effectively. In 
essence, what the Government and the utility companies would rather have is as 
much wind power capacity up and running, instead of taking the nature of windfarm 
holdings in the UK into consideration.  Toke (2006:26) found that: “the lack of 
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farmer and cooperative ownership in the UK has significantly exacerbated planning 
controversies.” Thus, from the perspective of this research, much could have been 
done had the RO encouraged smaller companies, like the German system. This may 
also explain the reason for the persistent high profile record of community resistance 
against the development of wind power in the UK (Kelly 2007). 
 
8.4.2.3 Certainty for industry 
It is very important that policy instruments implemented to promote the deployment 
of renewable energy technologies be consistent and sustained over a long period of 
time (Sawin 2004). The RO had been surrounded by uncertainty and this has had a 
detrimental effect on industry confidence. This was due partly to the early stages of 
RO implementation, but also later to changes made through consultations and 
amendments. This finding is consistent with van der Linden et al (2005), and van 
Dijk et al (2003), who reported that revisions to support schemes from annual 
reviews can easily lead to uncertainty amongst producers. The RO has been in 
existence for seven years, yet it has been remarkably unstable. It has undergone a 
series of amendments and will change fundamentally in 2009/2010. Sawin (2004) 
pointed out that pressure to minimise costs under the quota system often encourage 
producers to turn to overseas turbine manufacturers, hence the RO has not been able 
to create an enabling environment for the development of UK made turbines. The 
fact that there are a lot of investments into onshore wind power in the UK does not 
help matters, the market risk is still very high because the RO as been subjected to 
political interference from inception48
 
.  
                                                 
48 Interview with the Head of Power REA (14 August 2006) 
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The recent energy review created further uncertainty in the market place, especially 
with the banding introduced into the RO by the Energy White Paper (DTI 2007).  
Most of the utility companies would have preferred for the RO to have remained 
largely unchanged.  Prior to the recent Energy White Paper, a senior manager of one 
utility company claimed:  
“The RO is rapidly moving to a phase of no confidence and no 
stability, and potentially could disintegrate into a heap with the 
review that is going on at the moment and the potential 
introduction of banding which fundamentally undermines the 
concept of the RO which was technology blind. Banding here 
means technology specific, fundamental change will just 
undermine the whole thing.” (Interview undertaken: 15th 
December 2006) 
 
The RO may introduce yet another element of uncertainty which may potentially hurt 
investors’ confidence. It makes it difficult for investors to fully understand the 
fundamental components of the RO so they can manage and mitigate associated 
risks. The introduction of different ROCs for renewable technologies contradicts the 
principle of the market system, which to some investors may not be the most 
efficient way of developing projects.  
 
When asked if the changes to the RO had affected investments into wind power in 
the UK, almost all the respondents indicated that it had and it had made an impact on 
decisions to invest further in renewables. Trade association respondents indicated 
that from the interaction with investors, any changes on the RO affects project 
finance. Investors dislike change and prefer stable market conditions in the long 
term, which allows them to forecast a definite return on investment. Findings from 
the interviews reveal that the changes to the RO basically mean that the Government 
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is allowed to make amendments at will to the operations of the RO, thus undermining 
the credibility of the RO.  
 
From the Government’s perspective, the changes to the RO are necessary to create an 
atmosphere for a convenient investment that is stable and attractive.  A senior 
Government official said that:  
“There is no doubt at the moment that the ROCs do not provide 
absolute certainty; I mean there is the rise of obligation up to 
2015-2016 and they will plateau in 2027. So we need to think 
very carefully as to whether or not that should be extended to 
get guaranteed higher returns for a little longer period or 
whether or not the licence of the obligation in 2027 will or not 
need to be extended. We also do need to balance the desire to 
create a more stable and attractive scheme for investors against 
the cost the obligation imposes on all the consumers…” 
(Interview undertaken: 5th June 2006) 
 
 
Generally any change to the system introduces a kind of regulatory risk and 
potentially impacts on the investor’s confidence. As such, the UK has no large 
manufacturing companies of wind turbines as the enabling environment for wind 
power is not yet there. Changes to the RO “do not allow for continuous developments 
of the market, they discourage innovation, and they make it difficult to establish 
strong domestic industry because investment in production facilities will take place 
only with a short-term perspective” (Sawin 2004:9). However, small turbine 
manufacturers are still available in the UK, though not enough to cope with the rise 
in the growth of wind power. As a result, the UK wind industry is also vulnerable to 
scarcity of components and high cost turbine prices from other parts the world.  
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In summary, it is important for the Government to improve the operation of the RO 
by making it free of any misrepresentation that would cause changes to be made and 
would stop it from being allowed to have an affect over a long period of time. 
 
8.4.2.4  Effectiveness 
Foxon and Parson (2007: 1541) reported that: “the RO has succeeded in creating a 
niche for renewable generation in the electricity supply market”. However, when 
asked about the effectiveness of the RO in delivering the 10.4% politically fixed 
target by 2010, all of the respondents interviewed argued against the RO in this 
regard and claimed that the UK will not meet the 10.4% politically fixed target by 
2010. There is no doubt, the RO has been very successful in delivering much onshore 
capacity, yet there is a long way to go in reaching the 10.4% target. During the 
interviews, evidence revealed that the inability of the UK to reach its target is due to 
the inherent fault in the design of the RO. Szarka (2007:96) adds that: “the 
consequence of the technology neutrality of the RO is that targets are not set for 
individual technologies, creating uncertainties over future sourcing mix.” A senior 
Manager in charge of the RO with one utility company said that:  
“The RO has made a viable and valuable contribution in 
moving the UK towards the 10.4% goal, but realistically, it is 
not going to hit the target. And you could argue actually that the 
RO is a market mechanism and it does not intend to achieve set 
targets. But what it has helped to do is to stimulate onshore 
wind in particular...........” (Interview undertaken: 29th 
November 2006) 
 
Two main reasons account for why the RO will not meet the 10.4% by 2010.  The 
first is attached to a design flaw, which means that the closer one gets to the target 
the less value the ROC is worth. To keep the market moving and to attract new 
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investment, ambitious targets rather than realistic ones have to be set. During one 
interview, a senior deputy head with a renewable energy association policy said that: 
“.....the way the obligation is designed is not to get around 
reaching its target. And as you know pretty much effectively 
when supply is behind demand, that way the ROC retains its 
values and then people will continue to invest in certain 
projects, but the closer you get to actually hitting that target, 
then the less valuable the ROCs become. And there is a kind of 
phenomenon known as ‘CLIFF EDGE’ which suggests that if 
the whole renewable criteria are actually met in a given year, 
ROC prices will plunge down.........” (Interview undertaken: 5th 
June 2006)  
 
 
Findings from the interviews reveal that the Government has two targets: the RO 
target which is the UK internal goal; and the EU target of 10.4%.  The UK internal 
target is set such that the value of the RO can be preserved. Thus, the percentage 
capacity of renewable electricity generated is capped so as to maintain a market for 
renewables. Also, capacities generated from other non-conventional sources are not 
included in the RO, because they are classified as non renewables e.g. the majority of 
the large hydro and energy from waste by degradable content. They are not paid into 
the RO scheme thus, creating a detachment between them and renewables.  
 
Secondly there is the issue of planning permission and connection to the grid. To 
date, planning applications still take a significant amount of time and effort on the 
part of developers. Less than 50% of planning applications are approved each year 
(Toke 2005) and there are still many projects in the queue waiting for connection to 
the grid, especially in Scotland. Sixteen of the eighteen respondents interviewed 
argued that the problem is not with the RO. The scheme has done exactly what it said 
it was going to do when it was set up. The failure of the UK in not meeting its target 
can be attributed to other factors, such as planning and consenting regimes. Wind 
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power opposition in the UK can be traced back to path-dependent factors (Toke et al 
2008). The actions of well organised anti-wind and landscape institutions have been 
instrumental in the delays in pushing forward wind installed capacity in the UK. 
(Toke et al 2008:1144) argues that there is less local energy activity in the UK than 
in countries like Germany and Demark, as such “outcomes of wind power policy 
depend on long existing cultural dispositions towards landscape; previous local 
political activity; and institutionalised (existing and past) preferences in the energy 
domain”. Illustrating this further a senior Manager with one utility company said 
that:  
“The RO has performed exemplarily..........what has failed 
arguably are the delivery channels, the consenting regimes and 
other aspects. But as an economic instrument it has been a 
whole heartedly 100% success. We have just witnessed a 
number of planning applications and a number of grid 
applications. What has failed is the delivery channel.” 
(Interview undertaken: 15th December 2006) 
 
In summary, the effectiveness of the RO is still subject to a great deal of conjecture 
and debate. The BWEA (2007) statistics show an improvement in the rate of 
submissions and approvals. Of the ninety-five submissions (1801.85MW), fifty-nine 
approvals (1130 MW) were made in the same year. However, building has been very 
slow as only twenty-nine (449.85 MW) were built. Therefore, it remains to be seen 
whether or not 2010 targets will be met, but increasingly this looks very unlikely. 
 
8.4.2.5  Efficiency 
The renewables obligation is often heralded as an efficient mechanism for supporting 
renewable energy sources. This is highly contested by the EU (2005a) report. 
Evidence from the interviews also reveals that renewable energy prices are not as 
low as often heralded. This is also consistent with Szarka and Blühdorn (2006) 
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findings. Szarka and Blühdorn (2006) argued that the efficiency of the RO is lower 
than stated. Szarka and Blühdorn (2006:13) also observed that during the winter of 
2005-2006, wind power prices rose to 12-13 Euro cents/kWh. The EU Paper (2005a) 
also reported that, at the moment, the green certificate system (RO) presents a higher 
level of support compared to other systems operating in other EU countries, 
including Germany. Respondents from the interviews also claimed that the RO is not 
efficient because consumers pay high prices and it may be very difficult when 
resources are limited to reduce consumer cost (Sawin 2004).  Moreover, the buy-out 
price paid for non compliance does not make things better because consumers are 
made to pay for what is not generated. Hence, in terms of static and dynamic 
efficiency the RO is less efficient than the FIT. Lipp (2007:5492) noted that: “the 
uncertainty of the RO has driven up support costs and has resulted in more expensive 
wind development in the UK”.  
 
Contrary to this view, the utility companies interviewed argued that the RO is not 
expensive and that it is the operation and people’s perception that is voiced regularly 
that makes the RO look expensive. They also argue that the RO is a valid support 
mechanism that enables projects to compete in the market and without it, projects are 
not economical. Therefore, the general consensus of the utilities is that the RO, if 
allowed to work, is very efficient and becomes a self correcting mechanism in terms 
of the money it pays out to the parties involved. One senior Manager with a company 
confirmed this and said that:   
“The problem is that…the RO looks expensive because if you 
compare the cost of the RO to the MW being built, the RO is 
absolutely expensive compared to the FIT, but that again is not 
the fault of the RO, that is because there are less MW being 
built; this has nothing to do with the RO, it is the planning 
system. So if all the stuff that is currently in the planning system 
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is allowed to come through and fed through the grid system, 
then the RO will be highly competitive and highly effective when 
compared to any FIT system.” (Interview undertaken: 27th 
November 2006) 
 
Looking at other available evidence Szarka and Blühdorn (2006:13) have reported 
that:   
“The outcome during 2002-2006 indicated not only that the RO is 
failing to provide a more cost-effective system than continental FIT 
, but worse, the RO is making wind power progressively more 
expensive to the UK consumer at a time when digressive FIT rates 
are making it cheaper in Germany.”  
 
To summarise, therefore, it is difficult under the RO to reduce production costs and 
investment costs. Developers had to import wind turbine and component parts and as 
such do not benefit from economic of scale through technology innovations, thus 
developers are exposed to higher risks and market uncertainties (Lipp 2007). 
Competition is also very limited as very few large companies control the market. The 
RO has been in place for just seven years now and is still going through major 
changes and restructuring, this alone presents a great deal of risk and uncertainties to 
investors.  
 
8.4.2.6  Market conformity 
Contrary to the views about the FIT and the MEP, the RO is credited by many 
commentators (Sawin 2004; Wiser et al 2002) as an instrument that works better 
with an open or liberalised market. In comparison with other countries investigated 
in this study, the UK was the first to liberalise its electricity market following the 
demand placed on the Member States by the EU to liberalise their energy market 
(Meyer 2003) and is now in the forefront of the campaign to encourage others.  
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When asked about the compatibility of the RO with the liberalisation of the 
electricity market pursued by the UK since 1989, fifteen of the eighteen interviewees 
claimed that the RO is a market based system and in that sense, it is compatible. 
Three reasons can be offered as a way of explaining the above claims. First, the RO 
affects all suppliers. Suppliers have the same obligation to meet a percentage of total 
demand via renewable energy sources electricity, so there is no discrimination 
between the suppliers.  They work towards the same obligation and they have been 
able to provide electricity to a great number of customers in absolute and percentage 
terms. Secondly, is the desire to foster competition among suppliers and give 
consumers the opportunity to choose their own suppliers. It is argued that this is what 
the RO does for the renewable market because, in theory, it does not discriminate 
between small and large suppliers. It enables investors to make the most efficient 
decisions49. Thirdly, the RO is an economic incentive which leaves it up to the firms 
to decide how to meet the Government’s renewable energy obligation. Failure to do 
this attracts a consequence, in the form of a penalty payment50
 
. 
Therefore, the RO does create an incentive for renewable generated electricity to 
trade in the British Electricity Trading Agreement (BETA) and to compete with other 
forms of energy. It is also a form of quota that provides financial benefits to both 
customers and suppliers especially from the supplier’s perspective. It helps to provide 
a way of recovering money from customers as a whole. It drives the development of 
the lowest cost technologies and best resources captured by market mechanism. 
Evidence from the interviews revealed that the RO does not require the Government 
to decide how much renewable technologies should be aspired towards, neither does 
                                                 
49 Interview undertaken: 29th November 2006 
50 Interview undertaken: 15th December 2006 
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it require the government to decide what kind of tariff level should be set for the 
different types of technology, it just puts in place one mechanism and allows it to 
develop. In addition, the project receives the ROC value as soon as they are built and 
there is no need for a contract, as required by the NFFO regimes. 
 
On the contrary, one of the main arguments against the compatibility of the RO with 
market liberalisation is that it does not allow market entry. Findings from the 
interviews reveal that the RO falls short of the kind of competitive market investors 
would like to see. Investors expect a market system that allows new entrants, but the 
RO is not good in terms of encouraging new entrants into the market. To date the UK 
electricity supply sector is dominated by the ‘big six’ utilities. Evidence from the 
interviews, also revealed that the UK Government fixes renewable quotas and the 
buy-out price for the RO, as such,  respondents claimed that the RO has worked well 
as an obligation, but not in terms of competition. The RO in its original design is 
meant to speed up competition. The RO does that without taking into consideration 
the supply or the number of people who dominate the market and as such the RO is 
viewed as an imposed market mechanism and not completely compatible with a 
liberalised market and cannot be viewed as a role model in a liberalised electricity 
market.  
 
In summary, the RO as discussed, is designed as a market based system, and 
throughout its seven years of existence, it is not completely compatible with a 
liberalised market because the RO has not been able to promote technological 
innovations in the manufacturing of wind turbines, which can allow developers to 
compete and drive down costs (Szarka 2007; Lipp 2007; Sawin 2004). Also there are 
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still a lot of issues about projects going through the grid, and the number of utility 
companies that tend to dominate the UK electricity market. There is also the issue of 
interference in the market through the recent banding introduced by the Government 
to the RES-E market /ROCs. Banding is not a bad idea but if it is not well planned it 
can introduce more complexities to the operation of the RO. Different levels of bands 
need to be decided upon and be appropriate for each technology. If not carefully 
thought through, it may result in more governmental interference in the future. 
However, this is greatly advantageous to technologies which are not yet developed or 
near market. Until these issues are resolved, the RO will not be completely 
compatible to the liberalisation of the electricity market and delivered renewable 
electricity will still be more expensive than other EU Member States using the FIT. 
 
8.4.2.7  Finance 
The RO is scheduled to remain in place until 2027, after which no one is really sure 
what will happen next. These uncertainties and fears sometimes determine wind 
power project ownership and investments. Sawin (2004:14) noted that: “there are 
potential uncertainties through many steps in the process from project planning to 
operation.” Many of the developers are discouraged by the complexities of the RO 
because of its risks (Menanteau et al 2003). Illustrating further, the Director of 
Economics of a popular renewable association said that:  
“The trouble of the RO is that it is a big boy’s game, it is so 
complicated that you have to deal with complicated issues, risks 
assessments, and you have to also move with the market 
because the prices you will get may be higher than everywhere 
else. So with all these happenings it is not a system the small 
independent generator would meet and operate easily…” 
(Interview undertaken: 14th June 2006) 
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Therefore, from the small players’ point of view, the RO is characterised by many 
risks and uncertainties. For the large businesses that do not need equity and finance 
from financial institutions, this is not such an issue. This explains why the RO is 
criticised as an instrument that generates windfall profits for large utility companies 
who take up the risk to invest in wind power. A Manager with one major utility 
company said that: 
“As a company we look at projects under individual merits and 
as a company look to have 100% finance when we own a 
project, we also look at individual projects, maybe we want to 
place it on balance sheet or off balance sheet finance. Each 
project will go on its own, we haven’t got a preference, it 
depends on the risk and the returns of a given project, and 
probably it will end up on balance sheet because of the size of 
the company.” (Interview undertaken: 28th November 2006) 
 
 
Financial institutions always want to be convinced of a project before committing 
funds to it. They prefer and are content to become involved in investments with low 
risk and market certainty. This may not be the case for the RO. Findings from the 
interviews reveal that the RO is weak in guaranteeing investment certainty because it 
is difficult to get liquidity from finance houses without the investor’s corporate 
assets. This partly explains why there are so few new entrants into the market. New 
entrants, especially the small scale generators find it impossible to obtain finance 
based on the RO contract.  Again from the utility perspective, it is generally accepted 
that there is a market risk operating within the RO. For them, the risks are negligible 
because the rate of investment is left for the market to decide.   
 
In summary, the analysis shows that the RO does not favour small players because of 
its risks and price volatility. With the exception of big investors, obtaining finance is 
somewhat difficult. Small investors do not have what it takes to convince the 
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financial institutions to obtain loans. But from the big investors’ point of view, risks 
are also negligible. A senior Manager with a major utility company claimed that the 
RO is a market based system and there are chances that players in the market are 
able to make enough money out of it. Although there are obvious risks associated 
with the market, they are calculated and sorted out in the investment analysis such 
that any political interference and changes to price do not matter. 
 
8.4.2.8  Impact on development 
The RO is usually criticised as being a technologically blind mechanism, but it has 
been an important tool for delivering a very good capacity of onshore wind power. 
Evidence from the interviews reveals that the RO has, without a doubt, made an 
enormous difference to the onshore wind development since 2002. Projects have 
been developed at a great rate and certainly faster than they have ever been in the 
UK. Illustrating the importance of the RO in stimulating the market, a Director of 
Economics and Markets with a renewable energy association said that: 
 “oh massively, massively, there is absolutely no denial that the 
existence of the RO hugely stimulated the market for onshore 
wind power in the UK. If you look at our statistics of 
submissions in the planning system in the last few years, there 
has massive rate of change in the submissions. When the RO 
was a kind of introduced people were like you have got a system 
where in we can bank on or we can trust, it brings a long term 
market signal, lets go for it. Like I keep saying, the failure is not 
all the fault of the RO.” (Interview undertaken: 14th June 2006) 
 
 
At the end of year 2006, total installed capacity reached 1963 MW representing a 
48% increase over 2005 records. The total electricity contribution of wind power in 
2004 was 1935 GWh representing 0.48% of the total UK electricity demand. And 
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wind power industry turn over for 2006 was well over 500 million Euros (IEA Wind 
2006). 
 
Moreover, in Scotland, the SRO has also proved efficient in delivering a high 
volume of wind power capacity. Evidence from the interviews shows that in 2002, 
Scotland received 10% of its electricity from renewable energy sources including 
hydro. In 2006, the rate was given as 15%. While in 2007 two of the respondents 
interviewed claimed that the percentage contribution of renewable electricity reached 
18%. Wind power, principally onshore wind, forms a major part of these 
percentages. An Executive Director with a trade association claimed that by 2020 it 
is expected that 50% of the electricity demand will come from renewable energy, out 
of which 20% will be supported by the SRO. This according to him will be made 
possible with a combination of the SRO and better planning processes. 
 
Furthermore, when asked about the economic contribution of wind power sector to 
the national economy, evidence revealed that the RO has contributed to the 
development of onshore wind power thus, there are few developers and construction 
companies involved. A senior Manager with one of the big four utility companies 
said that: 
“Well the RO has contributed hugely to the development of wind 
power (onshore) in the UK because without it you would not 
have any or so much. However, there are a lot of economic 
benefits generated from it, in terms of its construction activity, 
but there could have been more as the government made certain 
moves earlier on to attract turbine manufacturers into the UK, 
but that wasn’t done and it is too late now but even without that, 
there is still a lot more activities going on in various companies. 
At least for any particular projects built in the UK, one third of 
it goes to the contractor and to the huge amount of construction 
work that comes out of it, so thus creating huge benefit in the 
market.” (Interview undertaken: 27th November 2006). 
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To date, there are no large indigenous wind turbine manufacturing companies except 
for smaller and micro producers with a maximum production capacity of 20kW. 
Notwithstanding, the UK wind power sector employs about 4000 people and this 
figure is expected to increase as wind industry grows in the UK hence, from the 
Round 2 of offshore wind development about 20,000 more jobs are expected to be 
delivered by the industry (IEA Wind report 2006; Strachan et al 2006; BWEA 
2004). The Scottish Renewables Forum observed that about 1500 of these jobs are in 
Scotland (SRA 2007). Onshore wind is now relatively near market in the UK and it 
is expanding more rapidly than was expected.  
 
Furthermore, according to BWEA (2007)51, wind power contributes annually to the 
UK’s reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG). Table 8.4 below provides an overview 
of the amount of Carbon dioxide52 (CO2), Sulphur di-oxide53 (SO2), and Nitrogen 
Oxide54
Table 8.4: Greenhouse Gas Reductions 
 (NOx) reduced with the current installed wind capacity of the UK. 
CO2 reductions per 
annum 
SO2 reductions per 
annum 
NOx reductions per 
annum 
4329408 Tonnes 100684 Tonnes 30205 Tonnes 
Source: British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) [Online] 10th October 2009 
 
Overall, there is still room for improvement even though the RO has been able to 
deliver a record level of onshore wind, there is need to develop the offshore wind 
potential as well. Illustrating this further an environmental campaigner said that: 
“......there are a lot of winds out there that are viable, very 
powerful but we don’t really seem to be getting into it at all and 
                                                 
51 Accessed 23/10/2007 [Online] at http://www.bwea.com 
52 Created by the combustion of fossil fuel 
53 Sulphur di-oxide is released when coal and petroleum are burnt, thus causing 
acid rain 
54 Mono Nitrogen oxides are produced during combustion of fossil fuel at high 
temperature 
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that is frustrating, and there is no good reason for that…so 
there is still a great opportunity to tap into wind industry in the 
UK.” (Interview undertaken: 13th June 2006) 
 
8.5 POLICY LESSONS AND OUTCOMES 
The historical path of the deployment of wind power deployment in the UK has not 
been able to combine energy policy, environmental policy, and technological 
innovation and development. Communities have benefited little from the potential of 
investing in wind power. Toke et al (2008) traced this historically to the traditions of 
strong institutions promoting the value of landscape at the expense of community of 
societal participation (Szarka and Blühdorn 2006). This institutional conflict has 
created a form of top-down approach to the development of wind power. Wind 
power policy is characterised as not been able to reach a politically fixed target, 
having relatively high prices and being costly, as such a very limited number of 
companies and technologies have benefited from the gains of deploying renewables. 
Mitchell et al (2006) argued that long term renewable electricity prices are uncertain, 
therefore suppliers are very reluctant to sign long-term contracts hence; the volume 
and price risk is high.  
 
The past seven years have also witnessed a series of amendments and changes to the 
UK wind power policy instrument. This has introduced further complexities and 
uncertainties for investors and developers. A carefully thought out design and 
implementation from the onset would have prevented or minimised these 
complexities. The introduction of ROC prices and buy-out prices has added to 
consumer burdens. A very small number of suppliers control the UK renewables 
market. Consequently, the RO has not been able to balance the power of 
stakeholders in the market.  One party dominates the others in the market. The buy-
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out price over the years has only been recycled to only few utilities in the UK 
(Szarka 2007).  
 
The UK operates a very inflexible policy instrument which does not allow other 
technologies to develop. The original intention of the RO was to ‘pick no winner’ 
(Szarka 2007; Lipp 2007) among technologies. This has not been achieved as the RO 
tends to favour mature technologies and fails to provide enough support for 
emerging technologies. The recent banding is meant to correct this but again, 
complexities surrounding this cannot be accounted for. Bands for each technology 
need to be set in clear terms. Having varying scales of ROCs for each technology 
does not solve the problem alone. Investors still undertake investment and risk 
analysis as to what type of technology to invest in. In the case where bands are not 
set correctly, whereby investors makes excessive profit, the Government may 
interfere again with the market in the future, with the aim of addressing the market 
conditions.  
 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
From the analysis, the principal market driver for promoting wind power to date in 
the UK is the Renewables Obligation. Although it has changed every single year of 
its existence, it has helped deliver record levels of onshore wind. The changes made 
every year have also dented investors’ confidence, hence, investment in wind power 
is more risky than in countries like Germany.  
 
Unlike Germany and The Netherlands, the RO is not suitable for encouraging local 
investments in renewable energy. The ownership structure of wind power also differs. 
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Most of the wind installed capacity is controlled by large corporations and big utility 
companies. The UK wind power sector is still characterised by planning delays and 
an inadequate transmission infrastructure, hence, it is likely that the UK will not meet 
it 10% renewable target by 2010.  
 
Overall, this Chapter concludes that the RO is still more expensive than the German 
FIT and, as such has underperformed when compared with other policy instruments 
like the FIT. However, the RO cannot be solely blamed, as there are other issues 
surrounding the UK’s inability to reach the heights of Germany, Spain and Denmark. 
Notwithstanding, the RO still has a long way to go before catching up with other EU 
policy instruments like the German and Spanish FITs. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
A CROSS NATIONAL COMPARISON: DISCUSSION AND CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE FEED-IN TARIFF, THE MEP, AND THE 
RENEWABLES OBLIGATION 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principal objective of this research is to critically compare and contrast the 
performance of the feed-in tariff and quota system, using the data collected from key 
stakeholder groups and industry actors. Arising from the critical analysis in Chapters 
Six, Seven, and Eight, the aim of this Chapter is to attempt to add value to the current 
cross-national comparisons made about wind power delivery and to present a more 
rigorous comparative analysis, which teases out different dimensions of policy 
instrument evaluation. A key focus of this objective is to set this critique in the 
context of the EU’s harmonisation agenda, which is the subject of ongoing debate and 
conjecture throughout Europe (Soderholm 2008a, 2008b; del Rio 2005, 2004; de Vos 
2005; EU 2005a; Fouquet et al 2005). New institutional theory has helped in this 
study to explain the interaction and relationship that exists between various wind 
power stakeholder groups in the implementation and design of the choice policy 
instrument in three EU Member States. The understanding of the historical paths of 
each Member State has helped to explain the consequences of the varying degrees of 
achievements and successes of policy instruments adopted to promote wind power. 
To this end, this Chapter would also lend this understanding to explain the impact of 
EU policy instrument harmonisation on the development of wind power.  
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The Directive 2001/77/EC leans towards an EU-wide harmonised policy instrument 
for the promotion of renewable energy electricity in the future. However, with the 
current situations55
 
 (Swider et al 2008; de Oliver and Tolmasquim 2004) that exist in 
each Member State, this study argues that harmonisation may not be the best option 
for the EU wind power market. Considering different approaches to the development 
and deployment of wind power, this study argues that adopting a single renewable 
energy policy instrument for the EU is highly detrimental to the wind power industry. 
Combined with the environment, culture, and market structure of each Member State, 
harmonisation is not the best way forward. Further discussion of this is presented in a 
subsequent section of this Chapter.   
9.2 EVALUATION FRAMEWORK 
The framework utilised in this Chapter is reviewed in detail in Chapter Four. The 
analysis presented in this Chapter also follows on from the analysis presented in 
Chapters Six to Eight. A total of fifty-five in-depth semi-structured interviews were 
conducted, out of which four were at EU level. To compliment the data from the 
interviews, secondary or published materials are also utilised. This is to ensure 
consistency, reliability and accuracy of the data presented. 
 
9.3 WIND POWER AND EU POLICY 
To recap, the White Paper ‘Energy for the future: renewable sources of energy’ (EU 
1997), specifically provides a commitment to supply 12% of the EU’s energy from 
renewable energy sources by 2010 and observed that renewables can help reduce the 
EU’s dependence on imports of fossil fuel, reduce CO2 emissions, and stimulate 
                                                 
55 Different conditions and costs of grid connections; planning and other 
regulatory requirements 
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economic growth (see Chapter Two of this thesis). Thus, the document paved the way 
for the introduction of strategies for promoting renewables in the EU and brought 
awareness to the importance of renewables to the entire EU economy. The directive 
2001/77/EC was also adopted as a follow up measure for reaching the EU renewable 
target by 2010. However, as mentioned earlier, the directive sets indicative targets for 
the share of RES-E for each Member State, with each given the freedom to choose 
the kind of policy instrument that suits their particular market and legal system and 
outlined an ambitious target of 21% contribution of RES-E by 2010 (EU 2006a). In 
addition, the EU based on its Kyoto Protocol obligation to cut down carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions by 8% in 2010, the Council of the EU 
in March 2007 further reaffirmed the importance of renewables utilisation in the EU 
and stated that:  
“The European Council is aware of the growing demand for 
energy and increasing energy prices as well as of the benefits of 
strong and early common international action on climate 
change, is confident that a substantive development of energy 
efficiency and of renewable energies will enhance energy 
security, curb the projected rise in energy prices and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in line with the EU’s ambitions for 
the period beyond 2012……”  (EU 2007:20).  
 
9.3.1 Recent Developments 
In April 2009, the EU Parliament and the Council signed into law, the Directive 
2009/28/EC mandating all Member States to have in place renewable energy policy 
instruments that will enable them meet future EU targets. As opposed to the previous 
Directive 2001/77/EC that allowed Member States meet their indicative and 
ambiguous targets without much monitoring, the new Directive set mandatory targets 
and also attempt to monitor progress through the National Renewable Energy Action 
Plan (NREAP). Member States are now mandated to comply with the template of 
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NREAP commissioned by the EU Commission in June 2009. The template will 
allow Member States to build renewable energy development plans and also enable 
them report progress made to the Commission. 
 
This action by the EU is very significant and serves to correct the flaws of Directive 
2001/77/EC. When asked if the requirements of the EU before the new Directive 
would help the EU reach its target by 2010 and beyond, the four respondents 
interviewed at EU level claimed that reaching the EU target cannot be attained 
without binding decisions. Findings from the interviews reveal that without 
additional measures, especially within the EU-25, the target will not be achieved. 
Evidence reveals that the target can only be reached if Member States, whose policy 
instruments are not doing well at the moment, change their promoting schemes. A 
policy Director of a popular European renewable association stated that some 
Member States’ policy instruments are not working so well for example: Greek and 
Portuguese feed-in tariff, Belgian quota system etc. Some are flawed because of the 
inherent design issues. 
 
The Green Paper EU (2006a) stated that the EU will only achieve 19% of the 21% 
overall RES-E target in 2010. Only nine Member States56
                                                 
56 Denmark, Germany, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands 
 are now on track to reach 
their national indicative target (EU 2006b). Nonetheless, wind power has been an 
important part of renewable energy sources in Europe. Wind power has been very 
successful, and has made significant progress, and with over 40GW installed capacity 
in Europe it has now exceeded the 2010 targets (EU 2006a). As mentioned in early 
Chapters, the EU remains the world leader in terms of wind power installed capacity, 
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with 60% world share (Zervos and Kjaer 2009). According to EWEA (2010), 
9581MW wind capacity worth 11.5 billion Euros was installed in 2009. This 
represented a 21% increase compared to 2008 records hence, “...for the second year 
running in the EU, more wind power was installed than any other electricity 
generating technology” (EWEA 2010:6).  
 
Notwithstanding, this considerable market penetration the EU wind sector still faces 
huge challenges which need to be addressed. According to EU (2006a, 2006b, 
2005a), one third of EU Member States do not give enough support to wind power. 
Further, wind is still not sufficiently harnessed in half of the EU Member States. This 
is due to delays in authorisation, grid conditions and slow reinforcement and 
extension of the electricity grid. During one interview, a Chief Executive Officer 
from one European wind power association claimed that the EU needs a long term 
commitment to enable it to reach future targets. He also claimed that for the EU to 
escape from its current energy and climate change crisis, its needs to re-think the 
whole way energy demand is being met. Hence, wind power is expected to deliver a 
record level capacity of energy if the EU rises to tackle the challenges that currently 
impede on the future growth of the sector without delay. The next section provides a 
comparative analysis of the policy instruments utilised by the Member States 
investigated in this study. 
 
9.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
To recap, the feed-in tariff places an obligation on the utility companies to purchase 
green electricity from generators at a government fixed price. While the 
Environmental Quality of Electricity Production (MEP) is a kWh subsidy paid to 
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domestic producers of electricity from renewable sources and CHP who feed into the 
national grid renewable generated capacity (van Rooijen and van Wees 2007). In 
contrast the quota/renewables obligation (RO) mandates utility companies to supply a 
certain percentage of their electricity mix from renewable energy sources, with 
certificates allocated to ensure compliance in meeting the targets (IEA 2006; Ringel 
2006; Fouquet et al 2005; Sawin 2004). However, the comparative analysis presented 
in this Chapter is centred on renewable energy electricity generation and specifically 
wind power electricity generation of the Member States investigated. The analysis is 
also based on the criteria and framework outlined and discussed in Chapter Four of 
this study. 
 
9.4.1 Administration 
To recap, the directive 2001/77/EC demands that Member States should implement 
policy instruments that enable them to reduce regulatory and non-regulatory barriers, 
so as to increase renewable electricity and ensure that the rules [policy instruments] 
are objective, transparent and non-discriminatory.  
 
9.4.1.1  Transparency and practicability 
Following this principle, the FIT has proved more transparent than the RO. There are 
several reasons that explain this. Firstly, the FIT is simple and easy to understand. 
The FIT can be adjusted and monitored as the market develops. This is not the case 
with the RO. Secondly, the FIT mandates regional and local electricity suppliers to 
purchase electricity generated in their own locality at a stated price for different 
technologies. It also offers different prices for onshore wind depending on the 
location. Less windy sites are paid more than windy sites. In the UK, before the 
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introduction of banding, the RO did not consider this; the RO charges the same price 
for all technologies. Besides, suppliers can obtain certificates from any generator 
where ever their location. The RO is viewed as a market based policy instrument 
which allows the free interplay of demand and supply without any need for 
Government spending. This makes the RO complicated and volatile.  
 
The FIT and the MEP do not mandate the Government to fix targets and timetables, 
rather it creates a market for all forms of renewable energy source technology, 
irrespective of their stage of technological development. This is also consistent with 
Grotz and Fouquet (2005:19) findings that: “the demands and requirement for 
meeting targets are far more challenging under the RO than the FIT and the MEP 
systems.” Fouquet et al (2005) argued in support of this claim. The authors indicated 
that the requirements under the RO are far more difficult to meet, because in most 
cases, the fixing of targets is critical and may push prices up or down if not properly 
designed.  
 
9.4.1.2  Flexibility 
The FIT is also very flexible and accommodates changes without dampening 
investors’ confidence. It is always possible for the Government to change fixed prices 
to account for new capacity installed (Fouquet et al 2005; Sawin 2004). In essence, 
the FIT brings into the market a wide range of different technologies and does not 
pick winners as it takes into consideration the developmental stage of each renewable 
energy technology. Szarka (2007) pointed out that the RO picks winners by 
rewarding the cheapest technologies over others, as such; meeting targets is difficult. 
Thus, the RO is very inflexible, once targets are fixed, it is always difficult to make 
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any adjustments. However, because the MEP was not properly designed, it was very 
inflexible, the process of making changes and adjustments was impossible. This 
explains the reason why the MEP was abandoned in August 2006 by the Dutch 
Government. 
 
In terms of managing institutional conflicts, the FIT has survived various criticisms 
directed against it by electricity suppliers. Almost all parties involved in the design 
and implementation of the FIT are in favour of its continuous existence in Germany, 
except for the electricity suppliers who feel that computation and system balancing is 
more of a problem with the FIT laws. The transactional cost burden on the consumers 
under the FIT is also less than that in the RO. More of these issues are explored 
further in subsequent sections of this Chapter.  
 
9.4.2  Stakeholders Support/ Involvement 
To recap, the extent to which policy instruments encourage stakeholder groups to 
participate and be involved in wind power deployment is crucial to successful 
implementation. It is on this note that this section discusses stakeholders support and 
involvement under the following subheadings: 
 
9.4.2.1 Policy instrument design and implementation 
The FIT and the RO have enjoyed stakeholder (renewable and wind energy 
associations, project developers etc) support during and after their design. The MEP 
falls short of this credit. The MEP is decided upon by the Government alone and is 
imposed on key stakeholders, thus the MEP did not last for more than three years. 
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Stakeholders are involved through workshops and consultations57 in Germany while 
in the UK, stakeholders are involved through various rounds of consultation 
processes58
 
. The German FIT has been credited for involving wind research institutes 
and renewables association in the calculations and pricing of the FIT. The RO leaves 
this up to the market to fix prices however this has resulted in price fluctuations and 
distortions as only a few players dominate the UK electricity market.  
9.4.2.2  Planning issues 
Planning permission laws and regimes in the UK and The Netherlands are still very 
complicated (Klessmann et al 2008; Eltham et al 2008). Developers in the UK 
attempt to procure the best windy sites for siting wind parks, but in the process they 
are hit by strong public resistance. For example, the Middlemoor windfarm public 
inquiry held in November 2007 ended in intense debates and arguments 
(Northumberland Gazette 2007), but was eventually consented in August 2008 
(BWEA 2008). Although with the new planning laws in the UK, things have 
improved but it can get better by improving on wind farm build-up time. It is required 
in the German planning law that regional and local municipalities designate areas for 
wind power development, where this does not happen, Breukers and Wolsink (2007) 
pointed out that developers are free to develop and site wind power any where, 
provided they are outside the build up area. With this, institutional conflicts are 
minimized. Although, there are gradual changes noted in Germany as well, the spatial 
planning regime is now becoming a bigger issue (Toke et al 2008; Breukers 2006). 
                                                 
57 For example the consultation and workshop on the amendment of the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act 2004 from January 2006 to May 2008 
58 For example the Statutory Consultation on the Renewables Obligation Order 
2009 from June to September 2008; and the Statutory Consultation on 
Renewable Energy: Reform of the Renewables Obligation from May to September 
2007. 
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Albeit, to date there has not been any established body of anti-wind lobby group as in 
the UK and The Netherlands (Szarka 2007). Anti-wind lobbies in Germany and The 
Netherlands are more concerned with the protection of nature than landscape and 
cultural heritage protectionism (Breukers 2006). In The Netherlands, wind power is 
not included in planning laws. Breukers and Wolsink (2007) pointed out that wind 
power schemes require pro-active decisions from municipalities. Decisions are left in 
the hands of the planning and Spatial Ministry. Thus, wind power development is 
slower than in Germany as refusals cannot be appealed. For example Breukers and 
Wolsink (2007) found that 80% of the proposed wind power in The Netherlands are 
either refused or rejected by planning authorities. 
 
The recent planning review in the UK has also been of some help. Szarka and 
Blühdorn (2006:28) pointed out that the UK has no spatial planning regime, rather 
wind power planning and consenting is ‘criteria based’ decision making. Except for 
large projects which are decided by the central government, planning permission is 
granted by local authorities. Nevertheless, appeals against any rejected application are 
allowed in UK; the anti-wind lobby objective is more of landscape and nature 
protectionism. They use misleading information to gain ground and have been 
successful in resisting the development and advancement of wind power. Despite the 
review of the planning laws, their action and activity is very strong and influential. 
Windfarm sites and constructions are usually outside the community and as such 
account for the limited public support for wind power received in the UK. 
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9.4.2.3  Ownership structure 
Wind power ownership of the Member States examined in this study can broadly be 
divided into two types: (i) local co-operatives or small scale ownership; (ii) corporate 
or large scale ownership. Toke et al (2008:1140) defined the former as “schemes that 
are participative and locally based or run for non-profit, ‘ethical investment’ 
purpose”. The authors described the later as “a range of non-local types of ownership 
including utilities, independent power producers, and other hybrids” (Toke et al 
2008:1139). These two categories of windfarm ownerships differentiate the German 
and Dutch wind industry structure from that of the UK.  The German and the Dutch 
wind power markets are characterised by many small local co-operatives, while the 
RO tends to favour large corporations like utility companies, who tend to dominate 
the UK market. This is largely responsible for the huge public support usually 
accorded to the wind industry and the FIT in Germany. This is also consistent with 
Toke (2006:26) finding that:  
“Local ownership of wind power schemes has been associated 
with higher levels of planning acceptance compared with 
ownerships by remote corporations.”  
 
Thus, the RO is meant to promote the least cost technology option, while the FIT is 
open to all renewable energy technologies, no matter the stage of development and 
the costs involved. This is also consistent with the findings of Szarka and Blühdorn 
(2006), Toke (2006), Fouquet et al (2005), Sawin (2004), that the RO tends to 
promote least cost projects, thereby restricting them to geographical locations, which 
promote the concentration of large scale projects, in a single centralised location. This 
was also the case in Germany during the 1990s.  Szarka and Blühdorn (2006:25) 
pointed out that most of the developments in Germany are based in the Northern 
Coaster Lander. This became a problem when most windy sites in this region were 
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paid the same rate as the less windy areas. Nevertheless, the government became 
aware of this and the problem was resolved. Hence, Fouquet et al (2005) noted that 
the situation was improved by adjusting the feed-in tariff payments to reflect different 
costs of production in different regions. Thus, regions and locations with low wind 
speed are paid more than regions with high wind speed. In the past, this was not the 
case with the RO. It has also not been proved yet how this would be achieved with 
the recent banding regime. Furthermore, this may account for the reason why there is 
very strong negative public acceptance rate for wind power in the UK. Toke et al 
(2008:1140) state that: “co-operatives involve large numbers of people investing in 
wind power, hence enlarging the pro-wind power lobby at both local and national 
level”.  
 
In the UK, the RO is dominated and controlled largely by only a few utility 
companies and big organisations, there are only few co-operatives. Individuals cannot 
afford to go through the process of application, planning and consultation. It takes 
time and demands a large amount of money with no guarantee of success. So, projects 
are better left for the big companies that can afford to bear the costs and risks 
associated with these hurdles. This is also consistent with Szarka and Blühdorn 
(2006:29) finding that:  
“In Germany, availability of subsidies for investment in wind 
farms and guaranteed feed-in tariffs encouraged ownership by 
farmers and by the general public, leading to large numbers of 
community ventures called Burgerwindparks (Citizens’ wind 
farms).”  
 
To summarise this discussion, the FIT and the MEP tend to favour small scale 
companies and local ownership of windfarms, than the RO. This is why ownership 
structures in Germany and Netherlands are quite different from the UK. Although 
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stakeholders in the UK are largely involved during the consultation process and in the 
design stage of the RO, the system is not suitable for co-operatives and local 
ownerships. Hence, with the regional spatial planning regime in Germany, there 
seems to be a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the demands and acceptance of wind power 
(Breukers 2006). While in the UK, because of the well organised anti-lobby groups 
and a difficult planning regime, there seems to be ‘top-down’ approach to the 
demands and acceptance of wind farms (Cowell 2007; Strachan and Lal 2004). 
 
9.4.3  Certainty for Industry 
To recap, wind power is a near market technology and still requires adequate subsidy 
to make it compete on a commercial basis with non renewables. It demands that 
supports are consistent to encourage an enabling environment for industrial and 
technological development. This section compares the policy instruments based on 
their stability and investment certainty. 
 
9.4.3.1  Stability and investment certainty 
 The FIT is a relatively stable policy instrument that has to date been deployed in 
Germany to deliver a huge capacity of wind power. The FIT provides a very high 
level of investment certainty and equally guarantees a high return on investment. The 
FIT has been in existence since 1991 and usually guarantees payments for up to 
twenty years. As a result, investors are willing to and enthusiastic about investing in 
wind power. The stability of the FIT also helps to create an enabling market 
environment to support the development of a domestic wind turbine manufacturing 
sector. Germany represents one of the biggest wind turbine manufacturing industries 
in the world (IEA Wind 2007).  The FIT also creates market incentives for small scale 
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generators and cooperative developments hence, the German wind power industry is 
characterised by local ownership schemes.  
 
By contrast, the MEP is an unstable policy instrument and was only in existence for 
three years before it was abandoned by the Dutch government through the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The risk of investing into wind power is high; there is no 
guarantee of return on investment. This has been largely responsible for the gradual 
loss of the Dutch wind turbine manufacturing industry (IEA Wind 2007).  
 
Similarly, the RO has changed every single year since its introduction. Each time the 
RO has been reviewed, investors have been uncertain of its future and the credibility 
of the system. To date, the RO is characterised by most investors as being risky and 
uncertain (Grotz and Fouquet 2005). It is still very much unclear what the future 
holds for the wind industry when the RO comes to an end in 2027.  Furthermore, 
there is no local or national wind turbine manufacturer in the UK. Investors are faced 
with the option of importing wind turbines from Germany, Spain and China (IEA 
Wind 2007). As such, investors are vulnerable to price increases in wind turbines and 
a scarcity, in some cases. This is a major setback for the RO. 
 
In summary, it can be inferred from this discussion that the FIT is a very strong 
policy instrument that guarantees a high return on investment. It also creates an 
enabling business environment with low or no risks (Toke 2007a; Toke and Lauber 
2007; Szarka and Blühdorn 2006) when compared to the other policy instrument 
investigated in this study.  
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9.4.4  Effectiveness 
To recap, the effectiveness of the policy instrument examined in this study has been 
measured by the quantitative amount of wind power installed capacity added annually 
over the period 2002 to 2008. When comparing the installed capacity from 2002 to 
2008, the German FIT is well ahead of the other two policy instruments. 
 
9.4.4.1  Wind capacity added over time 
Table 8.1 shows the countries installed capacity from year 2002 to 2008. 
Table 9.1: Wind power installed capacity 
Year Germany Netherlands United Kingdom 
2002 11994 MW 693 MW 552 MW 
2003 14609 MW 912 MW 649 MW 
2004 16629 MW 1078 MW 888 MW 
2005 18428 MW 1299 MW 1353 MW 
2006 20622 MW 1560 MW 1963 MW 
2007 22,247 MW 1,746 MW 2,389 MW 
2008 23,903 MW 2,225 MW 3241 MW 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
 
 
As Table 9.1 shows, the German wind installed capacity had increased from 11994 
MW in 2002 to 23,903 MW by the end of 2008. While The Netherlands and the UK 
capacity only increased from 692 MW and 552 MW to 2,225 MW and 3,241 MW by 
the end of 2008. This clearly shows that the German FIT is more effective in 
delivering wind capacity than either the MEP or the RO. 
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Similarly, Table 9.2 (1-3) provides a breakdown of the annual growth rate of 
installed capacity of the three Member States. Germany’s annual growth rate of 
installed capacity has decreased significantly. Table 9.2 (1-3) shows that the rate of 
annual growth (in percentage) for Germany fell from 21.8% in 2003 to 7.4% at the 
end of 2008. Two main reasons account for this. The first is a result of the saturated 
market for wind power in Germany. Almost all the good sites for onshore wind 
power have already been allocated. The second is re-powering, which is slow at the 
moment, because of changes in spatial and regional laws (Szarka and Blühdorn 
2006). Notwithstanding, Germany’s total annual additions since 2002 were no lower 
than 1600MW, as shown in Table 9.2 (1-3). Similarly, in The Netherlands, the rate 
of installed capacity growth for wind power also fell from 31% in 2003 to 27% in 
2008. Total additions to annual installed capacity grew from 219 MW to 479MW. 
The slow rate of growth may also be due to strict planning permission laws in The 
Netherlands (Agnolucci 2007a; Agterbosch et al 2007). 
 
In comparison with the RO in the UK, the annual installed capacity rose from 97MW 
in 2002 to 852MW in 2008, showing an increase from 14.9% in 2003 to 35.7% in 
2008. This growth rate notwithstanding, The Netherlands and the UK still remain far 
behind Germany in terms of installed capacity. Like The Netherlands, planning 
permission laws in the UK are still complex and complicated. It takes a considerable 
amount of time to get a project up and running in the UK. The current BWEA 
records shows that of the 2101.75 MW approved in 2008, only 522.80 MW was 
built. Similarly, records for this year show that about 3113.31 MW has been 
consented but so far only 895.55 MW is under construction. No doubt, the RO is 
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working, nevertheless, it needs to come a long way to compete with the FIT’s 
records (Toke et al 2008). 
Table 9.2.1: Germany 
Year Installed capacity 
(MW) 
Annual change in 
capacity added 
(MW) 
Rate of growth 
(%) 
2002 11994  - - 
2003 14609  2615 21.8 
2004 16629  2020 13.8 
2005 18428  1799 10.8 
2006 20622  2194 11.9 
2007 22247 1625 7.9 
2008 23903 1656 7.4 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
 
Table 9.2.2: Netherlands 
Year Installed capacity 
(MW) 
Annual change in 
capacity added 
(MW) 
Rate of growth 
(%) 
2002 693  - - 
2003 912  219 31% 
2004 1078  166 18.2% 
2005 1299  141 13% 
2006 1560  314 28% 
2007 1746 186 11.9 
2008 2225 479 27.4 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
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Table 9.2.3: United Kingdom 
Year Installed capacity 
(MW) 
Annual change in 
capacity added 
(MW) 
Rate of growth 
(%) 
2002 552  - - 
2003 649  97 14.9% 
2004 888  239 26.9% 
2005 1353  465 34.4% 
2006 1963  610 31.1% 
2007 2389 426 21.7 
2008 3241 852 35.7 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
When comparing the three Member States in terms of their contribution to the EU 
wind installed capacity, Table 9.3 (1-3) shows that at the end of 2008 Germany holds 
36.81% of the total EU wind installed capacity, while The Netherlands and the UK 
account for only 3.43% and 4.99%. Again the shares of Germany and The 
Netherlands fell from 58% and 3.38% in 2002 to 36.81% and 3.43% in 2008. While, 
the UK share increased from 2.7% to 4.99%. 
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Table 9.3.1: Germany’s Percentage Share in Total EU Capacity 
Year Total EU Capacity 
(MW) 
Germany Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
Share in 
Percentage 
2002 20447 11994  58.7% 
2003 28440 14609  51.4% 
2004 34205 16629  48.6% 
2005 40584 18428  45.5% 
2006 48000 20622  43% 
2007 56517 22247 39.36% 
2008 64935 23903 36.81% 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
Table 9.3.2: Netherlands’ Percentage Share in Total EU Capacity 
Year Total EU Capacity 
(MW) 
Netherlands 
Installed Capacity 
(MW) 
Share in 
Percentage 
2002 20447 693 3.38% 
2003 28440 912 2.15% 
2004 34205 1078 3.15% 
2005 40584 1219 3.01% 
2006 48000 1560 3.25% 
2007 56517 1746 3.09% 
2008 64935 2225 3.43% 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
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Table 9.3.3: UK’s Share in Total EU Capacity 
Year Total EU Capacity 
(MW) 
UK Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
Share in 
Percentage 
2002 20447 552 2.7% 
2003 28440 649 2.28% 
2004 34205 888 2.60% 
2005 40584 1353 3.34% 
2006 48000 1963 4.09% 
2007 56517 2389 4.23% 
2008 64935 3241 4.99% 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the fall in the German shares may be as a result of the current 
re-powering ongoing in Germany. This also implies that onshore wind has reached 
its peak in Germany, while in the UK there is still room for more capacity, but due to 
the problems and barriers highlighted earlier, percentage changes are too small to 
affect the capacity delivered by the FIT in Germany. Similarly, comparing the total 
percentage of Germany with the other EU Member States, it can be concluded that 
Germany is still very successful. The FIT remains an important element in the 
development of wind power in Germany. From Table 9.3(1-3), evidence reveal that 
Germany held 43% of the total EU wind capacity in 2006, while the UK and 
Netherlands had 4.09% and 3.25% respectively. Comparing these results, Figure 8.1 
below indicates that all the other Member States together produced 49.66% installed 
wind capacity in the same year. 
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Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
 
However, it can be seen from Figure 9.1 that, Germany still remains a major player 
in the EU wind power market and irrespective of the fall in the share percentage of 
the country, it can be concluded that the German FIT performed better than the MEP 
and the RO.  
 
Linked to this is the comparison of the Member States in terms of the annual 
percentage share of the EU installed capacity. The German FIT still leads the other 
policy instruments. Table 9.4 shows that of the 8484MW installed capacity added to 
the EU capacity in 2008, Germany’s share was 19.63% (1665MW), while The 
Netherlands and the UK share stood at 5.89% (500 MW) and 9.85% (836 MW). The 
total added capacity from Germany was 100% more than the added capacity in The 
Netherlands and the UK. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: The Comparison of 
Percentage Share of Wind Capacity 
of the EU Member States
Germany
Netherlands
UK
Others
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Table 9.4: Percentage Share of Member States in regards to Annual EU 
installed Capacity 
Year EU Annual 
Capacity Added 
(MW) 
Added Capacity 
from Germany 
(MW and %) 
Added Capacity 
from 
Netherlands 
(MW and %) 
Added Capacity 
from United 
Kingdom (MW 
and %) 
2002 - - - - 
2003 7993 2615 (32.71%) 219 (2.7%) 97 (1.2%) 
2004 5765 2020 (35%) 166 (2.9%) 237 (4.1%) 
2005 6299 1799 (28.6%) 141 (2.2%) 465 (7.4%) 
2006 7496 2194 (29.3%) 293 (4.5%) 610 (8.1%) 
2007 8554 1667 (19.49%) 210 (2.45%) 427 (4.99%) 
2008 8484 1665 (19.63%) 500 (5.89%) 836 (9.85%) 
Source: European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) [Online] 31st July 2009. 
9.4.4.2 Ability of policy instrument to reach targets 
Furthermore, the success of any policy instrument is not the amount of capacity 
added to wind power alone, but its ability to achieve renewable energy targets set by 
the national Government (Butler and Neuhoff 2008; 2004). Unlike the quota system 
(RO) where targets are fixed and set by the Government, Fouquet et al (2005) argued 
that it is not possible to know in advance how much wind power or renewable 
energy capacity can be added over a set time with the German feed-in tariff. 
Nevertheless, EU (2006a, and 2005a) named Germany as one of the Member States 
that will reach its 12.5% renewable electricity target by 2010. According to the 
Renewable Energy Source Act Progress Report (BMU 2007a), of the 12.5% RES-E 
capacity, 6% will come from wind power. The report also claimed that the feed-in 
tariff has been instrumental in the delivery of wind power installed capacity in 
Germany.  
 
Similarly, EU (2006a, 2005a) also named The Netherlands among one of the 
Member States that will reach its renewable electricity target by 2010. One of the 
reasons the MEP was abandoned by the Dutch Government was because it is 
believed that with the current approved renewable capacity, the 9% target will be 
reached by 2010. This is not the case for the UK. So far, the RO has not been able to 
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prove its ability to reach political set targets. Though relatively new when compared 
to the FIT, renewable energy electricity is still less than 5% in the UK (IEA Wind 
2007). Thus, the contribution of wind power to the total 10.4% is less than 4%; 
hence a shortfall of the target is envisaged by 2010. This is also consistent with the 
finding of Szarka and Blühdorn (2006:17) that: 
“Germany is one of the few EU countries capable of reaching 
its 2010 RES-E target of 12.5%, as set out in the European 
directive 2001/77/EC. The contrast between Germany having 
18427 MW of capacity in January 2006 and the UK 1342 MW 
is clear-cut. A very high rate of new build in the UK in the near 
future could reverse this assessment, but it is currently 
unlikely.”  
 
One reason why it is currently unlikely for the UK to reach the 10.4% target and 
possibly catch up with Germany is the planning system. It takes too long to get wind 
power sites consented in the UK. As long as this remains, wind power capacity in the 
UK will remain low. Marsh and Toke (2006:1) pointed out that: “high rates of 
failure of proposed wind power schemes and lengthy planning procedures make this 
target difficult to achieve”. In addition to the ‘historical’ influence of landscape and 
anti wind organisations, issues like delays in planning approval, local authority and 
land owners perception, the make-up of local MPs and the way local interest groups 
can influence decisions all add up to form constraints limiting the deployment of 
wind power schemes. Furthermore, meeting targets in the UK is impossible as a 
result of the inherent flaws in the design of the RO. Szarka (2007) attributed this to 
the fundamental principle of the RO as a ‘technology blind’ policy instrument. 
According to the author, this makes targets setting for each technology impossible. 
Thus, the RO in its original state is not designed to meet quotas or targets. According 
to the Carbon Trust (2006:2), it is expected that the UK will only reach 7.6 per cent, 
9.6 per cent, and 10.1 per cent of generation status by 2010, 2015, and 2020 
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respectively.  The reason to explain this revolves around the fact that the closer the 
market gets to meet targets, the less value the renewables obligation certificate has. 
This in itself is regarded as a threat to the market. Similarly, the risk and 
uncertainties associated with the RO make finance and investments in wind power 
very difficult for small-medium scale players. Butler and Neuhoff (2008) pointed out 
NETA places a premium on reliable generation and penalises intermittent 
generation. This is a particular problem for small scale industry generators, “since 
such facilities are unable to balance their supply with alternative source of energy” 
(Butler and Neuhoff 2008:1859), thus the RO tends to pass on the market risks to the 
private sector. Hence, until the Government addresses these issues, investors’ 
confidence will remain low, resulting in a lower contribution of wind power 
compared to other Member States like Germany, Spain, and Denmark. 
 
To summarise this discussion, the FIT has been more effective in delivering huge 
mega watt (MW) installed capacity in Germany than the UK renewables obligation. 
Although the RO is still relatively new, there are many opportunities and room for 
improvement in order to produce record levels of wind power capacity like the 
German FIT. It is also too early to assess the impact of the recent RES-T banding on 
the effectiveness of the RO, empirical evidence will be required in the near future to 
explain the impact of banding on the RO. 
 
9.4.5  Efficiency 
The aim of any wind policy instrument is to make RES-E competitive, whilst cutting 
costs for the final consumer hence, to make RES-E cheap and affordable to 
households and individuals. However, contrary to popular argument that the German 
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FIT and the MEP are more expensive than the RO (EURELECTRIC 2004), both 
systems have proved to be cheaper and more efficient in reducing costs than the RO 
or the quota system.  
 
9.4.5.1 Prices and cost reduction 
Table 9.5 presents estimates of prices for wind power generated electricity from 
2003-2008 as offered by each policy instruments. 
 
Table 9.5: Prices of wind generated electricity, 2003-2008 (in eurocents per 
kWh) 
Year Germany Netherlands UK 
2003 6.80-8.80 9.20 9.60 
2004 6.50-8.50 9.60-9.90 10.10 
2005 6.50-8.53 9.90 10.10 
2006 5.28-8.36 9.90 13.00 
2007 5.30-8.40 9.90 13.00 
2008 5.30-8.40 9.90 14.00 
Source: Fouquet and Johansson (2008) Szarka and Blühdorn (2006); BMU 
(2007); Grotz and Bishoff (2005). 
Author Generated 
 
Evidence from Table 9.5 proves that the FIT and the MEP offer lower prices than the 
RO. Two reasons were suggested by Grotz and Bischof (2005:2) for this:  
• “The unstable and fluctuating green certificate and electricity prices due to 
developments in the market and meteorological factors lead to high risk 
surcharges with investors and banks. Consequently, considering higher post-
interest equity returns and shorter capital return periods will be sought. 
• The green certificate price is determined by the marginal costs of the most 
expensive technology or the least favourable site which have to be used to 
comply with the quota.” 
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This is also consistent with the findings of Neuhoff and Butler (2004). The authors 
concluded in their research that the higher market risks for the wind investment make 
it difficult to bring about low prices. Therefore, the RO does not deliver wind power 
electricity generated capacity at a lower rate or cost to the final consumer than the 
FIT or the MEP systems. Szarka (2007:99) also provides four reasons that explain 
why the FIT offers lower prices than the RO. These include: “(i) the FIT prices are 
predictable and as such gives investor security; (ii) low risks and guaranteed 
revenues translate into low interest rates on loans; (iii) private investors are often 
willing to accept lower rates of return on investment than corporate investors; (iv) 
RES-E generators do not have to pay for balancing services, whilst grid connection 
costs are relatively favourable.”  
 
The FIT also achieves cost reductions by “the regular adjustment to prices 
[degression] to tariffs for renewable energy in response to changes in technologies 
and the market places” (Sawin 2004:12). This is different to the RO. Prices fluctuate 
without reference to the market place. As a way of explaining this, Szarka (2007:99) 
found that: “wind power is a price taker, wholesale price inflation produces wind fall 
profits.” 
 
9.4.5.2  Market risks 
The FIT reduces costs and prices without affecting investment security. The higher 
market risks for wind power investors in the UK make it difficult to bring about lower 
prices of generated capacity in the UK. As result, the RO does not deliver wind power 
electricity generated capacity at a lower rate or cost to the final consumer than the 
FIT or the MEP systems. Furthermore, the FIT offers long-term guaranteed prices. 
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This reduces market risk as investors know what the market can offer and can base 
investment calculations on this. Also, the degression introduced into the FIT makes it 
possible for investment to be rewarded adequately, not over what the market can bear 
or by placing additional burden on the final consumer (Szarka 2007; Mendonca 
2007). However, due to the market risks, only a few operators or suppliers control the 
market in the UK. The market lacks effective competition and as such consumers pay 
higher prices in the UK than in Germany. Klessman et al (2008) also pointed out that 
the FIT exempt renewable generators from all market and price risks, while the RO 
possess two risks to electricity generators: the fluctuating electricity price risk; and 
the certificate price risk. This favours large electricity suppliers who have the ability 
to manage the market risks. It is not surprising then, that the UK electricity market is 
controlled by few large suppliers or the ‘big six’. 
 
9.4.5.3  Static efficiency 
Under the FIT, prices are guaranteed on a long term basis, hence investors can reduce 
their costs by purchasing equipment, wind power turbines and component parts from 
a competitive market. Sawin (2004:12) observed that: “pricing laws (FIT) can drive 
down costs by driving economics of scale and innovation. Hence manufacturers and 
developers will compete for the lowest possible costs in order to achieve higher profit 
margins which promote cost reductions”. Hence, project developers create 
competition by searching and seeking out least cost equipment from manufacturers, 
while manufacturers of wind turbines and component parts operate a competitive 
market. Therefore, Finon and Perez (2007:90) conclude that: “developers-investors 
search to increase their profits by looking for the cheapest equipment and minimizing 
their costs by generating competition between manufacturers”. 
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On the other hand, the RO is also designed to be a market system as such; it has the 
potential to make generators compete in the market. Generators can compete when 
searching for contracts with suppliers. This can drive down the cost of projects 
developed in response to the increasing demand for certificates from the obligated 
purchaser (Finon and Perez 2007). Regrettably, this is difficult to achieve with the 
UK renewables obligation. The reason is that the UK wind industry is characterized 
by limited domestic supplies of wind turbine. 
 
9.4.5.4  Dynamic efficiency 
The FIT has been able to link the promotion of renewables electricity with industrial 
development. This is currently the case with Germany. The FIT is not 
‘technologically neutral’ as opposed to the RO before the introduction of banding in 
the UK. Finon and Perez (2007:90) pointed out that the design of the FIT 
accommodates diversity by “differentiating technologies in order to respond to long 
term energy policy aiming diversification”. Therefore the FIT is efficient in this 
regard.  
 
In comparison with the RO, the FIT encourages the development of local wind 
turbines and component part manufacturing industries. Eventually, these industries 
are able to invest in R&D because of the economic of scale they enjoy. It is also very 
easy to learn more about and to improve turbine and component part development 
over a period of time 59
                                                 
59 The FIT in Germany is guaranteed for a period of 15 years 
. This is absent in the UK wind industry at the moment. 
However, this is what the banding of the RO seeks to achieve. Banding facilitates the 
establishment of various ROCs for different renewables technologies, but as 
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mentioned previously, it is early to assess the effect of banding on the UK renewables 
market. 
 
9.4.6 Market Conformity 
To recap, the Directive 2001/77/EC allows Member States to deploy policy 
instruments that best suit each national market and supporting legal systems. One of 
the ultimate aims of including this in the Directive is to prepare all the Member States 
for an EU-wide harmonised system. In this section, policy instruments are compared, 
based on their compatibility with national and international market rules and 
regulations. 
 
The FIT and the MEP are similar in this regard. Under the German FIT, wind power 
generators are exempted from the electricity market. Prices are fixed and as such 
generators sell at a guaranteed price (Klessman et al 2008). The authors also add that 
generators are free to sell wind generated electricity to end-users or via traders or 
power exchange. Therefore, the TSOs bear the risk of integrated capacity into the 
market and are responsible for forecasting, scheduling, and balancing. There has been 
institutional conflict as a result. The utility companies that bear this burden have 
consistently criticised the FIT for this.  Finon and Perez (2007) on the other hand, 
argued that the FIT set de facto the RES-E production outside the electricity market, 
given the obligation to purchase at a fixed price. This implies that about 12.5 per cent 
or more of German electricity will be set outside the market by 2010 and beyond. 
Although this is not so much of an issue in the German market, however this is 
contrary to the expectations of the internal electricity market where the laws of supply 
and demand fix the price and determine the quantity sold in the market. Hence, the 
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FIT does not encourage cross border and international boundary trade even within EU 
Member States surrounding the German borders. This is a significant weakness of the 
FIT. 
 
In contrast, under the RO, wind power generators deals with the risk and market 
uncertainties as the value of the wind power generated electricity are directly related 
to the market price. Finon and Perez (2007), and Szarka (2007) pointed out that part 
of the costs included in the certificate is used to pay wind power producers. Wind 
power generators sell electricity directly to the market. No special mechanism is 
needed to integrate the renewable (wind power) electricity into the market (Klessman 
et al 2008). Therefore, the RO is very much open to competition, and to an extent, the 
laws of supply and demand fix the price and regulate the market within a well 
designed quota system. Albeit, the RO like the FIT is not completely compatible with 
this sort of market. Although the UK operates a liberalised electricity market, the RO 
still falls short of some requirements that would enable it to fully comply with a free 
market system. One of the main reasons that explain this revolves around the limited 
or few players in the market. Evidence arising from interviews with UK utility 
companies reveals that competition does exist between suppliers of electricity but, it 
is not evident that there are a large number of suppliers beyond the current ‘big six’ 
controlling the market. There is also a strong interference from the Government in 
matters associated with the RO. Over the years the RO has been in existence, it has 
witnessed many changes, which have undermined its credibility. Furthermore, the RO 
tends to put a cap on the amount of renewables electricity capacity that can be 
brought to the market by setting a quota which is binding on all parties concerned. 
Also, before the introduction of banding, the RO tends to restrict variety and 
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innovations by promoting only the least cost technology (onshore wind) at the 
expense of others. 
 
To summarise this discussion, it can be inferred that the FIT, MEP and the RO are not 
fully compatible with a liberalised electricity market but are compatible with their 
local, regional, and national market systems, and are usable in the market 
environment (Finon and Perez 2007). Be that as it may, the RO is more compatible 
and open to competition than the feed-in tariff and the MEP (Elliot 2007; Finon and 
Perez 2007). 
 
9.4.7 Finance 
One key characteristics of a good policy instrument is continuity and stability over a 
long period of time. The FIT law usually guarantees prices for up to 20 years, 
bringing about long term certainty to the renewable energy market. Sawin (2004) also 
found that the FIT guarantees return on investments, therefore companies and large 
corporations are willing and able to invest in wind power technology, to train staff 
and to establish other services and resources with a long term perspective. 
 
As a result, banks and other lending institutions find it easier to finance wind power 
projects in Germany. They are well assured of the return on investment. With the 
MEP system, although similar to the German FIT, investors are generally not willing 
to invest in wind power because of the risk and uncertainty that characterize the 
Dutch market, where a project is not qualified for the MEP subsidy until it is fully 
operational. In that way, no one is really sure of the projects viability and certainty 
until the subsidies are available. In fact, as it is at the moment, the MEP was 
 254 
abandoned in August 2006 as such new projects cannot qualify for the MEP subsidy 
unless they were developed before August 2006. This makes investment and 
financing issues complicated in The Netherlands. The MEP, in itself, is a good policy 
instrument for the take-off of a renewable energy market but the ‘stop and go’ nature 
and issues with Government policy needs urgent attention. 
 
Likewise, things are not too different with the RO. There are still numerous potential 
uncertainties and a high level of risk that makes finance difficult and almost 
impossible for willing investors. This is also consistent with Fouquet et al (2005) 
findings that potential uncertainties exist in the many steps and processes a developer 
has to go through from the planning stage, up to the point where projects are 
operational. Different levels of costs are also involved at every stage and until the 
project completes the planning permission stage successfully, it is not certain whether 
banks and financial institutions will be willing to commit themselves to funding wind 
power projects. This issue alone turns willing investors away from the market, 
making the RO unattractive for small market players. Only large companies are able 
to withstand the risk, troubles, and uncertainties associated with the RO. A small 
scale or local ownership structure may not be able to withstand this. 
 
In summary, the FIT at the moment guarantees return on investment compared to the 
MEP and the RO. As such, the process of obtaining finance or funds from lending 
institutions is easier with the FIT. 
 
 
9.4.8  Impact on Development 
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To recap, the impact on development in this study has been defined as the extent to 
which policy instruments contribute to economic growth, and environmental and 
social benefits. This section will examine the positive effects of policy instruments 
using the following subheadings.  
 
9.4.8.1  Innovation and technology development 
The FIT has been very successful in promoting industrial development. It encourages 
new innovations and technological development especially to the advantage of wind 
power (Fouquet et al 2005; Lauber 2005, 2004; Martinot 2005; Sawin 2004; 
Menanteau et al 2003). The German wind power sector is currently benefiting from a 
strong industry base in the manufacturing of wind turbines. The German wind turbine 
manufacturing industry leads the way in the world, alongside their Spanish, Danish, 
U.S.A., India, and China counterparts, in the supply of wind turbines to other parts of 
the world including the UK and The Netherlands.  Table 9.6 shows the top ten wind 
turbine suppliers. 
Table 9.6: World Wind Turbine Manufacturers 
MANUFACTURER COUNTRY OF 
EXISTENCE 
MARKET SHARE IN 
PERCENTAGE 
Gamesa Spain 15.4% 
GE Wind U.S.A 16.6% 
Vestas Denmark 22.8% 
Enercon Germany 14% 
Suzlon India 10.5% 
Siemens Denmark 7.5% 
Acciona Spain 4.4% 
Goldwind China 4.2% 
Nordex Germany 3.4% 
Sinovel China 3.4% 
Others Various 10.5% 
Source: BTM Consult AsP (2008) 
Author Generated 
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Furthermore, the German wind power sector also benefits in R&D and Demonstration 
which makes new innovations possible (Klaassen et al 2005). For example the 
development and production of a 5MW wind turbine capacity is underway in 
Germany and will soon be supplied across the continent (IEA Wind 2007). This is 
also consistent with the finding of Fouquet et al (2005:21) that: “with the minimum 
price systems [FIT], technological improvements increases profit thereby 
encouraging innovation.”  This is made possible because the FIT is guaranteed for a 
long period of time and as such creates a good investment environment for investors. 
Producers of wind turbines and component parts are guaranteed of the demand for 
their products, hence they are bound to make profit. Sawin (2004:9) noted that: “once 
producers achieve a certain level of profit, they invest in R&D to lower costs and 
increase profits…” This is the case in Germany to date, where innovation and 
technology development is made possible because of the ‘sustained and growing 
market’ provided by the FIT (Sawin 2004). The FIT has also been able to 
demonstrate its ability to link the political and economic sector through this.   
 
This is not the case with The Netherlands. As a pioneer of wind power development, 
the Dutch market gradually lost its place as a result of the inconsistencies in policy 
instruments, and uncertainties surrounding the development of wind power future 
market. Innovation and technological development is also very difficult under the 
RO. Sawin (2004:9) pointed out that: “the surplus may go entirely to consumers, and 
as a result producers do not receive enough profit (or reliable long term profits) to 
invest in R&D in order to reduce their costs”. In most cases the RO over 
compensates investors, although proponents argued against this notion and claimed 
that the RO only compensates the first technology risk takers or movers. Hence, 
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utility companies, producers, and generators do not have any option other than to opt 
for turbines produced outside the UK, thus they find it cheaper to buy wind turbines 
and component parts from abroad rather than at home.  There is also no incentive for 
R&D as such it is practically impossible for domestic industries of wind turbine to 
thrive in the global turbine manufacturing market. Thus, there are only few small 
scales or micro-generation turbine manufacturers in the UK at the moment (IEA 
Wind 2007). 
 
9.4.8.2  Employment and CO2 reduction 
Table 8.1 shows that German wind turbine and components parts manufacturing 
industry represents 20% of the global turbine manufacturing industry. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the level and rate of employment in Germany surpasses the 
other two countries (Hillebrand et al 2006; Ziegelmann et al 2000). According to the 
Renewable Energy Sources Act Progress Report (BMU 2007a) more than 9 billion 
euros were invested in renewable energy installations in Germany in 2006. According 
to Lipp (2007) the German renewable energy industry employed more than 150,000 
people in 2005, while wind power alone employed over 65, 000 people in same year. 
This is also expected to increase when offshore projects progress to deployment. The 
report also indicated that there was a reduction of about 45 million tonnes of CO2 in 
2006. While in the UK and The Netherlands, the wind power industry employs 2000 
and 4000 people respectively. A decrease of around 5 million tonnes of CO2 has been 
achieved as a result of the deployment of wind power in The Netherlands and the UK 
(BWEA 2009; IEA Wind 2009). This is also expected to increase when offshore 
projects progress to deployment. 
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To summarise this discussion, each of the policy instruments contributes one way or 
the other to creating employment, and reducing the effect of climate change on the 
environment, but overall the FIT seems to lead the way in this respect.  
  
9.5 HARMONISATION DEBATE 
According to Holzinger and Knill (2005:781-782) “harmonisation refers to a specific 
outcome of international co-operation, namely to constellations in which national 
governments are legally required to adopt similar policies and programmes as part 
of their obligations as members of international organisations”.  In this case, the EU 
renewable energy policy harmonisation is defined as the application of a single and 
binding renewable energy policy instrument for all the EU Member States. This will 
require that renewable energy activities to be monitored at EU level with Member 
States having limited control. Not surprising then that Howlett (2000:308) pointed out 
that: “harmonisation is characterised by highly institutionalised and centralised top-
down decision-making procedures in the course of which the co-operating states 
consent on the international harmonisation of their policies. It involves the conscious 
and negotiated modification of domestic policies by governments committed to cross-
national standards which they have had a hand in drafting”. Once Member States 
agree to the multilateral decision making process and a deal is reached and legalised, 
decisions becomes legally binding and must be implemented. Therefore EU 
renewable energy policy harmonisation implies that Member States would relinquish 
their present national renewable energy policy autonomy and sovereignty and comply 
with the EU regulations (Busch and Jorgens 2005). The EU renewable policy plans 
can be traced back to the Directive 2001/77/EC. 
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One of the key aspects of the directive 2001/77/EC allows individual Member States 
to adopt and implement frameworks that best suit their market systems and 
conditions. Reasons for this are threefold. The first is to attract a large RES-E 
capacity into the grid in order to meet EU 2010 target. Secondly, it is to allow 
individual Member States to develop RES-E market, and thirdly to enable Member 
States to reduce CO2 emissions. It mandates the European Commission to report the 
success and progress made by Member States at the end of 2005. Muñoz et al (2007) 
pointed out that the directive entitles the Commission to propose harmonisation of 
renewable energy electricity policy instrument. The Article 4(2) of the directive. 
Article 4(2) specifically states that: “……This report shall, if necessary, be 
accompanied by a proposal for a community framework with regard to support 
schemes for electricity produced from renewable energy sources”. According to 
Article 4, such a proposal should: contribute to the achievement of national targets; 
be compatible with the principles of internal EU electricity; consider different 
sources; technologies and geographical characteristics of renewable electricity; be 
simple, effective and cost-efficient; and include sufficient transitional periods of at 
least 7 years (Muñoz et al 2007). Nevertheless, the directive did not identify any 
policy instrument that fits perfectly into the above conditions, but these 
specifications tend to support a harmonised quota system over any other policy 
instrument implemented in the EU (Soderholm 2008a; Muñoz et al 2007; Rowlands 
2005; Lauber 2004). 
 
At the end of 2005, the EU Commission reports failed to come up with a proposal 
for a community wide framework because of the reasons outlined in the 
communication. The Commission concluded that harmonisation is difficult to 
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achieve in the short term and further experience needs to be gained on more recent 
policy instruments implemented by some Member States. Firstly, the report shows 
that the feed-in tariff is more effective than the quota system in terms of the 
quantitative amount of capacity added annually. Secondly, that the feed-in tariff is 
more cost-efficient than the quota system (EU 2005). Hence, the Commission 
concluded that harmonisation is difficult to achieve in the short term and more 
experience needs to be acquired on more recent policy instruments.  
 
In March 2006, the European Commission published its green paper ‘A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’ COM (2006) 105 final. It 
can be extracted from the ‘green paper’ that the European Commission seeks a long 
term commitment to the development and deployment of renewables in the EU. It 
also pointed towards the ‘Renewable Energy Road Map’ COM (2006) 848 final 
which claimed that the EU 12% will not be met by 2010.  The reasons why the EU 
will not meet its renewable energy target revolve around “the complexity, novelty, 
and decentralised nature of most renewable energy applications result in numerous 
administrative problems. These include unclear and discouraging authorisation 
procedures for planning, building and operating systems, difference in standards 
and certification and incompatible testing regimes for renewable energy 
technologies” (EU 2006a: 4). 
 
In terms of electricity generation, the communication also affirmed that with the 
current policies, only 19% of the 21% EU target will be achieved by 2010. 
Therefore, the communication proposed a performance reassessment of the Member 
States’ policy instruments and the need to revisit the EU harmonisation plans in the 
 261 
context of the EU internal electricity market. It therefore concluded that: “while 
national  schemes for renewable energy in electricity may still be needed for a 
transitional period until the internal market is fully operational, harmonised support 
schemes should be a long term objective” (EU 2006a:12). 
 
Based on this conclusion and others60, in 2008 the EU Commission issued a proposal 
for a ‘directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (EU 
2008c). Two main conclusions on the effectiveness and efficiency of current 
renewables policy instrument can be deduced from the accompanying document61
 
 to 
the draft proposal. Firstly, “the effectiveness of policies promoting wind energy, 
biogas and photovoltaics technologies has been highest in countries using feed-in 
tariffs as their main support scheme. However, not all feed-in schemes implemented 
in Member States have been equally successful. For onshore wind energy, Denmark, 
Germany, and Spain are showing the highest effectiveness indicators for the period 
1998-2006” (EU 2008d: 8).  Secondly, the feed-in tariffs are efficient in terms of the 
price they offer and in reducing producer profit.  
This is also consistent with Muñoz et al (2007) arguments that the largest increase in 
renewables electricity generation occurred in EU Member States with feed-in tariffs. 
This is so because the feed-in tariff, if well designed and implemented, brings with it 
a high investment security that is needed to stimulate the growth of a healthy wind 
power market.  
 
                                                 
60 See EU COM (2006:12) 848 final 
61 SEC (2008) 57 
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This performance notwithstanding, the accompanying document to the proposal of 
the directive on renewable energy concludes that the harmonisation of policy 
instruments is not a short term but a long term goal. Four reasons that explain why 
the Commission felt that harmonisation is inappropriate include: “(i) the experience 
with quantity-based and price-based instruments does not allow picking a “winner”, 
as both kinds of instruments have the same economic efficiency and can be designed 
in conformity with the rules on the internal market for electricity, the free movement 
of goods and EC State aid rules; (ii) the introduction of one harmonised system 
would create a lot of uncertainty and disruption in the market for renewables, as it 
would abolish well-established national support schemes; (iii) in a harmonised 
system, it might be difficult to differentiate between different costs for different 
technologies in different countries. If this is the case, additional support measures 
would be needed for technologies which are still relatively far from producing 
renewable electricity at market price; (iv) National support schemes are often 
designed so that they also promote regional development…harmonisation might 
oblige Member States to find other ways to promote regional development”  (EU 
2008d:14-15). 
 
Respondents from EU level and Member States are also of a similar opinion that 
harmonisation is currently not the way forward. Given that each Member State has 
different political, market, and cultural structures, it is practically impossible to come 
to a conclusion whether harmonisation will be achievable now or in future. Actors in 
favour of harmonisation, as pointed out by Jacobsson et al (2009) are both within and 
outside the European Commission. These actors have formed a strong coalition in 
support of a harmonised quota system. Earlier on, Eurelectric (2004) had argued in 
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support of the quota system. This has caused much uproar among those Member 
States not operating the market based system. Other actors identified by Jacobsson et 
al (2009) include; the Director General (DG) Enterprise and Industry; DG 
Competition, and DG Environment. Also included in the list are the big power 
producers and associates e.g. the European Federation of Electricity Traders, “energy 
regulators both at the Commission and national levels which maintains a symbolic 
relationship to the conventional power sector” (Jacobsson et al 2009: 2146). 
 
Reasons outlined by these actors to support a quota system harmonised system 
include: (i) “harmonisation framework (combined with the possibility of trade in 
renewable electricity) facilitates effectiveness and cost efficiency in reaching targets 
at the EU level” (del Rio 2005:1240). Thus, it is assumed that meeting the EU targets 
on climate change and renewable energy electricity goals will be achieved with less 
spending and capital. Rather than having all Member States meet individual targets, 
there will just be a single target for the entire EU; (ii) harmonisation of renewables 
policy instrument is an easy way to open up the internal market, to allow the trading 
of green electricity between Member States and outside the EU thus, harmonisation 
would promote cross-border trade among Member States and lead to cost reductions 
for consumers and households (Jacobsson et al 2009); (iii) to enhance co-operation 
among Member States and coordinate national policies and effectively measure 
progress. There will be a clearer policy instrument that would help avoid the double 
counting of green electricity.  
 
However, Member States implementing policy instruments other than the quota 
system have consistently resisted harmonisation because they feel the quota system 
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has not yet been proved to be successful in the EU.  There has not been a system in 
the EU that has delivered a record level of installed wind capacity like the German 
FIT, therefore harmonisation based on the quota system would not be supported in 
Germany because Member States (UK, Italy, and Belgium) with the quota system 
have not achieved enough to convince other Member States that the quota system is 
as viable and dependable as the German FIT. Besides, some Member States 
especially the new ones, are in the process of creating an enduring market for 
renewables, while the older ones are making considerable progress in meeting the 
EU target and consolidating their efforts towards having a stable renewable energy 
market. There are a number of policy instruments just beginning to be effective and 
if the national government decides to change these systems completely, it could be 
disruptive for such markets. It might also be very risky for emerging markets like the 
UK, France, and Portugal etc.  This is also consistent with the findings of Elliot 
(2007), Toke (2006), and del Rio and Gual (2004), who argued that harmonisation is 
the main source of uncertainty for investors. The authors concluded that 
harmonisation of renewable policy instruments in Europe is unlikely.  
 
Furthermore, no individual Member State will want to give up its present policy 
instrument for another. This is because national governments do not want to be seen 
as incompetent in the design and implementation of a renewable energy policy 
instrument. Every national government wants to be proud of their commitment to 
deliver wind power through the choice of their policy instrument. Therefore, 
Harmonisation for now is viewed as a political issue. Political processes in Europe 
are always difficult to make and sometimes when decided upon may be impractical. 
For example a senior government officer of one of the Member States said that: 
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“Harmonisation is unlikely for two reasons (i) more of political 
reasons because if you look at the track record of harmonisation 
at all in Europe, it is very difficult process (ii) there is no system 
which is by all means more successful than other systems, so 
every system has got its own advantages and disadvantages, and 
I think the EU Commission has said something about that in 
2005 that when you compare all support schemes in Europe, 
there is no winner and no clear conclusion that one system is an 
ideal system because it also depends on the market structure 
that each member states operates.” (Interview undertaken: 28th 
September 2006) 
 
This implies that all Member States have its own interest in renewables agenda. As 
long as national interest prevails over common interests and over the sense of 
direction for the bigger EU Community, there will not be any harmonisation. It is also 
evident at the moment that the FIT has been more efficient in delivering wind power 
than the quota system, but it would not really make sense to introduce a harmonised 
FIT because “it is difficult to establish an adequate value for an EU-wide tariffs and 
there is the possibility of over-pricing, which creates windfall profits for producers 
and undue costs for consumers” (Muñoz et al 2007:3106). Similarly, the German 
renewable electricity market is different from that of other Member States. This is 
because the FIT offers long term investment security of all renewables generated, 
whether on a small or large scale basis. As a result renewable energy is broadly 
supported by a wide spectrum of stakeholders groups. Muñoz et al (2007) also 
identified three core elements of the FIT law, these include; (i) grid access and 
priority of renewable electricity; degressive tariff; and nation wide equalization62
                                                 
62 For further detail see Munoz et al (2007:3106-3107) 
. 
The FIT has also been able to bring about industrial development in Germany and as 
such the deployment of renewable energy sources has exceeded the EU target of 
developing a strong renewable energy industry. Not surprising then, that Germany 
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leads the way in the EU in terms of wind power turbine and component part 
manufacture. 
 
Evidence from the interviews also revealed that no one policy instrument suits all 
Member States, because each has different socio-cultural and natural resource 
endowment. Some of the Member States e.g. the UK have a strong cultural respect 
for landscape and nature conservation and believe that renewable energy, such as 
wind power is harmful to the environment and has great potential to significantly 
change the UK landscape. This is the reason why there has been much resistance to 
the deployment of wind power at local level, unlike Germany and The Netherlands 
where landowners and local co-operatives exist and in most cases the demand for 
wind power and other renewable energy is from the bottom (from the community) 
rather than the top down approach as is evident in the UK. Furthermore, there are 
many fundamental issues63
                                                 
63 Fundamental issues like the way the different market operates and the way 
the different countries market are structured. 
 which pose a strong threat to harmonisation. Each 
Member State has different natural resource potential, for example the UK is regarded 
as one of the windiest countries in Europe. Theoretically, it should be cheaper to 
generate wind power than other places in Europe where there is less wind but at the 
moment that is not the case. Similarly, Germany and Spain have a lot of sunshine that 
can be harnessed to generate electricity more efficiently than in the UK or else where. 
Nevertheless, solar PV in Germany is still far behind onshore wind power in terms of 
development and as such, more expensive to support than onshore wind. Thus, 
harmonisation based on one single policy instrument may discourage investment into 
renewables. The EU Commission offers no convincing reason to explain how a single 
policy instrument can ensure the stimulation and deployment of renewable energy 
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across its Member States. Therefore, it is reasonable to have different ambitious 
targets that are legally binding while still allowing individual Member States to 
develop schemes that best suit their geography and market system. 
 
In addition, there are two main policy instruments in the EU upon which 
harmonisation can be based: the FIT (Germany or Spain model) or quota system (UK 
model). Each of these has their merits and demerits64
“EURELECTRIC believes that market based system is a better 
way to ensure increased adoption of power plants based on 
renewables than feed-in systems or similar support schemes 
with fixed price elements. Certification of RES origin helps 
create demand for RES energy and can be developed into a 
certificate trading market system. Such a market-based 
approach, implying continuously correct price signals to all 
economic actors, is preferable as they minimise distortions to 
the markets.” 
. Although during the early days 
when the debate on harmonisation began, the quota system was the most favoured 
(Eurelectric 2004). Recently, the quota system has been criticised as being an 
expensive and ineffective model (Elliot 2007; Toke 2006; EU 2005a). Earlier on, 
Eurelectric (2004:5) argued in support of the quota system and concluded that:  
 
However in contrast, the UK renewables obligation, for example, has not provided 
enough evidence to show how, a quota system works better than the FIT in reality. 
This is also consistent with the EWEA (2005:18) recommendation that:  
“These mechanism must be given time to prove their 
effectiveness before a decision on a common harmonised 
mechanism is decided. More time and experience are therefore 
needed to make credible conclusions on the impacts of the full 
range of options.” 
 
                                                 
64 See for example: Fouquet and Johansson (2008); Finon (2007); Eurosolar 
2006. 
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To date it is not yet clear how the renewables obligation is going to meet the 10.4% 
target for the UK by 2010 hence, the adoption of TGC or quota based system may 
adversely affect targets if not designed properly.  
 
The FIT systems on the other hand seem to be working well and Member States using 
them are leading the way in terms of installed capacity for wind power, yet countries 
with other forms of policy instrument and market systems would not want to abandon 
their system for any other.  This is also consistent with del Rio and Gual (2004:232) 
findings that: “it is highly likely that some member states will strongly reject a 
common framework and even more likely if this was based on TGCs….a common 
support framework will be resisted not only by policy makers in certain member 
states but also by those benefiting from the current domestic support schemes (i.e. 
receiving generous feed-in tariffs”. For example the German FIT has been successful 
(Elliot 2007), and has many advantages65
 
 over the RO but the question is; can 
Member States like the UK abandon their present market based ideology for a fixed 
price system? The current application of a FIT model to support a renewables micro-
generation project in the UK and the RO banding will provide an answer to this in the 
near future.  
Furthermore, in Member States such as the UK, where local and community wind 
farm ownership is difficult due to the actions of the anti-wind lobby, it is unlikely that 
the FIT system will achieve much.  Equally, not all the FIT systems have worked 
successfully in all the Member States operating the FIT. For example the MEP in The 
Netherlands failed because it was not properly designed and implemented. Therefore, 
                                                 
65 Guaranteed prices; investment security; degressive tariffs that brings about 
fall in costs of renewables and also allows the growth of the domestic turbine 
and component part manufacturing industry. Etc. 
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it is not guaranteed that the implementation of the FIT system throughout the whole 
of the EU will bring about success.  
 
Therefore, an EU-wide harmonised policy instrument, for now, may ultimately inhibit 
the growth of the European wind power market. A harmonised system may bring 
further uncertainties to the hearts and minds of willing investors, thereby resulting in 
less investment into the European wind power market. When this happens Europe 
may also lose its position as the world leader in the wind power market. This is 
consistent with EWEA (2007a:2) position paper on harmonisation.   
“The EWEA believes that a hasty move toward a harmonised 
EU-wide payment mechanism for renewable electricity would 
put European leadership in wind power technology and other 
renewables at risk. Changes in frameworks always create 
uncertainty and have to be based on sound knowledge and well-
proven tools.” 
 
National histories demonstrates that Member States have different culture, 
stakeholder groups, political, and business practices that will influence policy 
instruments and the likelihood of any policy succeeding. Hence, a harmonised policy 
instrument may hinder the development of the progress made so far by every Member 
State in wind power. Member States are, at the moment, working on making 
individual policy instruments effective. Therefore an attempt to disrupt this process 
would be a major set back for the EU wind industry in particular. Given the fact that 
there is no single internal electricity market in Europe, harmonisation is pointless and 
lacks proper foundation. 
 
To summarise therefore, it is important that the EU does not disrupt the current 
Member States’ progress. Rather it should plan to promote renewable energy than its 
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harmonisation agenda, and the EU Commission should come up with effective ways 
to deal with the three other key issues identified in the directive 2001. One of which 
is to remove all the administrative barriers currently hindering any further 
deployment of wind power in each Member State. The EU Commission should also 
decide upon a binding legislation and directives that mandate Member States to 
expand their grid system (Swider et al 2008). 
 
9.6 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this Chapter shows that wind power has been promoted in three 
country cases, each of which having different policy instruments; as such, the 
performance outcome of the policy instruments differs significantly. One key reason 
for this is that the German feed-in tariff has demonstrated that with clear objectives 
and set targets, wind power can contribute significantly to the national electricity 
sector. In so doing, the FIT has been more stable and effective than other support 
schemes. Findings from the comparative analysis also demonstrate that the FIT has 
been able to go beyond the creation of a political market for wind power and has 
actually brought about industrial development, thus giving wind power deployment 
economic value. Although the RO and the MEP also contributed to the development 
of wind power in the UK and in The Netherlands, evidence from the analysis shows 
that these contributions have been limited because of market uncertainties and the 
lack of transparency in the support they offer wind power and other renewables. For 
example, the MEP’s path development shows that the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs dominates other stakeholder groups in the design and implementation of 
renewable energy policy instruments, as such, policy instruments introduced over the 
last two decades have failed in The Netherlands. Although, the RO, receives support 
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from stakeholder groups, it is flawed as it is, inflexible to necessary changes which 
would enable the UK to meet and exceed its renewable energy targets. In the past, the 
RO only supported the least expensive renewable technology option, it is still 
uncertain whether the current introduction of the RO banding will make a difference. 
A technology blind policy instrument, like the RO, defeats the main purpose of this 
market based mechanism, because the most developed renewable energy is promoted 
at the expense of the least developed. It is, therefore important, that the choice of 
policy instrument be such that promotes all renewable technology and allows 
competition. It should also create an enabling environment for technologies to evolve, 
and migrate from R&D to maturity. Nevertheless, as argued by Szarka (2007), it is 
difficult to have a policy instrument that meets all the necessary requirements for 
promoting renewable energy technologies, thus, it is important that Member States 
implement policy instruments that are compatible to their market and regulatory 
condition at any time.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is concerned with evaluating the performance of three wind power 
policy instruments, namely the feed-in tariff, the MEP, and the renewables 
obligation, specifically in the context of Directive 2001/77/EC, which called for the 
harmonisation of the EU wind power policy instruments.  Three EU Member States 
have been selected for detailed investigation: Germany, The Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom.  The rationale behind the selection is that these particular 
countries have adopted different approaches and policy instruments to the 
deployment of renewable energy, with varying levels of success (Agnolucci 2008, 
2007a, 2007b, 2006; do Valle Costa et al 2008; Toke 2007; Jacobsson and Lauber 
2006; Mitchell et al 2006; Ringel 2006; Sawin 2004; Dinica 2002; Grotz 2002; 
Reiche 2002). Based on the notion of path dependency of historical institutional 
theory, this study explored the historical emergence, the architect, and the outcome 
of the support and implementation of the policy instruments. These parameters were 
useful to explaining the performance of the policy instruments implemented in the 
three country cases investigated in this study.  
 
Finally, this Chapter highlights key findings, draws conclusions and offers policy 
recommendations that national governments could adopt to facilitate the delivery of 
wind capacity and further advances in the European wind power market. 
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10.2 SUMMARY OF AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
In conceiving this study, assumptions were made that there was a need to carry out 
research that evaluates the performance policy instruments in the Member States 
investigated. The purpose was to extend the current literature base and to increase 
both academic and practitioners’ understanding of the lessons learnt from the 
deployment of policy instruments across the EU. The main aim of this study is to 
contribute in addressing the challenges of wind power market expansion, by 
providing an empirical critique of the current policy instruments (i.e. the feed-in 
tariff, MEP, and renewables obligation) adopted in the three EU Member States 
investigated and to develop an integrative framework for evaluating the performance 
of wind power policy instruments, especially in light of the EU proposed 
harmonisation plans.  
 
Three objectives were pertinent in investigating the research problem. Namely:  
1. To critically examine the international and EU renewable energy policy 
drivers, and the role of wind power especially in the EU energy and climate 
change debate.  
2. To critically appraise the wind power industry structures and the role of 
stakeholder groups (e.g. NGOs and renewable energy consortiums) in the 
business environment in each Member State under investigation.   
3. To utilise the framework developed to critically compare and contrast the 
performance of the feed-in tariff and quota system. 
 
In order to address the research problem and deal extensively with the research 
questions associated with the performance of policy instruments, a qualitative 
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research approach was adopted. In-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with key policy makers and a wide range of stakeholder groups involved in the 
design and implementation of renewable energy policy instruments in the country 
cases.    
 
10.3 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNT 
This thesis found that the approach to wind power deployment in the three country 
cases varies significantly and this has affected the pattern of each country’s wind 
power policy instrument.  Due to the diversity of the wind power industry each 
Member States has experimented with different policy instruments and has achieved 
various levels of success. Undoubtedly wind power deployment is crucial to the EU 
and the national 2020 renewables target, however, this research has shown that it is 
not the experimentation of policy instruments that matters. What is important, is the 
operating environment and how precisely the policy instruments are designed and 
implemented. Thus, the success of wind power deployment does not depend solely 
on the particular policy instrument option adopted, but also on the political and 
regulatory environment and the stakeholder groups in the business environment of 
each Member State. For example, it emerged from the study that the feed-in tariff is 
the most effective instrument to-date in the EU, for promoting the deployment of 
wind power. Reasons found in this study to explain this resolved around the fact that 
the German FIT has successfully brought about a market take-off of wind power in 
Germany; and secondly it is designed such that the German renewable energy targets 
and objectives are achieved and surpassed.   
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The MEP, a form of feed-in tariff system implemented in The Netherlands between 
2003 and 2006, was very instrumental to the growth of wind installed capacity in The 
Netherlands, however, were it not for the design problems it would have lasted 
longer than it did. Nevertheless, the UK is on it way to see a historic impact of the 
feed-in tariff on small scale generating systems (REA 2009), future research will be 
useful in this area to critically examine the impact of the FIT in the UK when some 
experiences would have been gained. 
 
This research has also shown that a stable and flexible policy instrument is necessary 
for the national and EU wind power industry. A stable policy instrument would 
encourage stakeholders to make investments that could bring about industrial 
development. The researcher noted that the stability of the feed-in tariff has a 
positive effect on investment and growth of wind power in Germany. It emerged 
from the study that investors and developers are confident because the fixed prices 
bring about steady growth in the market. The FIT also witnessed various 
adjustments, especially through the introduction of degression, but their impact does 
not affect investors’ confidence. With these positive effects, the feed-in tariff has 
been able to link together economics, politics and technology to achieve industrial 
development. Thus, the objective of implementing a renewable energy policy 
instrument goes beyond meeting EU targets to bring about strong and healthy 
renewable energy manufacturing sector to the German nation. Analysis showed that 
the MEP and RO have not been able to achieve this. Though path dependency argues 
that choices made in the past influences subsequent choices, The Netherlands and 
UK can learn from the German experience by ensuring that wind power policy 
instruments are stable, and flexible to accommodate changes without hampering on 
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investors confidence. Rather than having to comply with EU and international 
obligations, renewable energy policy instruments should aim at economic and 
industrial development. 
 
This thesis also found that technology blind or neutral policy instruments can 
potentially promote the development of one renewable energy technology option at 
the expense of others. This research has shown that a technology blind policy 
instrument may not be successful in supporting renewable energy, as renewable 
energy technologies do not have an equal opportunity to compete and develop. For 
example until recently, before the introduction of banding, the UK renewables 
obligation has only been able to push onshore wind nearer to the market. One lesson 
that has been ignored is how the current banding would affect the development of 
other renewable energy technologies without changing the fundamental principles of 
the RO.  
 
On the other hand, technology differentiation avoids discrimination, thus, it gives all 
renewable energy technologies the opportunity to get support and compete in the 
market. It would also enable new technologies to be introduced, grow and mature to 
the point where they would be close to the market. This will see non-commercial 
renewables migrating from R&D support to commercial level, which in turn may 
lead to industry development. For example offshore wind and solar PV are gradually 
being supported at the moment by the German feed-in tariff and hopefully in the next 
few years they will be viable and appear on the list of developed renewables. Notably 
in the UK is the implementation of the FIT to support small scale renewable 
 277 
capacities however, it is too early to comment on the impact this will have on the UK 
renewable industry. 
 
Evidence from the research also showed that community ownership and involvement 
could significantly boost wind power acceptance and implementation at national 
level. Community involvement ensures that the local population enjoys the benefits 
of the development of renewable energy technologies in their environment and as 
such institutional conflicts between the community and other stakeholder groups can 
be minimised. Evidence from this research demonstrates that when conditions are 
favourable to the local communities, it increases the acceptance of renewable energy 
development, especially for technologies like onshore wind that involves 
construction and changes to the landscape.  
 
The country cases showed different patterns in this regard. The deployment of wind 
power in Germany started from the grassroots, and as such, local ownership and 
community involvement in wind power brought about a high rate of public 
acceptance and less opposition. The Netherlands had a similar experience with the 
implementation of the MEP, nevertheless, planning permits and the policy 
instrument decision making process still lies in the hands of very few, who exert 
authority and power to the disadvantage of wind power development. Analysis also 
showed that in The Netherlands stakeholders are neither well informed nor consulted 
about the potential benefits of investing into wind power. The feed-in tariff on the 
other hand has acted as a stimulus that drives community involvement in renewables. 
It offers minimum risk and investors are guaranteed a return on investment. Energy 
regulators and suppliers have little power, as they are mandated by law to accept, 
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pay, and feed all the energy generated into the grid. Though there have been some 
institutional conflicts as a result, the feed-in tariff has survived all criticism. 
Furthermore, investigation of the UK pattern showed that the presence of a well 
organised anti-wind lobby has robbed the UK of community ownerships, and 
therefore the benefits of implementing renewable energy technologies have a limited 
impact on the grassroots. The vulnerability and complexity of the RO also contribute 
to this problem. The RO has changed every single year, but its fundamental structure 
remains the same, leaving wind power development in the hands of big companies 
who have the means to withstand the market risks and uncertainties. Thanks to the 
recent plans to implement the feed-in tariff in order to get the local community 
involved in the renewable energy industry but the impact is yet to felt, may be until 
sometime in the future when there is enough evidence. 
 
One key lesson learnt in this research is that the involvement of various stakeholder 
groups in the design and implementation of wind power policy instruments 
demonstrates how far and how well it would perform. The process of interaction 
between policy makers and stakeholders reduces conflicts and makes policy goals 
and objectives clear to all concerned. Historically, the Dutch wind power policy 
instruments in the past have been characterised as uncertain because they are 
basically devised and designed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  Other 
stakeholder groups are only involved when the choice policy instrument has been 
concluded hence, they only lasted for a short period. Analysis showed that from the 
onset, the German feed-in tariff was given transparent targets and goals through 
consultations and the involvement of stakeholder groups. Research institutes and 
wind energy associations and institutions are involved in the research and fixing of 
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prices of the FIT. As such, the German feed-in tariff has been able to propel 
renewable energy industry development. Economic benefits have trickled down to 
the small local communities because for every one or two people employed by the 
wind turbine manufacturing industry more than four or five are indirectly employed. 
Stakeholders are also consulted in the UK renewables obligation but the inherent 
flaws in the design of a market based system has left the wind power industry in the 
hands of few big energy suppliers who exert control in the market. A key 
recommendation here is for both the Dutch and UK policy makers to create a balance 
in design and implementation of policy instruments.   
 
Concerning the harmonisation of EU renewable energy policy instruments which 
have received much attention in recent times (Soderholm 2008a; Elliot 2007; Lise et 
al 2007; Szarka 2007; Egenhofer and Jasen 2006; Held and Ragwitz 2006; Toke 
2006; de Vos 2005; del Rio 2005; del Rio and Gual 2004; Eurelectric 2004; Lauber 
2004), it was established in this research that harmonisation, based on a single policy 
instrument is not feasible and may, ultimately, inhibit the growth of the European 
wind power market. A harmonised system may cause uncertainties amongst willing 
investors, thereby causing a withdrawal of further investment in the wind power 
market. If this happens, Europe may also lose its position as the world leader in the 
wind power market. Evidence from this study indicates that each Member State is 
unique in its own right and consists of different market structures, culture, regulatory 
environment, and stakeholder groups, thus it is unlikely that what works well for the 
German market would work efficiently and effectively in other Member States. The 
factors that are responsible for the success or failure of Member States’ policy 
instruments are not identical. This reason alone makes harmonisation of the EU wind 
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power policy instruments undesirable and meaningless. Furthermore, the adoption of 
a quota system for this purpose would not be advantageous. Experiences have shown 
that the renewables obligation lacks security for investment in wind power, due to 
high risks and fluctuations in prices. The feed-in tariff, on the other hand, has been 
very successful because it guarantees investment security with minimum risks and 
market certainty. Nevertheless, a harmonised feed-in tariff is not feasible because it 
is difficult to establish an adequate value of tariff across the EU. One main 
disadvantage of the feed-in tariff is that it does not allow trade across the borders. As 
such, the adoption of the feed-in tariff would mean that Member State would 
compete with each other on the same platform. As mentioned earlier, because each 
Member States has different natural conditions of renewable energy, tariffs cannot be 
the same and customers would opt for cheaper electricity. This makes harmonisation 
based on the feed-in tariff challenging, regardless of its success. Besides, the success 
of wind power deployment does not only depend on the policy instrument option 
adopted, but also on the political and regulatory environment, industry structures, 
and stakeholder groups at play in the business environment in each Member State. 
Therefore, there is no one best policy option for EU harmonisation.  In general terms, 
the idea of harmonisation should, at the moment, be less important at EU level, 
instead Member States should be encouraged to implement flexible and less volatile 
policy instruments. 
 
Although there is no one best policy option for EU-wide harmonisation, there can be 
a best option at national level. For example, the German and Spanish feed-in models 
have been instrumental to the development of wind power in both countries and have 
led to the emergence of a strong manufacturing industry of wind turbines and its 
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component parts. Nevertheless, as argued by Szarka (2007:103) “no choice [policy 
instrument] can be right forever”, therefore, one key policy recommendation that 
can be made at this level is that national policy instruments adopted at any point in 
time should be flexible and adjustable to market conditions, without jeopardising 
investors’ confidence. The choice of policy instrument, at any particular time, should 
also be consistent in the medium and short-term to allow different renewable energy 
technologies to develop and advance, to the point where they can be competitive 
with a minimum level of support (See further summary of findings in Appendix 5). 
 
10.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study has contributed to the understanding of wind power policy instruments by 
developing an integrative framework for evaluating the performance of wind power 
policy instruments implemented in three EU member states namely: Germany, The 
Netherlands, and UK. The findings from the comparative analysis presented enabled 
this study to add value to the cross national comparison made about wind power 
delivery system in the EU. Initial findings demonstrate that policy instrument 
evaluation is complex and difficult to attain because of the theoretical representations 
made in the literature about wind power policy instruments. Therefore, going beyond 
theoretical analysis, this study further appraise the usefulness of the operations of the 
framework by applying it to evaluate the performance of two prominent policy 
instruments (the feed-in tariff and the renewables obligation). The framework was 
also used as a convenient tool for presenting the views of key wind power policy 
makers and stakeholder groups with vested interest in wind power. 
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The discussion and analysis on the performance of policy instruments in the 
literature has been based on theoretical experience. Evaluation criteria have largely 
been related to effectiveness and efficiency criteria. This study has extended the 
literature by providing a holistic and non biased framework used to present the views 
of policy makers and stakeholder groups thus, enhancing the understanding of the 
performance of wind power policy instruments. It has also demonstrated that the 
diversity of different approach to wind power delivery in the country cases 
investigated has affected the outcome of the implementation of policy instruments. 
The success of wind power deployment does not only depend on the policy 
instrument option adopted, but also on the political and regulatory environment, 
industry structures, and stakeholder groups at play in the business environment of the 
Member States. 
 
As noted in this study, there has been debate regarding harmonisation of the EU wind 
power policy instruments. This study demonstrates that the different culture and 
wind power market systems make harmonisation difficult. Besides, the notion of path 
dependency utilised in this study to explain the diversity of wind power in Member 
States also help to demonstrate that the choices made in the past influences the 
subsequent choices hence, the planned harmonisation would discourage investments 
into wind energy and further inhibit the future of wind power development in 
Europe. It could also disrupt the focus of Member States from their current efforts 
towards the 2020 and later targets. This is crucial if the EU wishes to retain its 
current position as the world leader of wind installed capacity and wind turbine 
manufacturing and component parts. 
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By employing a qualitative approach through semi-structured interview, this study 
has utilised the framework as a convenient tool to present the data collected from 
senior policy makers and practitioners of the wind power industry thereby providing 
a holistic explanation of wind power policy instruments in the country cases. Hence, 
this study’s contribution to knowledge can be summarised as follows: 
 This study has identified that the analysis presented in the literature about 
policy instruments evaluation and performance are based on theoretical 
evidence, and has therefore designed research to address these particularly by 
adding value to the cross national comparisons made about wind power 
delivery in the EU. 
 It has also developed an integrative framework and went further to appraise 
the usefulness of the operation of the framework by applying it to evaluate 
the performance of policy instruments. 
 The study also provides a means of presenting the views of senior policy 
makers and practitioners about policy instruments experiences hence, this 
study helps to bridge the gap between academics’ and practitioners’. 
 It has also expanded the debate on the proposed EU harmonisation agenda by 
using the notion of path dependency to explain the diversity of wind power 
industry of each Member States, and concluded that harmonisation will 
further inhibit the development of EU wind power industry. 
The research limitations and policy recommendations for policy makers and 
practitioner are set out in the following sections. 
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10.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
One of the key objectives of this thesis was to compare and contrast the performance 
of the feed-in tariff, MEP and the quota system, using the evaluation framework 
presented in Chapter Four. The analysis of this thesis was limited to the views of four 
stakeholder groups namely; the government (e.g. DTI, BMU), the Utilities (Nuon; 
RWE; EoN etc), renewable and wind energy associations (BWEA, NWEA, BWE 
etc), environmental NGOs and consultancy firms involved in the research and 
development of RES-E policies (e.g. Greenpeace, Ecofys etc.). A three-year period is 
too short a time to consider and include the views of other stakeholder groups, like 
the renewable energy sources funding financial institutions, insurance companies, 
project developers, local community schemes etc. Furthermore, undertaking a cross 
national research has significant cost implications. This thesis operated within a very 
tight budget thus, only fifty-five interviews were conducted at EU level and in the 
Member States investigated. In addition, because this thesis was a cross national 
study, the researcher had to deal with respondents with different cultures, language, 
and background. Some of the respondents speak German and Dutch as their first 
language and therefore, were not fluent in English. A number of the respondents in 
this group found it difficult to express themselves well and as a consequence the 
researcher had spend time to probing further, especially during the data collection 
stage. The evaluation framework utilised in this thesis was developed from first hand 
knowledge gained from the literature studied. Evidence from the research findings 
shows that it could be adopted as a tool for evaluating the performance of various 
policy instruments deployed to promote renewable energy in the EU and in other 
regions of the world. It is adequate and suitable for examining the views of the 
stakeholders investigated in this thesis. However, when applied in the examination of 
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other stakeholder groups’ views, which were not included in this thesis because of 
time limits, a few notes were considered relevant. First, when taking the views of the 
banks and insurance companies involved in financing and covering wind power 
investments, it is important to understand how they perceive policy instruments and 
why they lack confidence in any scheme. Compared to Germany (Enzensberger et al 
2003), wind power project finance in the UK is not easy to procure (Klessmann et al 
2008; Eltham et al 2008; Butler and Nuehoff 2008; Helm 2002a). Most of the UK’s 
wind power projects are owned by large corporations (the Big Six utilities), who 
finance wind power projects themselves. When they need to obtain loans from the 
bank, they have the collateral to prove their ability to repay. However, this is not the 
case for the smaller generators, because they do not have the means to convince the 
banks of their reliability, they find it difficult to survive. It is not surprising then, that 
small scale generators in the UK are not as common as in Germany.  Banks and 
insurance companies are principally affected by the level of risks they can bear for 
any type of renewable investment. They are always interested in being able to pass 
some level of investment risks on to other parties. Where this is not possible, they 
tend to avoid such an investment portfolio. So, it is necessary when evaluating the 
performance of policy instruments, from the banks and insurance companies’ point 
of view, to examine why they lack confidence in any policy instrument. A qualitative 
or quantitative analysis of this factor can be undertaken. 
 
Secondly, from the point of view of the transmission system operators (TSO), it is 
important that the ‘system balancing and intermittency’ factor be integrated into the 
framework. The transmission operators in Member States where the feed-in tariff is 
implemented are mandated to feed all renewables generated energy into the grid at 
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any time. Therefore, they always need to balance the supply and demand of 
electricity generated and if this is not well calculated, it may result in serious 
technical problems. Also, during intermittencies or when the wind is not blowing, 
how the policy instrument helps to balance up supply and demand and deals with the 
uncertainties arising from a shortage or an excess of generated capacity supplies is 
very important. A qualitative analysis approach can be undertaken to examine this 
factor. 
 
Thirdly, when taking the view of wind power project developers, it is important that 
planning and permission issues are integrated into the framework. Planning issues 
are often seen as a ‘problem’ in EU Member States. A qualitative or quantitative 
analysis of this factor can be undertaken. 
 
Overall, the research findings of this thesis provides enough evidence that the 
framework was very effective and appropriate for analysing the performance of the 
FIT, MEP, and the RO.  
 
10.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One key contribution of this thesis to the renewable energy literature is the attempt to 
provide a workable framework for evaluating the performance of two prominent wind 
power policy instruments; the feed-in tariff, and the quota system. Arising from the 
research findings, it can be concluded that the feed-in tariff, to-date, leads the way in 
terms of success rate in the delivery of wind installed capacity. The lack of clarity on 
the part of The Netherlands government has lead to wind power policy failures 
witnessed at present. Thus national governments, and wind power policy makers can 
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learn from the experiences of the outcomes of the evaluation of the performance of 
the German feed-in tariff by the design and implementation of a clear, flexible, and 
stable policy instruments that allow stakeholders to contribute without much conflict 
of interest.   
 
Hence, it is important to extend the lessons learnt to evaluate the policy instruments 
implemented in China, India, and the United States. These countries, in recent times, 
have emerged as world leaders in terms of wind power development. The 
implementation of the evaluation framework developed in this study will be very 
useful in assessing and analysing each country’s policy instrument. A comparison of 
the lessons learnt could be extended to emerging countries like Canada and Portugal.  
 
Furthermore, interest in renewable energy has also been shown in developing 
countries, especially Africa (CREN 2009). It would be reasonable to undertake 
further research work focussing on the development of wind power and other 
renewable energy technologies in Africa. There is need for research into the design 
and implementation of support for wind power in this region. A key aspect of the 
research should look into the establishment of the wind power industry with the help 
of consistent and valid support. It is important to ascertain whether experiences in 
Europe and other continents of the world can be applicable to Africa. 
 
Furthermore, financial institutions are important to the development of wind power in 
any continent of the world, as in most cases they finance wind power projects of 
various capacities. Since they hold the funds and decide whether investment into 
wind power in any location is viable or not, further research is needed to explore the 
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factors that inhibit the flow of finance from banks and investment houses to the 
renewables industry.   
  
Moreover, due to current and ongoing criticism against wind power generation 
capacity, there is the need for future research into how EU citizens can be educated 
on the benefits of investing into wind power and other renewables. This will offer 
additional ways of involving the general public in wind power investment and will 
also go beyond NIMBYism, weakening the activities of anti wind lobbying groups 
especially in some Member States like the UK, and The Netherlands, etc that are 
lagging behind in terms of wind installed capacity. In addition, there is a requirement 
for further research into the level of support and subsidy for the successful take-off of 
offshore wind, especially in countries like Germany and Denmark, which have 
reached their peak in terms of onshore installations. It has not yet been proved 
whether the feed-in tariff would work well with investment offshore because of the 
huge investment costs involved, neither has it yet been proved whether the current 
RO banding will be of any significant help. Therefore, research into the potential 
economic benefits and the appropriate support needed for offshore development is 
essential to boost investor confidence.  
 
10.7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The aim of this section is to conclude with a series of recommendations to address 
identified impediments in the use of existing policy instruments in the promotion of 
future wind power deployment. These recommendations follow the findings from the 
analysis presented in Chapters Six to Nine of this study.  
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1. The need for a flexible, predictable and transparent policy instrument. 
Evidence from the country analysis shows that wind power is a near market 
technology and needs stable and consistent support to enable it to compete 
effectively with other non renewables technology. For wind power to make a 
significant contribution to the electricity sector of EU Member States, it is 
required that the choice of policy instrument be predictable and enduring.  
This also follows that policy instruments should not be too rigid to 
accommodate any changes necessary for a balanced market and technology 
growth. Since no policy instrument is suitable forever (Szarka 2007), 
adjustments would be needed at any point to keep up with Member States’ 
regulatory and market demands. Albeit, such changes should enable the 
chosen policy instrument to meet set goals and objectives without affecting 
investors’ confidence. This is one of the main reasons why the German FIT is 
successful. The FIT is transparent, clear, and open to all stakeholder groups 
who are interested in ‘entry’ into and ‘exit’ from the industry. For example, 
the price of wind power, generated from windy and less windy sites differs 
and is clearly set out in the feed-in law. The law is also guaranteed for over 
10 years. Thus, it is very important that the policy instruments adopted by 
each Member State should be clearly defined and easily understood by all 
parties concerned. 
 
2. In order to avoid a ‘stop and go’ type of policy instrument, it is important that 
renewable energy stakeholder groups are involved in the design and 
implementation of policy instruments. The lack of engagement by policy 
makers with stakeholders could lead to policy failure and uncertainty in the 
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wind power industry. If this happens investors would rather diversify their 
energy portfolio to markets where they would be better informed about 
market conditions and the certainty of their investment. For example, the 
German wind power sector demonstrates how national governments can 
successfully engage all stakeholder groups in the design and implementation 
of policy instruments. Research institutes and renewable associations are 
involved in the calculations and fixing of the feed-in tariff prices for all types 
of renewable energy technology generated. Involvement with the right 
associations would reduce institutional conflicts and allow checks and 
balances in the market.  Also linked to this, is the idea that policy instruments 
should offer opportunities for small, medium, and large scale ownership. In 
addition, the engagement of the communities would reduce public resistance 
to the acceptance of renewable energy technologies.   
 
3. It is also important that Member States move away from creating a political 
market for wind power to adopting policy instruments that bring about 
economic benefits and industrial development. This can be achieved when 
national governments view wind power and other renewable energy 
technology sources as an opportunity for industrial development, as opposed 
to just meeting international obligations. Again, this explains why the 
German wind power industry has been very successful. Wind power 
deployment in Germany has gone beyond meeting international and regional 
obligations and has created an opportunity to develop a strong manufacturing 
base for wind turbines and component parts. Thus, policy instruments should 
be such that allow technology diversity and enable renewable energy 
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technologies to evolve and migrate from R&D support to a point where they 
can survive with minimal support. It requires policy instruments to be 
consistent, to the point where renewables technology can proceed through the 
learning curve to maturity. 
 
4. Public Enlightenment. National Governments should initiate education and 
awareness programmes that would influence its citizens. Thus, it is important 
that Member States focus on removing barriers currently inhibiting the 
development of wind power and other renewable resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
Ackermann, T., and Soder, L. (2000) ‘Wind energy technology and current status: a 
review’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 4(4), 315-374 
 
Ackermann, T., and Soder, L. (2002) ‘An overview of wind energy-status 2002’, 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 6(1-2), 67-128 
 
Ackermann, T., Andersson, G., Soder, L. (2001) ‘Overview of government and 
market driven programs for the promotion of renewable power generation’, 
Renewable Energy, 22 (1-3), 197-204 
 
Agnolucci, P., (2006) ‘The use of economic instruments in the German renewable 
electricity policy’, Energy Policy, 34(18), 3538-3548 
 
Agnolucci, P., (2007a) ‘Renewable electricity policies in the Netherlands’, 
Renewable Energy, 32(5), 865-883 
 
Agnolucci, P., (2007b) ‘The effect of financial constraints, technological progress 
and long-term contracts on tradable green certificates’, Energy Policy, 35(6), 3347-
3359 
 
Agnolucci, P., (2007c) ‘Wind electricity in Denmark: A survey of policies, their 
effectiveness and factors motivating their introduction’, Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 11(5), 951-963 
 
Agnolucci, P., (2008) ‘Factors influencing the likelihood of regulatory changes in 
renewable electricity policies’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 12(1), 
141-161 
 
Agterbosch, S, Vermeulen, W, Glasbergen, P. (2004) ‘Implementation of wind 
energy in the Netherlands: the importance of the social-institutional setting’, Energy 
Policy, 32(18), 2049-2066 
 
Agterbosch, S. (2006) Empowering wind power: on social and institutional 
conditions affecting the performance of entrepreneurs in the wind power supply 
market in the Netherlands. A PhD Thesis- Utrecht University, the Netherlands 
 
Agterbosch, S., Glasbergen, P., and Vermeulen, W.J.V., (2007) ‘Social barriers in 
wind power implementation in The Netherlands: Perceptions of wind power 
entrepreneurs and local civil servants of institutional and social conditions in 
realizing wind power projects’,  Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review, 11(6), 
1025-1055  
 
Agterbosch, S., Glasbergen, P., and Vermeulen, W.J.V., (2009) ‘The relative 
importance of social and institutional conditions in the planning of wind power 
projects’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Review, 13(2), 393-405 
 
Aitlam, D., Burton, N., Cuthill, I., Festing, M., Hutton, J.,  and Playle, L., (2006) 
‘Why do a pilot study?’, A Publication National Centre for the Replacement, 
 292
Refinement and Reduction of Animals in Research Working Group, United 
Kingdom. 
 
Alexander, E.R. (2005) ‘Institutional transformation and planning: from 
institutionalisation theory to institutional designs’, Planning Theory, 4(3), 209-223 
 
Alhaji, A.F. (2007) ‘What is energy security? Definition and concepts’, Middle East 
Economic Survey, L (45), 1-5 
 
Andersen, P.D., and Jensen, P.H. (2000) ‘Wind energy today and in the 21st century’, 
Journal of Global Energy Issues, 13(1-3), 145-158 
 
Anger, N. (2008) ‘Emissions trading beyond Europe: linking schemes in a post-kyoto 
world’, Energy Economics, 30(4), 2028-2049 
 
Aras, H., Erdogmus, S., Koc, E. (2004) ‘Multi-criteria selection for a wind 
observation station location using analytic hierarchy process’, Renewable Energy, 
29(8), 1383-1392 
 
Armenteros, F.M., and Lefevere, J. (2001) ‘European Court of Justice, 13 March 
2001, case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AktiengessellSchaft V. Schleswag 
AktiengessellSchaft’, Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law, 10(3), 344-347 
 
Asif, M. and Muneer T. (2007) ‘Energy supply, its demand and security issues for 
developed and emerging economies’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
11(7), 1388-1413  
 
Baban, S.M.J., Parry, T. (2001) ‘Developing and applying a GIS-assisted approach to 
locating wind farms in the UK’, Renewable Energy, 24 (1), 59-71 
 
Bansal, R.C., Bhatti, T.S., Kothari, D.P. (2002) ‘On some of the design aspects of 
wind energy conversion systems’, Energy Conversion and Management, 43(16), 
2175-2187 
 
Barbour, R., (2008) Introducing Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publications 
 
Bariball, K.L., and While, A. (1994) ‘Collecting data using semi-structured 
interview: a discussion paper’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 19, 328-335 
 
Bechberger, M., and Reiche, D. (2003) ‘RE in EU-28: Renewable energy policies in 
an enlarged European Union’, Refocus, September/ October, 30-34 
 
Bechberger, M., and Reiche, D. (2004) ‘Renewable energy policy in Germany: 
pioneering and exemplary regulations’, Energy for Sustainable Development, 8(1), 
47-57 
 
Berg, B.L., (2006) Qualitative Research Methods for Social Science. (6th Ed) Boston, 
Mass : Pearson Allyn and Bacon 
 
 293
Bevir, M., and Rhodes, R.A.W. (2002) Interpretive theory. In Marsh, D., and Stoker, 
G. (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science (2nd ed). New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 131-152 
Bielecki J. (2002) ‘Energy security: is the wolf at the door?’, The Quarterly Review 
of Economics and Finance, 42(2), 235-250 
 
Bilgili, M., Sahin, B., Kahraman, A. (2004) ‘Wind energy potential in Antakya and 
Iskenderun regions, Turkey’, Renewable Energy, 29(10), 1733-1745 
 
Blok, K. (2006) ‘Renewable energy policies in the European Union’, Energy Policy, 
34(3), 251-255 
 
Boswell, T., and Brown, C., (1999) ‘The scope of general theory: methods for 
linking deductive and inductive comparative history’, Sociological Methods and 
Research, 28(2), 154-185 
 
Bower, J., Bunn, D.W., and Wattendrup, C. (2001) ‘A model-based analysis of 
strategic consolidation in the German electricity industry’, Energy Policy, 29(12), 
987-1005 
 
Brandt, U.S., and Svendsen, G.T.(2006) ‘Climate change negotiations and first-
mover advantages: the case of the wind turbine industry’, Energy Policy, 34(10), 
1175-1184 
 
Brennand, P.T. (2004) ‘Renewable energy in the United Kingdom: policies and 
prospects’, Energy for Sustainable Development, 8(1), 82-92 
 
Breukers, S., (2006) Institutional Capacity Building for Wind Power, a Geographical 
Comparison. PhD. Thesis, University of Amsterdam 
 
Breukers, S., and Wolsink, M. (2007a) ‘Wind power implementation in changing 
insitutional landscapes: an international comparison’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 2737-
2750 
 
Breukers, S., and Wolsink, M., (2007b) ‘Wind energy policies in the Netherlands: 
institutional capacity-building for ecological modernization’, Environmental Politics, 
16(1), 92-112 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2008a. Russia and Ukraine gas row heat up. 
31/12/2008 [Online] Available from http://www.bbc.com [Assessed 18 July 2009] 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2008b. Oil could hit $200 within years. 
08/08/2008 [Online] Available from http://www.bbc.com [Assessed 18 August 2008] 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2009a. Russia short off gas to Ukraine. 
01/01/2009 [Online] Available from http://www.bbc.com [Assessed 18 July 2009] 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2009b. Ukraine warns EU of gas problems. 
03/01/2009 [Online] Available from http://www.bbc.com [Assessed 18 July 2009] 
 
 294
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 2009c. Pressure rising as gas supply falls. 
06/01/2009 [Online] Available from http://www.bbc.com [Assessed 18 July 2009] 
 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) 2004. UK Wind Industry Calls for Key 
Actions on Planning. BWEA Press Release 06/08/04 [Online] Available from 
http://www.bwea.com [Assessed 18 April 2006] 
 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) 2005. Power of the wind blows away 
myths. BWEA Press Release 14/11/05 [Online] Available from 
http://www.bwea.com [Assessed 7 March 2006] 
 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) 2006. The year of Renewable 
Revolution….a renewed breaking year for wind energy. BWEA Press Release 
21/02/06 [Online] Available from http://www.bwea.com [Assessed 28 December 
2006] 
 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) 2008. United Kingdom Wind Energy 
Database (UKWED): Consented Projects. [Online] Available from 
http://www.bwea.com [Assessed 21 October 2008] 
 
British Wind Energy Association (BWEA) 2009. Annual Reviews 2008. [Online] 
Available from http://www.bwea.com [Assessed 17 May 2009] 
 
BTM Consult ApS (2008) International Wind Energy Development: Wind Market 
Update 2007, Forcast 2008-2012. Press Release 27/03/08 [Online] Available from 
http://www.btm.dk  Ringkobing: Denmark [Accessed 15 October 2008]  
 
Brunekreeft, G., Neuhoff, K., and Newberry, D. (2005) ‘Electricity transmission: an 
overview of the current debate’, Utilities Policy, 13(2), 73-93 
 
Bryman, A., (2008) Social Research Methods (3rd Ed.). London: OUP 
 
Bryman, A., and Bell, E. (2004) Business Research Methods, (1st ed). London: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Bulmer, S.J. (1994) ‘The governance of the European Union: a new institutional 
approach’, Journal of Public Policy, 13(4), 351-380  
 
Bulmer, S.J. (1998) ‘New institutionalism and the governance of the single European 
market’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5(3), 365-386 
 
Busch, P., and Jorgen, H. (2005) ‘The international sources of policy convergence: 
explaining the spread of environmental policy innovations’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 12(5), 860-884 
 
Busgen, U. and Durrschmidt, W. (2009) ‘The expansion of electricity generation 
from renewable energies in Germany: a review based on Renewable Energy Sources 
Act progress report 2007 and the new German feed-in legislation’, Energy Policy, 
37(7), 2536-2545 
 
 295
Butler, L. and Neuhoff, K., (2004) ‘Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction 
mechanisms to support wind power development’, Cambridge Working Papers in 
Economics (CWPE 0503) 
 
Butler, L., and Nuhoff, K. (2008) ‘Comparison of feed-in tariff, quota and auction 
mechanisms to support wind power development’, Renewable Energy, 33(8), 1854-
1867 
 
Carbon Trust and LEK Consulting (2006) ‘Policy frameworks for renewables-
analysis on policy frameworks to drive future investment in near and long-term 
renewable power in the UK’, [Online] Available from 
http://www.cleanenergystates.org  [Assessed 17 July 2009] 
 
Carr, E.C.J. and Worth, A. (2001) ‘The use of the telephone interview for research’, 
Nursing Times Research, 6(1), 511-524 
 
Carter, S.M., and Little, M., (2007) ‘Justifying method, taking action: 
Epistomologies, methodologies, and methods in qualitative research’, Qualitative 
Health Research, 17(10), 1316-1328 
 
Cassidy, P. (2002) ‘Policing the environment: environmental and energy policy and 
its effect on the renewables sector’, Refocus, 3(3), 72-73 
 
Celik, A.N. (2003) ‘Assessing the suitability of wind speed probability distribution 
function based on wind power density’, Renewable Energy, 28(10), 1563-1574 
 
Christainsen, A.C. (2002) ‘New renewable energy development and the climate 
change issue: a case study of Norwegian politics’, Energy Policy, 30(3), 235-243 
 
Ciocirlan, C.E. (2009) ‘Analysing the relative strength of policy instruments to 
stimulate renewable energy markets: A comparative state analysis’, Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 11(4), 515-538 
 
Clont, J.G. (1992) ‘The concept of reliability as it pertains to data from qualitative 
studies’, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the South West Educational 
Research Association. Houston, TX 
 
Coenraads, R., and de Vos, R. (2004) ‘Europe sets the pace: an overview of 
Australia, Japan, USA and EU green power markets’, Refocus, 5(6), November-
December, 58-59 
 
Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K., (2000) Research Methods in Education (5th 
Ed.) London: Routledge 
 
Collingridge D.S. and Gantt E.E (2008) ‘The quality in qualitative research’, 
American Journal of Medical Quality, 23(5), 389-395 
 
Connelly, J., and Smith, G., (2003) Politics and the Environment: From Theory to 
Practice (2nd Ed) London: Routledge 
 
 296
Connor, P.M. (2003) ‘UK renewable energy policy: a review’, Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 7(1), 65-82 
 
Connor, P.M. (2005) The UK Renewables Obligation. In Lauber, V. (2005) 
Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century. London: 
Earthscan Publications, 159-186 
 
Connor, P.M., and Mitchell, C. (2004) ‘Renewable energy policy in the UK 1990-
2003’, Energy Policy, 32(17), 1935-1947 
 
Correlje, A., and van der Linde, C. (2006) ‘Energy supply security and geopolitics: a 
European Perspective’, Energy Policy, 34(5), 532-543 
 
Costantini, V., Gracceva, F., Markandya, A., and Vicini, G. (2007) ‘Security of 
energy supply: comparing scenarios from a European perspective’, Energy Policy, 
35(1), 210-226 
 
Council for Renewable Energy in Nigeria (2009) Development Bank to finance 
renewable power plants. [Online] Available from http://www.renewablenigeria.org 
[Assessed 15 September 2009] 
 
Cowell, R. (2007) ‘Wind power and ‘the planning problem’: the experience of 
Wales’, European Environment, 17(5), 291-306 
 
Cowell, R., and Strachan, P. (2007) ‘Managing wind power deployment in Europe’, 
European Environment, 17(5), 285-290 
 
Cresswell, J., and Miller, D. (2000) ‘Determining validity in qualitative inquiry’, 
Theory Into Practice, 39(3), 124-130 
 
de Alegria Mancisidor, I.M., de Basurto Uraga, P.D.,  de Alegria Mancisidor, I.M., 
and de Arbula Lopez, P.R. (2009) ‘European Union’s renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency policy review: the Spanish perspective’, Renewable and   
Sustainable Energy Review, 13(1), 100-114 
 
de Jager, D., and Rathmann, M. (2008) Policy instruments design to reduce financing 
costs in renewable energy technology projects. Publication of Ecofys by order: 
International Energy Agency-Renewable Energy Technology Deployment, Utrecht: 
The Netherlands 
 
de Oliveria, R.G., and Tolmasquim, M.T. (2004) ‘Regulatory performance analysis 
case study: Britian’s electricity industry’, Energy Policy, 32(11), 1261-1276 
 
de Vos, R., (2005) ‘Harmonizing RE: Towards a common RE support system for 
Europe’, Refocus, September/October, 58-59 
 
del Rio Gonzalez, P., and Hernandez, F.(2007) ‘How do energy and environmental 
policy goals and instruments affect electricity demand?’, a framework for the 
analysis’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 11(9), 2006-2031 
 
 297
del Rio, P. (2005) ‘A European-wide harmonised tradable green certificate scheme 
for renewable electricity: is it really beneficial?’ Energy Policy, 33(10), 1239-1250 
 
del Rio, P. and Gual, M. A. (2004) ‘The promotion of green electricity in Europe: 
present and future’, European Environment, 14(4), 219-234 
 
del Rio, P., and Gual, M.A. (2007) ‘An integrated assessment of the feed-in tariff 
system in Spain’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 994-1012 
 
Denzin N.K (1989) Research Act: A theoritical introduction to sociological methods. 
London: Prentice hall 
 
Denzin N.K and Lincoln Y.S (2003a) Collecting and Interpreting qualitative 
Materials. (2nd ed) London: Sage  
 
Denzin N.K and Lincoln Y.S (2003b) The Landscape of Qualitative Research: 
Theories and Issues (2nd ed)  London: Sage  
 
Denzin N.K and Lincoln Y.S. (2003c) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (2nd ed) 
London: Sage  
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2003) Our Energy Future: Creating a Low 
Carbon Economy, Energy White Paper. February, London: DTI 
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2004) Creating a Low Carbon Economy- 
First Annual Report on the Implementation of the Energy White Paper, April, 
London: DTI  
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2005) Energy White Paper: Commitment 
and Milestones Completed Between April 2004 and May 2005, July, London: DTI  
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2006) The Government Report on "the 
Energy Challenge”, July, London: DTI  
 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) (2007) Meeting the Energy Challenge: A 
Energy White Paper on Energy, May, London: DTI 
 
Devine, F. (2002) Qualitative methods. In Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (2002) Theory 
and Methods in Political Science (2nd ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 197-215 
 
Dias, R.A., Mattos, C.R., and Balestieri, J.A.P. (2004) ‘Energy education: breaking 
up the rational energy use barriers’, Energy Policy, 32(11), 1339-1347 
 
Diermeier, D., and Krehbiel, K., (2003) ‘Institutionalism as a methodology’, Journal 
of Theoretical Politics, 15(2), 123-144 
 
DiMaggio, P.J. (1988) Interest and agency in institutional theory. In: Zucker, L. 
(1988) (Ed) Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment. 
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 3-21 
 
 298
Dinica, V. (2006) ‘Support systems for the diffusion of renewable energy 
technologies—an investor perspective’, Energy Policy, 34(4), 461-480  
 
Dinica, V., (2002) Renewable Energy in the United Kingdom. In Reiche, D. (Ed.), 
2002 Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union: Case Studies of all 
Member States. Frankfurt/ Main, Peter Lang. 239-253 
 
Dinica, V., and Arentsen (2003) ‘Green certificate trading in the Netherlands in the 
prospects of the European electricity market’, Energy Policy, 31(7), 609-620  
 
Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 September 
2001, on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the 
internal electricity market. Official Journal of the European Communities, 
27/10/2001 
 
Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 April 2009, 
on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources and 
amending and subsequently repealing Directive 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC 
 
Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 
1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity, Official Journal 
L 027, 30/01/1997 page 0020-0029 
 
do Valle Costa, C., Rovere, La E., and Assmann D. (2008) ‘Technological 
innovation policies to promote renewable energies: lesson from the European 
experience for the Brazillian case’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 
12(1) 65-90 
 
Dominaco, F. (2007) ‘Concentration in the European electricity industry: the internal 
market as solution?’, Energy Policy, 35(10), 5064-5076 
 
Dowding, K. (1994) ‘The compatibility of behaviouralism, rational choice and new 
institutionalism’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6(1), 105-117 
 
Dunlop, J. (2004) ‘U.K. wind power: regulatory issues and the ROC price map’, The 
Journal of Alternative Investments, 7(2), 85-92 
 
Duranti, A. (2006) ‘The social ontology of intentions’, Discourse Studies, 8(1), 31-
40 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., and Lowe, A., (2002) Management Research: An 
Introduction (2nd ed). London: Sage 
 
Egenhofer, C. (2007) ‘The making of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: status, 
prospects and implications for business’, European Management Journal, 25(6), 453-
463 
 
Egenhofer, C., and Fujiwara, N. (2007) Shaping the Global Arena: Preparing the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme for the Post-2012 Period. Policy Conclusions and 
Recommendations of a CEPS Task Force Report No61, Brussels, March 
 299
 
Egenhofer, C., and Jansen, J.C. (2006) ‘A timetable for harmonisation of support 
schemes for renewable electricity’, European Review of Energy Markets, 1(2), 1-26 
 
Egenhofer, C., and Legge, T. (2001) Security of Energy Supply: A Question for 
Policy or the Markets?. A report of Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
Working Party, Brussels, November 
 
Egenhofer, C., and Legge, T. (2002) Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading in 
European-Conditions for Environmental Credibility and Economic Efficiency. A 
Report of the CEPS Task Force on Emissions Trading and the New EU Climate 
Change Policy, No. 43, Brussels, October 
 
Egenhofer, C., Gialoglou, K., Luciani, G., Boots, M., Scheepers, M., Costantini, V., 
Gracceva, F., Markandya, A., and Vicin, G. (2004) Market-based options for 
Security of Energy Supply. NOTA DI LAVORO 117. 2004, Brussels. 
 
Egenhofer, C., Urigoriev, L., Socor, V., and Riley, A. (2006) European Energy 
Security- What should it mean? What to do?. European Security Forum Working 
Paper No 23, Brussels, October 
 
Elliot, D. (2005a) Comparing Support for Renewable Energy Power. In Lauber, V. 
(2005) Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century. London: 
Earthscan Publications, 219-227  
 
Elliot, D. (2007) Supporting Renewables: Feed-in Tariffs and Quota/ Trading 
Systems. In: In: Elliot, D., (2007) Sustainable Energy: Opportunities and 
Limitations. London: Palgrave. 174-189 
 
Elliot, D., (2005b) ‘Feed-in or quota? Is REFIT better than RO?’, Refocus, 
November/December, 53-54 
 
Eltham, D.C., Harrison, G.P., and Allen, S.J. (2008) ‘Change in public attitudes 
towards a Cornish wind farm: implications for planning’, Energy Policy, 36(1), 23-
33 
 
Enzensberger, N, Wietschel, M., Rentz, O. (2002) ‘Policy instruments fostering wind 
energy projects - a multi-perspective evaluation approach’, Energy Policy, 30(9), 
793-801 
 
Enzensberger, N., Fichtner, W., and Rentz, O. (2003) ‘Financing renewable energy 
projects via closed-end funds- a German case study’, Renewable Energy, 28(13), 
2023-2036 
 
Eurelectric (2004) A Quantitative Assessment of Direct Support Schemes for 
Renewables. Working Group, Renewable and Distributed Generation. 2003-030-
0741, Belgium 
 
 300
European Communication (EC), 2005. European Union action against change: EU 
Emissions Trading- an open scheme promoting global innovation. 2007 Edition, 
Brussels 
 
European Communication (EC), 2007. European Union action against change: EU 
Emissions Trading-an open system promoting global innovation. 2007 Edition, 
Brussels, November 
European Communication (EC), 2008. European Union action against 
change:Leading global action to 2020 and beyond. 2008 Edition, Brussels. 
 
European Environment Agency (EEA) (2008) Technical Report 6/2008 “Annual 
European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1999-2006 and inventory report 
2008”, EEA, Copenhagen, June 
 
European Environment Agency (EEA) (2001) Technical Report 10/2001 “European 
Community and Member States greenhouse gas emission trends 1990-99”, EEA, 
Copenhagen, August 
 
European Renewable Energy Council (2004) Renewable Energy Policy Review: The 
Netherlands, Brussels: EREC 
 
European Union (EU), 1995. An Energy Policy for the European Union-White 
Paper; COM(95) 682 final, Brussels, December 
 
European Union (EU), 1996. Energy for the Future: Renewable Energy Sources of 
Energy-Green Paper for a Community Strategy. COM(96)576, final, Brussels, 
November 
 
European Union (EU), 2000a. Action Plan to improve Energy Efficiency in the 
European Community. COM (2000)247 final, Brussels, April 
 
European Union (EU), 2000b. Towards a European Strategy for the Security of 
Energy Supply, Green Paper, COM (2000)769, Final, Brussels, November 
 
European Union (EU) 2009. Commission decision of 30.06.09 establishing a 
template for National Renewable Energy Action Plan under Directive 2009/28/EC; 
COM (2009) 5174-1, Brussels, June 
 
European Union (EU), 2001. Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions on the implementation of the Community Strategy and Action Plan on 
Renewable Energy Sources (1998-2000). COM (2001)69 final, Brussels, February 
 
European Union (EU), 2005c. Energy Efficiency in the European Community-
Towards a Strategy for the Rational Use of Energy. COM(1998)246, final, Brussels, 
April 
 
European Union (EU), 2004. The Share of Renewable Energy in the EU; Country 
Profiles: Overview of Renewable Energy Sources in the Enlarged European Union; 
COM(2004) 366 final, Brussels, May 
 301
 
European Union (EU) 2008. A proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources; 
COM (2008) 19 Final, Brussels, January 
 
European Union (EU), 2005b. Energy Efficiency-or Doing more with less, 
COM(2005)265 final, Brussels, June 
 
European Union (EU), 2006c. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy, COM (2006)105, Final, Brussels, March 
 
European Union (EU), 2006b. Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the 
Potential. COM (2006)545 final, Brussels, October 
 
European Union (EU), 2007. An Energy Policy for Europe; COM(2007) 1 final, 
Brussels, October 
 
European Union (EU), 2008a. Europe’s Climate Change Opportunity. COM(2008)30 
final, Brussels, January 
 
European Union (EU), 2008b. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC. COM(2008)16 final, Brussels, 
January 
 
European Union (EU), 1997. Energy for the Future: Renewable source of energy- 
White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan; COM (97) 599 final, 
Brussels, November 
 
European Union (EU), 2002. Final Report on the Green Paper “Towards a European 
strategy for the security of energy supply”; COM(2002) 321 final, Brussels, June 
 
European Union (EU), 2006a. Renewable Energy Road Map; Renewable energies in 
the 21st century: building a more sustainable future; COM (2006) 848 final, Brussels, 
January 
 
European Union (EU), 2005a. The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy 
Sources. Communication from the Commission, COM(2005) 627 Finals, Brussels, 
December   
 
European Wind Energy Association (2006a) Response to the European 
Commission’s Green Paper: A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and 
Secure Energy (EWEA Position Paper) September 2006. [Online] 
http://www.ewea.org [Accessed 12 December 2006] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (2007a) Making 180 GW a Reality by 2020. 
EWEA Position on the future EU Legislation for Renewable Energy and its Impact 
on the Wind Industry. [Online] http://www.ewea.org  [Accessed 5 November 2007] 
 
 302
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2006b. Wind Power Installed Capacity 
in Europe by end of 2005 (Cumulative) [Online] Available from 
http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 20 April 2006] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2006c. Why Wind? [Online] 
Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 17 November 2006] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2007b. Wind Power Installed Capacity 
in Europe by end of 2006 (Cumulative) [Online] Available from 
http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 10 March 2007] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2008a. Delivering Energy and Climate 
Solutions. EWEA 2007 Annual Report, Brussels, March 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2008b. Wind Power Installed Capacity 
in Europe by end of 2007 (Cumulative) [Online] Available from 
http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 10 May 2008] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2009a. Wind Energy- the Fact, 
EWEA, Brussels, February [Online] Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 
17 May 2009] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2009b. Winning with European Wind: 
Creating Power, Helping the Environment. EWEA 2008 Annual Report, Brussels, 
June [Online] Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 17 May 2009] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2009c. The Economics of Wind 
Energy: A Report by EWEA, Brussels, March. [Online] Available from 
http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 17 May 2009] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2009d. 2008 Statistics: Wind now 
Leads EU Power Sector. [Online] Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 16 
July 2009] 
 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), 2010. Wind in Power: 2009 European 
Statistics. [Online] Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 15 March 2010] 
 
EuroSolar (2006) Five reasons for a feed-in tariff model, five reasons against quota 
systems. [Online] Available from http://www.eurosolar.org [Accessed 17 May 2009] 
 
Eurostat (EUR 2008a) Energy Consumption and Production- EU 27 energy 
dependence rate at 54% in 2006, energy consumption stable. News Release, 98/2008, 
Brussels, July 
 
Eurostat Pocket Books (EUR 2007) Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators. 
2007 Edition, European Commission, Luxembourg. 
 
Eurostat Pocket Books (EUR 2008b) Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators. 
2008 Edition, European Commission, Luxembourg. 
 
 303
Farinelli, U., Johansson, T.B., McCormick, K., Mundaca, L., Oikonomou, V., 
Ortenvik, M.P., and Santi, F. (2005) ‘“White and green”: comparison of market-
based instruments to promote energy efficiency’, Journal of Cleaner Production, 
13(10), 1015-1026 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) (2006a) Graphics and Tables on the Development of Renewable Energy 
Sources in Germany in 2005 May, Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(2007a) Renewable Energy Source Act Progress Report 2007 (Draft): Pursuant to 
Article 20 of the Act July, Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(2006b) Environmental Policy: Renewable Energy Sources in Figures- National and 
International Development May 2006, Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(2006c) Renewable Energies: Innovation for the Future April, Berlin: BMU  
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(2005) BMU Information paper on the VDEW proposed for a so-called “integrative 
model” for the support of renewable energies in the electricity sector. 27 October 
2005. Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 
(BMU) (2007b) What Electricity from Renewable Energies Costs. Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Natural Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
(2003) Report by the Federal Republic of Germany pursuant to Article 3 paragraph 3 
of Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001 on the promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources in the internal electricity market. Berlin: BMU 
 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Natural Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
2004a The Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources (Renewable 
Energy Sources Act) Berlin:BMU  
 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Natural Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) 
2004b The Act Revising the Legislation on Renewable Energy Sources in the 
Electricity Sector, (EEG) of July 2004, Berlin: BMU 
 
Ferguson, D. (2006) ‘No new EU solutions?: lobbying for renewables’, Refocus, 
7(3), May –June, 50-54 
 
Finon, D., and Perez, Y. (2007) ‘The social efficiency of instruments of promotion of 
renewable energies: a transaction-cost perspective’, Ecological Economics, 62(1), 
77-92 
 
 304
Finon, D. (2007) ‘Pros and cons of alternative policies aimed at promoting 
renewables’, European Investment Bank (EIB), 12(2), 110-133 
 
Finon, D., Johnsen, A.T., and Midttun, A. (2004) ‘Challenges when electricity 
markets face the investment phase’, Energy Policy, 32(12), 1355-1362 
 
Fischer, F. (1998) ‘Beyond empiricism: policy in post positivist perspective’, Policy 
Studies Journal, 26(1), 129-146 
 
Flick, U., (2006) An Introduction to Qualitative Research (3rd Ed) London: Sage 
Publication 
 
Fouquet, D. and Johansson, T.B. (2008) ‘European renewable energy policy at 
crossroads- focus on electricity support mechanisms’, Energy Policy, 36(11), 4079-
4093 
 
Fouquet D., Grotz, C., Sawin, J., and Vassilakos, N. (2005) Reflections on a possible 
unified financial support scheme for renewable energy systems (RES): A comparison 
of minimum-price and quota systems and an analysis of market conditions. Brussels 
and Washington DC: European Renewable Energies Federation and Worldwatch 
Institute. January 
 
Fouquet, D. (2006) Prices for Renewable Energies in Europe: Feed-in tariffs versus 
Quota Systems- a Comparison. European Renewable Energies Federation Report 
2006/2007, Brussels: EREF 
 
Fouquet, R. (1998) ‘The United Kingdom demand for renewable electricity in a 
liberalised market’, Energy Policy, 26(4), 281-293 
 
Foxon, T.J., and Pearson, P.J.G. (2007) ‘Towards improved policy processes for 
promoting innovation in renewable electricity technologies in the UK’, Energy 
Policy 35(3), 1539- 1550 
 
Foxon, T.J., Gross, R., Chase, A., Howes, J., Arnall, A., Anderson, D. (2005) ‘UK 
innovation systems for new and renewable energy technologies: drivers, barriers and 
system failures’, Energy Policy, 33(16), 2123-2137 
 
Franzosi R.P. (2004) Content Analysis. In: Hardy, M., and Bryman, A. (2004) 
Handbook of Data Analysis. London: Sage Publications. 547-565 
 
Fuchs, D.A., and Arentsen, M.J. (2002) ‘Green electricity in the market place: the 
policy challenge’, Energy Policy, 30(6), 525-538 
 
Fusaro, C. (2005) ‘What is green trading?’, Refocus, March/April, 62-63 
 
Gan, L., Eskeland, S.G., & Kolslius, H.H. (2006) ‘Green electricity market 
development: lessons from Europe and the US’, Energy Policy, 35(1), 144-155  
 
General Wind Energy Council (2006) Global Wind Energy Outlook 2006. [Online] 
Available from http://www.gwec.net [Assessed 20 October 2006] 
 305
 
General Wind Energy Council (2007) Global Wind 2006 Report. [Online] Available 
from http://www.gwec.net [Assessed 17 August 2007] 
 
General Wind Energy Council (2008) Global Wind 2007 Report. [Online] Available 
from http://www.gwec.net [Assessed 10 July 2008] 
 
German Energy Agency (2005) Planning of the Grid Integration of Wind Energy in 
Germany Onshore and Offshore up to the Year 2020. DENA Grid Study, Berlin: 
DENA, February  
 
Gipe, P. (2009) Brief summary of world wind energy stats 2008. [Online] Available 
from http://www.wind-works.org [Assessed 17 May 2009] 
 
Glaser, B.G., and Strauss, A., (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies 
for Qualitative Research. New York: Aldine Publishing Company 
 
Golafshani, N., (2003) ‘Understanding reliability and validity in qualitative 
research’, The Qualitative Report, 8(4), 597-607 
 
Green, J. and Thorogood, N., (2009) Qualitative Methods for Health Research (2nd 
Ed). London: Sage Publications 
 
Grotz, C. (2002) Renewable Energy in Germany. In Reiche, D. (Ed.), 2002 
Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union: Case Studies of all 
Member States. Frankfurt/ Main: Peter Lang. 107-121 
 
Grotz, C., and Bischof, R., (2005) Minimum Price System Compared with the Quota 
Model-which System is more Efficient?. Berlin: The German Wind Energy 
Association (BWE), 2005 
 
Grotz, C., and Fouquet, D., (2005) ‘Fixed prices works better: A comparison of 
renewable energy promotion gives thumps up to feed-in schemes and opposes 
premature EU harmonisation’, New Energy, 2, 18-21 
 
Gunzenhauser, M.G. (2006) ‘A moral epistemology of knowing subjects: theorizing 
a relational turn for qualitative research’, Qualitative Inquiry, 12(3), 621-647 
 
Gutermuth, P. (2000) ‘Regulatory and institutional measures by the state to enhance 
the deployment of renewable energies: German experiences’, Solar Energy, 69(3), 
205-213 
 
Gysen, J., Bruyninckx, H., and Bachus, K., (2006) ‘The modus narrandi: A 
methodology for evaluating effects of environmental policy’, Evaluation, 12(1), 95-
118 
 
Haas, R., Eichhammer, W., Huber, C., Langniss, O., Lorenzoni, A., Madlener, R., 
Menanteau, P., Morthorst, P-E., Martins, A., Oniszk, A., Schleich, J., Smith, A., 
Vass, Z., Verbruggen, A (2004) ‘How to promote renewable energy systems 
successfully and effectively’, Energy Policy, 32(6), 833-839 
 306
Hain, J.J., Ault, G.W., Galloway, S.J., Cruden, A., and McDonald, J.R. (2005) 
‘Additional renewable energy growth through small-scale community oriented energy 
policies’, Energy Policy, 33(9), 1199-1212 
 
Hall, P.A., and Taylor, R.C.R. (1996) ‘Political Science and the three new 
institutions’, Political Studies, XLIV, 936-957 
 
Hamilton, S., Whitehouse, R., Brown, K., Combes, P., Herring, E., and Thomas, 
M.S. (2006) ‘Phenomenology in practice: towards a p methodology for a ‘subjective’ 
approach’, European Journal of Archaelogy, 9(1), 31-71 
 
Harmelink, M., Voogt, M., & Cremer, C. (2006) ‘Analysing the effectiveness of 
renewable energy supporting policies in the European Union’, Energy Policy, 34(3), 
343-351 
 
Hasselbladh, H., and Kallinikos, J.(2000) ‘The project of rationalization: a critique 
and reappraisal of neo-institutionalism in organisation studies’, Organisation Studies, 
21(4), 697-720 
 
Hays, K. (2005) ‘European wind: offering growth amidst diverse market condition’, 
Refocus, March/April, 30-35 
 
Hedenus, F., Azar, C., and Johansson, D.J.A. (2010) ‘Energy security policies in EU-
25- the expected cost of oil supply disruption’, Energy Policy, 38(3), 1241-1250 
 
Heiskala, R. (2007) ‘Economy and society: from Parsons through Habermas to 
semiotic institutionalism’, Social Science Information, 46(2), 243-272 
 
Held, A., Ragwitz, M., and Haas, R. (2006) ‘On the success of policy strategies for 
the promotion of electricity from renewable energy sources in the EU’, Energy and 
Environment, 17(6), 849-868 
 
Held, A., and Ragwitz, M., (2006) ‘RE policy in Europe: The international feed-in 
cooperation –optimisation and better coordination of national policy instruments’, 
Refocus, November/ December, 42-47 
 
Helm, D. (2002a) ‘A critique of renewables policy in the UK’, Energy Policy, 30(3), 
185-188 
 
Helm, D. (2002b) ‘Energy policy: security of supply, sustainability and competition’, 
Energy Policy, 30(3), 173-184 
 
Hemmelskamp, J., (1998) Wind Energy Policy and their Impact on Innovation-An 
International Comparison. Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Institute 
for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), Seville, Spain. 
 
Hillebrand, B., Buttermann, H.G., Behringer, J.M., and Bleuel, M. (2006) ‘The 
expansion of renewable energies and employment effects in Germany’, Energy 
Policy, 34(18), 3484-3494 
 
 307
Hinshelwood, E. (2001) ‘Power to the people: community-led wind energy-obstacles 
and opportunities in a South Wales valley’, Community Development Journal, 36(2), 
95-110 
 
Hirschl, B. (2009) ‘International renewable energy policy-between marginalisation 
and initial approaches’, Energy Policy, 37 (11), 4407-4415 
 
Hirsch, P.M., and Lounsbury, M. (1997) ‘Ending the family quarrel; towards a 
reconciliation of “old” and “new” institutionalisms’, American Behavioural Scientist, 
40(4), 406-418 
 
Hoaran, P., and van Regemorter, D. (2004) ‘The costs and benefits of early action 
before Kyoto compliance’, Energy Policy, 32(13), 1477-1486 
 
Holhinen, H., and Tuhkanen, S. (2004) ‘The effect of wind power on CO2 abatement 
in the Nordic Countries’, Energy Policy, 32(14), 1639-1652 
 
Holt, A. (2010) ‘Using the telephone for narrative interviewing: a research note’, 
Qualitative Research, 10(1), 113-121 
 
Holzinger, K., and Knill, C. (2005) ‘Causes and Conditions of cross-national policy 
convergence’, Journal of European Public Policy, 12(5), 775-796 
 
Hollway, W., and Jefferson, T., (2000) Doing Qualitative Research Differently: Free 
Association, Narrative, and the Interview Method. London: Sage  
 
Howlett, M. (2000) ‘Beyond legalism? Policy ideas, implementation styles and 
emulation based on convergence in Canada and U.S.A’, Environmental Policy, 
20(3), 305-329 
 
Howlett, M. (1991) ‘Policy instruments, policy styles, and policy implementation: 
national approaches to theories of instrument choice’, Policy Studies Journal, 19(2), 
1-21 
 
Hseih, H., and Shannon, S.E., (2005) ‘Three approaches to qualitative content 
analysis’, Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), 1277-1288 
 
Huber, C., Ryan, L., O’Gallachoir, B., Resch, G., Polaski, K., and Bazilian, M. 
(2007) ‘Economic modelling of price support mechanisms for renewable energy: 
case study on Ireland’, Energy Policy, 35(2), 1172-1185 
 
Hughes, J.A., and Sharrock, W.W., (1997) The Philosophy of Social Research. 
Longman Social Research Series, London: Longman 
 
Hvelplund, F. (2001) ‘Political prices or political quantities? A comparison of 
renewable energy support systems’, New Energy, 5, pp18-23 
 
Hvelplund, F. (2005) Renewable Energy: Political Prices or Political Quantities? In 
Lauber (2005) Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century. 
London: Earthscan Publications, 228-245 
 308
Ibenholt, K. (2002) ‘Explaining learning curves for wind power’, Energy Policy, 
30(13), 1181-1189 
 
Immergut, E.M. (1998) ‘The theoretical core of the new institutionalism’, Politics 
and Society, 26(1), 5-34 
 
Ingram, P., and Silverman, B.S. (2002) ‘Introduction: the new institutionalism in 
strategic management’, Advances in Strategic Management, 19, 1-30 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2001). Towards a Sustainable Energy Future. 
Paris: OECD/IEA 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2004) World Energy Outlook, Paris: IEA 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2005) World Energy Outlook, Paris: IEA 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), (2007) Energy Policies of IEA Countries: A 
Standard Review of the Netherlands, Paris: IEA 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Policies of IEA Countries: The 
Netherlands. Paris: IEA/OECD 2004 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2000. July 
2001, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2001. July 
2002, Paris: IEA Wind  
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2002. July 
2003, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2003. July 
2004, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2004. July 
2005, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2005. July 
2006, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2006. July 
2007, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
International Energy Agency Wind Energy (IEA Wind) Annual Report 2008. July 
2009, Paris: IEA Wind 
 
Jacobsson S., and Lauber, V., (2006) ‘The politics of energy system transformation-
explaining the German diffusion of renewable energy technology’, Energy Policy, 
34(3), 256-276 
 
 309
Jacobsson, S., and Johnson, A. (2000) ‘The diffusion of renewable energy 
technology: an analytical framework and key issues for research’, Energy Policy, 
28(9), 625-640 
 
Jacobsson, S., and Johanson, A. (2009) ‘The diffusion of renewable energy 
technology: an analytical framework and key issues for research’, Energy Policy, 
37(3), 407-429 
 
Jacobsson, S., Bergek, A., Finon, D., Lauber, V., Mitchell, C., Toke, D., and 
Verbruggen, A. (2009) ‘EU renewable energy support policy: faith or fact?’, Energy 
Policy, 37(6), 2143-2149 
 
Jager-waldau, A. (2005) ‘EU renewables: energy end-use efficiency and electricity 
from biomass, wind and PV in the EU’, Refocus, March/April, 58-60 
 
Jager-waldau, A. and Ossenbrink, H. (2004) ‘Progress of electricity from biomass, 
wind and photovoltaics in the European Union’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 8(2), 157-182 
 
Jager-Waldau, A., Bertoldi, P., Huld, T., Kautto, N., Scholz, H., Dunlop, E., 
Machirant, A., and Suri, M. (2004) ‘Scientific Technical Reference System on 
Renewable Energy and Energy End-Use Efficiency’. Status Report 2004 
 
Jansen, C.J., and  Uyterlinde, M.A. (2004) ‘A fragmented market on the way to 
harmonisation? EU policy making on renewable energy promotion’, Energy for 
Sustainable Development, 8(1), 93-107 
 
Jansen, J.C. (2003) Policy support for renewable energy in the European Union: a 
review of the regulatory framework and suggestions for adjustment, ECN-C—03-
113, The Netherlands 
 
Jean-Baptiste, P., and Ducroux, R. (2003) ‘Energy policy and climate change’, 
Energy Policy, 31(2), 155-166 
 
Jepperson, R. (1991) Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In 
Powell, W.W., and DiMaggio, P.J. (1991) The New Institutionalism in 
Organisational Analysis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 143-163 
 
Jobert, A., Laborgne, P., and Mimler, S. (2007) ‘Local acceptance of wind energy: 
factors of success identified in French and German case studies’, Energy Policy, 
34(3), 256-276 
 
Johansson, B.T., and Turkenburg, W. (2004) ‘Policies for renewable energy in the 
European Union and its member states’, Energy for Sustainable Development, 8(2), 
5-24 
 
Junginger, M., Agterbosch, S., Faaij, A. & Turkenburg, W. (2004) ‘Renewable 
electricity in the Netherlands’, Energy Policy, 32(9), 1053-1073 
 
 310
Jurgenson, D.L., (1989) Participant Observation: a Methodology for Human Studies. 
London: Sage Publications 
 
Kamp, L.M. (2010) The development of wind power in The Netherlands and 
Denmark: the impact of different innovation strategies and policies. In Strachan, P., 
Lal, D., and Toke, D. (2010) Wind Power and Power Politics: International 
Perspective. Rutledge Studies in Science, Technology, and Society series. 
 
Kamp, L.M. (2007) ‘The importance of Learning processes in wind power 
development’, European Environment, 17(5), 334-346 
 
Kamp, L.M., Smits, E.H.M., Andriesse, C.D. (2004) ‘Notions on learning applied to 
wind turbine development in the Netherlands and Denmark’, Energy Policy, 32(14), 
1623-1637 
 
Kaplan, A. (1943) ‘Content analysis and theory of signs’, Philosophy of Science, 
1943 
 
Keijzers, G. (2002) ‘The evolution of Dutch environmental policy: the changing 
ecological arena from 1970-2000 and beyond’, Journal of Cleaner Production, 8(3), 
179-200 
 
Kellet, P., (2002) Policy Lessons for Successful RE Electricity Market Development. 
Renewable Energy Action (REACT), Altener 2002-157 
 
Kelly, G. (2007) ‘Renewable energy strategies in England, Australia and New 
Zealand’, Geoforum, 38(2), 326-338 
 
Kelly, N. (2006) ‘The roles of energy efficiency in reducing Scottish and UK CO2 
emissions’, Energy Policy, 34(18), 3505-3515 
 
Kirk, J. and Miller, M.L (1989) Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, 
London: Sage 
 
Kjaer, C., (2008) ‘Wind power’, European Union, Issue 16. [Online] Available from 
http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 17 July 2009] 
 
Kjaer, C. and Schafer, O. (2004) The Myth of Effective Competition in European 
Power Markets. Brussels: European Renewable Energy Council 
 
Klaassen, G., Miketa, A., Larsen, K., and Sundqvist, T. (2005) ‘The impact of R&D 
on innovation for wind energy in Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom’, 
Ecological Economics, 54(2-3), 227-240 
 
Klessmann, C., Nabe, C., and Burges, K. (2008) ‘Pros and cons of exposing 
renewables to electricity market risks- a comparison of the market integration 
approaches in Germany, Spain, and UK’, Energy Policy,  [online] Available from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com [Accessed 14 August 2008]  
 
 311
Klevas, V., Streimikiene, D., and Grikstaite, R. (2007) ‘Sustainable energy in Baltic 
States’, Energy Policy, 35(1), 76-90 
 
Klinski, S. (2005) The Renewable Energy Sources Act and The Internal Market: 
Compatibility of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) with the Current 
Provision of the Internal Electricity Market and the Freedom of Movement of Goods. 
Expert Opinion; Presented a part of the Federal Environment Ministry (BMU) 
project “Legal and administrative obstacles to increasing the use of renewable 
energies in Germany”. Berlin: BMU 
 
Kolev, A., and Rless, A. (2007) ‘Energy-revival of a burning matter’, European 
Investment Bank (EIB), 12(1), 10-29 
 
Koro-Ljungberg, M. (2008) ‘Validity and validation in the making in the context of 
qualitative research’, Qualitative Health Research, 18(7), 983-989 
 
Koster, M.J.M. (1998) ‘Organizing for competition: an economic analysis of 
electricity policy in the Netherlands’, Energy Policy, 26(9), 661-668 
 
Krohn, S., and Damborg, S. (1999) ‘On public attitudes towards wind power’, 
Renewable Energy, 16(1-4), 954-960 
 
Kruyt, B., van Vuuren, D.P., de Vries, H.J.M., and Groenenberg, H. (2009) 
‘Indicators for energy security’, Energy Policy, 37(6), 2166-2181 
 
Kwant, K.W. (2003) ‘Renewable energy in the Netherlands: policy and instruments’, 
Biomass and Bioenergy, 24 (4-5), 265-267 
 
Laird, F.N., and Stefes, C. (2009) ‘The diverging paths of German and United States 
policies for renewable energy: sources of difference’, Energy Policy, 37(7), 2619-
2629 
 
Lauber, V. (2001) The different concepts of promoting RES-Electricity and their 
political careers. Paper prepared for the Conference on the Human Dimensions of 
Global Environmental Change, Berlin, 7-8 December 2001. 
 
Lauber, V. (2002a) Renewable Energy at the EU level. In Reiche, D. (Ed.), 2002 
Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union: Case Studies of all 
Member States. Frankfurt/ Main: Peter Lang. 25-36 
 
Lauber, V. (2004): ‘REFIT and RPS: options for a harmonised community 
framework’, Energy Policy, 32(12), 1405-1414 
 
Lauber, V. (2005) Tradable Certificate Systems and Feed-in Tariff: Expectations 
Versus Performance. In Lauber (2005) Switching to Renewable Power: A 
Framework for the 21st Century.  London: Earthscan Publications, 203-216 
 
Lauber, V.(2002b) The different concepts of promoting res-electricity and their 
political careers. In: Frank Biermann, Rainer Brohm and Kalus Dingwerth, eds. 
2002. Proceedings of the 2001 Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of 
 312
Global Environmental Change “Global Environmental Change and the Nation State”. 
Potsdam:Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, 296-304 
 
Lauber, V., and Mez, L. (2006) ‘Renewable electricity policy in Germany, 1974 to 
2005’, Bulletin of Science Technology Society, 26(2), 105-120 
 
Lehr, U., Nitsch, J., Kratzat, M., Lutz, C., Edler, D. (2008) ‘Renewable energy and 
employment in Germany’, Energy Policy, 36(1), 108-117 
 
Lewis, J.K., and Wiser, R.H. (2007) ‘Fostering a renewable energy technology 
industry: An international comparison of wind industry policy support mechanisms’, 
Energy Policy, 35(3), 1844-1857 
 
Lin, A.C. (1998) ‘Bridging positivist and interpretivist approaches to qualitative 
methods’, Policy Studies Journal, 26(1), 162-180 
 
Lincoln, Y.S., and Guba, E.G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
 
Lipp, J. (2001a) ‘Policy consideration for a sprouting UK green electricity market’, 
Renewable energy, 24 (1), 31-44 
 
Lipp, J. (2001b) ‘Policy considerations for a sprouting UK green electricity market’, 
Renewable Energy, 24(1), 31-34 
 
Lipp, J. (2001c) ‘UK RE policy: more questions than answers?’, Refocus, 2(6) July-
August, 10-12 
 
Lipp, J. (2007) ‘Lessons for effective renewable electricity policy from Denmark, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom’, Energy Policy, 35(11), 5481-5495 
 
Lise, W., Timpe, C., Jansen, J.C., and ten Donkelaar, M. (2007) ‘Tracking electricity 
generation attributes in Europe’, Energy Policy, 35(11), 5855-5864 
 
Loiter, J.M., and Norberg-Bohm, V. (1999) ‘Technology policy and renewable 
energy: public roles in the development of new energy technologies’, Energy Policy, 
27(2), 85-97 
 
Lowndes, V. (1996) ‘Varieties of new institutionalism: a critical appraisal’, Public 
Administration, 17, 181-197 
 
Lowndes, V. (2002) Institutionalism. In Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (2002) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science (2nd ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 91-108 
 
Lund, P.D. (2009) ‘Effects of energy policies on industry expansion in renewable 
energy’, Energy Policy, 34 (1), 53-64 
 
Lund, P.D. (2007) ‘Effectiveness of policy measures in transforming the energy 
system’, Energy Policy, 35(1), 627-639 
 
 313
Ma, S. (2007) ‘Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The paradigmatic 
implications of historical institutionalism’, International Political Science Review, 
28(1) 57-78 
 
MacCullaich, F. (2001) ‘UK onshore wind: constraints and opportunities for wind 
farms in the UK’, Refocus, November/December, 30-33 
 
Mack, N., Woodsong, C., Macqueen, K.M., Guest, G., and Namey, E. (2005) 
Qualitative Research Methods: A data Collector’s Field Guide. Family Health 
International, North South Carolina: U.S.A 
 
Madlener, R., and Stagl, S. (2005) ‘Sustainibility-guided promotion of renewable 
electricity generation’, Ecological Economics, 53(2), 147-167 
 
Maffie, J., (1999) ‘Epistomology in the face of strong sociology of knowledge’, 
History of the Human Sciences, 12(4), 21-40 
 
March, J.G., and Oslen, J.P. (1984) ‘The new institutional factors in political life’, 
The American Political Science Review, 78(3) 734-749 
 
March, J.G., and Oslen, J.P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions: The Organisational 
Basis for Politics. New York: The Free Press 
 
March, J.G., and Oslen, J.P. (1996) ‘Institutional perspective on political 
institutions’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, 
9(3), 247-264 
 
March, J.G., and Oslen, J.P. (2005) ‘Elaborating the new institutionalism’, Working 
Paper No 11, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo 
 
Marsh, D., and Furlong, P. (2002) A skin not a sweater: ontology and epistemology 
in political science. In Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (2002) Theory and Methods in 
Political Science (2nd Ed). New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 17-41 
 
Martinez, M.G., Martin, E.P., and Garcia, J.O. (2007) ‘The current situation of wind 
energy in Spain’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 11(3), 467-481 
 
Martinot, E. (2001) ‘Renewable energy investment by the World Bank’, Energy 
Policy, 29(9), 689-699 
 
Mason, J. (2006) Qualitative Researching (2nd Ed) London: Sage Publication 
 
Mayer, S. (2008) ‘Path dependence and Commission activism in the evolution of the 
European Union’s external energy policy’, Journal of International Relations and 
Development, 11(3), 251-278 
 
Mckay, H. (2006) ‘Environmental, economic, social, and political drivers for 
increasing use of woodfuel as a renewable resource in Britain’, Biomass and Bio-
energy, 30(4), 308-315 
 
 314
Menanteau, P., Finon, D., Lamy, M. (2003) ‘Prices versus quantities: choosing 
policies for promoting the development of renewable energy’, Energy Policy, 31(8), 
799-812 
 
Mendonca, M. (2007) Feed-in tariffs: Accelerating the Deployment of Renewable 
Energy, London: Earthscan 
 
Menges, R. (2003) ‘Supporting renewable energy on liberalised markets: green 
electricity between additional and consumer sovereignty’, Energy Policy, 31(7), 583-
596 
 
Menz, F.C., and Vachon, S. (2006) ‘The effectiveness of different policy regimes for 
promoting wind power: experiences from the states’, Energy Policy, 34(14), 1786-
1796 
 
Metwally, H.M.B. (2000a) ‘Operation of new variable speed constant voltage wind 
frequency generator connected to the grid’, Energy Conversion and Management 
41(7), 701-712 
 
Metwally, H.M.B. (2000b) ‘New self-excited variance speed constant frequency 
generator for wind power systems’, Energy Conversion and Management, 41(13), 
1405-1417 
 
Meyer, N.I. (2003) ‘European schemes for promoting renewable in liberalised 
market,’ Energy Policy, 31(7), 665-676 
 
Michaelowa, A. (2003) ‘Germany- a pioneer on earthen feet?’, Climate Policy, 3(1), 
31-43 
 
Midttun, A., and Gautesen, K. (2007) ‘Feed in or certificates, competition or 
complementarity? Combinning a static efficiency and a dynamic innovation 
perspective on the greening of the energy industry’, Energy Policy, 35(3), 1419-1422 
 
Midttun, A., and Koefoed, A.L. (2003) ‘Greening of electricity in Europe: challenges 
and developments’, Energy Policy, 31(7), 677-687 
 
Mints, P. (2007) ‘Germany-model success?’, Refocus, May/June, 48-50 
 
Mitchell C., Bauknecht D, and. Connor P.M (2006) ‘Effectiveness through risk 
reduction: a comparison of the renewable obligation of England and Wales and the 
feed-in system in Germany’, Energy Policy, 34(3), 297-305 
 
Mitchell, C. (1995) ‘The renewables NFFO’, Energy Policy, 32(12), 1077-1091 
 
Mitchell, C. (2000a) ‘Neutral regulation- the vital ingredient for a sustainable energy 
future’, Energy and Environment, 2(4), 377-389 
 
Mitchell, C. (2000b) ‘The England and Wales Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation: History 
and Lessons’, Annual Review Energy Environment 25, 285-312 
 
 315
Moore, C, Ihle, J. (1999): ‘Renewable energy policy outside the United States’, 
Renewable Energy Policy Project, Issue Brief, October 1999, No. 14 
 
Morthorst, E.P., Jergensen, H.B., Chandler, H., and Kjaer, E. (2005) Support 
Schemes for Renewable Energy: A Comparative analysis of Payments mechanism in 
the EU- RE-Xpansion Project. A Report of the European Wind Energy Association 
(EWEA). Brussels: EWEA  
 
Morthorst, P.E. (2003a) ‘A green certificate market combined with a liberalised 
power market’, Energy Policy, 31(1), 1393-1402 
 
Morthorst, P.E. (2003b) ‘National environmental targets and international emission 
reduction instruments’, Energy Policy, 31(1), 73-83 
 
Mudler, M., ten Carte, A., and Zwart, G. (2007) ‘The economics of promoting 
security of energy supply’, European Investment Bank (EIB), 12(2), 38-61 
 
Muller, M., Sensfub, F., and Wietschel, M. (2007) ‘Simulation of current pricing 
tendencies in the German electricity market for private consumption’, Energy Policy, 
35(8), 4283-4294 
 
Muñoz, M., Oschmann, V., and Tàbara, D. (2007) ‘Harmonisation of renewable 
electricity feed-in laws in the European Union’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 3104-3114 
 
Nadai, A. (2007) “Planning”, “sitting” and the local acceptance of wind power: some 
lessons from the French case’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 2715-2726 
 
Neilsen, L., and Jeppesen, T. (2003) ‘Tradable Green Certificates in selected 
European countries-overview and assessment’, Energy Policy, 31(1), 3-14 
 
Neuhoff, K., and Newberry, D. (2005) ‘Evolution of electricity markets: Does 
sequencing matter?’, Utilities Policy, 13(2), 163-173 
 
Neuman, W.L. (2006) Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative 
Approaches, (6th Ed). Pearson International Edition, New York: Pearson 
 
Newberry, D. (2005) ‘Integrating electricity transmission systems’, Utilities Policy, 
13(2), 69-71 
 
Newberry, D. (2006) ‘Electricity liberalisation in Britain and the evolution of market 
design’, Electricity Market Reform, 109-143 
 
Newberry, D.M. (2002a) ‘Problems of liberalising the electricity industry’, European 
Economic Review, 46(4-5), 919-927 
 
Newberry, D.M. (2003) ‘Network capacity auctions: promise and problems’, Utilities 
Policy, 11(1), 27-32 
 
Newberry, D.M. (2004) ‘Regulation and competition policy: longer term 
boundaries’, Utilities Policy, 12(2), 93-95 
 316
Newbery, D. (2002b) ‘Regulatory challenges to European electricity liberalisation’, 
Swedish Economic Policy Review, 9, 9-43 
 
Nigel, G.G., (2001) Researching Social Life. (2nd ed). London: Sage 
 
Nilsson, M. (2006) ‘Red light for Green Paper: the EU policy on energy efficiency’, 
Energy Policy, 35(1), 540-547 
 
Nordhaus, W. (2007) ‘The Stern review on the economics of climate change’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, 45(3), 686-702 
 
Northumberland Gazette United Kingdom (2008) Wind Farm Inquiry Ends- with a 
Bang. News Release 03/12/2007 [Online] Available from 
http://www.northumberlandgazette.co.uk [Accessed 21 October 2008] 
 
O’Gallachoir, B.P.O., Chiorean, C.V., McKeogh, E.J. (2002) ‘Conflicts between 
electricity market liberalisation and wind energy policies’, Sustainable Energy 
Research Group, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University 
College Cork, Ireland 
 
Oberndorfer, U, and Rennings, K. (2007) ‘Costs and competitiveness effects of the 
European Union emissions trading scheme’, European Environment, 17(1), 1-17 
 
Odenberger, M., and Johnsson, F. (2007) ‘Achieving 60% CO2 reduction within the 
UK energy system- implication for electricity generation sector’, Energy Policy, 
35(4), 2433-2452 
 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 2008. The Renewables Obligation 
Buy-out Price and Mutualisation Ceiling. Monday January 28. [Online] Available 
from: http;//www.ofgem.com [Accessed 17 July  2009] 
 
Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) 2009. Renewables Obligation: 
Annual Report 2007-2008. [Online] Available from: http;//www.ofgem.com 
[Accessed 17 July  2009] 
 
Otitoju, A., Strachan, P., and Toke, D. (2010) Assessing the performance of the UK 
renewables obligation: cinderella or ugly sister? In Strachan, P., Lal, D., and Toke, 
D. (2010) Wind Power and Power Politics: International Perspective. Rutledge 
Studies in Science, Technology, and Society series. 
 
Parahoo, K., (2006) Nursing Research: Principles, Processes and Issues. (2nd ed). 
Basingstoke: Macmillan 
 
Parkhill, K. (2007) ‘Tension between Scottish National policies for onshore wind 
energy and local dissatisfaction-insights from regulation theory’, European 
Environment, 17(5), 307-320 
 
Patton, M.Q. (2002) Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (3rd ed.). CA: 
Sage Publications 
 
 317
Paulsson, F., Malmborg von, F. (2004) ‘Carbon dioxide emission trading, or not? an 
institutional analysis of company behaviour in Sweden’, Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 11(4), 211-221 
 
Perrels, A. (2003) ‘Reconciling competitiveness and environmental objectives’, 
Applied Energy, 76(1-3), 75-87 
 
Peterson, J. (1995) ‘Decision-making in the European Union: towards a framework 
for analysis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1), 69-93 
 
Pierson, C. (1991) Beyond the Welfare State?: The New Political Economy of 
Welfare (1st ed.) United States: Polity Press 
 
Polit, D.F., and Beck, C.T., (2009) Essentials of Nursing Research: Appraising 
Evidence for Nursing Practice (7th Ed.). China: Wolters Kluwer/ Lippincott Williams 
and Wilkins. 
 
Powell, W.W. (2007) ‘The new institutionalism’, The International Encyclopaedia of 
Organisation Studies, London: Sage 
 
Powell, W.W., and DiMaggio, P.J., (1991) The New Institutionalism in 
Organisational Analysis. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 
 
Prag, P. (2007) ‘Kyoto: UK not on target: policy and funding practices need attention 
for UK renewables to prosper fully’, Refocus, 8(1), January-February, 57-59 
 
Pryor, S.C., and Barthelmie, R.J. (2010) ‘Climate change impacts on wind energy: a 
review’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14(2010), 430-437 
 
Punch, K.F., (2005) Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches (2nd Ed.). London: Sage Publications 
 
Ranci, P.J., (2005) Renewable Energy Policy in Germany: An Overview and 
Assessment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Technical Report PNWD 3526 
 
Rathmann, M. (2007) ‘Do support systems for RES-E reduce EU-ETS-driven 
electricity prices?’, Energy Policy, 35(1), 342-349 
 
Read, M., and Marsh, D. (2002) Combining qualitative and quantitative methods. In 
Marsh, D., and Stoker, G. (2002) Theory and Methods in Political Science (2nd ed). 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 231-248 
 
Reeves, A., and Beck, F. (2003) ‘Wind energy for electric power’, Renewable 
Energy Policy Project, Issue Brief, July 2003 
 
Reiche, D. (2002a) Renewable Energy in the Netherlands. In Reiche, D. (Ed.), 2002 
Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union: Case Studies of all 
Member States. Frankfurt/ Main: Peter Lang. 183-195 
 
 318
Reiche, D. (2002c) Renewable Energies in the EU Member States in Comparison. In 
Reiche, D. (ed.), 2002 Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union: 
Case Studies of all Member States. Frankfurt/ Main: Peter Lang. 13-24 
 
Reiche, D. (ed.), (2002b). Handbook of Renewable Energies in the European Union. 
Case Studies of all Member States. Frankfurt/ Main: Peter Lang. 
 
Reiche, D., and Bechberger, M. (2004) ‘Policy difference in the promotion of 
renewable energies in the EU’, Energy Policy, 32(7), 843-849 
 
Reijnders, L. (2002) ‘Imports as a major complication: liberalisation of the green 
electricity market in the Netherlands’, Energy Policy, 30(9), 723-726 
 
Remenyi D, Williams B, Money A, and Swartz E. (1998) Doing research in business 
and Management, an introduction to process and methods. London: Sage  
 
Richard, L., (2005) Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide. London: Sage 
Publications 
 
Ringel, M. (2003) ‘Liberalising European electricity markets: opportunities and risks 
for a sustainable power sector’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 7(6) 
485-499 
 
Ringel, M. (2006) ‘Fostering the use of renewable energies in the European Union: 
the race between feed-in tariffs and green certificates’, Renewable Energy, 31(1), 1-
17 
 
Ritchie, J., and Lewis, J., (2003) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social 
Science Students and Researchers. London: Sage 
 
Robson, C., (1993) Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and 
Practitioners-Researchers. London:  Blackwell 
 
Robson, C., (2002) Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and 
Practitioners-Researchers. (2nd ed.) London:  Blackwell 
 
Rowlands, H.I. (2005) ‘The European directive on renewable electricity: conflicts 
and compromises’, Energy Policy, 33(8), 965-974 
 
Rowlands, H.I. (2005) Global Climate Change and Renewable Energy: Exploring the 
Links. In Lauber (2005) Switching to Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st 
Century. London: Earthscan Publications, 62-82  
 
Sahin A.D. (2004) ‘Progress and recent trends in wind energy’, Progress in Energy 
and Combustion Science, 30, 501-543 
 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P., and Thornhill, A., (2007) Research Methods for Business 
Students (4th ed.) Harlow: Financial Times Prentice Hall 
 
 319
Sawin, J. (2004) ‘National policy instruments- policy lessons for the advancement 
and diffusion of renewable energy technologies around the world’, International 
Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn, June 1-4 
 
Sayigh, A. (1999) ‘Renewable energy- the way forward’, Applied Energy, 64(1-4), 
15-30 
 
Scharpf, F.W. (2000) ‘Institutions in comparative policy research’, Comparative 
Political Studies, 33(6/7), 762-790 
 
Schenk, N.J., Moll, H.C., Potting, J., and Benders, R.M.J. (2007) ‘Wind energy 
electricity and hydrogen in the Netherlands’, Energy Policy, 32(10), 1960-1971 
 
Schienstock, G. (2007) ‘From path dependency to path creation: Finland on its way 
to the knowledge-based economy’, Current Sociology, 55(1), 92-109 
 
Schorer, T. (2007) ‘Repowering of wind turbines under the aspects of nature 
conservation and regional planning’, German Wind Energy Institute (DEWI) 
Magazine, 30, February  
 
Scottish Executive (2000), Scottish climate change programme: Summary. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive  
 
Scottish Executive (2009), Renewables action plan. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive  
 
Scottish Renewables Economic Impact Report (2007). Published by Scottish 
Renewables, Glasgow: United Kingdom 
 
Seale C. (2002) ‘Quality issues in qualitative inquiry’, Qualitative Social Work, 1(1), 
97-110 
 
Seale, C.F. (1999) ‘Quality issues in qualitative research’, Quality Inquiry, 5(4), 465-
478 
 
Shui- Fai, W.  (2005) ‘Obliging institutions and industry evolution: a comparative 
study of the German and UK wind energy industry’, Industry and Innovation, 12 (1), 
117-145 
 
Sijm, J.P.M. (2002) The performance of feed-in tariff to promote renewable 
electricity in European countries, ECN-C- -02-083. A publication of the Energy 
Research Centre, Petten, the Netherlands 
 
Silverman, D. (2006a) Doing Qualitative Research (2nd ed) London: Sage 
 
Silverman, D. (2006b) Interpreting Qualitative Data (3rd ed) London: Sage  
 
Sims, R.E.H. (2004) ‘Renewable energy: a response to climate change’, Solar 
Energy, 76(1-3), 9-17 
 
 320
Slingerland, S. (2003) ‘Energy conservation and electricity sector liberalisation in the 
Netherlands and the UK: case studies on the development of cogeneration of heat 
and power, wind energy and demand-side management as energy conservation 
options’, International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 19(1), 95-114 
 
Smith, A., and Watson, J. (2002) ‘The Renewable Obligation: can it deliver?’, 
Tyndall Briefing Note No. 4, April 2002 
 
Soderholm, P. (2008a) ‘The political economy of international green certificate 
markets’, Energy Policy, 36(3), 2051-2062 
 
Soderholm, P. (2008b) ‘Harmonisation of renewable electricity feed-in laws: A 
comment’, Energy Policy, 36(3), 946-953 
 
Spanjer, A. (2007) ‘Russian gas price reform and the EU-Russia gas relationship: 
incentives, consequences and European security of supply’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 
2889-2898 
 
Steinmo, S. (2001) The new institutionalism. In: Clark B., and Foweraker, J. (2001) 
The Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought, London: Routlege 
 
Stenbacka, C., (2001) ‘Qualitative research requires quality concepts of its own’, 
Management Decision, 39(7), 551-555 
 
Stenzel T, Foxon T., and Gross R. (2003) Review of Renewable Energy Development 
in Europe and the US: A Report for DTI Renewable Innovation Review. London: 
Imperial College London Centre for Energy Policy and Technology  
 
Stephens, N. (2007) ‘Collecting data from elites and ultra elites: telephone and face-
to-face interviews with macroeconomists’, Qualitative Research, 7(2), 203-216 
 
Stern, N. (2006a) ‘What is the Economics of Climate Change?’, World Economics, 
7(2), 1-10 
 
Stern, N. (2006b) ‘The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press UK 
 
Strachan, P.A, David, L., and von Malmborg, F. (2006) ‘The evolving UK wind 
energy industry: critical policy and management aspects of the energy research 
agenda’, European Environment, 16 (1), 1-18 
 
Strachan, P.A., Lal, D. (2004) ‘Wind energy policy, planning and management 
practice in the UK: hot air or gathering storm?’, Regional Studies, 38(5), 551-571 
 
Streimikiene, D., and Klevas, V. (2007) ‘Promotion of renewable energy in Baltic 
States’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 11(4), 672-687 
 
Streimikiene, D., and Mikalauskiene, A. (2007) ‘Application of flexible Kyoto 
mechanism for renewable energy projects in Baltic States’, Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Review, 11(5), 753-775 
 321
 
Sturges, J.E. and Hanrahan, K.J. (2004) ‘Comparing telephone and face-to-face 
qualitative interviewing: a research note’, Qualitative Research, 4(1), 107-118 
 
Swider, D.J., Beurskens, L., Davidson, S., Twidell, J., Pyrko, J., Pruggler, W., Auer, 
H., Vertin, K., and Skema, R. (2008) ‘Conditions and costs for renewable electricity 
grid connection; examples in Europe’, Renewable Energy, 33(8), 1832-1842 
 
Szarka, J. (2004) ‘Wind power, discourse coalitions and climate change: breaking the 
stalemate?’ European Environment, 14(6), 317-330 
 
Szarka, J. (2006) ‘Wind power, policy learning and paradigm change’, Energy 
Policy, 34(17), 3041-3048 
 
Szarka, J. (2007) Wind Power in Europe: Politics, Business and Society. Energy, 
Climate and the Environment Series, London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Szarka, J. and Bluhdorn, I., (2006) ‘Wind power in Britain and Germany: explaining 
contrasting development paths. Anglo- German Foundation for the Study of Industry 
Society 
 
Tapia, A., Tapia, G., andOstolaza, J.X. (2004) ‘Reactive power control of wind farms 
for voltage control applications’, Renewable Energy, 29(3), 377-392 
 
Tews, K., Busch, P., and Jorgens, H. (2003) ‘The diffusion of new environmental 
policy instruments’, European Journal of Political Research, 42(4), 569-600 
 
Thelen, K. (1999) ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’, Annual 
Review of Political Science, 2, 369-404 
 
Thelen, K. (2002) How institutions evolve: insight from comparative historical 
analysis. In Mohoney, J., and Rueschemeyer, D. (2002) Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 208-240 
 
Toke, D. (2002) ‘Wind power in UK and Denmark: can rational choice help explain 
different outcomes?’, Environmental Politics, 11(4), 83 -100 
 
Toke, D. (2005) ‘Explaining wind power planning outcomes: some findings from a 
study in England and Wales’, Energy Policy, 33(12), 1527-1539 
 
Toke, D. (2006) ‘Are green electricity the way forward for renewable energy? An 
evaluation of the UK’s Renewable Obligation in the context of international 
comparisons’ Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 23(3), 361-374  
 
Toke, D. (2007a) ‘Renewable financial support systems and cost-effectiveness’, 
Journal of Cleaner Production, 15(3), 280-287 
 
Toke, D. (2007b) Supporting Renewables: Local Ownership, Wind Power and 
Sustainable Finance. In: Elliot, D., (2007) Sustainable Energy: Opportunities and 
Limitations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 155-173 
 322
 
Toke, D., and Lauber, V. (2007) ‘Anglo-Saxon and German approaches to 
neoliberalism and environmental policy: the case of financing renewable energy’, 
Geoforum, 38(4), 677-687 
 
Toke, D., Breukers, S., and Wolsink, M. (2008) ‘Wind power deployment outcomes: 
how can we account for the difference?’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 12(4), 1129-1147 
 
Toke, D. and Marsh, D. (2006) ‘Will planners tilt towards windmills?’, Report of 
Sustainable Technologies Programme Research Project into planning and financial 
issues surrounding wind power, Economic and Social Research Council, London. 
 
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), International Energy Agency 
(IEA) 2002. Reforming energy subsidies, United Nations Publication, Oxford. 
 
Vachon, S., and Menz, F.C. (2006) ‘The role of social, political, and economic 
interests in promoting state green electricity policies’, Environmental Science and 
Policy, 9(7-8), 652-662 
 
van Asselt, H., and Biermann, F., (2007) ‘European emissions trading and the 
international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries: a legal and political 
evaluation of possible supporting measures’, Energy Policy, 32(13), 1477-1486 
 
van der Linden, N.H., Uyterlinde, M.A., Vrolijk, C., Nilsson, L.J., Khan, J., Astrand, 
K., Ericsson, K., and Wiser, R. (2005) Review of International experience with 
Renewable Energy Obligation support mechanisms, ECN-C--05-025, The 
Netherlands 
 
van Dijk, A.L., Beuskens, L.W.M., Boots, M.G., Kaal, M.B.T., de Lange, T.J., van 
Sambeek, E.J.W., and Uyterlinde, M.A. (2003) Renewable Energy Policies and 
Market Development, ECN-C--30-029, The Netherlands 
 
van Rooijen, S.N.M., and van Wees, T.M. (2006) ‘Green electricity policies in the 
Netherlands: an analysis of policy decisions’, Energy Policy, 34(1), 60-71 
 
van Sambeek, E.J.W., and van Thuijl, E. (2003) ‘The Dutch renewable electricity 
market in 2003: an overview and evaluation of current changes in renewable 
electricity policy in the Netherlands, ECN-C—03-037 
 
Vehmas, J., and Luukkanen, J. (2003) ‘Renewable energies in the European Union 
and Turkey’, Paper presented at EUROPA Bridges of Knowledge “Energy Policy of 
the EU and Implications for Turkey”, Conference/Workshop 19 September 2003 
 
Verbruggen, A. (2009) ‘Performance evaluation of renewable energy support 
policies, applied on Flanders’ tradable certificates system’, Energy Policy, 37(4), 
1385-1394 
 
Veza, J., Penate, B., and Castellano, F. (2004) ‘Electrodialysis desalination designed 
for off-grid wind energy’, Desalination, 160(3), 211-221 
 323
Walker, G., and Devine-Wright, P. (2008) ‘Community renewables: what should it 
mean’, Energy Policy, 36(2), 497-500 
 
Weisser, H. (2007) ‘The security of gas supply- a critical issue for Europe?’, Energy 
Policy, 35(1), 1-5 
 
Wiser, R., and Bolinger, M. (2007) ‘Can deployment of renewable energy put 
downward pressure on natural gas prices?’, Energy Policy, 35(1), 295-306 
 
Wiser, R., Hamrin, J., and Wingate, M. (2002) Renewable Energy Policy Option for 
China: A comparison of Renewable Portfolio Standards, Feed-in Tariffs, and 
Tendering Policies.  A Report of the Centre for Renewable Energy Solutions, 
Chicago: USA 
 
Wiser, R.H. (2000) ‘The role of public policy in emerging green power markets: an 
analysis of marketer preferences’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 4(2) 
177-212 
 
Wohlgemuth, N., and Missfeldt, F. (2000) ‘The Kyoto mechanism and prospects for 
renewable energy technologies’, Solar Energy, 64(4), 305-314 
 
Wolfe, P. (2004) ‘The future for UK renewables’, Utilities Policy, 12(1), 5-7 
 
Wolsink, M. (1996) ‘Dutch wind power policy: stagnating implementation of 
renewables’, Energy Policy, 24(12), 1079-1088 
 
Wolsink, M. (2000) ‘Wind power and the NIMBY- myth: institutional capacity and 
the limited significance of public support’, Renewable Energy, 21(1), 49-64 
 
Wolsink, M. (2007a) ‘Planning of renewables schemes: deliberative and fair 
decision-making on landscape issues instead of reproachful accusation of non-
cooperation’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 2691-2704 
 
Wolsink, M. (2007b) ‘Wind power implementation: the nature of public attitudes: 
equity and fairness instead of backyard motives’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, 11(6), 1186-1207 
 
World Wind Energy Association (WWEA) 2006. Worldwide Wind Energy boom in 
2005- 58982 MW Capacity Installed [Online] Available from http://www.wwea.org 
[Assessed 7 May 2006] 
 
World Wind Energy Association (WWEA) 2007. New World Record in Wind Power 
Capacity: 14.9 GW added in 2006- Worldwide Capacity at 73.9 GW. WWEA Press 
Release [Online] Available from http://www.wwea.org [Assessed 5 May 2007] 
 
World Wind Energy Association (WWEA) 2008. World Turbine Generate more than 
1% of the Global Electricity- Worldwide Capacity at 93.8 GW- 19.7 GW added in 
2007. [Online] Available from http://www.wwea.org [Assessed 18 August 2008] 
 
 324
World Wind Energy Association (WWEA) 2009.  World Wind Energy Report 2008. 
[Online] Available from http://www.wwea.org [Assessed 16 July, 2009] 
 
Word Wind Energy Association (WWEA) 2010. World Wind Energy Report 2009. 
[Online] Available from http://www.wwea.org [Assessed 15 March, 2010] 
 
Wüstenhagen, R., and Bilharz., M., (2006) ‘Green energy market development in 
Germany: effective public policy and emerging customer demand’, Energy Policy, 
34(13), 1681-1696 
 
Wustenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., and Byrer, J.M. (2007) ‘Social acceptance of 
renewable energy innovation: an introduction to the concept’, Energy Policy, 35(5), 
2683-2691 
 
Yanchar, S.C., Gantt, E.E., and Clay, S.L., (2005) ‘On the nature of a critical 
methodology’, Theory and Psychology, 15(1), 27-50 
 
Yang, M. (2007) ‘Climate change drives wind turbines’, Energy Policy, 35(12), 
6546-6548 
 
Zervos, A., and Kjaer, C. (2009) Pure Power: Wind Energy Targets for 2020 and 
2030. A Report by European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) – 2009 Update. 
[Online] Available from http://www.ewea.org [Assessed 15 March 2010]  
 
Ziegelmann, A., Mohr, M., and Unger, H. (2000) ‘Net employment effects of an 
expansion of renewable-energy systems in the Federal Republic of Germany’, 
Applied Energy, 65(1-4), 329-338 
 
Zittel, W., and Schindler, J., (2005) Oil Depletion. In Lauber (2005) Switching to 
Renewable Power: A Framework for the 21st Century. London: Earthscan 
Publications, 21-61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 325
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
The Face-to-face, and 
Telephone Interview 
Schedule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 326
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1: THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT 
GERMANY 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the market drivers of promoting wind 
energy in the Netherlands and the performance of the Feed-in tariff (FIT). The 
questionnaire seeks to obtain a view of the operation, administration, and the 
performance of the FIT. The questionnaire is divided into the following sections 
1. The Principal Market Drivers 
2. Design of the FIT 
3. Implementation of the FIT 
4. Performance of the FIT 
5. Barriers to Wind Energy Development 
 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
Principal Market Drivers 
1. What, in your own opinion are the principal market drivers for the promotion 
of renewable energy in Germany? 
2. Which of these, if any, do you think is most crucial, both in the short-to-
medium term, and the long-term? 
3. To what extent do you feel that these drivers affect the development of 
support mechanisms to promote the German wind energy market? 
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Support Mechanism Design 
4. What factors are considered before the design of the choice of support 
scheme? 
5. How significant are these factors to the design of support mechanism? 
6. What are the principal components of the choice of support mechanism? 
7. What is the role of the Ministry of Environment in renewable energy/ wind 
energy policy design? 
8. Why the choice of the FIT? 
9. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the FIT? 
 
Implementation of Support Mechanism 
10. What principal role does the Ministry of Environment play in the 
implementation of the FIT? 
11. What are the ongoing challenges of implementing the FIT in the Germany? 
12. How significant are these challenges to the success of the FIT? 
 
Performance of Support Mechanism 
13. To what extent is the choice of support mechanism committed to achieving 
the politically set target of 12.5% renewable energy by 2010? 
14. How commensurate is the benefit of choice of support mechanism to the risk 
and costs of implementation? 
15. To what extent has the choice of support mechanism been supported by other 
stakeholders? e.g. the wind energy industry, investors etc. 
16. To what extent does the choice of support mechanism encourage local and 
corporate ownership? 
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17. Is there any administrative procedure to follow in implementing the FIT? If 
so, what are the features of this procedure? 
18. How flexible is this procedure? 
19. To what extent is the FIT compatible with the liberalisation of the electricity 
market? 
20. To what extent have the FIT contributed to the development of wind energy 
market in Germany? 
 
The Future and Barriers to Wind Energy Implementation 
21. What system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? Why? 
22. How does the FIT match this system? 
23. What are the principal problems and challenges facing the renewable energy 
sources development in Germany? 
24. Which of these do you think is more difficult to overcome now and in the 
future? 
25. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in Germany? 
26. What plans do the government have in place to solve these problems? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 1a: GERMANY 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the performance of the Feed-in tariff (FIT). 
The questionnaire also seeks to obtain a view of the operations, administration, and 
the performance of the FIT. 
 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
1. Is your organisation involved in the design/ formulation of the FIT? (Political 
and legislative drivers). 
2. if so, what role did your organisation play in the design of the FIT 
3. To what extent is your organisation committed to strengthen the wind energy 
market in Germany? 
4. What is the relationship of your organisation with the government, and the 
wind energy industry? 
5. To what extent do you feel the choice of support mechanism is committed to 
achieving the politically set target for renewable energy by 2010? 
6. In relation to price, and cost per MW of installed capacity, how would you 
describe the efficiency of the FIT? (Static and Dynamic Efficiency) 
7. To what extent do you feel the FIT encourages small scale generating 
companies?  
 330
8. To what extent do you feel the FIT also encourages local and corporate 
ownership? 
9. How would you describe the FIT in terms of stability and investors 
confidence? 
10. How would you describe the FIT in terms of equity and finance? 
11. What about in terms of transparency, practicability, and flexibility? 
12. To what extent is the FIT compatible with the liberalisation of the electricity 
market? 
13. To what extent has the FIT contributed to the development of wind energy 
market in Germany? 
14. What about in terms of employment? 
15. Does the government involve other stakeholders in the design of the FIT? 
16. To what extent do the stakeholders support the FIT? 
17. What do you consider are the strengths and weaknesses of the FIT? 
18. Which system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? Why? 
19. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having a harmonised system? 
20. What do you feel are the principal problems and challenges facing the 
renewable energy sources development in Germany? 
21. How do you consider the grid issue? 
22. Which of these do you think will be more difficult to overcome now and in 
the future? 
23. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in Germany? 
24. What plans does your organisation have to address these problems? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2: THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMICS AFFAIRS 
NETHERLANDS 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the market drivers of promoting wind 
energy in the Netherlands and the performance of the Electricity Generation 
Environmental Quality (MEP). The questionnaire seeks to obtain a view of the 
operation, administration, and the performance of the MEP. The questionnaire is 
divided into the following sections 
1. The Principal Market Drivers 
2. Design of the MEP 
3. Implementation of the MEP 
4. Performance of the MEP 
5. Barriers to Wind Energy Development 
 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
Principal Market Drivers 
1. What, in your own opinion are the principal market drivers for the 
promotion of renewable energy in the Netherlands? 
2. Which of these, if any, do you think is most crucial, both in the short-to-
medium term, and the long-term? 
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3. To what extent do you feel that these drivers affect the development of 
support mechanisms to promote the Dutch wind energy market? 
 
Support Mechanism Design 
4. What factors are considered before the design of the choice of support 
scheme? 
5. How significant are these factors to the design of support mechanism? 
6. What are the principal components of the choice of support mechanism? 
7. What is the role of the Ministry of Economics Affairs in renewable 
energy/ wind energy policy design? 
8. Why the choice of the MEP? 
9. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the MEP? 
 
Implementation of Support Mechanism 
10. What principal role does the Ministry of Economics Affairs play in the 
implementation of the MEP? 
11. What are the ongoing challenges of implementing the MEP in the 
Netherlands? 
12. How significant are these challenges to the success of the MEP? 
 
Performance of Support Mechanism 
13. To what extent is the choice of support mechanism committed to 
achieving the politically set target of 9% renewable energy by 2010? 
14. How commensurate is the benefit of choice of support mechanism to the 
risk and costs of implementation? 
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15. To what extent has the choice of support mechanism been supported by 
other stakeholders? e.g. the wind energy industry, investors etc. 
16. To what extent does the choice of support mechanism encourage local and 
corporate ownership? 
17. Is there any administrative procedure to follow in implementing the MEP? 
If so, what are the features of this procedure? 
18. How flexible is this procedure? 
19. To what extent is the MEP compatible with the liberalisation of the 
electricity market? 
20. To what extent have the MEP contributed to the development of wind 
energy market in the Netherlands? 
 
The Future and Barriers to Wind Energy Implementation 
21. What system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? 
Why? 
22. How does the MEP fit into this system? 
23. What are the principal problems and challenges facing the renewable 
energy sources development in the Netherlands? 
24. Which of these do you think is more difficult to overcome now and in the 
future? 
25. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in the Netherlands? 
26. What plans do the government have in place to solve these problems? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2a: NETHERLANDS 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States. 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the performance of the Electricity 
Generation Environmental Quality (MEP). The questionnaire also seeks to obtain a 
view of the operations, administration, and the performance of the MEP. 
 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
1. Is your organisation involved in the design/ formulation of the MEP? 
(political and legislative drivers). 
2. If so, what role did your organisation play in the design of the MEP? 
3. To what extent is your organisation committed to strengthen the wind energy 
market in the Netherlands? 
4. What is the relationship of your organisation with the government, and the 
wind energy industry? 
5. To what extent do you feel the choice of support mechanism is committed to 
achieving the politically set target for renewable energy by 2010? 
6. In relation to price, and cost per MW of installed capacity, how would you 
describe the efficiency of the MEP? (Static and Dynamic Efficiency) 
7. To what extent do you feel the MEP encourages small scale generating 
companies?  
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8. To what extent do you feel the MEP also encourages local and corporate 
ownership? 
9. How would you describe the MEP in terms of stability and investors 
confidence? 
10. How would you describe the MEP in terms of equity and finance? 
11. What about in terms of transparency, practicability, and flexibility? 
12. To what extent is the MEP compatible with the liberalisation of the electricity 
market? 
13. To what extent has the MEP contributed to the development of wind energy 
market in the Netherlands? 
14. What about in terms of employment? 
15. Does the government involve other stakeholders in the design of the MEP? 
16. To what extent do the stakeholders support the MEP? 
17. What do you consider are the strengths and weaknesses of the MEP? 
18. Which system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? Why? 
19. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having a harmonised system? 
20. What do you feel are the principal problems and challenges facing the 
renewable energy sources development in the Netherlands? 
21. How do you consider the grid issue? 
22. Which of these do you think will be more difficult to overcome now and in 
the future? 
23. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in the Netherlands? 
24. What plans does your organisation have to address these problems? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 3: DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
& THE SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States. 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the market drivers of promoting wind 
energy in the UK and the performance of the Renewable Obligation. The 
questionnaire seeks to obtain a view of the operation, administration, and the 
performance of the Renewable Obligation. The questionnaire is divided into the 
following sections 
1. The Principal Market Drivers 
2. Design of the RO 
3. Implementation of the RO 
4. Performance of the RO 
5. Barriers to Wind Energy Development 
 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
Principal Market Drivers 
1. What, in your own opinion are the principal market drivers for the 
promotion of renewable energy in the UK? 
2. Which of these, if any, do you think is most crucial, both in the short-to-
medium term, and the long-term? 
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3. To what extent do you feel that these drivers affect the development of 
support mechanisms to promote the UK wind energy market? 
Support Mechanism Design 
4. What factors are considered before the design of the choice of support 
scheme? 
5. How significant are these factors to the design of support mechanism? 
6. What are the principal components of the choice of support mechanism? 
7. What is the role of the DTI in renewable energy/ wind energy policy 
design? 
8. Why the choice of the RO? 
9. What do you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the RO? 
 
Implementation of Support Mechanism 
10. What principal role does the DTI play in the RO implementation? 
11. What are the ongoing challenges of implementing the RO in the UK? 
12. How significant are these challenges to the success of the RO? 
 
Performance of Support Mechanism 
13. To what extent is the choice of support mechanism committed to 
achieving the politically set target of 10% renewable energy by 2010? 
14. How commensurate is the benefit of choice of support mechanism to the 
risk and costs of implementation? 
15. To what extent has the choice of support mechanism been supported by 
other stakeholders? e.g. the wind energy industry, investors etc. 
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16. To what extent does the choice of support mechanism encourage local and 
corporate ownership? 
17. Is there any administrative procedure to follow in implementing the RO? 
If so, what are the features of this procedure? 
18. How flexible is this procedure? 
19. To what extent is the RO compatible with the liberalisation of the 
electricity market? 
20. To what extent have the RO contributed to the development of wind 
energy market in the UK? 
 
The Future and Barriers to Wind Energy Implementation 
21. What system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? 
Why? 
22. How does the RO fit into this system? 
23. What are the principal problems and challenges facing the renewable 
energy sources development in the UK? 
24. Which of these do you think is more difficult to overcome now and in the 
future? 
25. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in the UK? 
26. What plans do the government have in place to solve these problems? 
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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 3a: UNITED KINGDOM 
Research Title: Fostering the delivery of wind power: An evaluation of the 
performance of policy instruments in three EU Member States. 
 Interview Questionnaire 
 This interview questionnaire asks about the performance of the Renewable 
Obligation (RO). The questionnaire also seeks to obtain a view of the operations, 
administration, and the performance of the RO. 
Statement of Confidentiality 
We would like to emphasise that any information which you supply to us will be 
treated with the strictest confidence. 
1. Is your organisation involved in the design/ formulation of the RO? 
(Political and legislative drivers). 
2. if so, what role did your organisation play in the design of the RO 
3. To what extent is your organisation committed to strengthen the wind 
energy market in UK? 
4. What is the relationship of your organisation with the government, and 
the wind energy industry? 
5. To what extent do you feel the choice of support mechanism is committed 
to achieving the politically set target for renewable energy by 2010? 
6. In relation to price, and cost per MW of installed capacity, how would 
you describe the efficiency of the RO? (Static and Dynamic Efficiency) 
7. To what extent do you feel the RO encourages small scale generating 
companies?  
8. To what extent do you feel the RO also encourages local and corporate 
ownership? 
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9. How would you describe the RO in terms of stability and investors 
confidence? 
10. How would you describe the RO in terms of equity and finance? 
11. What about in terms of transparency, practicability, and flexibility? 
12. To what extent is the RO compatible with the liberalisation of the 
electricity market? 
13. To what extent has the RO contributed to the development of wind energy 
market in UK? 
14. What about in terms of employment? 
15. Does the government involve other stakeholders in the design of the RO? 
16. To what extent do the stakeholders support the RO? 
17. What do you consider are the strengths and weaknesses of the RO? 
18. Which system would you favour for an EU-wide support mechanism? 
Why? 
19. What are the advantages and disadvantages of having a harmonised 
system? 
20. What do you feel are the principal problems and challenges facing the 
renewable energy sources development in the UK? 
21. How do you consider the grid issue? 
22. Which of these do you think will be more difficult to overcome now and 
in the future? 
23. To what extent do these problems impact on the development of the wind 
energy market in the UK? 
24. What plans does your organisation have to address these problems? 
 
 341
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 Names of Organisation 
Interviewed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 342
COUNTRY: GERMANY 
Type of 
Organisation 
Position Held Date of Interview 
and How the 
Interview was 
Conducted 
Total 
Number of 
Interview = 
17 
Ministry of 
Environment 
and Natural 
Conservation 
Deputy Head 
of Renewable 
Energy 
Division and 
Staff of 
Renewable 
Energy 
Division 
30th October2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview  
1  
German 
Energy 
Agency 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Officer 
10th November 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1  
German Wind 
Energy 
Association 
Policy 
Director 
1st November 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
German 
Association of 
Electricity 
Producers 
Policy 
Director 
2nd November 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Greenpeace 
Germany 
National 
Campaigner 
Climate 
Change and 
Renewable 
Energy  
31st October 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
World Wind 
Energy 
Association 
Secretary 
General 
1st December 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
German 
Renewable 
Energy 
Federation 
President of 
Association 
26th October 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Oko Institute Policy Officer 25th October 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
German Wind 
Institute 
Policy Officer 9th November 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Ecofys 
Germany 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Consultant 
1st November 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
1 
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interview 
RWE 
Germany 
Project 
Manager 
30th November 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Vattenfall 
Germany 
Project 
Manager 
30th November 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
E.ON 
Germany 
Project 
Manager 
1st December 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
EnBW 
Germany 
Project 
Manager 
7th December 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Franhaufer ISI 
Germany 
Senior 
Scientist 
3rd November 2006 
 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Environmental 
Policy 
Research 
Centre, Free 
University, 
Berlin 
Germany  
 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Academic 
Expert 
13th November 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Environmental 
Policy 
Research 
Centre, Free 
University, 
Berlin 
Germany  
 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Academic 
Expert 
10th November 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
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EUROPEAN UNION 
Type of 
Organisation 
Position Held Date of 
Interview and 
How Interview 
was Conducted 
Total 
Number of 
Interview = 4 
European 
Commission 
Director 
General 
Transport and 
Environment 
14th August 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
European Wind 
Energy 
Association 
Chief 
Executive 
Officer 
11th September 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
European 
Association of 
Electricity 
Producers 
(EURELECTRIC) 
Policy 
Director 
14th August 2006 
 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
European 
Renewable 
Energy Council 
Policy 
Director 
16th August 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
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COUNTRY: THE NETHERLANDS 
Type of 
Organisation 
Position 
Held 
Date of 
Interview and 
How Interview 
was Conducted 
Total 
Number of 
Interview = 
16 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Affairs 
Senior 
Renewable 
Energy 
Policy 
Advisor 
28th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
TenneT 
Netherlands 
Senior 
Manager 
25th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Energy 
Research 
Centre of the 
Netherlands 
Group Leader 
Renewable 
Energy 
29th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
The 
Netherlands 
Agency for 
Sustainability 
and Innovation 
(SENTER 
NOVEM) 
Senior 
Renewable 
Energy 
Policy 
Advisor 
26th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Wind at Sea 
Energy 
Research 
Centre of the 
Netherlands 
(ECN) 
Group Leader 29th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Evelop 
Netherlands 
Renewable 
Energy 
Project 
Manager 
27th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Netherlands 
Wind Energy 
Association 
(ECN) 
Project 
Manager 
27th September 
2006 
1 
Ecofys 
Netherlands 
Renewable 
Energy 
Policy 
Consultant 
27th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Ecofys 
Netherlands 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Consultant 
27th September 
2006 
 
1 
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Face-to-face 
interview 
 
The 
Netherlands 
Association of 
Electricity 
Producers 
(Energiened) 
Policy 
Director 
25th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
 General 
Energy 
Council 
Netherlands 
(Ger 
Algemene 
Energieraad) 
Council 
Secretary 
26th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
ENERQ 
Netherlands 
Manager 4th October 2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Delta 
Netherlands 
Project 
Manager 
1st December 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
University of 
Amsterdam 
Renewable 
Energy 
Policy 
Academic 
Expert 
26th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Greenpeace 
Netherlands 
Climate 
Change and 
Energy 
Campaigner 
26th September 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Eneco 
Netherlands 
Project 
Manager 
1st December 2006
 
Telephone 
interview 
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COUNTRY: UNITED KINGDOM 
Type of 
Organisation 
Position Held Date of 
Interview and 
How Interview 
was Conducted
Total Number 
of Interview = 
18 
Department of 
Trade and 
Industry UK 
DTI Officer in 
Charge of the 
Review of the 
RO 
2005/2006 
14th June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Office of the 
Gas and 
Electricity 
Markets UK 
Head of 
Renewable 
Obligation 
15th August 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
British Wind 
Energy 
Association 
UK 
Director of 
Economics 
and Markets 
14th June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Association of 
Electricity 
Producers UK 
Head of 
Renewables 
15th  June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
 
1 
Greenpeace 
UK 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
and 
Environmenta
l Campaigner 
13th June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Scottish 
Executive UK 
Policy Officer 
Renewables 
and 
Consenting; 
Deputy 
Branch Head, 
Renewables 
and Consent 
05th June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Scottish 
Renewables 
UK 
Chief 
Executive 
05th  June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Renewable 
Energy 
Association 
UK 
Head of 
Power 
14th  August 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Friends of the 
Earth UK 
Environment 
and Policy 
Campaigner 
14th June 2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
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British 
Institute of 
Energy 
Economics  
UK 
Fellow British 
Institute of 
Energy 
Economics, 
and 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Academic 
Expert 
08th September 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
DM Energy 
Consultants, 
UK 
Director and 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Consultant 
19th October 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Ecofys UK Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Consultant 
24th November 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
Npower UK Head Strategy 
and 
Regulation 
12th December 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
E.ON 
(Powergen) 
UK 
Commercial 
Manager, 
Development 
and 
Construction 
29 November 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Scottish 
Power 
Managing 
Director, 
Renewables 
and major 
Projects 
27th November 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Scottish and 
Southern 
Head of 
Projects 
Development 
15th December 
2006 
 
Face-to-face 
interview 
1 
EDF UK Carbon Policy 
Market 
Manager 
28th November 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
Good Energy Commercial 
and 
Renewable 
Energy Policy 
Management 
Staff 
13th December 
2006 
 
Telephone 
interview 
1 
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APPENDIX 3 
World Wind Power 
Capacity in Charts 
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 YEAR CAPACITY 
ADDED 
ANNUALLY 
(MW) 
TOTAL 
CAPACITY 
(MW) 
PERCERNTAGE 
INCREASE 
2000 4539 18039 33.62 
2001 6283 24322 34.83 
2002 6859 31181 28.20 
2003 8114 39295 26.02 
2004 8398 47693 21.37 
2005 11331 59024 23.75 
2006 15127 71151 25.56 
2007 22776 93927 32.01 
2008 27261 121188 29.02 
 
(1) Capacity Added Annually 
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(2) World Installed Capacity 
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APPENDIX 4 
Codes and Categories of 
the Data 
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Code Category codes Theme 
01 Administration   
  01a Practicability 
  01b Simplicity 
  01c Flexibility 
  01d Transparency 
  01e Institutional conflicts 
 
Code Category codes Theme 
02 Stakeholders 
involvement and 
support 
  
  02a Actors and institutional relationship 
  02b representations 
  02c Public acceptance and support 
  02d Ownership structure 
  02e Risks 
 
Code Category codes Theme 
03 Certainty for 
industry 
  
  03a stability 
  03b Investment certainty 
  03c risk 
  03d Nature of wind power manufacturing industry 
  03e Industrial development 
  03f Institutional linkages 
 
Code Category codes Theme 
04 Effectiveness    
  04a Target delivery 
  04b Time 
  04c Deployment rate 
  04d Contribution to national target 
  04e Planning and permission laws 
  04f risk 
 
 
Code Category codes Theme 
05 Efficiency   
  05a Price 
  05b Costs  
  05c Fluctuation of prices 
  05d Competition  
  05e Static efficiency 
  05f Dynamic efficiency 
  05g Risk  
 
Code Category codes Theme 
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06 Market 
Conformity 
  
  06a Compatibility with national system 
  06b Liberalisation 
  06c Competition 
  06d Barriers to entry 
  06e Institutional conflicts 
  06f Ownership structure 
  06g Risk  
 
Code Category codes Theme 
07 Finance   
  07a Investors confidence 
  07b Ease of obtaining finance 
  07c Investment risk 
  07d Pay back 
 
Code Category codes Theme 
08 Impact on 
development 
  
  08a Wind turbine industry 
  08b Technology development 
  08c Stimulation for market growth 
  08d Employment  
  08e Environmental impact 
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APPENDIX 5 
Summary of Research 
Findings 
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Further Summary of Research Findings  
 Dimension 1: 
Administration 
Dimension 2: 
Stakeholders 
Support and 
Involvement; and 
Certainty of 
Industry 
Dimension 3: 
Effectiveness; 
Efficiency; 
Market 
Conformity; and 
Finance 
Dimension 4: 
Impact on 
Development 
Policy 
Instruments 
    
Feed-in Tariff 
(FIT) 
Transparent and 
flexible 
Widely enjoys 
stakeholders’ 
support and 
involvement. 
Encourages small 
scale and 
generating 
companies to 
grow. Shares 
owned to a large 
extent by local and 
corporate farmers. 
Stable, boost 
investors’ 
confidence, and 
comes with little 
or no risks 
Very effective in 
delivering 
quantitative 
targets, has 
delivered the 
fastest 
development of 
wind energy. 
Capable of 
delivering wind 
energy at a low 
cost; reduces 
production risks 
and investments 
costs; does not 
encourage 
international and 
cross border trade 
thus limiting 
competition 
among suppliers. 
Guarantees return 
of investments, 
easy to obtain 
loans. 
Encourages local 
and national 
development of 
wind turbine 
manufacturing 
companies thus 
creating 
employment more 
than the other 
systems. Helps 
contribute to 
reducing the threat 
of global 
warming. Tends to 
lead the way in 
this regard more 
than any other 
policy instrument. 
Electricity 
Generation 
Environmental 
Quality (MEP) 
Transparent and 
flexible 
Stakeholders are 
not involved. 
Encourages small 
and local 
ownerships of 
wind investments. 
Lacks continuity, 
very risky, and 
lacks good 
investor 
confidence 
quality. 
Effective in 
delivering some 
capacities of wind 
power at a low 
cost as the FIT 
above; 
investments risks 
increases over 
time; and limits 
competition 
among suppliers. 
Guarantees return 
on investment but 
difficult to obtain 
loan. 
Does not 
encourage local 
and national wind 
turbine 
manufacturing 
companies thus 
contributing to a 
limited number of 
employments. 
Helps contribute 
to reducing the 
threat of global 
warming.  
Renewable 
Obligation (RO) 
Volatile, 
Complicated, and 
not flexible 
Widely involves 
stakeholders. Does 
not favour small 
scale and local 
ownership type of 
investment. Risky, 
unstable.  
Effective in 
delivering some 
capacities of wind 
power but not as 
fast as the FIT in 
delivering wind 
power capacities. 
More expensive 
than the FIT and 
the MEP thus 
investment risks 
Does not 
encourage local 
and national wind 
power turbine 
development 
companies thus 
contributing less 
employment 
opportunities than 
the FIT. Helps to 
reduce the threat 
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are high; more 
compatible to 
liberalised 
electricity market 
thus bring about 
competition in the 
market than the 
other systems. 
May not be too 
easy to obtain 
loans to finance 
investments into 
wind power 
because of the 
risks and 
uncertainties 
involved. 
of global 
warming. 
Author Generated 
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APPENDIX 6 
Typologies and Policy 
Instruments   
 
 
 
 
 359
  
 
 
Source: Held et al (2006) 
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